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take the air inside you
as a set of axioms
grinding on each other,
 
the dead thinking in us
is what we call thinking.
[…]
Now help him think,
the dead are hard of hearing
 
hence music, that special
art of being dead
for the benefit of the living.
  —Robert Kelly, Untitled (“Help Nietzsche thinking”)
Would I like to be a comet? I think so.
They are swift as birds, they flower
With fire, childlike in purity. To desire
More than this is beyond human measure.
  —Friedrich Hölderlin, Untitled (“In Lovely Blue”)
Do I still hear you, my voice? You whisper when you curse? And yet your curse should cause the 
bowels of this world to burst! But it continues to live and merely  stares at me all the more 
brilliantly and coldly with its pitiless stars; it continues to live, dumb and blind as ever, and the 
only thing that dies is—the human being. —And yet!
  —Friedrich Nietzsche, “Oedipus: Soliloquies of the Last Philosopher”
Friedrich Nietzsche: Notebook U-I-5 Spring 1873
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Preface
 
Soliloquies and Songs:
The Philosopher’s Birth
 Young Friedrich Nietzsche stands continually over an abyss: an abyss between poetry and 
philosophy, between art and science, between myth and knowledge, between a world in 
dissolution and the promise of a rising culture. It is a yawning chasm between finite past and 
infinite future, between the life of the ancients and the life of the moderns—between the mode of 
the soliloquy and that of the song. Hence the title, Songs of the Last Philosopher, in part 
borrowed from a fragment of Nietzsche’s (called: “Soliloquies of the Last Philosopher”) and in 
part renewed by  my own perspective and the impulse that Nietzsche’s task as a boundary  figure
—perhaps as a tragic hero, a last philosopher—was in great part to weave music and poetry, 
these rich artistic sources that open and expose the emptiness of the ground of so-called 
philosophical reason, into the discourse of that very reason: to push philosophy outside itself. 
Such songs lead to a madness—the madness of the unexpected—from which arises, as a need, 
the embrace of cosmic chance and eternal transformation across the tragedy of time. This is also 
the madness of action, posed in opposition to the sphere of thought. In order for philosophy to 
enter the world, to change it, it must freely exercise the mobile plasticity of the art instincts of 
nature, as Nietzsche calls them. Heraclitus’ enigmas, too, are songs. 
*
 Nietzsche’s early philosophy shall form the object of this work. It is a philosophy rife 
with contradictions. Most stunning, arresting, thoroughgoing of these contradictions is that 
between the drives within the young philosopher towards metaphysics and towards science. I 
have endeavored to show this contradiction, as well as the innumerable others, of which this 
5
constitutes, in a sense, the root, neither as a dialectical opposition nor as an irreconcilable 
schizophrenia, but, in keeping with the philosopher’s early thought, as a dissonant harmony—an 
ἀγών in the pervasive sense this had for the ancients. 
 Nietzsche’s early  philological study of the Greeks before Plato was not merely an 
academic endeavor; rather, it was necessitated by  a crisis in culture, indeed by what the 
blossoming philosopher perceived to be a lack of culture in his contemporary  Germany. He saw 
his time as an age of degeneracy, where the rise of philistinism and the radical separation of 
science, art, philosophy and philology threatened to so homogenize his people that the very 
possibility of unity and vitality  in the nation was eradicated from the national horizon. Not only 
Germany, but indeed, modern Europe as a whole, for Nietzsche, did not exist, but merely 
subsisted in a blind and painful disunity, and herein lay, for him, the tragic nature of his time. 
Nietzsche perceived the imminent death of metaphysics, or rather, the radical impossibility of 
metaphysics in his era, in his contemporary Germany. We mustn’t forget that this work was 
contemporary  with the Franco-Prussian War, in which Nietzsche served as a medical orderly  and, 
after perceiving this war’s fascistic effects, turned against it. At the opening of the war, in July 
1870, Nietzsche wrote to his friend, Erwin Rohde: “Our entire threadbare culture is plunging at 
the breast of the horrible demon.” (B 3, 130) This demon he called “military  genius” (1, 775; 
TGS).1 He consequently  believed, initially, that this explosion of Dionysian strife, the force of 
this military genius, would be capable of reviving culture. Yet, after experiencing the horrors of 
war and contracting dystentery and diphtheria, he began to view this war, rather, as a 
subordination of culture to the state. He wrote to Carl von Gersdorff in November, 1870: “I now 
6
1 Cited in Rüdiger Safranski, Nietzsche, trans. Shelley Frisch (New York-London: W. W. Norton & Co., 2002), 67.
consider Prussia a power that is extremely  dangerous for culture” (B 3, 155).2  Nietzsche’s 
philological work coincides with the unification of Germany; the question of the possibility  of a 
culture proper to Germany is, indeed, highly  contemporary. His response to this question, 
however, was to be an untimely one, primarily  involving a return to the rich source of ancient 
Greek culture.
 Nietzsche’s main concern, therefore, in his writing of the early 1870s, as a professor of 
philology at  the University  of Basel, was to open wide the possibility of creating culture. This 
entailed, in his view, a radical transformation of philology, then circumscribed by  esoteric 
academicism, so that  it could finally unite with philosophy, with art and with science, to 
reestablish the systemic unity internal to culture. He therefore contrives a series of figures and 
formulas destined to bring about this end—this restored harmony  of national life. These figures 
emerge, moreover, from his study of the “pre-Platonic” Greek philosophers. Traveling with a 
great mobility of spirit between the cosmic visions of these early philosophers, of which 
Heraclitus, Empedocles, Democritus are the most important to him, Nietzsche developed, from 
the ground of their tragic and secret fecundities, a series of theories on the role of the philosopher 
in the creation of culture. This hypothetical philosopher is conceived in a sense that owes much 
both to the genius of Schopenhauer, and to the Greek tragic hero. 
 Nietzsche and Jacob Burckhardt both conceived the ἀγών—the contest or competition—
as the central aspect of ancient Greek culture. Burckhardt, one of the leading historians of the 
19th century, who, like Nietzsche, advocated a rigorous historical relativism, had held a position 
at Basel since 1844, the year of Nietzsche’s birth, and the two enjoyed a mutual respect  and 
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2 Cited in Safranski, Nietzsche, 70.
friendship  upon the young philologist’s arrival at the university. Yet these two thinkers came to 
the realization of the ἀγών separately—Nietzsche had already formulated the theory prior to his 
arrival at Basel and it was perhaps in great part  this illumination that bound these thinkers to one 
another.3 Burckhardt’s book, The Greeks and Greek Civilization (Griechische Kulturgeschichte), 
contains a chapter called “The Agonal Age,” in which he advances this theory of the ἀγών as the 
dominant principle of Greek life. In 1872, Nietzsche wrote an essay called “Homer’s 
contest” (Homer’s Wettkampf) in which he also made this claim. 
 Though the ἀγών  is, for both Burckhardt and Nietzsche, thought as a paradigm that 
informs every sphere of ancient Greek life, from the state to the arena to the oracle to the theater, 
there are two essential components of the agonal theory  shared by these two moderns. The first  is 
the importance of the opposition between a good and a bad goddess Eris (strife), of which 
Hesiod speaks in his Works and Days, and the second is the prohibition of any absolute victory 
between the contestants. With respect to the first of these points, Burckhardt claims that the good 
Eris was both most central to the Greeks and prior to the bad Eris: “The good Eris was the first to 
be born (while the bad was only a variant fostering war and conflict) and Hesiod seems to find 
her not  only in human life but also in elemental Nature, for Cronos had placed her among the 
very roots of the earth [Gaia]. It  is the good Eris who awakens even the indolent and unskilled to 
industry; seeing others rich, they too bestir themselves to plough and plat and order their houses, 
so that neighbor vies with neighbor in striving for wealth.”4 Thus did this Eris work to incite men 
to competitive production. The Eris of destruction and war, on the other hand, could always be 
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3 Cf. Jacob Burckhardt, The Greeks and Greek Civilization, ed. Oswyn Murray, trans. Sheila Stern (New York: St. 
Martin’s Griffin, 1999), xxxii.
4 Burckhardt, The Greeks and Greek Civilization, 165.
traced back to this originary Eris. Nietzsche’s emphasis falls, rather, on the importance of the 
competitive jealousy awakened by the good Eris: “The Greek is envious and does not experience 
this characteristic as a blemish, but as the effect of a benevolent deity: what  a gulf of ethical 
judgement between us and him!”5  These two goddesses of strife can thus be accessed through 
one another—the regime of bad Eris can always be reversed into a regime of the good Eris. 
Nietzsche also insists upon the political significance of the ἀγών, emphasizing “the feeling that 
the contest is vital, if the well-being of the state is to continue.” It was for this reason that the 
contest could never allow an absolute victory. Taking an inspiration from Heraclitus, Nietzsche 
formulates this law of the Greek contest. Upon the banishing of Hermodor, the Ephesian sage 
said: “Amongst us, nobody should be the best; but  if somebody  is, let him be somewhere else, 
with other people.”6  From this vantage point, Nietzsche writes: “For why should nobody  be the 
best? Because with that, the contest would dry up and the permanent basis of life in the Hellenic 
state would be endangered.”7 The ἀγών that Nietzsche and Burckhardt theorize thus defines itself 
against the dialectic, conceived in the speculative sense, and this in two ways. Firstly, through 
this reversibility between a nihilistic (bad) strife and a life-affirming (good) strife, and secondly 
through the necessity  that this ἀγών continue eternally, without any conqueror ever prevailing. It 
is because of this exclusion of victory that the Hegelian Aufhebung, the process by which the 
dialectic passes over to a higher stratum through the mastering of one side by the other, is 
impossible in the process of the ἀγών.
9
5 Friedrich Nietzsche, “On the Genealogy of Morality” and Other Writings, ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson, trans. Carol 
Diethe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), “Homer’s Contest,” 174-181, 177.
6 Heraclitus, frag. 121. Cited in Nietzsche, “Homer’s Contest,” 178.
7 Nietzsche, “Homer’s Contest,” 178.
 Rather, between the contestants of the Greek ἀγών, there is a relation of duplicity which 
Nietzsche had employed in his theorization of the two art instincts of nature, the Apollonian and 
the Dionysian, in The Birth of Tragedy. These two instincts are defined by the impossibility of 
their existence without one another—they are complementary forces which, in their primordial 
struggle, eternally exist—their competition constitutes the very genesis of tragic art. Hence, they 
express themselves through one another, just as man expresses himself through nature and nature 
manifests itself in the form of man. The ἀγών thus carries the aspect of a circular economy 
between life and art. At times, the two sides of the contest blend and lose themselves in one 
another, becoming indistinguishable. These are moments of reconciliation. Yet following such 
harmonic moments, they must again separate and return to their relation of strife. Extending this 
agonal paradigm far beyond Burckhardt’s use, Nietzsche employs it to define the very attitude 
toward antiquity that the modern philologist must cultivate. The ἀγών, an antagonistic and 
primordial phenomenon is, in a certain perspective, the key to the Nietzsche’s early thought. 
 The return to the Greeks for the creation of novelty was by  no means a project foreign to 
German philosophy. It was, indeed, this very return that had characterized the German Romantic 
movement. Specifically, the high valuation of ancient tragedy as the source of cultural 
transformation and transition, indeed as the paradigm of the dialectic, was at  the very heart of the 
birth of speculative philosophy as well as of German Romantic literature. Some fifty years after 
the death of that  philosophical movement, Nietzsche finds himself, in the early 1870s, in close 
conversation and harmony with these predecessors. It is as if he found Schiller, Goethe, 
Hölderlin to be his true contemporaries, and it is to their constellation of problems and dangers 
that he responds. 
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 The second fragment toward Nietzsche’s unwritten Untimely Meditation, “We 
Philologists” (Wir Philologen) reads:
Passage on Faust
Hölderlin
Finish Empedocles8
The importance of Hölderlin, as at  once the modern tragedian and a figure of the modern tragic 
hero is, I shall be arguing, central to Nietzsche’s philological project. Nietzsche inherits the very 
archetype of the tragic hero as a herald of the culture to come from Hölderlin—this theory finds 
its ground in the case of Empedocles, the poet-philosopher who endeavored to save his people by 
thrusting himself into the flames of Mount Etna. Hölderlin’s unfinished Trauerspiel, The Death 
of Empedocles had made an impression on Nietzsche at a young age, evinced by a letter he wrote 
at sixteen, addressed to a hypothetical attacker of Hölderlin, his “favorite poet.” Taking 
Hölderlin’s subversion of his contemporary  speculative philosophy as a point of departure, I shall 
exhibit how the spirit  of Hölderlin, whose tragic death in madness took place only a year before 
Nietzsche’s birth, inspired the blossoming philosopher in his scientific-artistic-philosophical 
project. From Hölderlin, too, Nietzsche inherits the instinct toward tragic time—both for the 
ancients, in the rhythm of their tragedies, and for the moderns in their discontinuous dream of 
continuity. In the onrush of this time, the figure of the philosopher as tragic hero forms the 
radical cut, the caesura between a world of dissolution and a new culture. And it is precisely 
through his failure as a cultural reformer that he comes to constitute this chasm. The uncanny 
consonance between the tragic fates of Hölderlin and Nietzsche in long-endured madness—their 
respective descents into shadow-life, the first audible, productive and the second silent, evidently 
11
8  Friedrich Nietzsche, Unmodern Observations, ed. and trans. William Arrowsmith (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1990), 321.
haunts this discussion. Although the question of this consonance is of profound concern to me, it 
is not within the scope of the present project to formulate a response to it. 
 While there is an extreme, agonal tension between the metaphysical and the scientific 
views of life in Nietzsche’s early  work, his instinct toward a rejection of metaphysics entirely is 
central to his thought—this is particularly evident in his notebooks. I will therefore draw in great 
part from posthumously published fragments as well as from works published 
contemporaneously to their composition, or written with the intention of publication, and notes 
for courses given at Basel. There are thus various levels of textual direction, the intricacies of 
which I do not address. At a basic hermeneutic level, one might say  that the addressee of these 
writings changes from form to form. The fragments would be addressed, then, to Nietzsche 
himself, as he takes on other voices to converse with himself, to experiment with his own 
thinking and to push at the limits of the spheres he moves within in the mode of an often-tragic 
solitude. The published works would be addressed to an audience to come—a community or a 
“we” that their very writing seeks to bring about, and to the few contemporary souls strong 
enough to receive the boldness of their claims; Richard and Cosima Wagner, Erwin Rohde and 
Carl von Gersdorff would number among these rare readers. The lecture notes, for their part, 
would constitute an address to Nietzsche’s small circle of students—indeed, many of his lectures 
of the early 1870s were delivered to no more than ten students. This was largely because, 
following the publication of The Birth of Tragedy in 1872, condemned by Wilamowitz, Ritschl 
and others as “fantasy philology” and “witty carousing,” Nietzsche’s student following at Basel 
was greatly diminished.9  To postulate the degree of truth or faithfulness of the philosopher to 
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9 Cf. Safranski, Nietzsche, 83-84.
himself in these different forms of writing is nearly  impossible. Rather, I might suggest  that the 
posthumous fragments carry most profoundly the trace of Nietzsche’s own becoming—the 
constant fluctuations of his self, of his multiple selves, and of their propositions, often 
contradictory, balanced on the limit between madness and reason. 
 The rejection of metaphysics, then, begins as a quiet, clandestine thought in the intimacy 
between Nietzsche and himself—the most dangerous thought, the most tragic thought, and, in a 
manner that he would later elucidate in its fullness, the most necessary thought to his time. The 
possessor of this poisonous, secret knowledge is the tragic philosopher. He attains this 
knowledge of the impossibility of metaphysics by an excess of consciousness—both of his time 
and of himself—which leads him to the foundational act capable of creating community: that of 
self-sacrifice. It is through the tragic thinking and the tragic songs of Hölderlin that Nietzsche 
comes to this sacrifice.
 The present essay  begins by tracing the configuration of Nietzsche’s early work, in which 
science and metaphysics struggle against each other in the ideal organization of a culture. It  then 
moves through Hölderlin, to grasp the significance of the tragedy’s temporality  and of the tragic 
hero’s role in the creation of culture, and ends by following Nietzsche’s theories of time and 
rhythm to the significance of the tragic hero for him, as the sacrificer of the metaphysical, and 
thereby, too, as the prophet of new community.
*
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 In 1887, Nietzsche would write, in a fragment: 
 To explore the whole sphere of the modern soul, to have sat in its every nook—
my ambition, my torture, and my happiness. 
 Really to overcome pessimism—a Goethean eye full of love and good will as the 
result. 
      KSA 12: 9 [117]10
We may  perhaps justly say that this instinct  runs through the philosopher’s work, ignited early in 
the figure—among many others—of the comet.
14
10 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, ed. Walter Kaufmann, trans. R.J. Hollingdale and Walter Kaufmann (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1968), 532.
1Philosopher as Comet
 The young Nietzsche envisioned the philosopher as a wandering soul, a solitary  spark in 
the night of an impoverished world, an open, limitless song that captures eternities in his 
incessant movement to fill living with power—this philosopher, above all, is the supreme 
untimely  creature. In his Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks (1873), written in the wake 
of The Birth of Tragedy (1872), Nietzsche speaks of the modern philosopher as a comet, the sole 
soaring entity  in a dissolving, barbaric sky whose stars have been reduced to uniformity and 
identity, all possibility of unity, community  between them obscured. While these faded stars 
belong to a world in which all that is alive has become measurable, calculable, commensurable, 
condemned to a self-inflicted destiny divested of singularity, the philosopher springs forth 
inhumanly, as that necessary hero who infinitely  escapes all form of measure and who travels 
across solar systems at unthinkable, incalculable speeds. If the fertile culture of the Greeks 
engendered philosophers who harmonized with their entire cosmos in a necessary  way, what can 
the modern philosopher’s task, in a world divested of such unified harmony, possibly amount to?
Only a culture [Kultur] such as the Greeks possessed can answer our questions as to the 
task of the philosopher, and only it, I repeat, can justify philosophy at all, because it  alone 
knows and can demonstrate why and how the philosopher is not a chance random 
wanderer, exiled to this place or that. There is a steely necessity which binds the 
philosopher to a genuine culture. But what if such a culture does not exist? Then the 
philosopher is a comet [Komet], incalculable and therefore terror-inspiring. When all is 
well, he shines like a stellar object  of the first magnitude in the solar system of culture 
[Sonnensysteme der Kultur]. That is why the Greeks justify philosophers. Only among 
them, they are not comets.11
15
11  Friedrich Nietzsche, Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, trans. Marianne Cowan (Lanham: Regenery 
Publishing, 1962) § 1, 33-34.
Culture, for Neitzsche, is characterized by  “vital unity.”12  In the absence of this unity, the 
philosopher, a monstrous heavenly body, must strive toward the creation of a new, unheard-of 
culture, an undiscovered species of necessity  whose face lies veiled beneath the soil of the 
modern age. In his project to expose it, the philosopher strives against the current of his time, as 
a crepuscular prophet. And might the comet’s tail, that unknown flame, brush against the surface 
of the earth in an infinitesimal instant of irreversible catastrophe whose result can only  be radical 
transformation, a resurgence of the long-buried force of life? Here is the question this Nietzsche 
dares to pose to us. 
 This indeterminate determination of the philosopher as comet comes to light, we must 
remember, in the field of philology, at a moment in the flowering of this science when it  is 
virtually  indistinguishable from Hellenism. Nietzsche had been appointed a chair in philology at 
Basel University in 1869, at the age of 24. For him, therefore, this proposition is at once 
philosophical, anthropological, artistic and prophetic. In his notes for a course on philology in 
1871, Nietzsche wrote: “Comprehension of Antiquity, full penetration of love.”13 This penetration 
demands first of all that we “experience our difference with it”14—the unsurpassable abyss 
between the Modern and the Ancient worlds must be not only understood but undergone in order 
for philology, and philosophy, to be possible. This experience, vastly changeable, must thus also 
be constantly  redefined, reevaluated, reestablished. The invisible historical fabric that binds us to 
and separates us from the Greeks is rewoven and rediscovered with every  change in the flux of 
16
12 Nietzsche, Unmodern Observations, 105.
13 Friedrich Nietzsche, Introduction aux leçons sur l’Œdipe-Roi de Sophocle et introduction aux études de philologie 
classique, trans. Françoise Dastur and Michel Haar (Paris: Encre marine, 1994), 93.
14 Nietzsche, L’Œdipe-Roi de Sophocle, 98.
life. Giorgio Colli writes with passion of the young Nietzsche: “Whoever has drawn such a 
wealth from these far-off spheres becomes an explosive force for the present [… .]”15
 Nietzsche’s book on the philosophers of the Greek tragic age followed a course given at 
Basel in 1872-1873 on the “Pre-Platonic Philosophers,” a term coined by  Nietzsche. Philosophy 
in the Tragic Age of the Greeks and The Pre-Platonic Philosophers run along two opposing 
tracks: while the former maintains a metaphysical and artistic investment through a fidelity to 
Schopenhauer and to Wagner, treating Hercalitus and his aesthetic cosmodicy as the acme 
ancient Greek philosophy, in keeping with the tone of The Birth of Tragedy, the latter tends 
decidedly  away from metaphysics, toward a scientific goal, and takes Democritus and his 
atomism as the acme of this history. Both art and science, however, as we will discover, are 
necessary to Nietzsche’s philological project—primarily a cultural project. 
 In his inaugural address at Basel University, delivered on May 28, 1869, and titled Homer 
and Classical Philology, Nietzsche claims: “Homer, as composer of the Iliad and the Odyssey, is 
an aesthetic judgement.”16  That is to say, Homer is a modern creation, projected onto an 
unknowable Greek world, outside the reach of our experience. For Nietzsche, Homer is a great 
poet, but he cannot be the man whom we call Homer; rather, he is a myth created by the soul of 
the Greek people. The Iliad and the Odyssey are the result of a great musical and poetic instinct 
that surpasses the bounds of the principium individuationis imposed by a state. The person, the 
very subjecthood of Homer is an invention, as Orpheus is an invention, a name destined to 
designate an eternal, musical instinct. In this address, Nietzsche puts forth a program for the 
17
15 Giorgio Colli, Écrits sur Nietzsche, trans. Patricia Farazzi (Paris: Éditions de l’éclat, 1996), 15.
16  Friedrich Nietzsche, Homer and Classical Philology,  in The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, Vol.  3, ed. 
Oscar  Levy, trans. J.M. Kennedy (London: J. N. Foulis, 1910).  http://www.gutenberg.org/files/18188/18188-h/
18188-h.htm. 
advancement of the “science” (Wissenschaft: literally, making of knowledge) of philology, which 
requires its unification both with science and with art. He writes: “Science has this in common 
with art, that the most ordinary, everyday  thing appears to it as something entirely new and 
attractive, as if metamorphosed by witchcraft and now seen for the first  time. Life is worth 
living, says art, the beautiful temptress; life is worth knowing, says science.”17 Antiquity, to be 
constantly revitalized and recreated, must be studied from both a scientific and an artistic 
perspective, and the one must never obscure the other. At the juncture between living and 
knowing stands philology, which, for its part, must unite with philosophy in order to treat  the 
Greeks properly. “We grant that philology is not the creator of this world, not the composer of 
that immortal music; but  is it  not a merit, and a great merit, to be a mere virtuoso, and let the 
world for the first time hear that music which lay so long in obscurity, despised and 
undecipherable?”18 The philologist’s task is to cultivate the modern ear, that it  might learn to hear 
the ancient music of life; it must facilitate the reception of the enigmatic Greek life-rhythm for 
the first time. To unveil that ancient force, to draw its infinitude into a twilit  present, this is the 
philologist’s task—and it is for this very  reason that the ancients cannot appear in their purity, 
but only through the mediation of the untimely thinker.
 Nietzsche reverses a formula of Seneca’s to say: “Philosophia facta est quæ philologia 
fuit.” (What was philology has now been made into philosophy.) His ambition is to overthrow 
the barbarity of modernity and resuscitate the Greek instinct for life among the Germans with 
this, “our” new philosophical philology. He explains his “philological creed” as follows: “By  this 
I wish to signify that all philological activities should be enclosed and surrounded by a 
18
17 Nietzsche, Homer and Classical Philology. 
18 Nietzsche, Homer and Classical Philology.
philosophical view of things [… .]”19  Against the highly academic philology of his day, 
exemplified by Ulrich von Wilamowitz, whose central ambition was to make philology into a 
pure positive science (Wissenschaft), divested of philosophical or artistic influences, Nietzsche 
already, at the dawn of his ten-year career as a professor of philology, insists on the necessity to 
reassess and revalue the study  of the ancients through a philosophical perspective. The 
transformation (which is to say, creation) of the world depends upon the exigency that philology 
be philosophical, that philosophy be philological, and that this transfigured discipline ally itself 
with art  and with “the artistic friends of antiquity,”20 with science and with the great scientists. 
By this means alone will philology succeed in breeding the geniuses of the future, a modern race 
of demigods.
 “There is an invisible bridge from genius to genius,” writes Nietzsche in a notebook of 
1872, “—that is the truly  real ‘history’ of a people” (KSA 7: 19 [1]).21 It is this bridge that must 
continually be destroyed and rebuilt by the philosopher-philologist, each time anew, toward a 
future and the genius it unwittingly conceals. Or rather, the whole semicircular series of bridges 
must be demolished and re-erected once again each day, exposing ever greater dangers, 
discontinuities and possible harmonies. This history is never mastered by one logic but exposes 
the incommensurable difference between all self-necessitating logics, doctrines, philosophies, 
cosmogonies. Thus, with the gap of difference and community that separates and connects 
geniuses across a history comes also an immeasurable incomprehensibility. That wide chasm of 
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sameness and difference separates Heraclitus from Socrates, Schopenhauer from Nietzsche, 
Nietzsche from us.
 In the second of his Unzeitgemässe Batrachtungen—Untimely Meditations, entitled “The 
Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life” (1873), Nietzsche writes: “Only  insofar as history 
serves life do we wish to serve history.”22 The life of which Nietzsche here speaks is threefold, 
and requires a complex ἀγών between memory  and forgetting: “the unhistorical and the 
historical are equally necessary to the good health of a man [ein Mensch], a people [ein Volk], 
and a culture [eine Kultur].”23  It is thus that the creator of histories, and particularly  of 
philosophical histories, must at once be able to “diagnose” his time from the perspective of the 
past and to diagnose the past from the perspective of the present, in order to engender the 
philosophical explosion proper to his time, the one that  might push it beyond itself, onto 
unforeseeable, fertile ground. The degrees of memory and forgetfulness, of the historical and 
unhistorical forces necessary to a man, a people, a culture, is determined by the measure of 
capacity for plasticity, which Nietzsche views as an essential life-force, because, precisely, it 
determines the capacity for transformation. 
To determine this degree and thereby the boundary beyond which the past must  be 
forgotten if it  is not to bury  the present, we would have to know precisely how great is 
the plastic force24 [plastische Kraft] of a man, a people, or a culture. I mean the strength 
to develop uniquely from within, to transform and assimilate the past and the alien, to 
recover completely  from wounds, to redeem losses, and to refashion broken forms. There 
are men who possess so little of this strength that a single experience, a single pain, or, 
often and a especially, a single subtle wrong, the tiniest scratch, makes them bleed 
helplessly to death.25
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This force [Kraft] carries a primordial aspect—it is the Urkraft that makes possible the 
reestablishment of health for the future. Hence, an emphasis is placed both on the depths of a 
man, a people, a culture’s strength, its power to bring itself into existence, and on the surface-
phenomenon of life that is the result of the exercise of this power. Here it becomes evident that 
life has for Nietzsche both a scientific and a metaphysical signification. It is at once biological 
and primordial—and these two aspects are inseparable, enchained together in a circular relation 
at the heart of the world. And this is because the economy of the human creature is circular; 
when appearance, the exterior manifestation of life in cultural creations, transforms itself, 
therefore, the primordial and the underlying biological aspect of life must  also be transformed. It 
is the breaking-out of a vicious circle, where the disconnect between internal force and external 
creation is so great  that it  merely  subsists in a repetitive state of degeneracy, that enables a 
transformation of life and of culture. What shall enable this cutting of the vicious circle for 
Nietzsche shall be, precisely, the sacrifice—the abandonment of the metaphysical. With this 
sacrifice comes, too, the sacrifice of the capacity  for measuring the degree of plastic force 
inherent in a man, a people, a culture. The question of the source from which such a capacity 
might come to be is left open and unanswered by Nietzsche—it is perhaps only from within the 
rhythm of one’s time that such a measure might become possible. Measure itself, therefore, is 
ever relative—no universal law can be employed to undertake such a task. Indeed, there is a 
paradox in the concept of measure—for the tragic itself is defined by the impossibility of 
universal measure. It is only  by approximation that the quantity of plastic force can be grasped. 
The genius, or the tragic hero who is capable of this measure is therefore characterized by an 
internal admixture of metaphysical and scientific life-forces that allow him at once to embody 
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the tragedy of his time, which reaches its apex in his excessive self-consciousness, and to 
sacrifice the metaphysical portion of this tragedy. It is through this sacrifice that a culture 
divested of metaphysics can arise.
 The famous axiom of The Birth of Tragedy is that  “it is only as an aesthetic phenomenon 
that life is eternally justified”26—this proposition formed the basis of Nietzsche’s metaphysics of 
art. Insofar as life is an artistic, aesthetic phenomenon, it surpasses and even transfigures the 
biological, scientific force it manifests. Life as biological life, that is, as a surface-phenomenon, 
on the other hand, leads necessarily to the deeper reality  of life as the ground of all possibility, as 
a metaphysical force. Philosophy  reveals itself to be in a privileged position to serve and 
cultivate life, precisely because it  speaks the language of science but is primarily, primordially 
artistic. In a fragment of 1872, Nietzsche writes:
Great quandary: whether philosophy is an art [Kunst] or a science [Wissenschaft]. 
 In its aims and in its results it is an art. But its means, conceptual representation, it  
shares with science. It is a form of poetic artistry.—It cannot be categorized: 
consequently we must invent and characterize a species for it. 
 The physiography of the philosopher. He arrives at knowledge by poeticizing and 
poeticizes by  arriving at knowledge. […] Heraclitus can never be obsolete. [Philosophy] 
is poetry beyond the limits of experience, continuation of the mythic impulse; also 
essentially in images. 
     (KSA 7: 19 [62])27 
It is in this respect that  philosophy  is capable of bringing about culture—as a poetic force, in the 
sense of the Greek ποίησις, meaning creation. Philosophy’s power, which exceeds the measure 
of human experience, creating into outer solar systems, lies in reviving the “free poetic manner in 
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which the Greeks dealt with their gods!” (KSA 7: 19 [40]).28 Here, science is conceived as the 
means to philosophy as art, insofar as philosophy, in its scientific capacity, entails the creation of 
ordering concepts. Philosophy  is a kind of monster, a hybrid creature, perhaps a species of 
centaur which, exceeding all categorization, requires the creation of a new physiography to 
contain it, to think it. The proper measure of the artistic, mythic impulse and the scientific 
impulse is achievable thus only philosophically. And the individual, the philosopher who 
emerges from the dynamic between these impulses, is himself the harbinger of the culture to 
come. Nietzsche wrote to his friend and fellow-philologist, Erwin Rohde, in February, 1870, 
while he was writing The Birth of Tragedy: “Scholarship, art, and philosophy are now growing 
together in me so fully that some day I am sure to give birth to a centaur” (B 3, 95).29  This 
centaur—the mythical, monstrous half-beast, half-man is the very emblem, the prophecy  of the 
new Kultur on the rise.
 Of the philosopher’s relation to art, Nietzsche also writes: “How does the philosophical 
genius relate to art? […] What remains when his system, as science, has been destroyed? But it  is 
precisely this remaining element that controls the drive for knowledge, that is hence the artistic 
element. […] In this control [of knowledge], the value of philosophy does not lie in the sphere of 
knowledge, but in the sphere of life: the will to existence uses philosophy for the purpose of a 
higher form of existence” (KSA 7: 19 [45]).30 All of philosophy’s force (Kraft) thus originates 
from its primordial artistic strength. Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe defines this plastische Kraft as the 
capacity to grow out of oneself, as the faculty  to “croître par soi-même” and to “s’accomplir par 
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soi-même”—in the manner of nature. The self-creation of life as a work of art, this “auto-
organic” capacity is the inner process that must be measured and cultivated by  the philosopher.31 
In an outline for the book, “Philosophers of the Tragic Age, in memory of Schopenhauer” (KSA 
7: 23 [25]),32 Nietzsche writes: “Philosophy, marvelous double nature” (KSA 7: 23 [28]).33 It is 
double, precisely, in its capacity as both an artistic and scientific force.
 Untimeliness is the way of life necessitated by  Nietzsche’s grand ambition to give rise to 
a new culture: “for I don’t  know what sense classical philology could have today, if not that of 
exercising an untimely influence, that is, of acting against the time, thus upon the time, and, let 
us hope, to the aid of a time to come.”34 It  is for this reason that the second Untimely Meditation 
begins with this forceful quotation from Goethe: “I hate everything that merely  instructs me 
without increasing or directly  conferring life on my activity.”35 History is fatal if it does not lead 
to the construction of another invisible bridge whose destination promises a resurgence of genius 
from its neglected tomb. As advice to the young philologist  Nietzsche proclaims: “He must have 
the courage to seek his path alone.”36 In other words: to leap into the doubly-unknown chasm of 
future and antiquity across an unbuilt footbridge, penetrating through the present with equal 
quantities of love and hatred. Likewise, Nietzsche says of “philosophers”: “following the road in 
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solitude is part of their character.”37  The modern wayward genius, isolated by virtue of his 
internal flame, must be both philologist and philosopher; in other words, the future of 
philosophy, as united with science and art beyond metaphysics, depends upon its intimate study 
of Greek antiquity. There alone will it find the source of a renewal of life for the future. 
 Untimeliness, the art of transforming antiquity  (Alterthum) into novelty  (Neuthum), is 
therefore the task of the philosophical genius. Paolo D’Iorio explains that  while the first of these 
words is “of common usage,” the latter is highly “rare in the German language”—it appears in 
Nietzsche’s writing only  twice: first, in the second Untimely Meditation, and second in the 
Miscellaneous Maxims and Opinions, appended to Human, All too Human in 1879.38  In the 
second Untimely, these terms are used in a reproach of the “antiquarian” historian, who, 
endlessly  accumulating the memories of history, finds that it  is impossible “to set aside such a 
past [Alterthum] for a new present [Neuthum].”39  The second occurrence is a reference to the 
appearance of the dead in dreams—when the dead reappear in this manner, “the distant past 
[Alterthum] becomes a new present [Neuthum].” These appearances are therefore “Signs of great 
changes [W a n d l u n g e n].”40 In both cases, therefore, it  is a matter of receiving ancient life 
into the heart of modern life by a process of anamnesis rendered possible through forgetting, 
which thereby creates this ancient life anew, in a manner unheard-of and unknown. This then is 
why plastic force is needed—to call back the past, differently, and, scientifically, to create the 
transformed present as a work of art. The collaboration of the scientific and the artistic and, 
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indeed, their necessary, ceaseless struggle with one another, is at the heart of philosophy and 
essential to the poetic work.
 What separates our time from that of the pre-Platonic Greeks, what separates ancient 
Greece from modern Germany, for Nietzsche, is predominantly the existence of culture. While 
the sphere of common life for the Greeks was constituted by an indestructible unity of art, ethics, 
philosophy and the state, such a cultural organism is no longer possible for the moderns. In 1872, 
Nietzsche writes: “At the proper height everything comes together and harmonizes—the 
philosopher’s thoughts, the artist’s works, and good deeds” (KSA 7: 19 [1]).41  The modern 
philosopher must therefore lay  the ground for a renewal of the culture of this Greek species, yet 
in a manner that utterly transforms it. But what does “culture” mean? The word comes from the 
Latin root colere, meaning “tend, guard, cultivate, till”—culture is a spontaneous outgrowing, an 
organic upsurge from the depths of the earth, that must be defined and perfected by a people. It  is 
the abundant  out-spring of that which is most natural, into the self-organizing forms of collective 
life and government. In German, Kultur is used in the sense of “civilization” as opposed to 
Bildung, which is closer to culture in the sense in which one speaks of high culture or being 
cultured. Nietzsche uses the word Kultur to designate the externalization of the natural instinct of 
a man, a people, a culture to create itself as a universal harmony by the harnessing of plastische 
Kraft. It is, indeed, this life-force rendered absolute in the circumscribed historical context of a 
nation. Nietzsche proclaims: “My task: to comprehend the inner coherence and the necessity of 
every culture [K u l t u r]” (KSA 7: 19 [33]).42  These vital organizations correspond to one 
another by an internal necessity that binds them into systemic harmony. For the Greeks, this is 
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none other than the cosmic harmony that unites human and divine life in a perfect, dynamic 
whole. In Attic tragedy, according to Nietzsche, this whole manifests as an artistic reflection of 
the primordial, Dionysian One. 
Nietzsche and the Metaphysics of Music
 Schopenhauer revives this concept of universal harmony in his metaphysics of music, 
wherein music appears as the absolute presentation of nature. He writes: “The four voices or 
parts of all harmony, that is, bass, tenor, alto, and soprano, or fundamental note, third, fifth, and 
octave, correspond to the four grades of the series of existences, hence to the mineral, plant, and 
animal kingdoms, and to man.”43 The vital harmony of nature, therefore, corresponds precisely  to 
musical harmony; the latter is, it  seems, an idealized copy of the former. Music, for 
Schopenhauer, is the purest manifestation of “the will” as life-force, in all its various forms. It is 
entirely  “independent of the phenomenal world” and could to some degree exist  in total absence 
of the world itself, as sheer will. Therein, no alien mediation—no Idea or representation 
(Vorstellung)—interferes with the will’s exhibition; music surpasses “the principium 
individuationis (the form of the knowledge possible for the individual as such)” and, in excess of 
the knowable, universally exposes the soul of the world. 
Music is as direct an objectification and copy of the whole will as the world itself, nay, 
even as the Ideas (Vorstellungen), whose multiplied manifestation constitutes the world of 
individual things. Music is thus by no means like the other arts, the copy of the Ideas, but 
the copy of the will itself, whose objectivity the Ideas are. This is why the effect of music 
is so much more powerful and penetrating than that of the other arts, for they speak only 
of shadows, but it speaks of the thing itself. Since, however, it is the same will which 
objectifies itself both in the Ideas and in music, though in quite different ways, there must 
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be, not indeed a direct  likeness, but yet a parallel, an analogy, between music and the 
Ideas whose manifestation in multiplicity and incompleteness is the visible world.44 
Objective representations thus seek to exemplify music by metaphor; all the other shadow-arts, 
subordinated to the representative structure, strive toward music as their ideality, and collapse the 
difference between Wille and Vorstellung by attempting an impossible equation of the two in 
signs. This however, merely  results in the endless and circular loss of the will itself, thus of 
music itself. 
 To create music purely, for Schopenhauer, is therefore the highest possible human 
achievement: “The composition of melody, the disclosure in it  of all the deepest secrets of human 
willing and feeling, is the work of genius [… .] The composer reveals the inner nature of the 
world, and expresses the deepest wisdom in a language which his reason does not understand; as 
a person under the influence of mesmerism tells things of which he has no conception when he 
awakes.”45  The composer-genius attains a lucidity of which men confined by reason alone are 
incapable; his power is universal, for he opens to man his essence as will—this capacity is called 
by Schopenhauer “inspiration.”46
 Nietzsche, following Schopenhauer, writes, in his notebook of Winter 1869-Spring 1870: 
“Music is a language which is capable of infinite explanation” (KSA 7: 2 [10]).47 The poverty  of 
words, which are “the most deficient signs” (KSA 7: 2 [11]),48 arises from their foundation by 
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thought as “concepts” out of an origin in “shared sensation” (KSA 7: 2 [10]).49 A “word” is an 
entirely  physiological phenomenon—it is nothing but the “portrayal of a nerve stimulus in 
sounds.”50 In another note, he writes: “Truth and lie physiological” (KSA 7: 19 [102]).51 Thus, as 
language is strictly circumscribed by a set of possible sensations and ways of capturing them and 
draining them of life, “[t]he largest amount of feeling does not express itself through words. And 
the word itself barely hints: it  is the surface of the choppy  sea, while the storm rages in the 
depths [in der Tiefe]” (KSA 7: 2 [10]).52  These depths however, do not house the 
Schopenhauerean will; they are, rather, the epicenter of emotion, the impulsive and powerful 
drive to life, conceived both biologically and metaphysically. The experience of this drive, 
undergone in the music of the Dionysian dithyramb, does not, like the will of Schopenhauer, 
recede infinitely into some noumenal nethersphere, but requires symbolic expression, and for this 
purpose, a Dionysian language must be born, a language that speaks life anew from its 
profoundest depths. Indeed, it  is the simultaneous “coexistence” of “presence of mind and 
intoxication” entailed by  “Dionysian artistry” that “characterizes the high point of Hellenism 
[… .]” This artistry  is born, like tragedy  itself, the absolute Hellenic art, from the unification of 
Dionysus and Apollo, in a relation at once agonal and amorous, upon Dionysus’ arrival on Greek 
soil from the East: “originally  only Apollo was the Hellenic god of art and it was as a result of 
his power, which so effectively restrained Dionysus as he advanced like a storm from Asia, that 
29
49 Nietzsche, Early Notebooks, 14.
50 Nietzsche, Early Notebooks, 255.
51 Nietzsche, Unpublished Writings, 36.
52 Nietzsche, Early Notebooks, 15.
the most beautiful bond of brotherhood was able to arise.”53 This bond was forged, in fact, at the 
Delphic oracle: “Because the Delphic priesthood saw through the new cult and took notice of its 
deep  effect upon the social processes of regeneration and furthered it  according to their political-
religious aim to a certain extent, because the Apollinian artist learned with careful moderation 
from the revolutionary art of the Bacchus service, because finally, the dominion of the year in the 
Delphic cult order was divided between Apollo and Dionysus, both gods emerged as victors out 
of their contest: a reconciliation on the battleground.”54  The ἀγών between the two gods, the 
ceaseless relation of strife and reconciliation, thus took place originally  in the sphere of 
divination. The Delphic cult  thus incorporated Dionysus as a necessary  counterpart to Apollinian 
prophecy, which preached measure and self-knowledge—only through an ecstatic, Dionysian 
experience of becoming divested of the self and plunging into oblivion was the individuation 
required by the Greek state possible. Dionysian purification brought Apollinian illumination to 
its highest power and, locked in their struggle, the struggle between two impulses to 
symbolization, one destroying individuality  and the other striving to reestablish it, not only 
tragedy but first tragic prophecy was born.
 Erwin Rohde, in his monumental philological work, Psyche: The Cult of Souls and the 
Belief in Immortality among the Greeks (1894), would make this assertion even more explicitly. 
He writes that Apollo, after a “prolonged resistance” following Dionysus’ arrival in Greece from 
Thracia, did indeed “enter into the closest alliance with this remarkable divine brother of his, the 
Hellenized Dionysus. The covenant must have been made at Delphi. […] The festal year of 
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Delphi was divided, though unequally  it is true, between Apollo and Dionysus. To such an extent 
had Dionysus taken root  at Delphi, so closely were the two gods related, that while the front 
pediment of the temple showed the form of Apollo, the back pediment represented Dionysus—
and the Dionysus of the nocturnal ecstatic revels. […] The two divinites have many of their titles 
and attributes in common; in the end, the distinction between them seems to disappear 
entirely.”55 This insight into the origin of the tragic ἀγών between Apollo and Dionysus reveals 
prophecy as the nexus of this event—for Nietzsche, therefore, the philological resuscitation and 
the philological reapprpopriation of the struggle between these two divine forces, alternating in 
dissonance and consonance, allows for science and art to unite as a method of divination—thus, 
of the prophetic unveiling of a future Kultur, arising as a necessity—as the destiny  of cultural 
dissolution. 
 The cathartic experience of Dionysian tragic music is at once the primordial desire for a 
new system of representation (µίµησις): “In the Dionysian dithyramb the Dionysian reveler is 
incited to the greatest exaltation of all his symbolic possibilities: something never before 
experienced struggles for utterance, the annihilation of the individual, the oneness as the soul of 
the race and of nature itself. The essence of nature shall now express itself: a new world of 
symbols is needed, the accompanying representations are symbolized in images of a heightened 
humanness [… .]”56  The Dionysian impulse to symbolization lies beneath the Apollinian  one; 
from its great depths, it must  disrupt and destroy this surface-regime of signs and create a new 
one, which shall expose nature and the essence of humanity  as a unity. This essence, however, is 
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precisely that which is least human—the monstrous face of man that springs from music. Thus, 
Nietzsche’s view of the self-representation of the Dionysian in music differs from 
Schopenhauer’s view in that  this instinct is nothing but the drive to symbolization. The 
Dionysian hence achieves its goal precisely insofar as it is actualized as art: rather than being a 
copy of that natural instinct, music is its very  genesis. For the Dionysian is nothing but this 
impulse to symbolization, which the dithyrambs ceaselessly awaken.
 For Nietzsche, there is one form of life that overrides all others in the constellation of 
culture. In a fragment, he writes: “Culture—the rule of art over life [Kultur—Herrschaft der 
Kunst über das Leben]. The degrees of goodness of a culture depend firstly on the degree of this 
rule and secondly on the value of art itself” (KSA 7: 19 [310]).57 The creation of culture is the 
task of the artist, who creates in natural purity, and whose pulsing music communicates through 
the adequate externalization the essence of life—the esse, breath. For the ancients, Nietzsche 
insists, there is no possible determination of a “concept of being” but rather “esse [to be] 
basically  means ‘to breathe.’”58 In the spirit of the ancients, and through this philological gesture, 
Nietzsche rejects ontology  as a central object of philosophy, just as he shall reject all idealist 
separations of a thing-in-itself from experience, and insists, rather, on a metaphysics of the βίος, 
natural life. He continues: “And if man uses it of all things other than himself as well, he projects 
his conviction that  he himself breathes and lives by means of metaphor […] upon all things. He 
comprehends their existence as a ‘breathing’ by analogy with his own.” Therefore, though the 
“original meaning of the word was soon blurred” we have the remnants of a proof that man 
understands the existence of other creatures “anthropomorphically”—by an extension and 
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projection of his breath onto them.59 Again, Nietzsche writes, in a fragment of 1872: “Concepts 
arise only from intuition. ‘Being’ is the transference of breath and life to all things: addition of 
the human awareness of life” (KSA 7: 23 [13]).60 Philosophy weaves its “webs of language”61 by 
the self-projection of human life onto that which is without it, and the appropriation of these 
things as concepts, through a metaphoric transmutation. All inanimate things become signs of 
which the true meaning is simply  man himself. Being, therefore, is ultimately  illusory, 
nonexistent for it presupposes the stagnancy, the eternity  of all living things while Nietzsche, 
following Heraclitus, asserts that such an eternity  is impossible, as life itself is nothing but 
becoming—we are transformed with every  breath, and the only possible eternity therein is that of 
the endlessness of becoming itself. It  is for this reason that Nietzsche will reject Parmenides. In a 
fragment, Nietzsche noted: “systems as anthropomorphisms” (KSA 7: 19 [245]).62  From this 
results the following “[c]urious problem: the self-consumption of philosophical systems! 
Unheard of both in science [die Wissenschaft] and art [die Kunst]! The situation is similar in the 
case of religions: that is remarkable and significant” (KSA 7: 19 [63]).63 Philosophical systems 
are created in the same manner, and by the same anthropomorphic procedure, as religious 
systems—by a projection of the human organism onto the cosmos. It is the task of philosophy to 
determine the proper measure and proportion of science and art for the good of culture; this 
requires that belief be transferred from the realm of “religion”—or philosophy as religion (as in 
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the case of Kant, who valued belief above knowledge)—to that of a dissonant harmonic unity 
between the arts and sciences.
 Therefore, art is precisely  that which for Nietzsche makes life possible, giving birth to it 
continually as a primal and originary force—for the fundament human instinct is that  toward 
symbolization and the creation of illusion, and such illusions, in turn, engender life: “We live 
only by means of […] artistic illusions [Illusionen der Kunst].” The task of “higher culture” is 
the “[c]ontrol of knowledge as the drive of art.” Through the illumination of the fact that the 
same “world” is “reveal[ed]” by the “philosophical systems of the early Greeks” and by their 
“tragedy,” we are able to “grasp the unity  of philosophy and art for the purpose of culture” (KSA 
7: 19 [51]).64 This then is the vital coupling from which alone a culture is created.65 Nietzsche 
also writes, as a central principle of the Greeks: “Identity between life and philosophy” (KSA 7: 
16 [17]).66  It is this fluidity, this incessant interpenetration and thus transfiguration of life and 
philosophy that  Nietzsche wishes to bring about once more among the Germans. Only a 
philosophy of life, established by  a return to the ancient Greeks, can save modernity from 
barbaric devolution. Every philosophical doctrine, like every artwork, is a manifestation of “[t]he 
beautiful lie”—and this is how “the Greeks philosophized” (KSA 7: 19 [221]).67 As art is the 
medium of the beautiful lie, it  has, in view of the failure of knowledge, also become the only 
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means to the creation of truth: “The truthfulness of art: now it alone is honest. / Thus, by an 
enormous detour, we return to natural behavior (among the Greeks). It has proved impossible to 
build a culture on knowledge” (KSA 7: 19 [105]).68 Nietzsche speaks both of the life-serving 
power of art and of the “barbarizing influence of knowledge” (KSA 7: 19 [51])69 whenever faith 
is put into it alone. The very indistinguishability of truth and lie, and the loss of measure for 
both, is what  constitutes, for the moderns, the tragic experience—our tragedy is precisely  the 
loss of any possibility  of a life-giving metaphysics. In a fragment of 1872, Nietzsche writes: 
“impossibility of metaphysics” (KSA 7: 23 [7]).70  Yet for the Greeks there was the supreme 
possibility of illusion, that is, art, as a force that created nature and transformed life, although its 
superficial nature was recognized.
 It is only with Plato that the sovereignty of the beautiful lie is dismantled: “Plato wants a 
new state in which dialectics rule; he denies the culture of the beautiful lie” (KSA 7: 19 [221]).71 
It is at  this Platonic moment that  philosophy and art are severed from one another—the one 
subsumed under the category of knowledge and the other, that of illusion. Before this moment, 
they  combine and collaborate in a necessary manner: “Viewed from the standpoint of the present, 
that entire period of Greek philosophy also belongs within the domain of their art” (KSA 7: 19 
[36]).72  Nietzsche writes, in his notebook of 1870-1871: “My philosophy is an inverted 
[umgedrehter] Platonism: the further something is from true being, the purer, the more beautiful, 
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the better it is. Living in illusion as the goal [Das Leben im Schein als Ziel]” (KSA 7: 7 [156]).73 
This life of illusion, therefore, defines itself against metaphysics and against the dialectic in all 
its myriad forms, including any  dialectic of history; to live in illusion requires that all 
philosophical concepts be recognized as the manifestation of primal human drives—thus, no Idea 
or ideal shall be posited as the ground of reality—merely  the constantly-transforming life-breath 
of becoming lies at the heart of nature as illusion. Such an inversion of the Platonic, hierarchical 
regime of Ideas and their copies requires a resuscitation of those true Greeks, the philosophers of 
life who lived in the tragic age, lives of the beautiful lie. 
 Nietzsche, in his course at Basel on the ancient Greek philosophers (1872), rejected the 
term “pre-Socratic” to describe these philosophers whose thought brought about the very dawn 
of philosophy, and replaced it with the term “pre-Platonic.” He justified this designation in the 
following manner: 
Plato is the first grand mixed character both in philosophy and in his philosophical 
typology. Socratic, Pythagorean, and Heraclitean elements unite in his theory  of the 
Ideas: it  should not, without further qualification, be called an original conception. Also, 
as a human being he possesses the traits of a regally proud Heraclitus; of the melancholy, 
secretive, and legislative Pythagoras; and of the reflective dialectician Socrates. All 
subsequent philosophers are of this sort  of mixed philosophical type. In contrast, this 
series of pre-Platonics presents the pure and unmixed types, in terms of philosopheme as 
well as of character. Socrates is the last in this series. […] [These pre-Platonics] are 
genuine ‘discoverers.’ […] They had to find the path from myth to laws of nature, from 
image to concept, from religion to science.74
 The purity of the ancients was therefore destroyed at Plato’s hands—their singularity as 
types was demolished, such that they became, rather, ingredients to be used and abused against 
their own ends. The genealogy of the pre-Platonic philosophers tells of the liberation of σοφία 
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from µύθος; their history is that of a striving toward the foundation of science, away from the life 
of myth. At the end of this history, however, and before the goal of the pre-Platonics had been 
achieved, Socrates rejected both art and myth in favor of rational morality. In a fragment of 
1875, Nietzsche writes: “With Empedocles and Democritus, the Greeks were well on their way 
to correctly assessing human existence, its irrationality, its suffering; but they never reached this, 
thanks to Socrates.” It was by introducing “terrible abstractions, ‘the good, the just,’” which 
diverted men from seeking the path of life and art, from understanding the cosmic workings 
(KSA 7: 6 [25]).75  In the notes for his final lecture on the pre-Platonics, Nietzsche writes: 
“[Socrates] was always hostile to the entire culture and the arts, along with the natural sciences. 
[…] He dispenses entirely with physics [… .] Likewise, he thinks nothing of art; he grasped only 
its practical and agreeable aspects, and he belongs among the despisers of tragedy. […] Thus 
Socratic philosophy is absolutely practical: it is hostile to all knowledge unconnected to ethical 
implications.”76  In a reversal of his characterization in The Birth of Tragedy of Socrates as the 
champion of science who puts tragedy to death by means of making Euripides his mask and 
having him employ the deus ex machina, Socrates is here envisioned as the murderer of both 
science and art, paving the way for Plato’s metaphysics morality by turning against culture. 
Socrates puts an end to the aesthetic world-view of Heraclitus, in whose mouth Nietzsche puts 
the following phrase with reference to fire as the eternal cosmic Justice and of all else as 
Injustice: “It is a game. Don’t take it so pathetically  and—above all—don’t make a morality of 
it!”77 For, before Socrates, morality is highly malleable, serving only  the greatness of life and the 
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health of art. For the future, Nietzsche calls for both, with Schiller, a recreation and 
reenforcement of morals and, with Wagner, a subordination of morality to art. While, in 
“Athens,” life was “constantly suffused in responsibility, commitments, initiative, and effort” 
such that the people, for “cheer” knew how to “honor and crave art, the festival, and cultivation 
in general,” the “Germans’ moral weakness is the primary cause for their lack of culture” (KSA 
7: 31 [2]).78 For without a moral structure to a culture, no art can be properly created for its 
people. In accordance with his view of the pre-Platonic philosophers as pure, Nietzsche calls 
these philosophers from Thales to Socrates “archetypal philosophers” and declares: “Each is the 
first-born son of philosophy.”79 
 After Plato, thus, original philosophy is no longer possible; how the purity achieved by  
the pre-Platonic philosophers had ever come about became a mystery—these early philosophers 
were dismembered, obscured in their luminous wholeness and transformed into enigmatic, near-
sacred figures. In a fragment of 1872, Nietzsche writes: “Later, people took from these 
venerable-incomprehensible ones whatever they needed, they looted them; and hence we find, 
sometimes here, sometimes there, in Plato’s academy  as well as among the Stoics and in the 
gardens of the Epicureans, one of Parmenides’ arms, a piece of Heraclitus’ shoulder, one of 
Empedocles’ feet” (KSA 7: 23 [1]).80  It became necessary, thereafter, that each philosophical 
system possess its pieces of the creators of pure ancient wisdom, as every  church requires its 
saintly relic. Indeed, Nietzsche makes this very  analogy in Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the 
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Greeks: “Other peoples have saints; the Greeks have sages.”81 Of the pre-Platonics in their over-
analyzed, disfigured state, Nietzsche writes: 
In order to understand them as wholes, one must recognize in them the first outline and 
germ of the Greek reformer; their purpose was to pave the way for him, they were 
supposed to precede him as the dawn precedes the rising sun. But the sun did not rise, the 
reformer failed: hence the dawn remained nothing but a ghostly apparition. However, the 
simultaneous emergence of tragedy demonstrates that something new was in the air; but 
the philosopher and legislator who would have comprehended tragedy never appeared, 
and hence his art died and the reformation became forever impossible. It  is not possible to 
think of Empedocles without a sense of profound sadness; he came the closest to filling 
the role of the reformer. That he also failed and soon disappeared—following who knows 
what horrible experiences and what hopelessness—was a pan-Hellenic catastrophe. 
      KSA 7: 23 [1]82 
The tragic failure of the philosopher as cultural reformer, the failure to unite tragedy with 
philosophy and hence the tragic fate of the Hellenic world itself, results instead in the dissolution 
of philosophy into science and morality which, alone, and separated by a chasm, cannot suffice 
to found a culture. This fate requires, indeed, a genealogical approach—one that apprehends the 
abyss of difference between the ancients and us and that travels the hidden passages of history to 
discover what it was that made their lives tragic. The figure of the philosopher as failed reformer, 
although he seems to represent the tragic downfall of tragic culture and thus must be restored in 
modernity as a successful reformer is in fact, as I shall later explicate, himself a necessary step  in 
the creation of culture in one of Nietzsche’s many perspectives. 
 In a fragment of 1872, Nietzsche proposes the following: “The philosopher as the 
physician of culture (Kultur)” (KSA 7: 23 [15]).83  On March 2, 1873, Nietzsche wrote to his 
friend Carl von Gersdorff: “My book is growing and taking the form of a pendant to ‘Tragedy.’ I 
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will call it, perhaps, ‘the philosopher as the physician of culture.’ I want, in fact, to make it a 
surprise  to Wagner for his next birthday.”84  This role for the philosopher—as physician—is 
justified on the following grounds:
Philosophy can create no culture,
  but it can prepare it;
  or preserve it;
  or moderate it.
Such a proposition, insofar as it is true for the Greeks, extends into the present as an exigency to 
the nation that has no philosophy, and because of this, no culture. “For us: For these reasons, the 
philosopher is the supreme tribunal of the schools. Preparation of the genius: since we have no 
culture” (KSA 7: 23 [14]).85 The pre-Platonic philosophers, as pure types, must thus be used by 
the modern philosopher in his practice as the physician of culture; this philosopher has the moral 
responsibility of diagnosing the complex constellation of the individual, the people and the 
civilization (Kultur) and treating them with the proper doses of each of these pure philosophies 
to serve their maximal health. This requires the determination of the proper combination and 
dynamic—the proper harmony, for a given time, between myth, art and science, these 
components of culture. Knowledge and art are regarded by Nietzsche, respectively, as the 
destructive and creative forces between which the conflict much ultimately result in the 
formation of a culture. “Art is more powerful than knowledge, because it wants life, while 
knowledge achieves as its ultimate goal nothing but—destruction.”86 
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 Hence, Nietzsche follows in the footsteps of Goethe, who, caught in the struggle between 
science and art, had written in his Theory of Colors:
Neither in knowledge nor in reflection can anything whole be put together, since in the 
former the internal is missing and in the latter the external; and so we must necessarily 
think of science as art  if we expect to derive any kind of wholeness from it. Nor should 
we look for this in the general, the excessive, but, since art is always wholly represented 
in every individual work of art, so science ought to reveal itself completely  in every 
individual object treated.87
The possibility  of a whole vision of the world to emerge hinges on this capacity to consider 
science as art: herein lies the goal of Goethe’s poetic scientism. The Birth of Tragedy itself 
begins with a declaration of Nietzsche’s ambition to create a new “science of aesthetics 
[ästhetische Wissenschaft] [… .]”88  In a certain perspective, his is the continuation of Goethe’s 
project to combine art with science, or rather, to subsume science under the title of art—to 
transform science itself into an art which, as we know, also requires a transformation of the 
meaning of art. That science, like art, requires representation, which is to say, the 
presentification of nature, is the radical claim Nietzsche, with Goethe, is making. If philosophy 
stands at the midpoint between art and science, this is because, for Nietzsche, it must  work in the 
service of life, springing from the changeable vital force in becoming, whose appearance men 
are.
Imitation and the Approach to History
 The Dionysian art instinct is the embodiment of Nietzsche’s epistemology, which views 
the fundamental human drive as that toward artistic, instinctual creation. The medium of this 
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creation, as I have said, is that of music. In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche speaks of the 
Schiller’s “poetic process,” wherein he began “the act of creation” faced not with any series of 
images in a causal arrangement, but, rather, overcome with a musical mood. He quotes Schiller: 
“With me the perception has at  first no clear or definite object; that is formed later. A certain 
musical mood comes first, and the poetical idea only follows later.”89 This primordial music, for 
Nietzsche, the Dionysian, is thus the source of lyric poetry, while the Apollinian  appearance is 
that of epic poetry, though neither of these sources can create without the strife and struggle of 
the natural-artistic forces: “Taking part in both worlds [the Dionysian and Apollinian], poetry, 
too, reaches new spheres: simultaneously  sensuality of image, as in epic, and the intoxication of 
feeling of the tone, in lyric.”90 Poetry is defined by Schiller as “giving mankind its most complete 
possible expression [… .]”91 And it is in the later surfacing of the poetic idea, which corresponds 
as language to the Apollinian, that illusion manifests itself at once as the revitalized beautiful lie 
and as the new establishment of truth. The art of which Nietzsche speaks is this double-weaving 
of truth and lie that founds a culture, the collective life of a people. For art to rule life, it  is thus 
necessary  that, out of an original, musical and willful instinct, something altogether monstrous, 
absolutely different from its nature be created by  human life, to re-appropriate this life as at once 
infinitely other and infinitely similar to it, and so to preside over it  in a world to come. Art must 
simultaneously  announce and bring about this world’s arrival. Nietzsche declares: “Our salvation 
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does not lie in knowing, but in creating!” (KSA 7: 19 [125]).92  The first order of creation is, 
indeed, cosmogony: world-creation.
 It is the task of culture itself to engender instinct as the source of culture, which, for 
Nietzsche, is also a second nature. In a fragment of 1873, he writes:
Imitation [Das Nachahmen] is the medium of all culture [Kultur]; it gradually  produces 
instinct. All comparison (primal thinking [Urdenken]) is an imitation. Species develop  as 
a result of the first specimens’ preference for imitating only similar specimens, i.e. 
copying the largest and strongest specimen. The installation of a second nature by  way of 
imitation. In procreation the most remarkable thing is the unconscious imitation and at 
the same time the education of a second nature. 
       KSA 7: 19 [226]93 
Instinct, the original, spontaneous movement of life and its unmediated self-manifestation, lies 
not, for Nietzsche, at a prehistoric original point, but must, on the contrary, be created through 
imitation as the movement by which a culture, and thus a new nature, comes to be. This 
imitation, however, is not a mere copy  of an original. It is, rather, a self-originating, creative 
process whereby the sphere of the primordial itself is brought about. 
 Conversely, in his notes toward his second Untimely Meditation, Nietzsche warns against 
imitation as mere copying (Nachmachen) for the health of a culture. He presents the portraits of 
two sorts of historians, the monumental and the antiquarian. “Imitation (Nachmachen)—do not 
imitate—result: assimilation. Point of view represented by the monumental.” As for the 
antiquarian philosopher, he is characterized by “Veneration, gratitude: result: loyalty”—that is, 
the desire to represent history exactly  as “it once was,” as a “consolation.” Later in the same 
fragment, on the subject of the “Deception of objectivity,” Nietzsche writes with foreboding: 
“Now pure comprehension, without reference to life—takes over the degenerate form of the 
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antiquarian (what is dead without veneration) and of the monumental (what  is living without 
imitation [Nachahmung])” (KSA 7: 29 [102]).94  The monumental, or exemplary 
(monumentalitsche) view of history thus calls for continual spurts of originality. It is its 
perspective that “the great moments in history form a chain; that in them a great mountain ridge 
of mankind takes shape through the millennia; that the peaks of such long-lost  moments might 
still be alive, still luminous, still great, for me [… .] But this very demand—that greatness should 
be immortal—kindles the most frightful battle.”95 For the need for the immortality  of greatness 
suffocates the great themselves. The antiquarian historian, on the other hand, is devoured by 
infectious nostalgia, “a blind mania for collecting things, an incessant, restless accumulation of 
everything that  has ever existed” and his “craving for the new” is nothing but a craving “for the 
old, for everything old.”96  He is incapable of forgetting and therefore antiquarian history 
“understands merely how to preserve life, not how to create life [… .]”97 Life is therefore stifled 
in the cobwebs of memory, and forgetfulness, which is absolutely  necessary to the maximal 
health of a man, a people, a culture, is ruthlessly eliminated from possibility.
 There exists, for Nietzsche, a third type of history: critical history. Its principle is the 
following: “In order to live, man must possess the strength, and occasionally  employ it, to shatter 
and disintegrate a past. He does this by  haling the past before a tribunal, interrogating it 
carefully, and in the end condemning it. But every past deserves to be condemned [… .]”98 To the 
critical historical type belongs the impulse to destroy the past from which we issued, to “attack 
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its roots with a knife” and “plant in ourselves a new habit, a new instinct, a second nature, so that 
the first nature withers.”99 Such an endeavor is “always dangerous, and dangerous even to life 
itself,” since one’s history is inescapable, and “risky […] because second natures are generally 
weaker than first natures.” Yet “for those who use critical history in the service of life, there is 
significant consolation in knowing that  every first nature was once a second nature, and that 
every  victorious second nature will become a first.”100 All three of these historical archetypes are 
necessary; it  is the task of the philosopher as comet and as cultural physician to determine which 
dosage of each is appropriate: “Every  man, every nation, requires, according to its goals, 
strengths, and necessities, a certain knowledge of the past, a knowledge now in the form of 
exemplary  history, now of antiquarian history, and now of critical history.”101  Each of these 
historical methods, accordingly, reflects an aspect of Nietzsche’s own approach to history, and 
particularly to Greek antiquity, with respect to his modern Germany. While in his ambition to 
create a second nature after the Greeks, to destroy their established, antiquarian history  and to 
erect a new, philological-philosophical one, his approach is primarily critical, yet it unites most 
strongly with monumental, or exemplary history, in his treatment of the pre-Platonics as pure 
types, as geniuses connected by an invisible series of bridges, which, nonetheless, are not 
identical to a chain of dialectical necessity. A different species of necessity takes hold in 
Nietzsche’s viewpoint; while he is strictly opposed to any kind of Hegelian διαδοχαί (succession) 
of philosophers, he does believe in the need for genius and absolute novelty  to form culture, by a 
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kind of spiritual correspondence between the geniuses of all times. For this purpose, the old form 
of imitation, inspired by Aristotle, as copying nature, must be demolished and a new one created. 
 Nietzsche thus avidly rejects all attempts to copy Greek antiquity in a barbaric manner—
he sees in opera a “warning example of the damage the direct aping of antiquity  can do.” Here, 
there is no “unconscious art growing out of the life of the people”—the “roots” of this art, rather, 
are thereby “badly mutilated” (KSA 7: 1 [1]).102  In the notes for the unwritten Untimely 
Meditation, Wir Philologen—“We philologists”—Nietzsche declares that  “antiquity” is “not to 
be imitated directly, but learned, in what way art achieved its highest perfection to date.” The 
“few” who are destined to be philologists must equally be “critics of the present,” must “measure 
our own times against antiquity” and therefore also “measure antiquity in terms of their own 
ideals”—in this respect alone can they  be “critics of antiquity.”103  The capacity to learn is 
precisely what we lack, and what the Greeks were abundantly capable of: “The Greeks as 
discoverers and voyagers and colonizers. They know how to learn: enormous power of 
appropriation. Our age should not believe that it stands so much higher with regard to its drive 
for knowledge: except that for the Greeks everything became life! For us it merely  remains 
knowledge!” (KSA 7: 19 [42]).104 The vital, artistic appropriation that Nietzsche calls for must 
not be one that remains an “aping” in the perilous realm of “knowledge” but, rather, must fill 
everything it imitates with life by creating it anew in the sphere of art. 
 The word Nachahmung in the German lies much closer to the Greek µίµησις than to the 
English imitation or the German Imitation. µίµησις means artistic representation. Yet this 
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definition is misleading; for art—τέχνη—does not represent nature but is its very manifestation. 
For the Nietzsche of The Birth of Tragedy, imitation for the Greeks is the act of the Dionysian 
and Apollinian  “art impulses of nature”105—the height of symbolic self-expression. Tragedy is 
the “equally  Dionysian and Apollinian  form of art” created by the “coupling” of these two vital 
impulses.106 Vitality, here, is itself, however, thought not as an original and extratemporal point 
to which it would be necessary to return, but must be considered in concordance with the 
inseparability of τέχνη and φύσις for the Greeks, in Nietzsche’s perspective. By  the German 
Idealists, tragedy had been conceived as “the absolute organon, or, to take up the expression that 
Nietzsche applied to Tristan (a work in which Nietzsche found approximately  the same thing), 
‘of all art, the opus metaphysicum.’”107 The Organon is “the self-engendering, as Subject, of the 
Work”108—the paradox here, is that the genius, or tragic hero, does not  spring out of some 
oblivion; he is created by necessity. The very composition of tragedy, for Nietzsche, involves 
tragic experience, which Schelling regarded as the conflict  between necessity, another name for 
destiny, and freedom, or our willful blindness in realizing our destinies. But the tragedy  for the 
moderns is precisely the lack of our divinities—our condemnation to the knowledge that we 
create our own truth. Hence the organon is transfigured—it must  be the work of mortals alone, 
in the tumult of their own becoming.
 The Aristotelian “imitation of nature,” for Nietzsche, does not mean a copying of reality 
but, by an artistic creation of the Dionysian as the realm of the noumenal for the Greeks, a 
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birthing of nature itself, of a first nature and then a second nature, of a new world where souls 
exceed themselves and intermingle in the the dawn of a collective lucidity. For Dionysian 
possession in tragedy, though it shatters individuality, does not, however, cloud consciousness. 
On the contrary, it clarifies it; for “[t]ragedy” requires “reflection.” Krell writes that for 
Nietzsche: “The chorus in tragedy motiviert die Besonenheit, ‘motivates lucidity.’” And this 
word, lucidity, this Besonenheit, is equally used by Nietzsche in his description of “the 
Dionysian dream of the Maenad troupes as described by the messenger in Euripides’ The 
Bacchae. At the heart of Dionysus, the epitome of Apollo.”109 Nietzsche’s very creation of these 
two art instincts of nature is exemplary of the creative imitation—µίµησις—of antiquity  he calls 
for. In the ecstatic (ἐκστατικός) experience of the Dionysian music of Greek tragedy, the dream-
fabric of the Apollinian  image is torn away, the “veil of maya” abolished, and man “feels 
himself a god, he himself now walks about enchanted, in ecstasy, like the gods he saw walking in 
his dreams. He is no longer an artist, he has become a work of art: in these paroxysms of 
intoxication the artistic power of nature reveals itself to the highest gratification of the primordial 
unity  [Ur-Einen].”110 The “Dionysian world-artist”111 must expose the soul of the universe by its 
creation—man becomes monstrous; in the experience of the Dionysian dithyramb, he is 
transformed into the very divine Apollinian  image he constructed in his dream. All that he had 
brought to presence as appearance becomes for him reality—the measure of the real. Only by 
self-dispossession through that fundamental human nature he has created can he cease to be the 
artistic creator of the world and embody that harmonious cosmos. The self-engendering world of 
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the Greeks is not some long-lost origin, but is still to be created. Lacoue-Labarthe affirms that for 
Nietzsche, “life is indeed thought on the model of art, and not the reverse.”112 Nietzsche himself 
writes, in a fragment of 1874: “Isn’t it nature that imitates art?” (KSA 7: 35 [12]).113 And this is 
the function of tragedy, and, indeed, of art in the highest sense: to deliver us from the dream-life 
of representation to a transfigured realm of experience. And this experience, as an artistic 
creation by man of his own nature, his own φύσις, is also a birth of man himself, and hence a 
primordial experience; or: the experience of the primordial, ever re-created by the agonal play 
between artistic impulses.
 Nietzsche writes in Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks: “Everywhere, the way to 
the beginnings leads to barbarism [Der Weg zu den Anfängen führt überall zu der Barbarei]. 
Whoever concerns himself with the Greeks should be ever mindful that an unrestrained thirst for 
knowledge for its own sake barbarizes men just  as much as å hatred for knowledge. […] 
Whatever [the Greeks] learned, they wanted to live through, immediately.”114  The origins are 
shrouded in barbarity, and to seek them simply  with knowledge is barbarizing; rather, this 
creation of this natural well-spring of all true experience is the task of science and art in their 
necessary  coupling, and thus the task of philosophy which unifies them. Nietzsche’s philological 
project, which would develop into his genealogical project, thus works against the grain of 
history and philosophy conceived in a metaphysical framework. The project of reuniting 
knowledge with life, conceived on a biological ground, was thus for Nietzsche an overturning of 
the metaphysical organization that posits an intelligible and unattainable substratum of the in-
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itself, the absolute or, indeed, the will behind the illusory phenomenal world, and projects a 
necessity or, in the case of Hegel, a dialectic, onto the unfolding of history. Michel Foucault 
writes: “Genealogy  does not oppose itself to history  as the lofty  and profound gaze of the 
philosopher might compare to the molelike perspective of the scholar; on the contrary, it  rejects 
the metahistorical deployment of ideal significations and indefinite teleologies. It opposes itself 
to the search for ‘origins.’”115 The origin, rather, lies in the future of a transfigured physis.
 Nietzsche ends the second Untimley Meditation in the critical perspective, by appealing 
to the need for a revitalization of “the Greek concept of culture”—that is, “the concept of culture 
as a new and improved physis.”116 The creation of culture is inseparably one with the recreation 
of nature; the creation of nature as culture. Lacoue-Labarthe interprets Nietzsche’s definition of 
culture as a living unity as follows: “A people, like a man or a culture, a civilization (Kultur), 
only exists, only has its proper unity insofar as it is thinkable as a work of art.”117 The essential 
task of the philosopher as comet is to recreate the Greeks as a model for the culture to come of 
which, in his untimeliness, he is the only member, the sign and lone announcer. Such a task must 
be completed anthropomorphically, in accordance with the man of his time. Just  as the Greeks, 
in Nietzsche’s creative view, formed their cosmogonies and philosophical systems by means of a 
projection of themselves onto nature, so that an “imitation” (Nachahmung) of nature that was its 
very genesis, modern man must create the nature he strives towards—that of antiquity—in order 
to engender the monstrous novelty of genius in the form of a Kultur. Goethe had said: “I call the 
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classic healthy, the romantic sickly.”118 It is indeed this health that Nietzsche seeks to bring about 
in the mimetic creation of culture.
 Knowledge, Wisdom, Belief
 Nietzsche holds Kant responsible for a resurgence of anthropomorphism in the domain of 
knowledge. In the place the Kantian idealist epistemology, Nietzsche will create a new 
epistemology  based upon sensation, strictly speaking, a physiological-materialistic ground. Yet 
we shall see that this ground is also metaphysical. He writes in a fragment of 1872: 
Human beings even immediately exploited Kantian epistemology  for a glorification of 
the human being: the world only  has reality in them. […] Intellect’s forms emerge very 
gradually out of matter. It is plausible in itself that  they are strictly adequate to truth. 
Where could such an apparatus that invents something new possibly have come from! 
 The primary  faculty  seems to me to be the perception of structure, that is, based 
upon the mirror. Space and time are merely measured things, measured according to a 
rhythm. 
       KSA 7: 19 [153]119 
This rhythm is for the human that of breath. In every living thing, the measure upon which all 
knowledge is based is relative to its powers of perception. Man sees himself reflected in the 
world—he grasps external forms as relative to his own human form. “All knowledge is a process 
of measuring according to a standard” (KSA 7: 19 [155]).120 Concepts, for Nietzsche, are formed 
out of images, which are the synthetic results of sensations; truth and lie, which are 
interpretations of these images, are separated only  by degree. It is, indeed, a moral question as to 
where the limit between the two must  be drawn. Yet the morality to which Nietzsche appeals 
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distinguishes itself from traditional morality in that it entails a tear in the veil of faith. His 
criticism of Kant is precisely that the latter creates an opposition between faith and knowledge 
and employs the former to destroy the latter: 
Kant says (in the second preface to the Critique): “I must, therefore, abolish knowledge to 
make room for faith; and the dogmatism of metaphysics, that is, the presumption that  it is 
possible to advance in metaphysics without a critique of pure reason, is the true source of 
all that unbelief—which is always very dogmatic—that opposes morality.” Very 
important! he was driven by a cultural need.
 Curious opposition, “knowledge and faith”! What would the Greeks have thought 
of this? Kant knew of no other opposition! But we do! 
       KSA 7: 19 [34]121
Nietzsche will replace this destruction of knowledge by faith with a tempering of the drive to 
knowledge by the artistic impulse. Both of these drives are present not only in the philosopher 
but in every  human being: “it  is only  a matter of degrees and quantities: all human beings are 
artistic, philosophical, scientific, etc. […] However, humanity  only  grows only through the 
veneration of what is rare and great” (KSA 7: 19 [80]).122 The epistemological structure of the 
mind is such that it  is primordially artistic—which is to say that it deals in illusions—and 
secondarily scientific. It thus produces metaphors that are held to be absolute truths. This power 
of illusion, for Nietzsche, rather than a moral exigency, is the force of philosophy, its 
definitional, pulsionary and instinctual drive. The supremacy of philosophy over science and 
over art is precisely due to the fact  that is “deals with great things and concerns” (KSA 7: 19 
[83]).123 It is for this reason that it is the philosopher must be central to the creation of culture: 
only he can determine the dosage, i.e., the necessary combination of quantities of these 
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fundamental impulses to contribute to a genesis of culture through greatness, by means of its 
“legislation.” 
 Nietzsche writes: “It is not a matter of destroying science, but rather of controlling it. In 
all its aims and methods it is wholly  reliant  on philosophical views, though it easily forgets this. 
But the philosophy that is in control of science […] must determine its value!” (KSA  7: 19 
[24]).124  The valuation of existence and its various constituent components—in the case of 
culture, science, art and philosophy—is, in Nietzsche’s view, the philosopher’s grand task. He is 
not meant to render social life possible—his purpose is not moral, but rather, by  the co-
ventriloquism  of philosophy and philology, the values of science, of knowledge, of faith, of 
morals must be disclosed. The “origins,” however, of these things, are mired in the confusion of 
history, confusion of memory, such that they lose their character as absolute beginnings and do 
not constitute a whole. 
 The limitation, thus, of Kantian morality, is that it remains in the realm of faith. Nietzsche 
writes, in a fragment of 1872: “Practical morality  will suffer greatly from the collapse of 
religion. […] If we can only create mores, powerful mores! Then we would also have morality. / 
But mores are formed following the example set by powerful individual personalities” (KSA 7: 
19 [39]).125  The philosopher, to incarnate this individual power by  bringing to the surface the 
spherical tragedy of modern existence—that is, to become the tragic hero of his people. It is in 
this same fragment that Nietzsche proposes the replacement of religion, hence of its metaphysics 
and its morality, by art: “I can imagine a wholly new sort  of philosopher-artist [neue Art des P h 
i l o s o p h e n - K ü n s t l e r s] who fills the void with a work of art [ein K u n s t w e r k], with 
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one that has aesthetic value” (KSA  7: 19 [39]).126  It is by a re-descent  to the depths of 
knowledge—to the primordial process by  which this knowledge is formed—where the human 
mind is revealed as the primary generator of illusions, that Nietzsche as philosopher-philologist, 
as a sounder of the traces of knowledge’s origins in artistic, plastic force, reveals faith as a lie 
and delivers us to the aesthetic as the ground of life. In place of religion, the primordial space of 
the instinct to faith must  be accessed; and this instinct finds itself, once again, embedded in the 
fundamentally artistic life-force, as one of its originary perversions. For faith serves to veil, to 
cover over and mystify, in short to stifle the “drive for truth (der Trieb zur Wahrheit)”127 such that 
its origins go everywhere invisible, eradicated by an all-encompassing illusion—by a faith that 
renders knowledge impossible, and thus eternally hides the rude and painful truth at which the 
pursuit of knowledge must eventually arrive—a truth that shatters the reality of this drive. 
 If man were nothing but a “knowing animal,” says Nietzsche: “He would be driven to 
despair and destruction by the truth, the truth that he is eternally condemned to untruth.”128 It is 
for this reason that man, as the sheltering vessel of knowledge and the instinct toward truth, must 
create ever new illusions in which to place his faith: “for man the only fitting belief is the belief 
in the unattainable truth, in the illusion that approaches him trustfully.”129  The ultimate 
incarnation of this truth, then, is the Kantian thing-in-itself, the unknowable that lurks beyond the 
surfaces of things, that is a receptacle for belief. And this belief renders all thought, all 
knowledge possible. Such an illusion differs from the artistic illusion which Nietzsche endorses 
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precisely because it is by  definition ungraspable, invisible, and because its very existence is 
unprovable. Yet Nietzsche calls to another concealing power; that of consciousness itself, the 
work of a cruel, abyssal Nature, which hides from man what is most intimate to him: 
Does nature not conceal most  things from [man], e.g. his own body, of which he has only 
a deceptive “consciousness?” He is locked up in this consciousness, and nature has 
thrown away the key. Oh, the disastrous curiosity of the philosopher who desires for once 
to peer out and down through a crack in the chamber of consciousness: he might  then 
suspect that man, in the indifference of his ignorance, rests on the greedy, the insatiable, 
the disgusting, the merciless, the murderous, as if he were hanging in his dreams from the 
back of a tiger. 
 “Let him hang,” cries art. “Wake him,” cries the philosopher, in the pathos of 
truth.130 
Yet to awake him would revive man from a world of imagination, where he comes to life as 
something other than himself, outside himself, into a world of beautiful lies, a life of shadows in 
which faith plays the central role of supplying an invisible inner truth to a truthless reality. The 
philosophy of which Nietzsche dreams—the culture-engendering philosophy, comes out of a 
unification of the philosophical drive to truth with the underlying artistic drive, which lives on 
images, on the dream-surface of the mind, lights flickering from the outside, lifting the mind into 
lucidity  through illusion. Nietzsche writes: “It is [the human being’s] nature to be so immersed in 
illusion (dream) and dependent upon surface (eye)” (KSA  7: 19 [183]).131 And again: “Due to 
the superficiality of our intellect, we do indeed live in one ongoing illusion: that means that in 
every  moment we need art in order to live” (KSA  7: 19 [49]).132 Only by  means of a control and 
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limitation, indeed, a legislation of the drive to knowledge by the philosopher can culture come 
about.133 This need defines the philosopher’s task: 
The supreme dignity of the philosopher is revealed when he gives focus to the limitless 
drive for knowledge, controls it by giving it unity. 
 This is how the earlier Greek philosophers are to be understood, they control the 
drive for knowledge. 
       KSA  7: 19 [29]134 
 Nietzsche proffers a doctrine of art and world as illusion: “When closed, my eyes see 
within themselves countless changing images—imagination produces them, and I know that they 
do not correspond to reality. Thus, I believe in them only  as images, not as realities. / Surfaces, 
forms. / Art includes the joy of awakening belief by  means of surfaces: but one isn’t really being 
deceived? For if so, it  would cease to be art! […] Art thus treats semblance as semblance, 
precisely does not want to deceive, is true. […] The world as semblance” (KSA  7: 29 [17]).135 
The philosopher speaks a double-tongue, both artistic and scientific, and wherein the artistic 
drive [Trieb] always exceeds the scientific one, wherein Nature’s mad, organic movement toward 
self-creation, its power to shroud the world in illusions, is ever stronger than the drive for 
knowledge. He is, precisely for this reason, the truest creator of gods, the truest creator of worlds 
in the absence of gods, the most capable of transfiguration. 
 A contradiction must be marked between the force of a Nature that precedes man, creates 
him, precedes culture, and a cultural human force whose task is to create that Nature, again, and 
again, newly at each turn. I would like to suggest a circularity between these two contradictory 
strains of proposition. Yet this contradiction, like all contradictions in Nietzsche’s writing, is not 
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dialectical; rather, it is born of an immense mobility between perspectives. Moreover, the 
structure of the Nietzschean contradiction reveals it, in this movement between visions, to be 
non-contradictory; the terms, that is, immediately lose the appearance of opposition, as soon as 
the “opposite” exposes itself. In fact, these contraries move in a circular manner, yet this is not 
the circle of Kant’s antinomies, nor is it the circle of Hegel’s dialectic. This circle is a 
physiological, epistemological, philological proposition, which is to be broken through sacrifice.
 Nietzsche makes a distinction between wisdom and knowledge (which he equates with 
science), under the heading: “Wisdom and Science. / On Philosophers. / Dedicated to the 
immortal Arthur Schopenhauer” (KSA  7: 19 [85]), which he had considered as a possible title 
for his book on the Pre-Platonics.136  He draws the following line of distinction: “σοφία and 
ἐπιοτήµη. Inherent in σοφία is discrimination, the possession of good taste: whereas science, 
lacking such a refined sense of taste, gobbles up anything that is worth knowing” (KSA  7: 19 
[86]).137  Philosophy, whose task is to control the drive to knowledge (KSA  7: 19 [83]: 
“Philosophical thought is a controlling of the drive for knowledge”)138 must have exquisite taste 
in order to choose that  which is worth knowing—and this, of course, with respect to the 
constellation of culture. Nietzsche traces σοφíα to sapio, “to taste”, sapiens, “one who tastes”, 
and σαφήσ, “tastable.”139  Thus taste rather than skill is attributed to the sages: “According to 
etymology, then, the word lacks the eccentric meaning: it  contains nothing of quietude and 
asceticism, only a sharp taste, a sharp knowledge, without any  connotation of a ‘faculty.’”140 
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Σοφία as taste is here defined as “active” and allied with those who are “of sharp taste,” as the 
reduplication of the first syllable exhibits in Σíσυφος (Sisyphus), for in the Eolian dialect, σοφία 
is σύφος. By an analogy  to the transformation of the Greek λύχυς (wolf) into the Latin lupus 
(where the χ becomes a p), Nietzsche traces the Latin sucus (taste, savor) to the Greek σοφóς, the 
φ having been transformed into a c. The Latin sapio (to taste) and sapiens (he who tastes) would 
thus come from σοφής and σοφóς, supposing the same equivalence of meaning as that between 
lupus and λύχυς. Nietzsche opposes taste to τέχνη “(from τεκ, to generate), which always denotes 
a ‘bringing forth’.”141 It is essential to mark this difference. For just as the philosopher cannot 
produce a culture, nor can he create knowledge; his task, rather, is to control it. He is, further, 
capable of performing such a task precisely because he embodies aspects of the artist, of the 
religious leader, and of the scientist. In fact, σαφής comes from “σα” and “σάος”—“light.” 
Originally, then σοφία and σαφής mean clarity, evidence, luminosity. Sharpness, thus, of 
decision.142
 The two cultural life-forces, art and philosophy, are called to bring about the coming birth 
of culture, which the young Nietzsche felt to be imminent. In this sentiment, he felt  himself to be 
the herald of the coming culture. He believed Wagner to be the beginning of a great cultural 
resurgence in Germany: “The problem: finding the culture to go with our music!” (KSA  7: 19 
[30]).143 Nietzsche and Wagner, in their own eyes, came to personify  the two poles of the culture-
creating life-force of which Nietzsche speaks—that  is, of art and philosophy (or, philology). 
Wagner wrote to Nietzsche: “You could take over quite a lot for me, perhaps one entire half of 
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my calling!” Musician and philosopher-philologist  were thus to mutually guide and inspire one 
another. Wagner wrote to Nietzsche on February 12, 1870: “Now you must demonstrate the 
purpose of philology  and help me usher in the ‘Renaissance’ in which Plato embraces Homer, 
and Homer, filled with Plato’s ideas, really does become the greatest possible Homer” (N/W 1, 
58).144 The two men were thus to push one another, by a sort of dialectical opposition, to become 
more fully what each of them was. They exchanged lives and wills under the Pindaric 
imperative: 
Like precious goods from Tyre, my melody 
comes to you over the gray sea. 
Hear it gladly, 
the Kastor-song on Aiolian strings, gladly 
for the seven-toned lyre’s sake. 
Listen, and become 
what you are. 
    Pythian 2, lines 65-71145
 On November 18, 1871, Nietzsche wrote to Carl von Gersdorff: “only  as fighters have we 
in our time a right to exist, as vanguard fighters for a coming saeculum, whose formation we can 
roughly presage from our own selves—that is, from our best moments; for these best moments 
do obviously estrange us from our own time, but they  must have a home somewhere; therefore I 
believe that we have in these moments a sort of obscure presentiment of what is to come.”146 In 
this communication, at once major and minor, hyperbolic and obscure, Nietzsche expresses this 
dispossession from his time precisely as the promise of greater time to come. He places himself 
at the crux of this transition from one generation to another.
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 To Erwin Rohde, on December 21, 1871, Nietzsche wrote the following, in reference to 
his week in Mannheim with Wagner: “I felt like a man whose presentiments have at last  come 
true. For that precisely is music, and nothing else is. But I consider that if only a few hundred 
people of the next generation will have from music what I have from it, I anticipate an entirely 
new culture!”147 In the same letter, he declares: “I have had a number of fundamental insights 
about Plato, and I think that we two might one day well and truly warm up and illuminate from 
inside the hitherto so shabby and mummified history of Greek philosophers.”148  The coming 
German culture and the revitalization of the history of Greek philosophy from within, as a 
philological pursuit, are the two tasks of the young Nietzsche, and they are intimately connected.
Truth and Lie: The Need for Myth
 The questions of foundational myths and the necessity  of metaphysics in the service of 
life occupy Nietzsche interminably. He writes, in a fragment of 1873, the enigmatic phrase: 
“New mythology” (KSA  7: 29 [102]).149 We must regard this as both an exigency toward the 
creation of a unifying mythology and the warning against a danger on this event’s horizon. 
 In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche insists on the “metaphysical comfort” we experience 
in tragedy—a comfort inherited from the Greeks. Metaphysics here serves myth as an integral 
cultural force. In his discussion of the Dionysian satyric chorus, in the presence of which the 
“Greek man of culture felt himself nullified” and overcome by  a “feeling of unity  leading back to 
the very heart of nature,” Nietzsche writes of the essential effect of the chorus as follows: 
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The metaphysical comfort—with which, I am suggesting even now, every true tragedy 
leaves us—that life is at the bottom of things, despite all the changes of appearances, 
indestructibly powerful and pleasurable—this comfort appears in incarnated clarity in the 
chorus of the satyrs, a chorus of natural beings who live ineradicably, as it were, behind 
all civilization and remain eternally  the same, despite all the changes of generations and 
of the history of nations. 
 With this chorus the profound Hellene, uniquely susceptible to the tenderest  and 
deepest suffering, comforts himself, having looked boldly  right into the terrible 
destructiveness of so-called world history as well as the cruelty  of nature, and being in 
danger of longing for a Buddhist negation of the will. Art saves him, and through art—
life.150 
Tragedy  provides the feeling of an ineffable, eternal, natural realm of primordial joy and 
suffering—the Ureine—by which the fleeting world of appearances is constantly  destroyed, and 
of which this world is an inadequate manifestation. The pessimism of the Greeks was thus at 
once their tremendous power of life-affirmation. Nietzsche’s intention, however, in this passage, 
is not  to create a new culture but to expose, in the manner necessary to the creation of a coming 
culture, a metaphysics of Greek civilization. 
 Nietzsche thus considers myth, in this work, to be absolutely necessary to the health of a 
culture: “without myth every culture loses the healthy power of its creativity: only a horizon 
defined by myths completes and unifies a whole cultural movement. Myth alone saves all the 
powers of the imagination and of the Apollinian  dream from their aimless wanderings.”151 He 
defines myth as “a concentrated image of the world that, as a condensation of phenomena, 
cannot dispense with miracles.”152 It is for this reason that he calls for “the rebirth of German 
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myth” out of “German music”—in this pursuit, he “we must hold fast to our luminous guides, the 
Greeks.”153 
 As a criticism of Schiller’s opposition of the naïve and sentimental, Nietzsche writes: “the 
present day has that frostily clear and sober atmosphere in which myth does not thrive, the air of 
the historical—whereas the Greeks lived in the twilight air of the mythical and hence could make 
clear contrasts and draw clean lines in their literature: whereas we seek twilight in art  because 
life is too bright. It is coherent with this that Goethe understood the position of the human being 
in nature, and that of surrounding nature itself, to be more mysterious, enigmatic, and demonic 
than his contemporaries; but for that sought all the more repose in the brightness and sharp 
definition of the work of art” (KSA  7: 29 [116]).154 A darkened world like that of the Greeks 
requires blinding luminosity  in its art, purest clarity in its philosophy. While the modern world, 
drenched in light, where knowledge has fatally mastered illusion and radical individuation rules 
day and night, the only  way  back to a sentiment of originality is by a tenebrous simulation of that 
Greek brightness in the absence of the myth that rendered this brightness possible. Goethe, the 
greatest and most Grecian German poet in the eyes of Schiller and Nietzsche, moves within this 
contradiction by drawing its tension out  to plenitude: the dusky enigma must be sung in the 
clearest tones possible. 
 Nietzsche wrote in 1872: “Philosophers appear during those times of great danger—when 
the wheel keeps turning faster—they and art take the place of disappearing myth. But they are 
thrown far ahead of their time, because they only gain the attention of their contemporaries very 
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slowly. / A people that becomes conscious of its dangers produces genius” (KSA  7: 19 [17]).155 
For the Greeks, the long process of absolution from myth was necessary to give birth to their 
culture. Yet in Nietzsche’s modern Germany, the triumph of absolute knowledge over illusion 
demands a resuscitation of myth and of illusion in art: “Illusion necessary for progress in 
culture” (KSA  7: 19 [64]).156  Both art and knowledge, however, repose upon an economy of 
meaning that pretends to universality. Both metaphor, the principle of illusion, and knowledge, 
constitute themselves by an equalization of unequal things. Of metaphor, Nietzsche writes: 
“Metaphor means treating as equal something that one has recognized to be similar in one 
point” (KSA  7: 19 [249]).157 And of knowledge: “Knowledge, quite strictly speaking, has merely 
the form of tautology  and is empty. Any knowledge that advances us is an identification of the 
non-identical, the similar, i.e. it  is essentially  illogical” (KSA  7: 19 [236]).158  Knowledge 
reduces and sets an equal value to radically different things—thereby, it destroys. It is, however, 
a natural occurrence. “The similar recalls the similar and compares itself with everything: that is 
knowledge, the quick grouping of everything that is identical. Only the similar perceives the 
similar: a physiological process.” (KSA  7: 19 [179]).159  The theory of like drawing to like is 
Empedoclean and Democritean; it is the axiom of the physical theory of effluences. Here, 
Nietzsche transforms it into a means for the critique of knowledge as reductive and destructive; 
without the opposing force of art, which explodes the scientific metaphors with its own illusions, 
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knowledge renders life impossible. Only in the time of the pre-Platonics were art and science 
capable of harmonious and dissonant coexistence.
 If a resurgence of myth is to serve as the soil of culture, it  must be a profoundly 
untruthful ground of truth: indeed, this myth, in an era of extreme self-consciousness, worlds 
away from the naïveté of the Greeks, must  be a myth that affirms itself as myth, and which, 
therefore, in no way inspires universal belief. For the nature of the beautiful lie is such that every 
cosmogony, every mythical foundation, reveals itself as anthropomorphic illusion: an economy 
of truths, therefore, which unveil themselves in the moment of their utterance as lies must be 
established. “The foundation of everything great and vital rests upon illusion. The pathos of truth 
leads to decline. […] Above all to the decline of culture” (KSA  7: 19 [180]).160 It is for this 
reason that the art impulses must triumph over the pathos of truth in philosophy: for it is by 
means of illusion alone that life comes about. Genius, the ultimate goal of culture, and that 
around which it thrives, requires a renaissance of the beautiful lie for its superhuman spark to be 
ignited. For the word genius means generative power for the root gen, produce, create. In the 
1640s, it takes on the meaning it is destined to have for Nietzsche: a natural brilliance of man 
that surges up and surpasses his finitude.
 In his World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer defines genius by  a monstrosity of 
thought. “[W]here the brain’s power of forming representations has such a surplus that a pure, 
distinct, objective picture of the external world exhibits itself without a purpose as something 
useless for the intentions of the will, which is even disturbing in high degrees, and can even 
become injurious to them—then there already exists at least the natural disposition to 
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abnormality. This is denoted by the name of genius, which indicates that something foreign to the 
will, i.e. to the I or ego proper, a genius added from the outside so to speak, seems to become 
active here.” The “surplus of brain activity” at work in the genius is called by Schopenhauer 
monstra per excessum.161  The difference, for him, between the genius and the normal man, 
separated by a “gulf,”162  is that of the capacity for objectivity and the confinement to 
subjectivity. The “genius has a double intellect, one for himself and the service of his will; the 
other for the world, of which he becomes the mirror, in virtue of his purely objective attitude 
toward it.”163 Thus is the genius, godlike, capable of representing not only his own will but also 
the universal will of all men, so great is his mental strength. Consequently, the work of a genius 
is the “quintessence” and manifestation of this fundamental “contemplative attitude[… .]” The 
“normal man,” by contrast, “has only a single intellect,” which is “subjective” rather than 
objective. The difference between a single and a double intellect is as unbridgeable as that 
between “the open chest  notes of the human voice” and “the falsetto notes”: high as the chest 
voice may  strain, it  is “essentially different” from falsetto.164 Schopenhauer qualifies, however, 
his definition of genius to say that it is contingent upon circumstance, and requires the proper 
situation to be engendered: “By itself, genius can produce original thoughts just as little as a 
woman by herself can bear children. Outward circumstances must fructify genius, and be, as it 
were, a father of its progeny.”165   Genius thus requires a culture in order to be born. Nietzsche 
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writes: “The Greeks as the only people of genius in world history. Even as learners they have 
genius.”166 The powers of appropriation and creation among the Greeks are especially potent and 
important; these, too, however, relied upon the culture in which the Greek soul was born.
 In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche writes of Homer as the archetypal naïve genius, which 
requires “the complete victory of the Apollinian  illusion” used by  “nature” to “achieve her own 
ends.” He explains: “In the Greeks the ‘will’ wished to contemplate itself in the transfiguration of 
genius and the world of art; in order to glorify  themselves, its creatures had to feel themselves 
worthy of glory; they had to behold themselves again in a higher sphere, without this perfect 
world of contemplation acting as a command or a reproach. This is the sphere of beauty in which 
they  saw their mirror images, the Olympians.”167 The Greeks created their gods, their forces of 
nature, in order both to reflect their will and to rule over them; the heroic genius could thus rise 
upward, toward his towering mirror image and, becoming godlike, serve as a natural force for the 
people himself. “It was in order to be able to live that the Greeks had to create these gods from a 
most profound need. [… O]ut of the original Titanic divine order of terror, the Olympian divine 
order of joy gradually evolved through the Apollinian  impulse toward beauty, just as roses burst 
from a thorny bush. How else could this people, so sensitive, so vehement in its desires, so 
singularly capable of suffering, have endured existence, if it had not been revealed to them in 
their gods, surrounded with a higher glory?”168 To live under “the bright sunshine of [the] gods is 
regarded as desirability  in itself, and the real pain of Homeric men is caused by parting from it 
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[… .]”169 Thus did every god render joy as well as suffering, light as well as obscurity absolutely 
necessary  to life. The task of the genius was to announce in immortal song “this oneness of man 
and nature” called “naïve” by Schiller.170
 Of the birth of modern genius, Nietzsche writes, in Wir Philologen: “In transitional world 
history the judgement will be most accurate, since it’s in such periods that the greatest genius 
exists. / Production of the genius as the only one who can really  value and deny life.”171 The task 
of philology united with philosophy, therefore, is to produce the monstrous genius that his time 
calls for, the only being capable of evaluating life for a culture.
 In Wir Philologen, Nietzsche wrote: “Leopardi is the modern ideal of a classicist. The 
German classicists can’t create anything.”172 At the heart of the task of philology thus lies artistic 
creation. In his Pensieri, Giacomo Leopardi wrote: “the greatness connected with genius cannot 
be achieved in our day without the soul wearing out the body, like the sword wears out its sheath. 
It was different in antiquity where genius and greatness were much more natural and 
spontaneous and could develop without so many obstacles to overcome; where the destructive 
cognition of truth (which today  goes hand in hand with great talent) was not  as 
powerful” (Pensieri I, 8/10/1820).173 On the Greek earth, body and spirit grew together naturally, 
spontaneously—they engendered themselves in harmonious unity  and took the form of the 
genius. For Nietzsche as for Leopardi, with the separation of these elements comes the tyranny 
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of knowledge over life, its constant effort to analyze and thus destroy  it. According to Nietzsche, 
the “[… dichotomy between] spirit (the faculty of abstraction) and bodies (lower sensory 
apparatus),” which he also calls the “unnatural tearing apart of the intellect” is the “original 
source first of dialectic […] and later of logic [… .]”174 His return to the Greeks is not a return to 
origins but a return to the time before the empire of knowledge rendered the life of a Kultur 
impossible. Such a time, because it never took place in a way our language could grasp, must be 
created anthropomorphically.
 In his essay On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense (1873), Nietzsche exposes the 
shattering truth of “truth,” which for him constitutes the very tissue of tragic experience: 
What then is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms, in 
short, a sum of human relations which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, 
transferred, decorated and which, after lengthy use, seem firm, canonical and binding to a 
people: truths are illusions that are no longer remembered as being illusions, metaphors 
that have become worn and stripped of their sensuous force, coins that have lost their 
design and are now considered only as metal and no longer as coins.175 
To build a culture on illusion in a world where knowledge reigns supreme, this requires first of 
all the philological, genealogical destabilization of dogma—the truths in which knowledge deals 
must be exposed in their infinite falsity, precisely to make room for an instinct toward illusion 
qua art. On the heels of Nietzsche’s announcement of this fact follows a metaphor; that of 
currency whose value has been lost, and which exists simply  as worn metal, material exchanged 
without a thought to its original meaning. This uncovering of value by metaphor constitutes a 
first truth for the coming world. Its purpose is strictly pedagogical; it is a model for the myths on 
which a culture must be built—metaphors which, in the same instant as they  are pronounced, 
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reveal their illusory nature, and the illusory nature of truth in general, so that truth is seen to rest, 
by necessity, on the surface of life yet as the only  means by which life comes to exist. A new 
constellation of truths without blind belief is what Nietzsche is proposing. This requires that men 
cease to copy language, i.e. merely to reproduce a set of lies in which they place their faith, and 
transform the system of signs instead, through a mimetic process. For we sleep most the time: 
“Men are deeply immersed in illusions and dreams; their eye glides along the surface of things 
and sees ‘forms’; their feeling nowhere leads to the truth, but is content to receive stimuli and, as 
it were, play  blind games on the back of things.”176 Men cling to the metaphysical meaning of 
the words they speak without  ever plunging into the depths of that meaning—they glide safely 
along the surface, in their eternal dream, never becoming conscious of their somnambulistic sub-
existence. It requires the rigor of philology, enforced by  its intimate relation to philosophy, to 
shatter this universal reverie.
 The insight into the illusory, untruthful nature of truth and the consequent need for a 
destabilizing unveiling of the old truths and a foundation of new ones are, for Nietzsche, at once 
Heraclitean and Schopenhauerean. For Heraclitus says: “wisdom alone wants and does not want 
to be called by  the name of Zeus” (14 [A 84]).177 Giorgio Colli explains this fragment as follows: 
“the name Zeus is acceptable as a symbol, as a human designation of the supreme god, but it is 
not acceptable as an adequate designation, precisely because the supreme god is something 
hidden, inaccessible.”178  This is why  every  utterance of the sage must be an enigma, a riddle: 
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“the enigma (l’enigma, also the riddle), extended to a cosmic concept, is the expression of the 
hidden, of the god. All the multiplicity of the world, its illusion-generating corporeality, is an 
interlacing of enigmas, an appearance of the god, in the same way  as the words of the sage are an 
interlacing of enigmas, sensible manifestations which are the imprint of the hidden.”179  Colli 
proposes this formula for the Hellenic wisdom uttered by Heraclitus: “There is a hidden world of 
which our world is the appearance, this is the Greek intuition: there, the gods live.”180 Heraclitus 
says, in continuity with the Delphic phrase, “Know thyself”: ἐδιζησάµην  ἐµεωυτόν; “I have 
searched myself out” (14 [A 37]).181 For the inner wisdom of man, all is unity, but in perception 
and language it appears as separation and contradiction. Man must have the courage to search for 
his inner λόγος, the eternal cosmic flame. Yet “nature loves to hide:” “ϕύσις [nature, birth] 
κρύπτεσθαι ϕιλέει” (14 [A 92]).182  Therefore, this process of self-searching is itself the the 
pursuit of the unknowable, that is, of our own birth and our own nature that recedes into oblivion 
even as we approach it, and remains, indeed, to be created at every moment. “Aeon considers the 
human being in itself as contrary to the Logos (ἄλόγος): only by his relationship to fire does he 
participate in the common intelligence (ζυνὸν λόγος).”183 The wisdom of man is measured by his 
proximity to fire. For the “con-tuitive god [… ,] all contradictions run into harmony, invisible to 
the common human eye, yet understandable to one who, like Heraclitus, is related to the 
contemplative god.”184  The realm of harmonious unity, which for men appears as warlike 
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dissonance, is attainable only  to the self-seeking sage, capable of transcending speech and 
becoming godlike, in other words, for Nietzsche, a genius. Indeed, Nietzsche made this extension 
himself, in a fragment of 1873: “Echoing Heraclitus: To the genius (god), even the most 
intelligent philistine (human being) is an ape” (KSA  7: 27 [67]).185 This formula, then, offers us 
another image, akin to metaphor of the philosopher as comet; the god of Heraclitus, which is 
nothing but an anthropomorphic projection onto nature, must be profoundly  reevaluated and 
recreated as a genius, to surpass the commonality  of the knowledge of humans themselves—
redefined as modern philistines—in his gesture of vital wisdom, achievable only through art.
 Schopenhauer, for his part, considers all material reality  to be the representation of that 
which is eternally unknowable and unrepresentable: the universal will to life. Yet  language is the 
path of sufficient reason, the only  means to civilization: “It is by the help  of language alone that 
reason accomplishes its most important achievements,—the united action of several individuals, 
the planned co-operation of many thousands, civilization, the state; also science, the storing up of 
experience, the uniting of common properties in one concept, the communication of truth, the 
spread of error, thoughts and poems, dogmas and superstitions.”186 
 Nietzsche’s goal is thus to cultivate new truths upon which a culture can function without 
believing in them—to replace the god behind language and the will behind representation with 
experience, life itself, and to place the essence of this new ground of life, no longer equatable to 
such a name because it is the stuff of infinitely changeable life itself, in the material of illusion 
itself—of future illusions. Both art and nature deal in illusions, anthropomorphisms, metaphors, 
metonymies, but while those of science, metaphysics, knowledge and religion symptomatically 
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mask their metaphorical origin and birth dogmas, those of art reveal themselves in the same 
instant as they present themselves as groundless, as illusory.
   Yet belief is also, to a certain extent, necessary to life, and in this degree Nietzsche agrees 
with Schopenhauer: “What the truth means to men! / The highest and purest life is possible in the 
belief that one has the truth. The belief in truth is necessary  for man. / Truth appears as a social 
need: through a metastasis it is then applied to everything that does not need it. […] The 
founding of states awakens truthfulness” (KSA  7: 19 [175]).187 It is precisely  for this reason that 
a culture cannot found itself on art alone, but requires at once the rigidity  of organizational laws, 
in the form of science and the state. Yet just as the long-suppressed Dionysian, “like a knight 
sunk in slumber” must be reawakened “from this abyss” so that the birth of German culture out 
of music and myth, the unseen “German knight,”188  may become possible, so art, led by 
philological philosophy, must triumph over science and destroy its leaden truths before any 
harmony between the two can be born. These laws, therefore, must be founded anew, and the old 
ones destroyed; a new, Dionysian language must be born, a language which speaks the 
unutterable; the depths. In a fragment of 1872, we read:
When it is a question, on the one hand, of the value of knowledge, whereas, on the other 
hand, a beautiful illusion, as long as one believes in it, has the same value as an item of 
knowledge, then one realizes that life requires illusions, that is, untruths that are held to 
be truths. […] In the struggle between ‘truth’ and ‘truth’ both seek an alliance with 
reflection. All true striving for truth came into the world through the struggle for a sacred 
conviction, through the πάθος of struggle: otherwise human beings have no interest in its 
logical origin [Ursprung]. 
       KSA  7: 19 [43]189
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There is, then, a necessary reversibility  between the lie that is held to be a truth and the truth that 
reveals itself as lie—the philosopher as comet, who re-evaluates at every step the value of 
knowledge and that of art, must, through the cultivation of illusions, reveal the chasmic depth 
between these two functions of illusion. Only  thereby  can old illusions, old myths, be unveiled as 
groundless lies even as new illusions are put in place on the very ground of that groundlessness; 
in the ruins of the failure of religion. It  is through this power that he shall put in place mores by 
acting as an example for his people. The new nature that  culture shall be thus necessitates, too, a 
new species of belief, or Apollinian dream. In this fragment, it is the need for “sacred 
conviction”—for religious belief—that gives birth, by  means of the agonal instinct to which this 
need gives rise, to truth. And if truths—common, binding myths, are necessary to a culture, so 
too is the their tragic dissolution into lies.
 Under the title “The Age,” Nietzsche declares: “Not directed toward happiness: the 
‘truth’; not in comfortable repose, but heroic and hard.” Novel truth, in other words, must 
destroy old, dogmatic truth. Nietzsche notes in the same fragment: “Against the overestimation 
of the state, of national interests” (KSA  7: 32 [72]).190  The philosopher’s task is, then, to 
cultivate the truths necessary to his time, and to attack at the roots the state’s truths, of religion’s 
truths, of metaphysical truths. And this task offers no end, no absolute; the philosopher is mired 
in the stuff of the tragic. He must eternally measure truths, create an ever new measure for them, 
and bring them into harmony and conflict as necessary.
 The task of history for Nietzsche is one that can in no way be bound to a metaphysics—it 
relates solely  and entirely to life, conceived as the force of becoming even underneath the 
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human. In his notes toward the second Untimely, Nietzsche writes: “History requires the active 
human being, history can be written only by the experienced person!” Yet his experience must 
supply him with a capacity for imperious mantic clarity of the highest order: he must not only be 
a student of the past but a prophet. In a fragment of 1873, he writes:
The voice of the past is always the voice of an oracle; only if you are seers into the future 
and are familiar with the present will you be able to interpret  the oracular voice of the 
past. Today we tend to explain the effect of the Delphic oracle with the claim that  those 
priests had precise knowledge of the past; it  is time we recognized that only those who 
build the future have the right to sit on judgement of the past: he is only a historian by 
virtue of being a seer. 
        KSA  7: 29 [96]191
The determination of truth and of myth is a matter of prophecy: the untimely  historical method 
reaches into the depths of the past—into primordial memory—in order to exercise the power of 
prophecy. It  is, therefore, not a matter of the present, but of the past and of the future, which 
battle against one another in tumultuous soul of the philosopher as comet.
Agonal Hellenism
 Nietzsche is firm in his affirmation that all every philosophical system for the Greeks is 
anthropomorphism. Thus, he divides the doctrines of the Greek philosophers into “Ethical 
anthropomorphisms: Anaximander : justice. / Heraclitus: law. / Empedocles: love and hate.” and 
“Logical anthropomorphisms: Parmenides: nothing but being. / Anaxagoras: νοῦς. / Pythagoras: 
everything is number.” (KSA  7: 19[116])192 From Thales to Socrates, these anthropomorphisms 
slowly wane, to be replaced, with positive science, presented in its purest form by  Democritus, in 
his materialist  doctrine of atomism. What first distinguished the philosopher from the Hellenic 
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sage—his original “Freedom from myth,” brought about by “Thales” (KSA  7: 19[18])193  is 
accomplished by degrees, until man finds himself nearly entirely purified from the world of myth 
in science. The birth of philosophy, for Nietzsche, coinciding with the birth of tragedy, is at once 
the birth of natural science and the beginning of the long, languishing death of myth. Nietzsche 
writes: “Myth seeks to understand all transformation following an analogy to human behavior, to 
human acts of will.” Stepping away from myth, Nietzsche claims, Thales presented “a hypothesis 
of the natural sciences of great worth.”194 The first philosopher’s great “freedom and boldness” 
was to “conceive the entirety of such a multifarious universe as the merely formal differentiation 
of one fundamental material”195—that is, water. Nietzsche, in his constant project to connect the 
pre-Platonics to the contemporary science of his time, relates this thesis, by analogy, to “the 
Kant-Laplace hypothesis concerning a gaseous precondition of the universe.”196  Science does 
not, however, eradicate anthropomorphism, but displaces it onto a different terrain—that of life 
itself, of human experience. In other words, it avows itself of the fact  that all truth is relative to 
perception, to the human creature; it  impales itself on the glittering lies that constitute truth. 
Science requires a bold surrender to the tragic. As a consequence, our physical apparatus 
remaining inescapable, no universalizing or absolute theory is possible. Nietzsche writes: “All 
knowledge comes about by  means of separation, delimitation, restriction; no absolute knowledge 
of a whole!” (KSA  7: 19 [141]).197 In the absence of an anthropomorphic absolute, a philosophy 
of “infinite approximation,” as Hölderlin put it, becomes necessary. It is in this sense that science 
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is the purification—the κάθαρσις of myth. It liberates man into the groundlessness of experience 
and of any philosophy to come.
  Natural science, as the destiny of myth, is necessary both to culture and to philosophy 
itself, insofar as it  allows for a new, non-mythical thinking of experience. Such a new thinking 
occasions, in its turn, a radical perspectivism. For Nietzsche, Heraclitus represents a major step 
forward in the coming of science. Friedrich Albert Lange had already considered this philosopher 
as a precursor to materialism, because of his physics of “persistent matter,” following and de-
mythifying the model of Anaximander’s ἄπειρον (often equated, by Nietzsche, with the Kantian 
thing in itself). According to this Heraclitean physics, it is “divine primitive fire […] into which 
the changing world returns, to proceed from it anew [… .]”198  In Nietzsche’s notes toward his 
lecture on Heraclitus, he speaks of the philosopher as a combatant of absolutism. For Heraclitus 
says: πάντα ῥεῖ (“All things flow”). “Nowhere does an absolute persistence exist, because we 
always come in the final analysis to forces, whose effects simultaneously include a desire for 
power (Kraftverlust).”199 Convinced of the scientific validity of this argument, Nietzsche uses a 
theory  of the natural scientist, Karl Ernst von Bär, to explain the Heraclitean principle, πάντα ῥεῖ. 
In von Bär’s lecture of 1860 called “Which Conception of Living Nature Is the Correct One?” he 
posits the following hypothesis: “The rates of sensation and of voluntary  movements, thus of 
conscious life, appear among various animals to be approximately proportional to their heart 
rates.”200  Experience, then, is absolutely conditioned upon the specificity of the physiological 
and mental apparatus. There is, then, no possibility  for a universal transcendental aesthetics such 
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as Kant proposes, as the standard of perception differs immeasurably from one creature to the 
next. “The inner life of various animal species (including humans) proceeds through the same 
astronomical time-space at different specific rates, and it is according to these that they 
subjectively and variously  judge the fundamental standard of time. For this reason alone, only 
because for us this fundamental standard is small, does an organic individual, a plant or an 
animal, appear to us as something remaining at one size and shape, for we could observe it  one 
hundred times more in a minute without noticing any  external alterations.”201 Nature and its laws 
depend entirely, therefore, on one’s perception of phenomena. Such a realization does not, 
however drive Nietzsche or his Heraclitus into Idealism, but rather into the experience of the 
tragic, which requires a constant reevaluation, destruction, and recreation of truths. Truth itself, 
then, has a homeotic character: homeosis is the process by which the cells of living creatures, by 
means of plasticity, transform themselves in order to perform other functions—this is the process 
that takes place when an animal (a spider, for example, or a lizard), having lost a limb, is capable 
of growing it back, not identically  but differently, through the instinctual transfiguration of its 
cells. That Heraclitus was aware of this nature of truth is evident  from what Nietzsche calls his 
“aesthetic cosmodicy”—his Cosmodicee der Kunst.202
 In On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense, Nietzsche claims that the “[human] 
intellect has no further mission beyond human life. It is human and only  its owner and creator 
treats it as solemnly as if the hinges of the world turned it. But if we could communicate with a 
gnat we would hear that it swims through the air with the same solemnity  and also feels as if the 
flying center of the world were within it. There is nothing so reprehensible or low in nature that 
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would not immediately  be inflated like a balloon by  a small breath of that power of knowledge; 
and just as every porter wants to have his admirer, so the proudest of men, the philosopher, 
believes that the eyes of the universe are trained on his actions and thoughts like a telescope from 
all sides.”203  The idea of humans as the center of the universe, and of an absolute or universal 
rule of life owing to this fact is entirely  fictitious; rather, everything must be relative. The conceit 
of knowledge is responsible for man’s irrepressible hybris. Nietzsche writes: “Science fathoms 
the course of nature, but can never command man. Inclination, love, pleasure, displeasure, 
elevation, exhaustion—science knows none of these. Man must interpret—and thereby assess—
his life and his experiences from a specific point of view” (KSA  7: 6 [41]).204  For this 
perspectivism to become possible, science and knowledge must unite with art and illusion in a 
relation of endless agonism. Nietzsche had considered as a title for his book on the pre-Platonics: 
“The Philosopher. Observations on the Struggle between Art and Knowledge. [Betrachtungen 
über den Kampf von Kunst und Erkenntniss]” (KSA  7: 19 [98]).205 This Kampf is Nietzsche’s 
translation of the Greek ἀγών (strife, competition), regarded by  both Nietzsche and Jacob 
Burckhardt as the fundamental structure of Greek life and the genesis of its multiple worlds. It is 
also the word used by Nietzsche to describe the relation between the Dionysian and the 
Apollinian in Attic tragedy. When Nietzsche writes: “My goal is to bring about a state of 
complete enmity between our present ‘culture’ and antiquity. Whoever wishes to serve the former 
must hate the latter,”206 he recasts this agonal formula as the necessary historical method through 
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which the Greeks must be created and destroyed, constantly  working to the service of a modern 
culture, just as the aion creates and destroys the world at its whim, subordinated to the unknown 
laws of a cosmic game. 
Cosmogony: Heraclitus and Democritus
 Concealed in the metaphor of the philosopher as comet is the double-impulse in the 
young Nietzsche: first, toward a metaphysics of art, whose task it is to annihilate and replace 
metaphysics as such, that is, the metaphysics put in place by  German Idealism, and, second, the 
impulse toward a new positivist materialism—a materialism free of all idealism. One might call 
these two impulses the Heraclitean impulse and the Democritean impulse. These two sages 
constitute the two acmes of pre-Platonic philosophy, for Nietzsche, with Empedocles occupying 
the agonal point of transition between them. Of Heraclitus Nietzsche wrote: “he is like a star 
without an atmosphere.”207 Heraclitus’ greatest attribute was his terrible hybris and solitude; he is 
exemplary  of those philosophers who “reject the people from the start” (KSA  7: 23 [14]).208 He 
created a metaphysical cosmodicy  describing the eternal flux of the universe. Democritus, for his 
part, was the first atheist, and the founder of atomism. He originated a theory of the birth of 
worlds in the absence of divinity. Nietzsche considers Heraclitus (along with Empedocles and 
Anaximander) to be among those philosophers who achieved “Mastery of the knowledge drive: 
or the strengthening of that which is mythical, mystical, and artistic. […] Legislation by 
greatness.” Democritus he enumerates among those (along with Thales and Parmenides) who 
affected the “Mastery of the mythical: strengthening the sense of truth over against free fiction. 
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Vis veritatis, or the strengthening of pure knowing” (KSA  7: 23 [14]).209 These two masteries 
necessarily oppose one another: it is a constant battle between the supremacy of the art-instinct, 
this eternal source of life, creation of nature, and the drive to knowledge, which searches for 
truth and eliminates myth. These are, indeed the two perspectives between which the young 
Nietzsche travels—the first is that of The Birth of Tragedy and the second that of the lectures on 
the pre-Platonic philosophers. To a culture, they are biologically necessary, and the ἀγών 
between them is, indeed, what makes it flourish. Thus illusion as illusion must master illusion as 
truth in the perspective of the myth- and art-drive while, from the perspective of the drive to 
knowledge, myth—false origins and metaphysical comforts—must be overcome by the urge 
toward the truth at the heart of the world. It  is clear, moreover, that these perspectives constantly 
reverse into one another and yet remain in separation.
 Every  pre-Platonic Greek philosophy has its cosmogony (κοσµογονία), each pure and 
original in its kind. Wisdom itself (σοφία), and thus philosophy, has two sources for Nietzsche—
two “preliminary stages.” The first is “a mythic preliminary  stage” and the second is a “sporadic-
proverbial one.”210 The first of these is nothing other than theogony and cosmogony, inseparable 
for the Greeks from poetry. Nietzsche devotes his third lecture on the pre-Platonic philosophers 
to an enumeration of these cosmogonies, out of which the philosophical instinct will be born. He 
begins: “The power to systematize—very strong in the Greek’s ranking and genesis of their gods
—presents us with a drive never coming to rest.”211  What separates us from the Greeks is thus 
their immense power of organization of nature which is at once an artistic creation of nature; 
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both that nature from which all human power springs and the nature of man as such. Cosmogony 
and theogony for them had a strictly cultural function: “It was the grand task to establish the 
rights and ranks of this colorful divine realm. The Greeks met it with their political and religious 
genius. The continual blending of the gods (θεῶν κρᾶσις) was faced with a crisis of the gods 
(θεῶν κρίσις). It  was especially difficult to bring the ancient  ranks of the Titans into a 
relationship  with the Olympians [… .] Bizarre contrasts allowed the possibility of fantastic 
innovations. Finally, a peace among the gods was established; Delphi was involved, probably 
above all; there, in any case, we find an epicenter of philosophical theology.”212  All ancient 
Greek theogonies, in Nietzsche’s eyes, begin in agonal dissonance; thus the αγών between the 
Titans and the Olympians was necessary  to the birth of theology, and to its centralization at 
Delphi, where the oracle was. 
 In keeping with the structure of Greek civilization, both Olympian and mystery gods 
were required in order for religion to thrive in harmony  with the state. The contradiction between 
these two species of god is “resolved with extraordinary  wisdom. First of all, [there were] gods 
who clarify everything at hand, as continual guardians and observers of all Greek existence, and 
likewise gods of mundane existence: next, for especially earnest religious elevation, as an 
individuation to all ascetic and pessimistic affects, [there were] the mysteries, with their hope of 
immortality. That these two currents did not harm or dishonor one another must  be deemed 
especially wise.”213  Nietzsche goes on to explain the Orphic theogonies. The most ancient of 
these are created by poets, toward which Aristotle alludes in listing the original elements in these 
theogonies: “Night and Heaven or Chaos and Ocean”; Nietzsche identifies these with their 
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authors: “Hesiod refers to Chaos [(χάος) Theogony, 116-7], Homer to Ocean (Ὀκεανός) [Iliad, 
bk. 14. 1.201; bk. 15, 1.240], and a theogony attributed to Eudemus (from which the 
Neoplatonist Damascius narrates [De princ., 382]) refers to Night and Heaven (Νὺξ καὶ 
Οὐρανός).”214 The theogony of Apollonius (Argonaut. 1.494ff.) “depicts Orpheus singing as, in 
the beginning, the earth, sky and sea separated themselves from the admixture of all things; as 
the sun, moon, and stars took up their orbits; [as] mountains, rivers, and animals came to be; as 
the Oceanids ruled over Ophion and Eurynome for the first time in Olympus; as they were hurled 
into the oceans by Chronos and Rhea, who were in their turn ousted by  Zeus.”215 According to a 
third Orphic theogony (Damascius, De Princ. 381), the world is born of “water and primeval 
mud,” which “thicken into earth” and engender “a dragon with wings on its shoulders and the 
appearance of a god; on both sides [it has] the head of a lion and that of a steer named Heracles 
or Chronos.” This monster then unites with necessity, Adrestea—“this then extended itself 
incorporeally across the entire universe. Chronos-Heracles produced a gigantic egg that broke 
open around the middle, with the upper half forming the sky and the lower half forming the 
earth.”216 Yet another, more ancient  Orphic theogony “places Chronos at the pinnacle.” The god 
creates “aether and chaos, from which he fashions a silver egg: from this is brought forth the all-
illuminating, first-born god, Phanes, who is also called Metis, Eros, and Erikpaios … 
Androgynous, since he contains the seeds of all the gods in himself. Phanes generates out of 
himself Echidna, or night, who, along with Uranus and Gaia, the step-parents of the middle 
generation of gods, is portrayed by  Hesiod in her essence. Zeus, having successfully taken 
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power, devours Phanes, and precisely because of this, he is the epitome of all things.” Nietzsche 
then quotes Plato, who relates as an “old saying (παλαιòς λóγος)”: “Zeus is the beginning and the 
middle, from Zeus everything is made” (Laws IV, 715e). Zeus then births the last generation of 
gods. Nietzsche emphasizes: “Most important is the story  of Dionysus Zagreus, the son of Zeus 
and Persephone who, torn limb from limb by the Titans, lives once again as the younger 
Dionysus, after Zeus has eaten his still intact heart.”217  In this cosmogony, Zeus acts as the 
mythical incarnation of the primordial element of which all matter is constituted. This 
metaphysical determination will later give way to a series of original physical determinations for 
the all-embracing One of life for the Greek philosophers, beginning with Thales’ designation of 
water as the primal element.
 That philosophy develops out of anthropomorphic cosmogonies conceived as poetry 
(ποίηση) is of the highest significance; for the Greeks created their worlds in richest multiplicity. 
They  did not regard nature as an unknowable and prehistoric origin of man but firstly as the 
ground of life that  must  be fashioned, made (ποιεῖσθαι) by him in song. Man must transcend 
himself, be outside himself, near-godly, in order to bring a universe into being. “The course of 
philosophy: at first  human beings are conceived as the authors of all things—gradually  things are 
explained according to analogies with individual human qualities—ultimately one arrives at 
sensation.”  Sensation, then, would be the ultimate purification from myth. Nietzsche then, in the 
same fragment, poses this “Important question: Is sensation a primordial fact of all matter? / 
Attraction and repulsion?” (KSA  7: 19 [149]).218 The paradox between metaphysics and science 
here comes to its apex: the importance of this question lies in the possibility  that science, in its 
83
217 Nietzsche, Pre-Platonics, 12.
218 Nietzsche, Unpublished Writings, 48.
purest form, might once again revert to the realm of the metaphysical. The primordial nature of 
sensation would have as its effect  that  science, or materialism—would have to be constantly 
recreated as art. The only  way in which it  might become possible to imitate the Greek 
philosophers is by an anthropomorphic leap that characterizes them according to our social 
necessities and that  creates them as cosmogonists. To experience our difference with the Greeks 
is to measure them against us by anthropomorphically  attributing to them this method of life and 
thought.
 Both Heraclitus and Democritus, on Nietzsche’s account, possess, as an essential 
component of their cosmogonies, a theory of the infinite succession of worlds. However, while 
that of Heraclitus inscribes itself in an artistic metaphysics, that of Democritus is purely 
scientific. Although Heraclitus is scientific insofar as he considers fire as the primal element, 
which “[transforms] itself into water and earth”219 to create the material of the world, his theory 
is ultimately  mythical and hence anthropomorphic, assigning godly agency to cosmic forces. 
“Since everything is fire, then whatever is not fire, which would be the opposite of fire, cannot 
exist at all.”220  All vapors are either pure or impure, depending on the direction of their 
evolution, toward or away from fire: “From the sea arise only pure vapors, which serve as 
nourishment; from the earth, only dark mists, on which the moist draws for nourishment. Pure 
vapors constitute the bridge from sea to fire; impure [vapors], the transition from earth to water. / 
Thus [there is] a double process, ‘the way  up and the way down (ὁδóς κάτω and ἄνω),’ both [of 
which are] one thing eternally  returning next to the other.”221 This then is a theory of the unity 
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and indestructibility of all matter in its gradation of warmth, and this matter is constantly 
becoming. 
Everlastingly, a given quality contends against itself and separates into opposites; 
everlastingly these opposites seek to reunite. Ordinary people fancy they see something 
rigid, complete and permanent; in truth, however, light and dark, bitter and sweet are 
attached to each other like wrestlers of whom sometimes the one, sometimes the other is 
on top. […] It is a wonderful idea, welling up  from the purest  strings of Hellenism, the 
idea that strife embodies the everlasting sovereignty of strict justice, bound to everlasting 
laws. Only a Greek was capable of finding such an idea to be the fundament of a 
cosmology; it is Hesiod’s good Eris transformed into the cosmic principle; it  is the 
contest-idea of the Greek individual and the Greek state, taken from the gymnasium and 
the palaestra, from the artist’s agon, from the contest between political parties and 
between cities—all transformed into universal application so that now the wheels of the 
cosmos turn on it.222 
The perception of stability is nothing but a myth—in reality, there is only constant change and 
flux, organized by a cosmic game of chance, where every  origin is split, such that there is no 
identity  that is not first of all traversed by difference. For Heraclitus says, in a phrase dear to both 
Nietzsche and Hölderlin: ἒν διαφέρον ἑαυτῷ—the one differentiating in itself. And, in another 
marvelous paradox, that the one is at the same time the many. The play of this competitive forces 
requires a time of becoming in which a creative-destructive movement rigorously prohibits any 
continuity  of subject. In this Heraclitean becoming, then, every  instant in the sacrifice of the 
instant that came before—every  world is the sacrifice of the previous world, which, as soon as it 
comes into being, plunges the whole string of worlds that came before it into forgetfulness. The 
paradoxical logic of this agonal movement is such that the more strongly  identity and 
reconciliation between opposing forces is approached, the more these forces differ from one 
another. Thus in Nietzsche’s appropriation of Heraclitus’ becoming, he reveals that  the Dionysian 
art-state of nature, the Ureine, is simultaneously and in its deepest truth the tearing-apart  of all 
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uniformity, all identity, all individuation. The matrix of Heraclitus’ ἀγών is fire itself, the divine 
force of life that creates and destroys worlds by turn, time and again to all eternity.
 Nietzsche affirms that Heraclitus “believes, like Anaximander, in a periodically  repeated 
end of the world out of the all-destroying cosmic fire. The period in which the world hurries 
toward the conflagration and dissolves into pure fire Heraclitus characterizes, with notable 
emphasis, as a desire, a want, or lack; the full consumption in fire he calls satiety.”223 Heraclitus 
says that the αἰών (aeon; life, time, century) is a child playing dice, or, in one of Nietzsche’s 
interpretations: “‘The world is the game Zeus plays, […] of the fire itself. The is the only sense 
in which the one is at the same time the many.’”224 Nietzsche writes of this “game of the great 
world-child Zeus”:225 “the ever self-renewing impulse to play calls new worlds into being.” For 
the αἰών, also called fire, “builds towers of sand like a child at the seashore, piles them up and 
tramples them down. From time to time it starts the game anew. An instant of satiety—and again 
it is seized by its need, as the artist is seized by his need to create.”226  Hence this creative 
instinct, at once an instinct toward destruction, ignites itself anew each day, sending the last 
world into oblivion.
 Stars, in his theory, are “barks in which pure vaporizations [are] gathered. Whenever 
these barks turn about, solar and lunar eclipses occur. The sun itself is thus a vaporous burning 
mass: daytime depletes the vapors, and in the morning they produce themselves anew; the sun is 
new every day.”227 Heraclitus thus devises a mythological, cosmological physics; Nietzsche calls 
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his system a cosmodicy, already many bounds beyond all theodicies. This word, cosmodicy, 
Cosmodicee a combination of the Greek words, κόσµος and δίκη, meaning, therefore, cosmic 
justice, was coined by Erwin Rohde in respect to Heraclitus, as an alternative to theodicy. He 
arrived at this formulation through a rejection of Bernays’ theory of Heraclitus as being 
indifferent to justice and injustice alike.228  Thus he rendered possible the interpretation of 
Heraclitus that  Nietzsche takes up when, for example, he puts in the Ephesian’s mouth the 
following words: “The struggle of the many is pure justice itself! In fact, the one is the many.”229 
Moreover, Rohde used this very expression, “aesthetic cosmodicy,” to describe The Birth of 
Tragedy.230 
 The Heraclitean solar system is formed of the purest, highest, and most vital beings: stars 
of primordial fire. For the wisdom of the Heraclitean man is determined by his proximity to fire, 
by the dryness of his soul: “the soul parched with thirst is the wisest” (14 [A 52]).231  And: 
“eternally living fire, which ignites with measure and is extinguished with measure” (14 [A 
30]).232  The solar system, reborn daily, is made of numerous constellations of pure wisdom, 
which reflect, in their harmonious and dissonant relation, the agonal brilliance of Greek 
civilization. In a fragment contemporary to his lectures on the pre-Platonics, Nietzsche writes: 
Heraclitus The creative power of the artist primordial [die bildende Kraft des 
Künstlers uranfänglich].
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The philosopher is the extension of that drive by which we, by means of anthropological 
illusions, continually relate with nature. The eye. Time. [Das Auge. Zeit.]
      KSA  7: 19 [134]233 
Here, the anthropomorphic-artistic, plastic power of man enigmatically clarifies itself in the role 
it shall come to play for Nietzsche. It is by a spherical projection of the human eye onto the 
cosmos that the world is created ever anew, and this projection is a temporal phenomenon—
therefore, subject to fluctuation, to the constant birth, death and rebirth that time entails. The 
human animal, in its incessant creation of the world, creates its own nature, its own internal 
physis over and over again, ever sacrificing old natures in the fiery  need to create and recreate 
the cosmos in its image. This is the only rule of the game—the only justice.
 Democritus and Heraclitus share the position that  movement (i.e., becoming) is incessant, 
and that “every motion presupposes an opposite” so that, consequently, for both of them: “war is 
the father of all things [… .]” War (πόλεµος) is here another name for the Hellenic ἀγών, the 
overarching principle of Greek life in Nietzsche’s view. Another consonance between the two 
philosophers, inseparable from that of strife, is the indestructibility of matter. In his section of 
Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks on Heraclitus, Nietzsche quotes Schopenhauer on this 
matter: “Forever and ever, persistent matter must  change its form. Grasping the due of causality, 
mechanical, physical, chemical and organic phenomena greedily push to the fore, snatching 
matter from one another, for each would reveal its own inherent  idea. We can follow this strife 
throughout the whole of nature. In fact we might say that nature exists by virtue of it.”234 Yet the 
Democritean system is “of the greatest consequence” because, with it, “for the first time the 
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collective, anthropomorphic, mythic view of the world has been overcome.”235  Democritus’ 
theory  of infinite worlds bases itself on the proposition that “[e]ach self-isolating entity from the 
mass of primal bodies: countless worlds exist. They are generated and yet also cast  into 
destruction.”236 
 Nietzsche had doubtless learned of this from Lange, who relates as Democritus’ fourth 
fundamental principle: 
The atoms are infinite in number, and of endless variety and form. In the eternal fall 
through infinite space, the greater, which fall more quickly, strike against the lesser, and 
lateral movements and vortices that thus arise are the commencement of the formation of 
worlds. Innumerable worlds are formed and perish successively and simultaneously.237 
Lange defends this theory, often accused, according to him, of being “monstrous” in antiquity, by 
insisting that it “stands much nearer to our modern ideas than that of Aristotle, who proved a 
priori that besides his self-contained world there could be no second.”238 Although Democritus’ 
view that large bodies fall faster than smaller ones is “erroneous,” the theory of lateral motion 
and revolution between atoms founded on the variousness of their shapes and the fact that 
collision never takes place in their center, but along the axes of individual atoms, is followed by 
“the principles of modern mechanical science.” These lateral motions gain in complexity, and “as 
the collision of constant new atoms with a layer of atoms already in lateral motion constantly 
imparts new forces, so we may suppose that the motion will continually increase.”239  Aristotle 
objected to the Democritean physics because he taught that “if there could be void space, which 
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he thought impossible, then all bodies must necessarily fall with equal speed, since the difference 
in the rapidity  of the descent is determined by the various densities of the medium—as, for 
example, water and air.” Lange concedes that here, as in his “doctrine of gravitation towards the 
center of the universe,” Aristotle “was at one with our modern science,” although his deduction 
is not consistently  “rational.” Epicurus, for his part, came to the following conclusion with 
regard to Democritus’ physics: “because in empty space there is no resistance, all bodies must 
fall equally fast”—this view, according to Lange, is only  “apparently in agreement with modern 
physics” since the “true theory of gravitation” would not come about until Galileo.240 Lange also 
relates Democritus’ theory  of the permanent subsistence of matter and the consequent doctrine 
that: “All change is only a combination and separation of atoms” to Kant’s “first analogy of 
experience,” according to which: “In all changes of phenomena matter is permanent, and the 
quality thereof in nature is neither increased nor diminished.”241 Lange’s purpose is thus to prove 
the currency of the Democritean system, and its proximity to “our” modern materialism, 
indissociable for him from Kantian metaphysics.
 Nietzsche explains the manner in which worlds are atomically created for Democritus as 
follows: 
A single world arises thus: impact between different sorts of atoms produces the excretion 
of a mass in which the lighter particles are driven upward. By the same effects of 
collision, the mass is caused to turn—the bodies forced outward settle themselves down 
from the outside, like a sort of skin. This shell becomes increasingly thin, since its 
particles are driven more and more into the middle. Out of the atoms in the middle, earth 
is formed; out of those that climb upward, sky, fire, and air. Here and there thicker masses 
ball together. Air, which forces itself about, is a stormy vortex motion; they gradually  dry 
out in this and are ignited by rapid motion as stars. Thus, smaller particles are squeezed 
out of the earthly corpus by winds and stars and flow together into the depths as water. 
90
240 Lange, History of Materialism, 1: 26.
241 Lange, History of Materialism, 1: 19.
The earth became increasingly more firm. Gradually it takes its place at the center of the 
world; in the beginning, since it was still small and light, it moved here and there. The 
sun and moon, being at an earlier stage of their formation, were stirred by those masses 
orbiting around the earth’s core and so were brought into line in our world system.242 
The stars which, for Heraclitus, were sparks of primordial fire, become for Democritus light, dry, 
quickly-moving clusters of air atoms, rising upward from the earth to form a mass of 
constellations, purified of myth.
 In this sense, the aesthetic intuitions of Heraclitus which, for him, remain in the realm of 
anthropomorphic myth, find their scientific actualization and justification in Democritus, just as 
they  find their incarnation in the tragic hero, Empedocles. Democritus defines thought as 
physical; Nietzsche writes, in a fragment of 1872, under the heading “Democritus”: “Thought as 
movement” (KSA  7: 23 [39]).243 And in the notes to his lectures: “Democritus proceeds only 
from the reality of motion, because, to be precise, thought is motion. […] ‘There exists a motion, 
since I think and thought has reality.’ But if motion exists, then empty  space must also exist, 
unless ‘Not-Being is as real as Being,’ [(Democritus, frag. 156)] or Not-Being (οὐδέν) is in no 
way less than Being (δέν). With absolutely filled space, motion is impossible.”244 Therefore, as 
Lange says: “Nothing exists by atoms and empty space: all else is only opinion.”245 This, then, is 
the materialist incarnation of the Heraclitean πάντα ῥεῖ—all things now take on their scientific 
aspect—they are moving atoms, hastened along the temporal path.
 At the midpoint between Heraclitus and Democritus, between mythical becoming and 
materialist positivism, Empedocles stands, the comet incarnate, the transitional figure between 
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Myth and Science, in whom this tension is strong enough to require a self-sacrifice of the highest 
order. He is, moreover, the tragic harbinger of culture. Nietzsche writes of this hero, alive in 
celestial flame, who is a mirror, indeed, for Nietzsche himself: 
Empedocles continually stands on this boundary line, […]; he demarcates the age of 
myth, tragedy, and orgiasticism yet  at  the same time there appears in him the new Greek, 
as democratic statesman, orator, enlightened figure, allegorist, and scientific human 
being. In him the two periods wrestle with each other; he is a man of competition [an 
agonal man, a man of the ἀγών] through and through.246
The German Romantic Mimesis of Antiquity and Nietzsche
 Nietzsche was not the first to connect the Greeks with the possibility of a German culture 
to come. This question, rather, had hung thickly in the air of German philosophy since 
Winckelmann’s famous and fateful utterance: “The only way we can become great, and, if this is 
possible, inimitable, is by imitating the Ancients.”247 Which is to say, following the Aristotelian 
determination, for art, τέχνη to imitate nature, φύσις. The Greeks represent  our lost nature which 
we must recover by an artificial, technical, artistic imitation of them—in order to attain to a 
culture that is properly our own. 
 Schiller, in his essay On Naïve and Sentimental Poetry, speaks of the love of “antiquity,” 
as well as that of “flowers,” of “animals,”248 etc., as the love of that which is both “natural” and 
“naïve”—he declares: “nature must contrast with art and put it to shame.” In these natural, naïve 
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things, “we cherish that inner necessity, that eternal oneness with themselves.”249  Schiller goes 
on: 
They  are what we were; they are what we should become once more. We were nature like 
them, and our culture should lead us along the path of reason and freedom back to nature. 
Thus they depict at once out  lost childhood, something that remains ever dearest to us, 
and for this reason they fill us with a certain melancholy. Because at  the same time they 
portray  our supreme perfection in an ideal sense, they transport  us into a state of sublime 
emotion.250 
Nature is called naïve because of its “superior force of the passion and a lack of reflection.”251 
However, he who lives in nostalgia, striving hopelessly  after his originary naïveté falls into 
modern sentimentality, which is barbaric. The sentimental age, the condemnation to an eternal 
striving back to a lost  nature, thus begins with self-reflection and self-consciousness, which 
brings with it both the idealization of a lost nature and the tragic impossibility of its recuperation
—this comes about with modern philosophy. 
 The Greeks existed with nature in a perfectly harmonious manner: “Consider how 
confidently  this people was able, under its serendipitous sky, to live with nature in the wild; 
consider how very much nearer to the simplicity of nature lay its manner of thinking, its way of 
feeling, its mores, and what a faithful copy of this is provided by the works of its poets.”252 The 
Greek “does not cling to nature with fervor, sensitivity, and sweet melancholy that we moderns 
do. Indeed, by personifying and deifying it in its individual appearances, and by presenting its 
effects as actions of beings endowed with freedom, the Greek overcomes serene necessity in it, 
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precisely what makes it so attractive to us.”253  Now: “Our feeling for nature is like the sick 
person’s feeling for health.”254 Yet it is still possible for genius to spring forth organically; indeed 
“[e]very  true genius must be naïve or he is no genius.”255 Poets, says Schiller, are “everywhere 
the guardians of nature”; in his relation to nature, the poet “will either be nature or seek the lost 
nature.” The former is the character of the naïve poet, the latter of the sentimental poet.256 “As 
long as the human being is still part  of nature that is pure […], he operates as an undivided 
sensuous unity  and as a harmonizing whole.”257 For Schiller, the purity of this cosmic harmony, 
both human and divine, in which the poet has a necessary existence, is broken by the mastery  of 
man by “culture and art,” following which “he can only express himself as a moral unity, that is 
to say, as someone striving for unity.” Thereafter, the poet, rather than naïvely  imitating the 
“actuality” of the nature of which he constitutes an essential component, must sentimentally 
imitate the ideal of this lost unity.258  Schiller calls Goethe a naïve poet in an age of 
sentimentalism—in other words, a comet—pure among the impure.
 Nietzsche wrote, in the summer of 1876: “The artist needs the infidelity  of memory in 
order not to copy (abzuschreiben) nature but to transform (umzubilden) nature” (KSA  7: 17 
[32]).259 This transformation entails, indeed, a maximal exercise of the homeotic plastic force—
we are separated from original nature—from the Greeks—by an ocean of oblivion: and this is 
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highly  necessary to our approach to them—for that origin, rather, lies in the future of a cultural 
resurgence. Nietzsche tirelessly emphasizes the importance of forgetting for life: “life in any true 
sense is impossible without forgetfulness.”260 For the “man who totally lacks the power to forget, 
who is doomed to see becoming everywhere” loses himself in “this flux of becoming” and “no 
longer believes in his own being” or in “himself [… .]”261  He is overcome by a Heraclitean 
paralysis of ceaseless transformation, and is yet incapable of transforming himself, because he 
refuses to let go of his past  selves. The reflective man, subject to knowledge and the “great and 
ever-growing burden of the past” envies innocent creatures who live unhistorically—his 
immediate reaction to seeing animals grazing in a field is one of intense pain and sentimentality: 
And so it hurts him, like the thought of a lost Paradise, to see the herd grazing, or, nearer 
still, a child, that has nothing yet of the past to disown, and plays in happy blindness 
between the walls of the past and the future. And yet its play must be disturbed, and only 
too soon will it be summoned from its little kingdom of oblivion.262 
Nietzsche’s modern man, like that of Schiller, thus also strives after the unity and innocence of 
childlike nature—of the Heraclitean cosmic child, who plays his game of chance instinctively, 
and yet in accordance with the laws of divine necessity. Nietzsche echoes Schiller: “The 
humanity of the Greeks lies in a certain childlike naïveté in which, among them, man is revealed
—his art, government, society, military  and civil law, sexual relations education, politics. It’s 
precisely the human element that appears among the Greeks in a state of nakedness and 
inhumanity  that makes it indispensable for education.”263  The cultural constellation of the 
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Greeks, for Nietzsche, grows out of their inhumanity, the pure organic impulse of that people. 
This inhumanity, however, is precisely what makes the Greeks human; indeed, it  is by means of 
their creative fervor that they constantly rebirth nature, first as myth, and gradually, in a series of 
cosmogonies, arrive at the creation of a physical world. This is the major difference between 
these two philosophers: for Schiller, modern life must first be sentimental and idealist in order to 
imitate antiquity  and thus to give way to a coming world, while for Nietzsche, the Greeks 
themselves are originally the creators of nature, and it is our task, within the breadth of our 
perspective, to create the Greeks themselves, not as our lost, irretrievable nature, but  as that 
model of a unified birth of culture as nature that our time requires: to create the Greeks as they 
created their world is, in the same breath, to create our own nature.
 Schiller’s “decisive gesture” with his On Naïve and Sentimental Poetry, according to 
Lacoue-Labarthe, was to historicize Aristotle’s definition of τέχνη in a particular manner. 
Schiller divides the ancient as the lost life of nature, the time of purity  and naïveté, from the 
modern, the artificiality of culture, the perverse sentimentality for a never-experienced 
childhood. 
“Generally  speaking,” a canonical text  of the Physics says, “on the one hand τέχνη 
accomplishes what φύσις is incapable of effecting; on the other hand, τέχνη imitates 
φύσις.”264 Interpreting historically, this double postulation can yield this result: art, so far 
as it imitates nature, is specifically—following Winckelmann—Greek art: mimesis is 
Greek. On the other hand, it is up to the Moderns to accomplish […] what nature cannot 
carry  out. Consequently, it is up to the Moderns to go a step beyond the Greeks—to 
“accomplish” them. 
 That is to say, also, to surpass and surmount them.”265 
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The ideal function of art is thus to create nature by µίµησις, that is, to engender, complete and 
dialectically overreach the world of the Greeks in the foundation of novelty.
 The explicit ambition of the Nietzsche of The Birth of Tragedy was a German “rebirth of 
tragedy,”266  which he meant to accomplish by a revival of that  “time” and of those “men” in 
whom “the German spirit has so far striven most resolutely to learn from the ancient Greeks”—
he names “Goethe, Schiller, and Winckelmann,” since whom, however, “the endeavor to attain to 
culture and to the Greeks on the same path has grown incomprehensibly feebler and feebler.”267 
In his prophetic voice, Nietzsche proclaims the source from which this miraculous resurgence, 
reconnecting the ancient Greeks to the modern Germans, must come: “Let no one try to blight 
our faith in a yet-impending rebirth of Hellenic antiquity; for this alone gives us hope for a 
renovation and purification of the German spirit through the fire magic of music.”268
 The opposition of Nature and Culture, of φύσις and τέχνη, of the Greek and the German, 
before Nietzsche found itself all too often superimposed on a metaphysical opposition, attributed 
also, yet in a premature stage of non-self-consciousness, to the Greeks, namely that of noumena 
and the phenomena. Nietzsche transforms the questions surrounding the relation of the Germans 
to the Greeks by shifting the terrain away from such metaphysical preoccupations and toward a 
concern for life with respect to a people; thus, of a philological typology of truths and a method 
for their cultivation and destruction. This very opposition becomes immediately untenable for 
Nietzsche, since he defines nature itself as the creation of culture.
97
266 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, § 19, 121.
267 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, § 20, 121.
268 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, § 20, 123.
The Young Nietzsche’s Schopenhauer and Lange
 Nietzsche called Schopenhauer a champion of culture, a hero of the conquest  of 
knowledge by art, both despite and by virtue of his asceticism. The young Nietzsche writes of his 
philosophical master, in 1873, in the following reverent manner: “[Schopenhauer] is the 
destroyer of forces hostile to culture; he reopens the depths of existence. Thanks to him the 
serenity of art becomes possible once more” (KSA  7: 28 [6]).269 Schopenhauer lifted the veil of 
language and morals, revealing the eternal suffering life in the will: “A chief source of that 
suffering which we found above all to be essential and inevitable to all life is, when it really 
appears in a definite form, that Eris, the conflict of all individuals, the expression of the 
contradiction, with which the will to live is affected in its inner self, and which attains a visible 
form through the principium individuationis. Wild-beast fights are the most cruel means of 
showing this directly  and vividly. In this original discord lies an unquenchable source of 
suffering [… .]”270 Nietzsche’s vocation is to transform this pessimism into an affirmation of life. 
“As Nietzsche wrote to Rohde in October 1868, the ‘ethical air, the Faustian odor, cross, death, 
and grave’ (B 2, 322) were what fascinated him about Schopenhauer. ‘Cross, death, and grave’ 
did not depress him; on the contrary, they seemed to be an elixir of life. […] [I]n his view, 
Schopenhauer’s negation of the will was not denial but extreme affirmation. It signaled the 
victory of the mental will over the natural will.”271 Nietzsche detected in Schopenhauer, as well 
as among the Greeks, the force of this life-affirming, active pessimism.
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 An early critique of Schopenhauer, titled “On Schopenhauer,” and written between 
October 1867 and April 1868, exposes the extent to which the young Nietzsche had already 
performed his essential work upon Schopenhauer’s opposition of the will as thing-in-itself and 
representation. Several years later, in 1870-1871, he would write: “In man the primal One looks 
back at  itself through the appearance: the appearance reveals the essence. I. e.[,] the primal One 
looks at man, more precisely, at man looking at the appearance, at man looking through the 
appearance. There is no road to the primal One for man. He is all appearance” (KSA  7: 7 
[170]).272  In other words, man’s essence, far from existing behind phenomena as a 
transhistorical, eternal truth, is inseparable from his phenomenality, which is in constant flux and 
transformation, and thus requires a constant reevaluation of life and its needs for science, art, 
philosophy.
 For Schopenhauer, according to Nietzsche, the problem of Kant, in seeking to “explain 
the world under an assumed factor,” namely, the thing-in-itself, and the reason why  he did not 
perceive his answer as a “failure” is that  “he did not want to sense the dark and contradictory 
elements in the region where indiv[iduality] ends.” Thus, for Schopenhauer: “The dark drive, 
brought under an apparatus of representation, manifests itself as world. This drive has not found 
a place under the princip[ium] indiv[iduationis].”273 The immense, destructive strife of the will 
is forever in excess of individuating representation, raging behind it in a noumenal realm and 
exposing the illusionary  nature of the individual—of the subject, by presenting the eternity of the 
oneness of all living things—all creatures capable of affirming the universal will, and thereby 
affirming life.
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 Nietzsche writes: “[Schopenhauer’s] answer to the yearning question of all 
metaphysicians—expressed in Goethe’s ‘whether the spirit would not reveal many a secret’—is a 
bold Yes; and to ensure that the new insight was seen far and wide, like an inscription on a 
temple, her wrote the redeeming formula for the old and most  important riddle of the world 
across the face of his book as the title The World as Will and Representation.” Nietzsche 
translates Schopenhauer solution in the following “semi-figurative form”: “The will, which has 
neither cause [grundlos] nor knowledge, manifests itself, when subjected to an apparatus of 
representation, as world.”274  This groundless will, then, surging forth at every instant like lava 
from its subterranean abyss, yet only finds incarnation as reality to the extent that some medium 
of representation, in its thin and veiling surface-existence, is used to express it. Representation, 
whose law is the principium individuationis, separating all things out into discrete and 
disconnected forms, is the falsifying manifestation of the will, whose breadth exceeds all 
individuation. For this reason, the Schopenhauerean Wille, the force of life, goes far beyond the 
Kantian Ding an sich which, for its part, remains separated from man, and eternally unknowable, 
existing merely as reality’s a priori condition of possibility. Schopenhauer’s Wille, declares 
Nietzsche, “went so far beyond Kant that its discoverer could say that  he considered it  as ‘that 
which has very long been sought under the name of philosophy, and which is therefore 
considered by  those who are familiar with history as the philosopher’s stone.’”275  This is the 
“quintessence of Sch[openhauer]’s system [… .]”276
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 Despite the fact that Schopenhauer followed Kant down his “dangerous path” toward the 
thing-in-itself in the creation of his philosophical system and, as Friedrich Überweg argued, 
viewed this as “only a hidden category,” a major difference emerges between the two 
philosophers. For that which Schopenhauer “puts in the place of the Kantian X, the will, is 
created only with the help  of poetic intuition, while his attempted logical proofs can satisfy 
neither Schopenhauer nor us.”277 It  is thus an intuition, an organic and artistic movement, that 
founds the will, and not a logical progression constituting a proof. It is, further, necessary to 
“protest against the predicates attributed by Schopenhauer to his will, which sound far too 
definite for something absolutely unthinkable and which are gained throughout from their 
opposition to the world of representation; while between the thing-in-itself and the appearance 
even the concept of opposition is meaningless.”278  No opposition can take hold between the 
ungraspable and the graspable. 
 This critique of Schopenhauer’s attribution of qualities to the thing-in-itself is executed in 
accordance with a specific neo-Kantian materialism. Nietzsche had read Lange’s History of 
Materialism (Geschichte des Materialismus, 1860) during the summer of 1866, and been greatly 
inspired by it. He brought this materialism to bear upon Schopenhauer’s determination of the 
thing-in-itself as will. This critique based itself on the postulate that the unknowable must not be 
regarded as a negation of the knowable or as its dialectical opposite. For if one does this, one 
immediately anthropomorphizes that which is beyond determination by projecting aspects of the 
known world onto one that exceeds all epistemological faculties. Thus, to reinterpret  the Kantian 
“thing-in-itself” as universal will is to assign it characteristics that are proper to the phenomenal
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—to the realm of experience. Lange accepts Schopenhauer’s designation of the will as a 
universal life-force, yet objects to its assignation to the position of the thing-in-itself. , otherwise 
one runs the risk of using the logic of the antipode to project determinations of the knowable 
world onto what is indeterminable.279 From Schopenhauer’s perspective, Nietzsche condemns 
the Kantian division between an atemporal, primordial cause of all things and the flux of 
becoming in a fallen, illusory world and advocates for the inclusion of the will in becoming as 
the interior life-force of man. From Lange’s perspective, however, he criticizes the 
Schopenhauerean will qua thing-in-itself as a name for the unnamable, unknowable essence 
behind all things. These two critiques, arising from opposing metaphysical and scientific 
impulses, compete in his reading of Schopenhauer.
 Nietzsche transforms, from the very start, the concept of the thing-in-itself, in the 
championing of his perspectivism. He writes: “there may be a thing-in-itself, albeit  in no other 
sense than that in the realm of transcendence anything is possible that is every hatched out in the 
mind of a philosopher.”280 That which the philosopher calls the universal condition of objective 
reality  is thus revealed by Nietzsche to be radically  subjective and perspectival; the language of 
universality  is nothing but an anthropomorphic and metaphorical disguise for the philosopher’s 
own urges and beliefs. Within the philosopher, two “possibilities” meet, properly, that of 
possibility and that of impossibility, and their combination engenders the unthinkable thought of 
the thing-in-itself, airing on the side of the impossible—the “negative power of the first 
possibility [… .]”281 Kant and Schopenhauer are thus like Parmenides, who “tested the existent 
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and the non-existent, the positive and the negative properties—and suddenly he found that he 
could not get  past the concept of a negative quality, the concept of non-existence.”282 Parmenides 
thus discovers reality  as “eternal unity”283— the “key to the cosmic secret, remote from all 
human illusion.”284 Having grasped this, he could thus “climb down, into the abyss of all things. 
[…] By wrenching apart the senses and the capacity  for abstraction, in other words by splitting 
up the mind as though it were composed of two quite separate capacities, he demolished the 
intellect itself, encouraging man to indulge in that wholly erroneous distinction between ‘spirit’ 
and ‘body’ which, especially since Plato, lies upon philosophy like a curse.”285 
 Since any opposition between the thing-in-itself and appearance is strictly unprovable, 
though it  can be thought, “this concept of a continually decreasing possibility” must be 
reinforced. Were the moralist to object  to this “knot of possibilities,” he would be countered by 
the declaration that “the thinker, faced with the mystery  of the world, has no other means than 
guessing, i.e. hoping that a moment of genius will place upon his lips the word that provides the 
key to the writing that lies before everyone’s eyes and yet has never been read, which we call the 
world. But is that word the will?”286 The question which Schopenhauer believed, at  the end of his 
life, had been left unanswered by  his philosophy was, according to Nietzsche, “the question of 
the limits of individ[uation].”287 Nietzsche will accordingly, in his own philosophy, stretch those 
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limits, placing his emphasis on the supreme malleability of individuality, no longer as a 
metaphysical principle, but as one that is highly subject to time and to history. 
 For Schopenhauer, all forms of “appearance” of “the will as a thing-in-itself” are “alien to 
itself” insofar as they  concern “only its nature as an object.”288  Space and time, thus, as 
appearances, are thus called by Schopenhauer the principium individuationis. Schopenhauer 
writes, quoted by Nietzsche: “This thing-in-itself, as such, is never an object, because every 
object is its mere appearance and no longer itself. If it was nevertheless to be thought of 
objectively, it had to borrow a name and a concept from an object, i.e.[,] from something in 
some way objectively given, and therefore from one of its appearances.”289  This objective 
thought, however, as Nietzsche points out, following Lange’s criticism of Schopenhauer, 
possesses merely “an apparent objectivity”—for in its process, we must adorn the “obscure and 
incomprehensible x” with “ brightly  colored garments” and, thereafter, regard these garments as 
the thing-in-itself. That is, by attributing human characteristics to the thing-in-itself through its 
determination as will, this very  thing is banished into invisibility: through this process, the 
“concept of the ‘thing-in-itself’ is secretly eliminated because it is ‘meant to be’ and we are 
handed another concept in exchange.”290 The dazzling cloak of language which encloses the will 
thus serves both to corrupt  and to bury deeper this concept of the thing-in-itself. It pretends to 
objectivity and confers on the true, unified, ineffable concept of reality a false existence. 
 This “borrowed name and concept is precisely the will, ‘because it is the clearest, most 
developed appearance of the thing-in-itself, directly  illuminated by knowledge.’” But what 
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fascinates Nietzsche most powerfully is that “all the predicates of the will too are borrowed from 
the world of appearances.”291  In other words, the will itself, unlike the Kantian thing-in-itself, 
has no reality  outside experience. “Admittedly, Sch[openhauer] makes an attempt here and there 
to present  the meaning of these predicates as totally incomprehensible and transcendent, e.g. W 
as W II, p. 368: ‘The unity  of that will in which we have recognized the essential nature of the 
nature-in-itself of the world of appearances is a metaphysical one. Consequently our knowledge 
of it is transcendent, i.e.[,] it is not based on the functions of our intellect and therefore cannot 
really be grasped by them.’”292  Nietzsche explains that both “will” and “unity” are “predicates 
for the thing-in-itself, taken from the world of appearances, under which the real heart of the 
matter, the transcendental, evaporates.”293  The predicates “unity, eternity (i.e timelessness), 
liberty (i.e. lacking in any reason [Grundlosigkeit]” are bound, like the thing-in-itself, to “our 
organization” and therefore “it is extremely  doubtful that they have any  meaning at all outside 
the sphere of human knowledge.” Yet the fact  that they exist unknowably, while “their opposites 
rule the world of appearances” is unprovable by both Kant and Schopenhauer; they  immediately 
clothe themselves in concepts of “multiplicity, temporality and causality” when exposed to the 
homogenizing light of the human gaze.294 This is why Schopenhauer says, and Nietzsche affirms 
he is “entirely right”: “it will never be possible to reach the nature of things from without: 
however much we may investigate, we gain nothing but images and names.”295  Thus, 
unbeknownst to Schopenhauer himself, he had created the possibility, through the failure of his 
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definition of the will as thing-in-itself, to philosophize this will as experience itself, in the ever-
shifting movements of history. 
 “The will appears:” writes Nietzsche, “how could it appear?”296 By means of intellect, the 
µηχανή of the will, which serves to represent the will, to conjure it to the surface from its depths. 
“But this enhancement of brain development is brought about by the constantly increasing and 
ever more complicated need of the corresponding appearances of the will.”297 The will and the 
intellect thus grow together, contiguously, out of a mutual necessity: the more powerful the 
intellect, which is to say, the more inhuman—the more godlike—the stronger is the will. The 
“conscious self” is “tertiary” for Schopenhauer: as consciousness it “presupposes the organism, 
and the organism presupposes the will.”298  The will appears in “a step-by-step sequence of 
phenomena” which bring on their wings “continually  increasing existential needs:” these in turn 
are satisfied by nature’s “corresponding a step-by-step sequence of aids” of which the intellect is 
one.299 In this manner, a “world of appearances” is placed “in front of the world of appearances”: 
“Before the appearance of the intellect we already see the principium indiv[iduationis], the law 
of causality, in full effectiveness.” Therefore, the intellect is in no way strictly  inchoate but, 
annihilating the possibility of any transcendence strictly speaking by the immediacy of its 
emergence, it  appears within the principle of individuation from the instant  of its first 
appearance: “The will seizes life post-haste, seeking to manifest itself in every way; it begins at 
the lowest levels and as it were works its way up from the bottom. In this region of 
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Schopenhauer’s system everything is already dissolved into words and images: the initial 
definition of the thing-in-itself—almost even the memory of it—has been lost.”300 There where 
this memory is once again evoked, the contradictory nature of Schopenhauer’s thought comes to 
full lucidity. The will must be both that which subtracts itself from all appearance and the very 
soul of this appearance. The “regressus of appearances” shows us that “it lay  in the nature of the 
thing-in-itself to manifest itself in such events.” Yet these events are merely  “translations into the 
language of our intuiting intellect.”301 
 The question of the intellect’s origin exposes, according to Nietzsche, the antinomy of 
Schopenhauer’s system—this is why Schopenhauer so carefully avoids this question. The 
intellect, in an identical manner to the thing-in-itself, must have “burst forth suddenly and 
abruptly from a non-existent world” as a “flower of knowledge” from within “a sphere of 
timelessness and spacelessness, without intervention of causality.” At this juncture, the intellect 
must either remain “eternally joined together with the thing-in-itself as a new predicate” or the 
intellect must prove itself to be impossible—that is, without origin.302 
 This loophole in the Schopenhauerean system reveals that he had already taken the fatal 
step away from metaphysics, in a manner that he himself avoided. He presents, in fact, the will 
and the representation by which it manifests itself all as the world itself. “Schopenhauer’s thing-
in-itself would therefore be at one and the same time princip[ium] indiv[iduationis] and the 
ground of necessitation: in other words, the existing world. Sch[openhauer] tried to find the x of 
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an equation: and the result  of his calculation is that it equals x, i.e.[,] that he has not found it.”303 
Anaximander’s ἄπειρον, the indefinite totality  of being, which places itself outside all 
experience, and of which Nietzsche claims: “We may look upon it as the equal of the Kantian 
Ding an sich”304  proves to remain untouched by Schopenhauer, who covers it in attributes and 
unites it inseparably with the manifest world. Nietzsche writes, in a fragment of 1872: 
As soon as one wishes to gain knowledge of the thing-in-itself, then it is precisely this 
world—knowledge is only possible as a reflection and by measuring oneself according to 
one standard (sensation). 
 We know what the world is. Absolute and unconditional knowledge is the desire 
to know without knowledge. 
     KSA  7: 19 [146]305
 Schopenhauer made the leap, against his own will, that Parmenides never could make—
from an eternal, stagnant being into the ever-moving flux of experience. Thereafter, the depths 
and the surface are no longer opposed, on two incommunicable registers of noumena and 
phenomena—they are an ever-changing, ever-moving unity—there is no will independent of 
time.  There is, Nietzsche can thus affirm, a genealogy of the will, as there is a genealogy  of 
every concept.
 Nietzsche writes, in a fragment of 1872: “There is no form in nature, because there is no 
distinction between inner and outer. / All art is based upon the mirror of the eyes.” (KSA  7: 19 
[144])306  All art, like all metaphysical philosophy, is anthropomorphic; through our doubly-
mirrored eyes we see nature as our reflection, and nature creates us through our projection of 
human aspects onto it—the Greeks were utterly aware of this secret paradox—this circularity  by 
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which plastic force is employed to create one world after another, interminably—yet we 
moderns, in our seriousness, have forgotten it. The primordial is nothing but sensation—a 
rhythmic force from which concepts arise by an artistic process: the senses create artistically  that 
which they sense.
 Nietzsche’s tendency toward metaphysics founds nothing less than a metaphysics whose 
basis is utterly  physical, which is to say, contained within the sphere of experience—it is highly 
questionable whether this can still be called a metaphysics. Two consequences follow from his 
interpretation of Schopenhauer, which includes the will in the realm of appearance, as its 
absolute and deepest sense. Firstly, the valuation of art above all else for Kultur, which is true 
both for antiquity and modernity—“for it is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that life is eternally 
justified”307 as Nietzsche declares in The Birth of Tragedy. His use of the term “aesthetic” must 
here be taken as a modification of its original Kantian meaning, as the science of the 
metaphysical conditions of sense perception, as well as of that meaning, popularized by 
Alexander Baumgarten in the 1750s, as the criticism of taste. We mustn’t forget, here, 
Nietzsche’s philological tracing of wisdom to taste: this assures the fact that, for him, the task of 
the philosopher is doubly aesthetic—for just as he must replace all a priori values and 
determinations of the thing-in-itself with sensation and the constantly sacrificial experience of 
becoming, he must also combine this transformation of the philosophical scope with a valuation 
of art and the plasticity of life above all else. Indeed, the significance of the aesthetic is artistic, 
yet in such a way that it surpasses the idealist, metaphysical definition by displacing it onto the 
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sphere of artistic creation. Life, therefore, is only justified insofar as it creates itself organically, 
through the ἀγών of the Dionysian and Apollinian art instincts of nature, as a tragic work of art. 
 Secondly, Nietzsche’s understanding of Schopenhauer leads him to the realm of the 
material—that is, away from metaphysics, toward science and positivism. Nietzsche had read, in 
1872, since its very appearance, Friedrich Zöllner’s book, On the Nature of Comets: 
Contribution to the History and the Theory of Knowledge (Über die Natur der Kometen. 
Beiträge zur Geschichte und Theorie der Erkenntniss, Leipzig, 1872) and considered it an 
example of “scientific Schopenhauerism.” Zöllner exposes, in his chapter “On the general 
properties of matter,” a “dynamic theory  of movement based on the attribution of physical facts 
to matter.”308 And these facts are, according to Zöllner, the fundamental materials used by the 
subject to create an external world of representation for himself. The result of this is that “the 
phenomenon of sensation is a fundamental fact of the observation just as well as the movement 
of matter, and we are even obliged to connect it  to movement, since it serves as the general 
property  and the condition of the comprehension of sensible movements.”309  Zöllner thus 
inscribes the Democritean concept of thought as movement in the Schopenhauerean framework.
 In November 1872, Nietzsche wrote to Rohde of his excitement with regard to Zöllner’s 
book: “Have you heard of the Zöllner scandal at Leipzig? Look, then, at his book on the nature 
of comets someday; there are many astonishing things in it for us. Since this act, here is an 
honest man who, in the most  contemptuous manner, has been excommunicated from the republic 
of scholars, his closest friends have broken with him and everyone is slandering him as ‘crazy!’ 
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Yes, quite seriously as ‘mentally  ill’ because he doesn’t play the same fanfare on his trumpet as 
his compatriots! Such is the spiritual state that rules in the ochlocracy 310 of Leipzig scholars!”311 
 It was not only by a gesture of solidarity that Nietzsche wished to draw attention to this 
work, having just undergone the experience of being ostracized by  the academic community of 
philologists as a result of the scandal caused by  The Birth of Tragedy. The book was also “for us” 
as he said, meaning, perhaps, that  it  contained within it the profound comprehension of the 
significance of the comet as at once a scientific, an artistic, and a philosophical figure of 
transition—the prototype of the tragic hero.
The Ground of the Tragic
 At the time of Nietzsche’s professorship at  Basel, the conflict  between Hegelian Idealism 
and neo-Kantianism was in full flower, constituting a dominating presence both for philosophy 
and for science. Lange’s History of Materialism heavily influenced both Nietzsche’s reading of 
Schopenhauer and his view of metaphysics. Lange, a natural scientist and a founder of the 
Marburg School of neo-Kantianism, had attempted to reconcile materialism with idealism, 
which, as had been recognized, refer back to one another in a self-perpetuating double-bind. He 
considered himself to be returning to pre-Hegelian philosophy (which he regarded as a misstep  in 
the history of philosophy, toward Scholasticism) in order to “complete what Kant had only  half 
done: the annihilation of metaphysics.”312  The paradox of materialism, that it constantly  falls 
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back into idealism by the need to traverse physiology, which renders it  impossible to prove the 
physical experience of things-in-themselves, had resolved itself for Lange, however, in an 
idealist position, following Hermann von Helmholtz and rejecting the anti-speculative theory of 
Heinrich Czolbe, according to which “the sensible qualities of sensation are already completely 
present in the external stimuli [… ;] from a red-radiating object  a ready-made redness, from a 
sound source a melody, detaches itself in order to penetrate into us through the portals of the 
sense organs.”313  Lange, on the basis of the lack of empirical evidence available to prove 
Czolbe’s position on the direct transmission of eternal objects to perception, concluded that this 
theory, too, ended by resorting to idealism.
 Helmholtz had sought to prove Kant’s transcendental idealism by means of empirical 
physiology. In his 1853 address “On Goethe’s Scientific Researches,” he had written: 
The result of [scientific] examination, as at present understood, is that  the organs of sense 
do indeed give us information about external effects produced on them, but convey those 
effects to our consciousness in a totally  different form, so that the character of a sensuous 
perception depends not  so much on the properties of the object perceived as on those of 
the organ by which we receive the information.314 
Moreover, since our “nerve excitations” must have a cause, as “there can be no effect without 
cause, Helmholtz concludes that “the investigation of sensory  perception also leads us to what 
Kant had already recognized, namely  that  the principle, ‘No effect without cause,’ is a law of our 
thought given before all experience.”315 Conceding to this idealist-physiological position, Lange 
wrote: 
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The senses give us, as Helmholtz says, effects of things, not faithful copies, let alone the 
things themselves. To these mere effects, however, belong also the senses themselves, 
together with the brain and the supposed molecular movements in it. We must therefore 
recognize the existence of a transcendent world order, whether this depends on ‘things-in-
themselves,’ or whether—since even the ‘thing-in-itself’ is but a last application of our 
intuitive thought—it depends on mere relations, which exhibit themselves in various 
minds as various kinds and stages of the sensible, without its being at all conceivable 
what an adequate appearance of the absolute in a cognizing mind would be.316 
Metaphysics therefore triumphs, even in materialism, over science; belief takes hold where the 
limits of perception end. It is here, therefore, that Nietzsche departs from both Schopenhauer and 
Lange, and embarks on the creation of his own philosophy. For he writes: “You should not flee 
into some metaphysics, rather, you should actively sacrifice yourself for the emerging culture 
[euch der  w e r d e n d e n  K u l t u r  thätig opfern]! That is why I am strictly against dreamy 
idealism [Traumidealism]” (KSA  7: 19 [154]).317
 Indeed, Nietzsche, the young philologist was deeply  convinced of, as he put it in a 
fragment of 1872: “The impossibility  of metaphysics” (KSA  7: 23 [7])318 in his time. This is, 
moreover, the fault of Kant in his eyes: “The consequences of Kantian doctrine. End of 
metaphysics as a scientific discipline” (KSA  7: 19 [51]).319  By installing the inescapable 
transcendental world of the thing-in-itself behind experience as its condition of possibility, and 
by creating a categorical hierarchy constitutive of man’s newly inescapable and radically 
individualized consciousness, Kant had rendered impossible both metaphysics and any science 
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worthy of it. The absence of the ground of metaphysics constitutes, for Nietzsche, the ground of 
the tragic.
 In a fragment of 1872, Nietzsche writes of the “philosopher of tragic knowledge” as he 
who “controls the unleashed drive for knowledge, not by means of metaphysics. He does not 
establish a new faith. He senses it to be tragic that the ground of metaphysics has been cut away 
and can never be satisfied by the colorful kaleidoscope of the sciences.” It is thus his task to 
“[work] toward the construction of a new life; he returns art to its rights.” For this tragic 
philosopher, “the image of existence is made complete by the insight that the metaphysical only 
appears in anthropomorphic form.” This is why he finds it “necessary to create a concept: for 
skepticism is not the aim. Once it reaches its limitations, the drive for knowledge turns against in 
order to proceed to the critique of knowledge. Knowledge in the service of the best life. / One 
must even desire illusion—that is what makes it tragic” (KSA  7: 19 [35]).320 It is for this reason 
that metaphysics must be replaced by art, and knowledge overcome. The Heraclitean impulse 
thus is the most urgent of all. 
 The philosopher as comet is also the tragic philosopher; he must be willing to sacrifice 
himself for the sake of a culture and its truths, thought his nature semi-divine nature be so 
superior to those he yearns to save. Schopenhauer had written a letter to Goethe on such heroism, 
in which he expressed the following: “The courage not to keep any  question just  in one’s mind is 
what makes a philosopher. Philosophers must be like Sophocles’ Oedipus, who tirelessly 
searches for enlightenment about his own terrible fate, even if he already suspects that he will be 
horror-struck by the answers.”321 In such a way does the philosopher move through the world: as 
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a tragic hero, ever searching for himself, after the fashion of Heraclitus, until his consciousness 
becomes monstrous with self-knowledge so that he tumbles reflectively, by will, into the arms of 
fate. For tragic knowledge demands a sacrifice in the service of a distant horizon of community.
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2Hölderlin’s Passage: Divine Infidelity and Downgoing
 Nietzsche’s early thought is traversed by an ever-urgent need for the hyperbolic 
affirmation and overcoming of the circularity  between Nature and Man, wherein they must 
constantly create one another as their origin. The apotheosis of this circularity  takes place in the 
semi-divine tragic hero, who transforms it into the excentricity of the comet’s path, through its 
tragic and, indeed, sacrificial affirmation. This schema is inherited from the modern tragic poet 
Friedrich Hölderlin. Nietzsche writes that “nature” has locked man up in his “consciousness”—
in a world of illusions—and “thrown away the key.”322  Yet it  is man himself who creates this 
nature from which he comes, and which has condemned him to blindness; he creates this 
primeval sphere for himself by means of an artistic, anthropomorphic procedure, just as the 
Greeks created their divinities in order that  they may be eternally hidden from sight, appearing 
only through the falsifying mediation of incarnation. 
 Nietzsche writes, in a fragment toward his Untimely Meditations: “Doesn’t  every true 
work of art give the lie to Aristotle’s claim? Isn’t it  nature that imitates art? Doesn’t it, with the 
restiveness of its becoming, merely  haltingly repeat, in an inadequate language and in ever new 
attempts, what the artist expresses in all its purity? Doesn’t nature long for the artist so that he 
can redeem it from its imperfection?” (KSA 7: 35 [12]).323 The mimetic circle between nature 
and art is thus established—art creates nature as its imitator and at once forms the ideal of 
nature’s originality. But this imitative φύσις, as we know, this second nature bears the mark, the 
remembrance of an artistically  created nature before it which, too, was once a second nature. The 
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truth of the “true work of art” lies in its capacity both to recreate nature and to bring to life the 
chimera of a first nature—an origin. The life of man, the constellation of values by which he 
measures his experience, depends on his capacity to perfect nature, to shape his absent origin 
through artistic creation. There where the circle between art and nature ought to close, where the 
repetition of its rhythmic movement should begin again, which is to say—where time is destined 
to return to itself in the instant of what would otherwise be its death, there stands the figure of the 
tragic hero, a herald, announcing the coming culture of which he is himself the exemplar, and 
marking the difference between old and new through an act of sacrifice. It is the sacrifice, 
precisely, that is necessary for self-transcendence and the new creation of the lost ground of 
nature. 
 Nietzsche is not himself that tragic hero—he does not consider himself to be that 
transitional figure transforming twilight into dawn. Rather, he conjures the hero, brings him into 
being in writing, where writing takes on the role of tragedy, as the active deliverance from 
reflection, from image or representation, from the Apollonian language of art as the beautiful, to 
the primordial, the space of the Ur where life is created as unity, as the changing, turbulent 
temporality of experience. Thus, from out of himself and in an untimely  fashion, by plunging 
into the depths of a past both contained in his memory and called into being across history, which 
is to say, anew, Nietzsche brings to the surface of his time a multiplicity  of tragic heroes. He 
divides himself in writing to unearth and to create his self-sacrificing heroes. It is not he, the 
philologist-philosopher who shall bring about the passage from modernity into culture, but these 
figures who are destined to accomplish this grand reformation are his own reflections, according 
to the anthropomorphic movement of creative conjuring. Thus these heroes come about both in 
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unity  with him and as absolutely strange, different, monstrous creatures whose destiny is that of 
a humanity’s force unleashed upon nature. By the circular movement between the nature that 
creates man and the man who creates his nature, which courses through and animates all life, 
Nietzsche transforms his predecessors into his successors by creating them, and among these 
figures, these tragic heroes, through whom the spirit of Heraclitus runs like a vital force, are 
Oedipus, Empedocles and Hölderlin. A figure of myth, a figure of philosophy  and a figure of 
poetry. All of these figures bear the burden of being, singularly and in their various sacred 
solitudes, the last human being. Nietzsche first uses this turn of phrase not to describe the 
nihilistic man of the present  age who can only blink, as in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, but in an 
enigmatic fragment of 1873 entitled “Oedipus / Soliloquies of the Last Philosopher” to which I 
shall return in the next chapter. 
 Hölderlin takes on for Nietzsche a multiple role. If he is one of Nietzsche’s tragic heroes, 
he is first the thinker of the tragic hero to whom Nietzsche is most indebted, the first to poetize 
the transformation of predecessors—heroes—into successors. It  is through Hölderlin that 
Oedipus and Empedocles emerge, and it  is Hölderlin’s mode of creating figures from out of his 
own depths yet through a most profound intimacy with the culture of his ancient Greece—his 
Hyperion, Empedocles, Oedipus, Antigone—that prefigures Nietzsche’s own hyperbolic practice 
of figuration. 
Human Measure: Nietzsche and Hölderlin
 In 1861, at the age of sixteen, Nietzsche wrote a letter in praise of Hölderlin, defending 
the poet against an imagined critic and “friend.” It is entitled: “Letter to my friend in which I 
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recommend that he read my favorite poet”324 and was written as a secondary school assignment 
at the Schulpforta. Nietzsche’s teacher, Herr Koberstein, gave him a B-grade for the composition, 
instructing him to focus on a “healthier,” and “more German” poet.325 In this letter, Nietzsche 
attacks his interlocutor for accusing Hölderlin of espousing “the ideas of a lunatic, violent 
outbreaks against Germany, deification of the pagan world, now naturalism, now pantheism, now 
polytheism, all confused” and for praising the poet solely  for his “accomplished Greek meters.” 
Passionately, Nietzsche insists that Hölderlin’s “poems (to consider their form alone) spring from 
the purest, most susceptible sensibility” and that their “naturalness and originality eclipse the art 
and formal skill of Platen.”326  It is precisely the organic character of Hölderlin’s poetry  that  is 
dear to Nietzsche, its effulgent  and excessive exercise of the “plastische Kraft”—the plastic 
force, which, in the second Untimely Meditation, defines the necessary limit between forgetting 
and remembrance for every man, people, and culture.327  Hölderlin, then, accomplishes the 
perfection of this power’s synthesis between the natural in the absolute and the original; his 
attitude toward antiquity is in the proper measure, standing midway between the human and the 
divine, between the ancient and the modern. 
 Nietzsche calls to his “friend’s” attention, then, the fact that  Hölderlin was not only  poet 
but tragedian: “you do not know his Empedocles then, this most important dramatic fragment, in 
whose melancholy tones reverberates the future of the unhappy poet, his grave of long madness, 
and not as you say in unclear talk but in the purest Sophoclean language and with an 
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inexhaustible fullness of profound ideas.”328  Already, then, the figures of Hölderlin and 
Empedocles (of Hölderlin’s Empedocles immediately, yet through this, also the Empedocles of 
Nietzsche) come to mirror one another in Nietzsche’s vision. The suicide of the ancient 
philosopher reflects itself in the madness of the poet, so that Hölderlin’s modern re-creation of 
Empedocles becomes a prophetic gesture connecting these two comet-like geniuses to one 
another. Indeed, Nietzsche says in his letter: “In the unfinished tragedy Empedocles, the poet 
unfolds his own nature to us. Empedocles’ death is a death from divine pride, from scorn of man, 
from being sated with the earth, and from pantheism. Whenever I have read it, the whole work 
has always moved me profoundly; there is a divine loftiness in this Empedocles.”329  Nietzsche 
thus casts a ray of light  into the tragic fate of his favorite poet. Hölderlin’s striving for divinity, 
like that of his Empedocles, was too strong—it overstepped the bounds of the human, filling the 
mortal world immeasurably  with shards of the sacred. It was the excess of his knowledge, 
brimming on godliness to such a degree that his superiority  led him to scorn men in their 
barbarity, their common mediocrity, that  rendered Hölderlin, and Empedocles through him, as his 
mirror image, tragic in the extreme. It was this that made the self-sacrifice both of the ancient 
and of the modern poet necessary—to communicate to those “contemporaries” whose ears were 
deaf and whose eyes were blind the tragedy of their time. 
 Yet Nietzsche holds testimony to the failure—itself tragic—of Hölderlin’s sacrifice, 
which itself mirrors the failure he perceived in the self-sacrifice of Empedocles. He ends his 
letter: “I only  hope—and do regard this as the purpose of my letter—that it will move you to an 
understanding and to an unprejudiced evaluation of this poet, whose very  name is hardly known 
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to most  of his countrymen.”330 Hence the excentric path of Hölderlin as a tragic hero, like that of 
Empedocles, is illuminated—his necessary failure, even in view of his divinity. For the hero’s 
universality  is beyond his time, and thus at  his most universal and his most divine, he becomes, 
in turn, most particular, most  mortal, and his death-song does not reach the ears of the people it  is 
destined for.
 Hölderlin, too, at the limit between sanity  and madness, had dreamed himself a comet. In 
the famous late fragmentary  poem, “In lieblecher Bläue” (“In Lovely  Blue”) dating from the 
early days of Hölderlin’s madness, and preserved (perhaps transformed) by  Wilhelm Waiblinger 
in his novel Phaeton (1823), he writes:
Would I like to be a comet? I think so.
They are swift as birds, they flower
With fire, childlike in purity. To desire
More than this is beyond human measure.331
The comet, common figure to Nietzsche and to Hölderlin, is that lonely celestial flame, whose 
motion transcends its time in a burst that sacrifices itself as it shoots across the sky—its path is 
necessarily excentric (i.e., non-circular). Hölderlin’s Hyperion, too, cries out to his barbaric 
“contemporaries”: “You have lost your faith in all that is great; thus you must depart, you must, 
if this faith does not return like a comet from foreign skies [wie ein Komet aus fremden 
Himmeln].”332 That flash of foreignness alone could give rise to the return of the gods; only  the 
monstrous could reverse the tragic dissolution of culture. That which is proper is only to be 
achieved across a purificatory (cathartic) travel through that which is foreign. 
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 The human measure of which Hölderlin speaks has thus, as its limit, the desire to be a 
comet. The very  force of the comet is its striving toward incalculability—its divergence from the 
circular path. This measure is never possible in an absolute sense, but only through what 
Hölderlin calls infinite approximation [unendliche Annäherung]. In a letter to Schiller of 
September 4, 1795, Hölderlin wrote: 
I am trying to develop for myself the idea of an infinite progression in philosophy. I am 
trying to show that the relentless demand that must be made on every system, namely the 
unification of subject and object in the absolute—in an ego or in whatever one wants to 
call it—is possible, albeit aesthetically, in intellectual intuition. It  is possible theoretically 
only through an infinite approximation [eine unendliche Annäherung], as in the squaring 
of the circle. I am thus trying to show that  in order to realize a system of thought an 
immortality is necessary—every bit as necessary as it is for a system of action.333 
The aesthetic is thus the only realm in which intellectual intuition, the immediate, sensuous 
attainment of the absolute, can be established; this is precisely because of its temporal character, 
its capacity  to render the unification and separation of the mortal and the immortal in their 
primordial rhythm—it is for this reason, too, that Empedocles was a poet, and that he was 
capable of the purification of his people. This notion of “infinite approximation,” which is the 
epicenter of the tragic, as the loss of absolute measure, thus requires an immortal counterpart to 
the mortal, in order for intellectual intuition to come about in a work of art. Hölderlin proposes 
tragedy, in fact, as the metaphor for intellectual intuition.334 This notion reappears in Hölderlin’s 
preface to the second edition of his novel Hyperion, which unites the poetic instinct of the 
ancients with the modern world. Here, it is a question of the possibility of a reunification of man 
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with nature in primordial oneness, after having fallen out of that originary natural state. He 
writes:
Neither our knowledge nor our action […] in any period of existence, attains that point at 
which all conflict ceases and all is one: the determinate line unites with the indeterminate 
one only in infinite approximation [unendliche Annäherung]. […] 
 [But that infinite reunion of man and nature] is actually  at hand—in the form of 
Beauty; to speak as Hyperion does, a new Kingdom awaits us, where Beauty is queen.—
 I believe we shall all say in the end: Holy Plato, forgive us! grievously have we 
sinned against you.335
The word Annäherung also means “reconciliation” or “rapprochement.” The movement of the 
tragic, for Hölderlin, always consists in the striving to reconcile, to bring into a lucid equality the 
human and the boundless. From this project  of infinite reconciliation, infinite approximation, a 
“calculable law” is formed, as is necessary in the writing of tragedies. Hyperion gives voice to 
this tragic knowledge in the following cry: 
Why are we excepted from the beautiful cycle of nature? Or does it also hold sway for 
us? 
 I would have had it, were one thing not in us: the monstrous striving to be all, 
which, like [E]tna’s Titan, rages up  from the depths of our being [ungeheure Streben Alles 
zu seyn, das, wie der Titan des Aetna, heraufzürnt aus den Tiefen unsers Wesens].336 
The Titan Typhon was defeated by Zeus in the subterranean region beneath Mount Etna—the 
very volcano into which Empedocles would throw himself. Here, it is the “monstrous striving to 
be all”—the constant impulse by which men move toward divinity, toward the infinite and 
toward ever-greater consciousness that prevents his return to the harmonious, circular movement 
of nature. The self-reflective man, beyond the boundless innocence of nature, is condemned to 
the excentric path of the comet—the path that does not lead back into the heart of his natural 
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origin but which, rather, casts him ever farther from that nature. Thus, incapable of measuring 
himself against the divine, and yet continually  striving toward it, man lives a tragic existence, 
banished from the circular sphere and sent to wander without the promise of a return to guide 
him back to nature. It is only  by infinite approximation that human measure can be divined; 
excentricity sets the limit of this measure.
 Nietzsche, for his part, pronounces, in a fragment of 1873, the following, unfulfillable 
exigency: “To be completely truthful—glorious, heroic joy of man, in a mendacious nature. But 
possible only in a very relative sense! That is tragic. That is the tragic problem of Kant! Now art 
acquires an entirely  new dignity. The sciences, on the other hand, are degraded by one 
degree” (KSA 7: 19 [104]).337 The definition of the tragic in the modern world is thus of the same 
nature for Hölderlin and Nietzsche: it is the condemnation to infinite approximation—the loss of 
the absolute, the disappearance of the god, the unity of man and nature that has turned the 
experience of men into an excentric movement, ever departing from Nature and speeding toward 
the unknown like a comet. Yet while for Hölderlin it is thus necessary  to strive toward being 
“all”—to achieve the reunification of man with nature through the endless mourning of their 
separation, the measure is, for Nietzsche, bodily.
 In his letter, Nietzsche speaks, too, of Hölderlin’s abhorrence for Germany. He writes: 
In other poems, especially in ‘Remembrance’ [‘Andenken’] and ‘The Journey’ [‘Die 
Wanderung’], the poet raises us up to the purest ideal spheres, and we feel with him that 
this was the element where he was at home. And last, a whole series of poems is 
noteworthy, in which he tells the Germans bitter truths which are, unfortunately, only too 
firmly grounded. In Hyperion too, he flings sharp and cutting words at German 
‘barbarism.’ Yet this abhorrence of reality is compatible with the greatest love of his 
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country, and this love Hölderlin did have in high degree. But he hated in Germans the 
mere specialist, the philistine.338 
In his first Untimely Meditation, Nietzsche writes of Hölderlin as a victim of his barbaric, 
philistine age—thus as an obscure version of Empedocles as failed reformer. He writes of “the 
noble Hölderlin” as “a tried-and-true non-philistine” who “perished by philistines [… .]” He 
attacks Friedrich Vischer, a Hegelian “esthete” and “culture-philistine” according to Nietzsche’s 
terminology, for appropriating the memory of Hölderlin and claiming that the poet  would never 
have been able to “‘endure the harshness of war’”—that he went mad because “‘his spirit lacked 
hardness and the weapon of wit’” and ultimately  that “‘He found it unendurable that one could 
be a philistine and still not be a barbarian.’”339 Vischer’s attack is based on the championing of 
philistinism, against which Hölderlin was ceaselessly critical, equating it with barbarism, and an 
accusation of Hölderlin’s lack of philistine “wit.” Viciously, Nietzsche remarks that Vischer 
“would certainly maintain that a man can be a philistine and still be a man of culture—such wit 
was lacking in poor Hölderlin, and this lack was his undoing.”340  Nietzsche affirms thus his 
affinity with Hölderlin, for he, too, identifies barbarity  with philistinism, and the heroes of 
culture who are able to do this—to diagnose their age and to will its surpassing—find themselves 
by this very fact  in the situation of tragic heroes. Hölderlin’s madness, for Nietzsche, is then 
parallel to the death of Empedocles—a going-under—Untergang—a self-sacrificial response to 
modern barbarism.
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 Hölderlin writes to his brother on June 4, 1799, of the “paradox, […] that the instinct for 
art and cultivation, with all of its modifications and varieties, is a proper service that men 
perform for nature.”341  By this paradox, then, an art, or a culture is performed that is the very 
presentation of the nature that it serves, or whose goal it accomplishes. The circle is thus formed 
between man and nature as economically, aesthetically, and tragically dependent upon one 
another. As Szondi puts it, Hölderlin wishes to “grant  man a position vis-à-vis nature that 
simultaneously  shows man as nature’s servant and nature as dependent on man”342—dependent, 
indeed, for its very existence. Therefore, the paradox that Nietzsche will later formulate is here 
expressed. This notion is again revealed in a fragment of Hölderlin’s on tragedy:
The significance of tragedies can be understood most easily  by way of paradox. Since all 
potential [Vermögen; ability] is divided justly and equally, everything that is original 
[alles Ursprüngliche] appears not in its original strength [ursprünglicher Stärke], but 
rather, properly [eigentlich; actually], in its weakness [in seiner Schwäche]. Hence, 
appearance and the light of life quite properly belong to the weakness of every whole. 
Now in the tragic, the sign itself is insignificant, without effect, but the original is openly 
revealed. Properly speaking, the original can appear only in its weakness; but  insofar as 
the sign itself is posited as insignificant = 0, the original, the hidden ground of every 
nature, can also present itself. If nature properly  presents itself in its weakest talent, then, 
when it shows itself in its strongest talent, the sign = 0.343 
Hölderlin speaks again of the essential equality of force in its original division, in a letter to Isaac 
von Sinclair of December 24, 1798, where this becomes a cosmological principle—here, tragedy 
begins to reveal itself, for Hölderlin, as a model or allegory for life itself, and most profoundly 
for modern life in the god’s absence. He writes: “indeed, it  is the first condition of all life and all 
organization—that in heaven and on earth no force rules monarchically. Absolute monarchy 
126
341  Cited in Peter Szondi, An Essay on the Tragic, trans. Paul Fleming (Stanford: Stanford University Press,  2002), 
11. Letter 67.
342 Szondi, The Tragic, 11.
343 Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke, 4:274. Cited in Szondi, The Tragic, 11.
cancels itself out everywhere, for it is without object [… .] Everything that is interpenetrates as 
soon as it becomes active. … Of course, from every finite point of view some one of the 
autonomous forces must be the ruling force, yet it  must be observed to prevail only temporarily 
and only to a certain degree.”344  The absolute as such, the kingly, is never pure—it only rules 
from one perspective at a time—it is only  appearance. Hence every king is a false king, and is 
never the sole sovereign endowed with divinity—even Oedipus, whose first error was to interpret 
the oracle “too infinitely,” by assuming the crime responsible for the affliction of Thebes with 
plague on a religious basis, considering the crime to be the fault of a single, particular man, and 
himself to the absolute exception from guilt as a monarch. The signification of the king—
translated by Hölderlin not as König but as Tyrann—is just this, that in Oedipus the transparency 
of the king unveils itself; the king becomes the most mortal of mortals—hence he can no longer 
remain a possessor of absolute power, absolute knowledge. In Oedipus, a transgression of the 
idea of the sovereign takes place, as he is defeated by the blind servitude to the myth of his 
kingship—herein lies, indeed, his tyranny. For he is unable to embrace the original equality  of all 
things.
 Hence Empedocles, the wandering god, in the first draft  of Hölderlin’s Trauerspiel, 
refuses to accept the crown offered to him by the Agrigent people, declaring the age of kings to 
be over. Rather, he commands them to return to the divine equality nature, saying: 
The narratives of your father’s voices teaching you,
All law and custom, names of all the ancient gods,
Forget these things courageously; like newborn babes 
Your eyes will open to the godliness of nature [Die Augen auf zur gottlichen Natur!]345 
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This revolutionary  spirit leads from monarchy back to the divine present in nature, where all 
things possess equal potential for self-actualization, equal, organic plastische Kraft. The 
abolition of the monarchic order must result in a return to the unity of nature. 
 The interpenetration of all living things, which results in activity—in other words, the 
coming-into-conflict of things, which alone ignites their movement, is a concept inherited from 
Empedocles, whose opposition between love, φιλία and strife, νεῖκος formed his cosmic 
principle. The battle between these two life-forces is the universal movement. In his explication 
of his cosmogony, Empedocles speaks of the double genesis of all things: 
For at one time [τοτὲ; once] [they] grew to be one alone 
from many, and at another [τοτὲ], again, [they] grew apart to be many from one. […] 
And these things never cease from constantly alternating,
at one time all coming together by love into one [φιλóτητι συνερχóµεν εἰς]
and at another time again all being borne apart  separately  by  the hostility of strife 
[νεῖκος].346 
Hölderlin takes the model of this cosmic double-movement in ceaseless transformation from 
extreme unity  in love to extreme separation in strife as the matrix of his philosophical and 
poetological thinking. According to Rohde, Empedocles, like the other Eleatics, denied 
“becoming and passing away” and “all qualitative change,”347 but rather than endorsing Being as 
an indivisible unity, he posited four “roots”—elements, whose “mixture and separation […] 
cause the appearance of becoming and perishing; and those two processes are caused by the two 
forces […] of attraction and repulsion, Love and Hate, which in the creative process struggle and 
in turn overmaster each other until at  last, in the final victory of one of the two forces, all things 
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are either united or divided: in either case the organic world ceases to exist.”348 The attainment of 
either absolute, thus, absolute separation or absolute unity, results in the annihilation of the 
world. The only force of life that preserves the activity of the universe is the mixture of elements 
that conjures the appearance of becoming, which, however, never corresponds to the actual pure 
dynamic of nature. For Empedocles, as for Hölderlin and Nietzsche, his successor, it is only 
through art, the aesthetic rendering, the aesthetic creation of nature that life is possible.
 There is, thus, according to Hölderlin’s fragment quoted above, no simultaneity  of origin 
and appearance in tragedy. The primordial force of nature is perfectly divided among all agents, 
and cannot coincide with its appearance, but rather, that underlying strength can only appear as 
weakness. Strength itself is merely recalled by  weakness, whose task it is to present that natural 
strength—this strength is merely traced, signified on the back of weakness. Yet this strength is 
brought about through weakness; the figure of the tragic hero is the clearest, the most transparent 
sign—through him alone, through the curse of his mortality, in its essential weakness, can the 
natural absolute strength of the divine in nature show itself. With the movement of the scenes in 
any tragedy, with the shift in their rhythms and tones, the relation between weakness and the 
strength that is its true sense shifts radically.
 Of this fragment, Lacoue-Labarthe writes, “we find, under the name of the tragic sign, the 
figure (in the strong sense, the Gestalt—Hölderlin also speaks of the symbol) of the suffering 
hero who is the site of the revelation and the epiphany of what is.”349 The hero, in other words, is 
the ultimate tragic sign—the incarnation of the primordial under the sway of destiny. Szondi 
writes: 
129
348 Psyche, 2:379-380.
349 Lacoue-Labarthe, Typography, 225.
In art, nature no longer appears “properly,” but through the mediation of a sign. In 
tragedy, this sign is the tragic hero. Insofar as he can do nothing against the power of 
nature and is destroyed by  it, he is “insignificant” and “without effect.” But in the tragic 
hero’s demise, when the sign = 0, nature presents itself as a conquerer “in its strongest 
talent,” and “the original is openly  revealed.” Hölderlin thus interprets tragedy as a 
sacrifice that man offers to nature in order to help it achieve an adequate appearance.350 
The proper, or what Nietzsche would call the quantity of plastic force in measure with a man is 
thus only possible by means of a dis-appropriation of the self—i.e., a sacrifice—that is at once 
the re-creation of nature, its strength transformed with every medium of weakness in which it 
necessarily appears. Because voluntary death is the ultimate form of weakness and of absence, 
the tragic hero, having attained to an excessive self-consciousness, must then resolve himself to 
sacrifice, precisely so that divine nature might once again achieve its unity in appearance.
  Another way of saying this is, as Hölderlin writes in the “Notes” to his translation of 
Oedipus: “the tragic transport [Der tragische T r a n s p o r t] is actually empty and the least 
restrained.”351  This transport  necessitates the intervention of “the pure word, the counter-
rhythmic rupture” which takes place, in both Oedipus Tyrannos and Antigone, when Tiresias 
enters into the drama; the portent gives the hero his tragic significance and determines his 
destiny  of sacrifice and, thus condemning him, liberates him.352  The “pure word” is thus, 
precisely, prophecy delivered as enigma—the most lucid coincidence of the calculable and the 
incalculable, and hence the moment where the approximation of god and man to one another is 
most accurate, when their reconciliation is most present. The tragic hero must become 
insignificant (must = 0) in that moment, in order for the prophecy, the sign of Zeus, to reveal 
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itself in him. And yet, because prophecy remains linguistic, and remains enigmatic, that is, 
because it comes into play through the mouth of Tiresias, the blind seer, who is, nonetheless, 
human, it  remains veiled; rather than presenting in its purity the union of god and man, it 
represents, by the silence it speaks (by the caesura it constitutes—the pause in tragic rhythm), 
their simultaneous separation. The paradoxical nature of the very  term “pure word” reveals itself 
here—for language is, by  its very  nature, impure, serving to mystify and conceal even as it sheds 
the light of divine flame on the future, is infinitely mirrored and reproduced by  the paradoxical 
form of its deliverance, in the likewise paradoxical person of Tiresias, and its reception by the 
human it  condemns, who necessarily misunderstands it. Through the interruption, thus, of the 
pure word in tragic transport, “manifestation [Vorstellung] itself” comes about; the manifestation 
of the hero’s fate of downgoing as the silent prophetic word.353
 The rhythm meets a “counter-rhythmic interruption”—a “caesura”—at the midpoint of 
the tragedy’s fated unfolding, there where the tragic transport is at its most empty—where the 
voice of the divine comes through in its purest  clarity.354 If “in the rapidity of the inspiration” the 
rhythm of the first scenes is “carried away” by the following scenes, then the caesura “must lie 
towards the front” to protect the earlier rhythm from the weight and speed of the later one—
because of the “counter-working of the caesura,” the balance must then “incline more from the 
back […] towards the beginning” in a diagonal that leans downward, halfway between the 
beginning and the end. On the other hand, if in the rhythm the later scenes “are more under 
pressure from those at the beginning,” the caesura lies towards the end, since the final scenes 
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require protection from the the initials ones, “and the balance will as a consequence incline more 
towards the end […] since the first half […] extends itself further but the balance comes later.” In 
this case, the opposite diagonal takes place.355  Hölderlin writes that the “rule,” the “calculable 
law of ‘Antigone’ compares to that of ‘Oedipus’ like __/____ to ____\__.”356 The reason for this 
is that: “In both plays the speeches of Tiresias form the caesura.”357 Hence, in Oedipus Tyrannos, 
the caesura lies toward the beginning of the play because “in excentric rapidity,” the earlier 
scenes “are more rended forward by  the following ones”—the caesura is necessary precisely  in 
order to establish an “equilibrium” between the two halves of the drama, divided by the counter-
rhythmic rupture. Hence, because in Oedipus the rhythm of the later scenes tends violently 
toward excess, because the second half “is originally more rapid and seems to weigh more,” the 
first half must be “as it were protected against the second one.”358  Hence the “balance 
inclines”359  from the end toward the beginning in Oedipus. In the case of Antigone, the 
succession is opposite. 
 The art of tragedy, as Hölderlin conceives it, depends upon the drawing-together of the 
calculable, “sensuous” medium of poetry  and the incalculable content of the play, which he also 
calls “reason.” Hence, in order for the boundless content to be “Something,” i.e., that it be 
“recognizable in the medium (moyen) of its appearance”—in order that it  be intelligible, a poetic 
“lawful calculation” is called for. This calculation, says Hölderlin, relates to the infinite, “living 
meaning which cannot be calculated” expressed in the drama in various ways throughout the 
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unfolding of the scenes, yet remains ever “distinct” from it. The movement of this 
correspondence of the calculable and the incalculable, which is changeable in the unfolding of 
the tragedy, is measured by the rhythm of poetic meter, both in the minutiae of its lines and in the 
succession of the scenes of the drama.360  Hölderlin says that this calculation “exists in tragedy 
more as a state of balance than as mere succession.”361 The caesura in the drama determines the 
point at which this balance is established; it approximates the measure of the two halves of the 
tragedy against one another, such that their weight may be equal, and it thus takes place at the 
turning-point of the action, where the tragic hero, as the sign through which the strength of 
divine nature manifests, = 0. This, then, is the moment at which the infinite time of the gods, the 
time without present, the αἰών, manifests itself through the medium of mortal, successive time, 
the χρόνος. It causes, therefore, a disturbance in the “onrushing time [reißenden Zeit]”362—an 
originary moment in the flux of becoming, when divine and mortal time are most united, and 
thus must separate most boundlessly—this, as we shall see, is the event of intellectual intuition 
for Hölderlin.
 In Oedipus der Tyrann, it  is from the moment of the hero’s tragic reception of the oracle, 
of his excessive interpretation of it, that his fate of striving willfully toward a monstrous self-
consciousness, which shall necessitate his destruction, is determined. The excentric temporal 
movement of the drama begins at this moment. The time of tragedy, for Hölderlin, is excentric 
precisely because it offers no continuity, and the rhythmic motion of the scenes will not allow 
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Oedipus to return to his original naïveté. Therefore, the further he proceeds toward self-
knowledge, the more firmly is the fate of his self-sacrifice determined. Hölderlin writes: “The 
intelligibility of the whole rests primarily  on one’s [ability to] focus on the scene where Oedipus 
interprets the saying of the oracle too infinitely [zu unendlich], and is tempted into nefas.”363 This 
infinitude of interpretation refers to Oedipus’ immediate drawing-together of the curse of the 
plague on Thebes and the murder of Laius, and thereafter the assumption of an infinite, 
inexpiable crime and a particular criminal guilty for it. After hearing the oracle, Oedipus initially 
“speaks in a priestly  fashion. ‘What is the rite / of purification [Reinigung]? etc.’ And moves into 
the particular, ‘Who is the man whose fate the God pronounces?’”364  By means of this 
interrogation—by the request that a man be designated as infinitely culpable for the infinite 
crime, Oedipus “leads [C]reon’s thoughts to the terrible pronouncement: ‘Our master, O Lord, 
was Laius / In this country, before you piloted the state.’” Having thus brought “the saying of the 
oracles and the story of Laius’ death, not necessarily related to it” together, “Oedipus’ spirit states 
in furious presentiment [and] knowing all, the nefas quite properly by resentfully interpreting the 
general injunction in particular terms and applying it to the murder of Laius, and then by taking 
the sin [Sünde] as infinite [unendlich].”365 It is at this moment that Oedipus accurses the culprit 
of Laius’ murder and ordains that he be shunned from Thebes. 
 This act gives rise to Oedipus’ “wonderful furious curiosity” in the exchange with 
Tiresias, his mad longing for and resistance to self-knowledge, “because knowledge [das Wissen]
—after it has broken through its barriers—as if intoxicated in its great harmonious form [wie 
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trunken in seiner herrlichen harmonischen Form], which can remain, is spurred to know itself 
more than it can bear or contain.”366 It is from the monstrosity  of this drive to knowledge, this 
monstrous seeking of himself to uncover the ground of his nature that the succession of the 
tragedy’s scenes unfolds, and that the hero falls ever further into the depth of his excentric path, 
into the excess of self-consciousness that will require him to sacrifice himself. This movement 
toward self-knowledge, thus, requires Oedipus to succumb to the tragic rhythm of the drama, 
from the later scene with Creon to the scene with Jacosta to the confrontation of the Corinthian 
messenger, as his “loyal and certain spirit suffers in furious excess which, rejoicing in 
destruction, merely follows the onrushing time [reißenden Zeit].”367 
 This tragic temporality, precipitated by fate, thus comes gradually, through his “desperate 
struggle to find himself,”368 to take the form of Oedipus’ ever-quickening, excentric, “madly  wild 
seeking for a consciousness.”369 It  is the attainment of this consciousness, the reception of the 
murderous response to the question of his provenance and of his crime as infinite—and, thereby, 
too, of the need for infinite punishment—that Oedipus unites with the divine precisely by 
separating from it, becoming empty so that mortality is turned in upon itself as the god 
withdraws. For Hölderlin writes that the “presentation of the tragic” rests upon “the boundless 
union” of god and man “purifying itself through boundless separation.”370  Hence, Oedipus 
himself, upon attaining the self-knowledge he had sought so furiously, becomes equal to zero, in 
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order to present the tragic absence of the god by taking responsibility for the crime that he had 
claimed to be infinite, and sacrificing himself as a result.
 Hölderlin and Nietzsche meet  in the thinking of rhythm as the cosmological, 
epistemological movement and measure. In accordance with his theory of the illusionary nature 
of space and of time, Nietzsche writes: “Space and time are merely  measured things, measured 
according to a rhythm” (KSA 7: 19 [153]).371 This rhythm, we have seen, is for the human that of 
breath. In every living thing, the measure upon which all knowledge is based is relative to its 
powers of perception. Bettina von Arnim relates two quotations of Hölderlin’s, reported to her by 
Isaac von Sinclair, probably  dating from the time of Hölderlin’s madness. The first runs as 
follows: “All is rhythm [Rhythmus], the entire destiny of man is a single celestial rhythm, just as 
the work of art is one unique rhythm.”372 And again: “Only the spirit is poetry, the one that bears 
in itself the mystery of an innate rhythm; and it is by this rhythm alone that it can become visible 
and living, for rhythm is its soul.”373 This rhythm then, excludes all absolute beginning, for that 
which awakes as rhythm is already separated from itself by  a distance of becoming as soon as it 
comes to consciousness—it is the pulse of life, and thus of poetry  that courses through the 
universal soul. This is also why Hölderlin says that the critical moment of tragedy—that of the 
caesura in its rhythmic progression, where a “categorical reversal” takes place between god and 
man—no longer fits “beginning and end [… .]”374 For in that rhythmed moment, the continuity, 
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the successive nature of time shows its very failure as it fragments itself, distancing self from 
self.
 For Hölderlin, tragedy  follows a “poetic logic,” different from philosophical logic in that 
the latter is the name of “the mere hanging together of the parts” that make up the whole of 
philosophy’s presentation of the only capacity of the soul with which it is concerned: the logical 
capacity. Poetry, on the other hand, presents the myriad, “various capacities of the human being” 
as a composed whole, and the “hanging together of the—more autonomous—parts of these 
different capacities may be called the rhythm (in a higher sense) or the calculable law.”375  Thus 
the supremacy of poetry over philosophy lies in its capacity to conjure a presentation of every 
human capacity, each with its own proper autonomy and singularity, not in the sphere of an ideal 
extra-spatiotemporal unity, but in the rhythmic time of the artistic. This rhythm, moreover, is one 
both appropriated from antiquity (in the form of Pindaric meter for the odes and Sophoclean 
meter for tragedy) and recreated by the artist in whom it is presented. For the purity of the truth 
unveiled and brought forth by  the tragic drama depends upon its propriety, its properness, to the 
poet himself. 
 Through this expression of the divine and the proper in the tragic drama, the subject and 
object are equally abolished in the tragic whole, which is to say that man and god unite, or 
rhythmically coincide infinitely; this is, for Hölderlin, the purest mode of tragedy. For he writes: 
Tragedy  […] resides in this: that the immediate God, wholly one with man, […] that  an 
infinite enthusiasm infinitely, which is to say  in antitheses, in consciousness that cancels 
out consciousness, and sacramentally departing from itself, apprehends itself, and the 
god, in the shape of death, is present.376 
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The sacrifice that tragedy  entails is this entrance of man into the god of death through the 
reversal by which, holding himself responsible for an immeasurable, inexpiable transgression 
committed through necessity, he resolves himself to separate infinitely from the god, descending 
into the “the excentric sphere of the dead [in die exzentrische Sphäre der Todten].”377 This god, 
the invisible face of mortality, is the eternal reflection of man himself. Catharsis, for Hölderlin, is 
the separation of god and man out of this infinite unification. 
The Perspective of the Moderns toward the Ancients
 In a letter to Casimir Ulrich Böhlendorff of December 4, 1801, Hölderlin lays out his 
theory  of the necessary  relation between the ancients and the moderns. The theory is organized 
around the postulate that: “the free use of that  which is our own is hardest  of all.”378 The proper is 
that impasse at which we must recognize the limit of our speech to say the god. The impossibility 
of philosophy is also the impossibility of the proper. It is the impossibility of the absolute in our 
own sphere—the absolute is, rather, something that has flown irretrievably, and the tragic poem, 
which temporally reveals this absence of the natural sphere of originality, incites then the 
necessity of its mourning, the necessity of its recurrence, differently.
  Hölderlin writes: “And it is my belief that clarity of exposition is originally  as natural to 
us as heavenly fire is to the Greeks. For precisely that reason the Greeks are more likely to be 
surpassed in fine passion, which is what you have managed to keep  [in your Fernando], than in 
the presence of spirit and faculty  for exposition we find in Homer.”379  What is proper to the 
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Greeks is precisely the lack of anything proper, that is to say, the force of appropriation, and the 
perfection of the formal exposition of this appropriated material—in other words, their capacity 
to, like the tragic hero, = 0 in order to let the strength of nature appear, and indeed, manifest itself 
through them. The rhythm of Greek drama expresses lucidly the infinite content of tragedy, the 
coming-together and separating of the divine and the human which is, in its essence, monstrous. 
Yet the moderns can repeat this poetic movement in a manner that, being proper, undoes the 
possibility of such propriety, precisely because the sole common element between the Germans 
and the Greeks is “living craft and proportion [… .]”380 The life-force of art, the capacity  for the 
aesthetic rendering of the rhythm of life, is what the ancients and the moderns share. Hölderlin 
writes, in a fragment called “The Standpoint from which we should consider Antiquity” that the 
“universal reason for the demise of all peoples” is “that their originality, their own living nature, 
succumbed beneath the positive forms, the luxury that their fathers produced, and also appears to 
be our own fate, only to a greater degree, inasmuch as an almost infinite antiquity, which we 
know either through education or through experience, influences and oppresses us.”381  This 
battle anticipates the conflicting views of Nietzsche’s antiquarian and critical historians.
 Hölderlin says in his letter to Böhlendorff that “sacred pathos” was “native” to the 
Greeks, such that they did not have to master it. Rather, the Greeks “are exceptional in their 
faculty for exposition, from Homer onwards, because this extraordinary  man had the feeling 
necessary  to capture the Junonian sobriety of the occident  for his Apollonian realm, and so truly 
to appropriate the foreign.”382  He then says: “With us it  is the other way around.” Hölderlin 
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defines the foreign doubly: for the Greeks, it  is the divine, while for the modern poet, it is the 
medium of representation—the words of the ode, the characters of the drama. The Greek power 
of appropriation, their contact with the god, is lost for us. We must, rather, learn to use what is 
proper to us, which is nothing other than the absence of the god, the national abandoned by  the 
divine: “Only is it  precisely  in what is proper to us, in the national, that we shall never match 
them.”383 Indeed, a deliverance of the national into the natural, which, among the Greeks, were 
harmonious, is Hölderlin’s ambition for his age.  Hölderlin’s Greece is purely  monstrous to 
itself by birth—it cannot appropriate itself, and does not seek to. Lacoue-Labarthe writes that for 
Hölderlin: “The Greeks’ proper is inimitable because it never took place. At the very most it is 
possible to catch a glimpse of it, or even perhaps deduce it from its opposite—art. And then 
introduce it, après coup, into this art. Hence the work of translation, which consists in making 
the Greek text say what it  said endlessly without ever saying it. Which consists, then, in 
repeating the unuttered of this text’s very utterance.”384 The task of translation is then to express, 
in the mode of the living, the Greek appropriation of the foreign as their own in our language, the 
exteriorization of the rhythm of our lives, our nation. This is then to say, through the cadence of 
the tragic drama, a multiple lack of the proper. Hyperion cries: “We find pleasure in flinging 
ourselves into the night of the unknown, into the cold foreign realm of some other world, and if it 
were possible, we would leave the domain of the sun, and plunge beyond the bounds of the 
comet. O! for man’s wild breast, no home is possible [… .]”385 Such is the homelessness, the full 
lack of the proper to which man is condemned. Here, then, is his proximity  and his distance from 
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Nietzsche: while for Hölderlin, it is precisely the emptiness, the dis-apppropriation of the proper 
that must be achieved by the moderns in order to imitate that same empty properness of the 
ancients, the power of appropriation and reception of the foreign, it is always, for Nietzsche, a 
question of expressing the void between the ancients and the moderns by a recreation of their 
φύσις as a model for culture.
 For Hölderlin, is only through poetry—and tragic poetry specifically—that  the unity that 
is at once a separation between god and man, between ancient and modern, and its necessary 
mourning can be put into voice, the living human force that breath supports. He speaks the 
following of Sophocles:
Many sought in vain to say joyfully the most joyful.
Here, finally, here in mourning [in der Trauer], it pronounces itself to me.386
 It is thus that mourning is the absolute and joyful affirmation of life for Hölderlin; 
mourning is the rhythm of life’s supremacy—the victory over the crushing power of the old. That 
he found this mourning to be the movement present in Sophocles’ tragedies and hence translated 
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them as Trauerspiele rather than Tragödien is his triumph in translation over the Greeks—his 
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manner of surpassing them in transmitting their wisdom into the light of his day.387
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the antique form necessarily exposed the undertaking to highly baroque elaboration,  by its very 
violence” (Benjamin, Trauerspiel,  59). As a consequence, then, of the “necessary tendency towards the 
extreme” (Benjamin, Trauerspiel, 57), which, according to Benjamin, is entailed in the formation of any 
philosophical concept, and which plays a central role in the baroque dramatic theory, the imitation of antique tragedy 
demands an overflowing of the ancient form, a radically violent recreation of tragedy as such—a radical 
transformation of both the ancient theoretical ground and the accomplishment, the flowering, of tragedy.
 What separates the baroque Trauerspiel from Hellenic tragedy in general is principally that the former has 
historical life as its object, while the latter has myth for its object. Indeed, “the word Trauerspiel was applied in the 
seventeenth century to dramas and to historical events alike.” (Benjamin, Trauerspiel, 63.) It is thus that, for Martin 
Opitz, tragedy [Tragödie] distinguishes itself from heroic poetry [Heroischen gedichte], which it matches in 
“majesty,” in that it “deals only with the commands of kings, killings,  despair,  infanticide and patricide, 
conflagrations, incest,  war and commotion, lamentation, weeping, sighing, and suchlike” (Martin Opitz,  Prosodia 
Germanica, Oder Buch von der Deudschen Poeterey. (Frankfurt a.M., n.d.  [ca 1650]),  30-31. Walter Benjamin, The 
Origin of German Tragic Drama [Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels], trans. John Osborn (London: NLB, 1977), 
62.). These things, Benjamin tells us, constitute “the artistic core of the Trauerspiel” (Benjamin, Trauerspiel, 62). 
The subject of the absolute monarchy bridges the gap between ancient and baroque tragedy—for the Greeks,  this 
monarchy has its source in the primordial, “past age of heroes,” while for Opitz it is historical and prescriptive—the 
purpose of tragedy is to confirm “princely virtues” and depict “princely vices.” The sovereign incarnates these 
virtues and vices (Benjamin,  Trauerspiel, 62). After Birkin, the Trauerspiel was rooted into a humanistic, Christian 
terrain, and the Aristotelian fear and pity (previously mediated through the Poetices libri septem of Julius Caesar 
Scaliger, from 1561, which restructured these “effects” of tragedy around modern individualism so that: “Fear is 
aroused by the death of the villain,  pity by that of the pious hero” (Benjamin, Trauerspiel, 61)) were replaced with 
“the glorification of God and the edification of one’s fellow-men as the purpose of the Trauerspiel” (Benjamin, 
Trauerspiel, 61). The function of the Trauerspiel then became, no longer either purification or the awestruck 
identification with a hero and the horror of a villain, but the fortification of the audience’s virtue through a religious 
experience transmitted through royal figures. History was considered to be the immediate manifestation and 
exemplification of the Trauerspiel in this sense,  and the sovereign its principal player. Thus Johann von Rist 
advised,  in his Alleredelster Belustigung, that the tragedian [Wer Tragödien schreiben] must be thoroughly “well-
versed in chronicles and history books, both ancient and modern, he must know thoroughly the affairs of the world 
and the state, in which politics truly consist [… .] In short, he must understand the art of government as thoroughly 
as his mother-tongue” (Die Aller Edelste Belustigung Kunst- und Tugendiebender Gemühter [April-gespräch] 
[Johann Rist], Frankfurt, 1666, 241-242. Benjamin, Trauerspiel, 63). It is therefore necessary that the writer of 
tragedies speak fluently the languages of both the ancients and the moderns—of both Trauerspiel and Tragödie,  in 
order properly and actually to transform the mythic into the historical—the function of the mourning-play is a 
purificatory one just as much as the Greek tragedy is,  yet the the latter is sublated into the former in this baroque 
dialectic between the ancient and the modern, such that Trauerspiel takes on the role that is suited to the historical 
catastrophes of its time, and its morality centers itself on the figure of the king as tragic hero, as an exemplary figure 
for the transmission of religious-moral exigencies. 
 Benjamin recalls Hellingrath’s appellation of Hölderlin’s late period, from which his translations of 
Sophocles date, as “the poet’s ‘baroque’ period” (Benjamin, Trauerspiel,  189). As such, his work is emblematic of 
the event of the German Trauerspiel by which the theory of tragedy and the “rules of ancient tragedy” were 
separated and at the same time combined with one another “around an allegorical figure representing the tragic 
muse” (Benjamin, Trauerspiel, 188). Thus the operation of ancient tragedy became binding to the development of 
the Trauerspiel, so that the tragic hero takes on an allegorical significance, and this power of allegory serves to 
shatter the symbol and the ideal relation of resemblance inherent to it. “In such a context of allegorical decay and 
destruction the image of Greek tragedy seemed to be the only possible, the natural sign of ‘tragic poetry.’  Its rules 
became significant anticipations of the Trauerspiel; its texts are read as Trauerspiel-texts” (Benjamin, Trauerspiel, 
189).
 Hölderlin’s Hyperion speaks of the originary  nature of poetry, out of which philosophy is 
born. He writes to Diotima as follows: “Like Minerva from Jupiter’s head, philosophy springs 
from the poetry of an infinite, divine Being. And thus, in philosophy, too, the irreconcilable 
ultimately  converges again in the mysterious wellspring of poetry.”388  Poetry, the primordial, is 
also the divine, then. In the tragic, man is both united with and separated from the god—he lives 
in the god’s service, and the god speaks through him. By Hyperion’s word, a dialectic between 
philosophy and poetry  emerges in which heterogenous, the contradiction with which the 
philosopher deals constantly, is transformed into the unified origin of poetry. Yet, for Hölderlin, 
neither the separation nor the unification are isolable; they relate to one another by a rhythm 
which is the life-force, and thus there is nothing but a rhythmic passage from the one into the 
other, never whole or silent, never still. 
 Hyperion, in the same passage, calls Heraclitus the father of philosophy: “The great word 
of Heraclitus, ἒν  διαφέρον  ἑαυτῷ (the one differentiating in itself), this only a Greek could find, 
for it is the essence of beauty, and before that was found, there was no philosophy.”389 
Differentiation takes place at the heart of union, uniformity. This is the divine moment, the 
coupling and separation of man and god—of the oneness that lies behind words and the 
heterogeneity they speak. The tragic, for Hölderlin, is the absolute metaphor for intellectual 
intuition, where metaphor is conceived in the sense of tragic transport, “Der tragische T r a n s p 
o r t”390—tragic travel. Indeed, tragic transport, for Hölderlin, is itself metaphor, taken in the 
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Greek sense as µεταφορά, transfer or transport.391 To call tragedy the metaphor for intellectual 
intuition is thus to say that tragedy  itself is the very  movement, the very transport that effects the 
event and the failure of this intuition, which are inseparable. Hölderlin writes: “The tragic, in its 
outer appearance heroic poem is in its basic tone idealistic, and all works of this kind must be 
founded on an intellectual intuition which cannot be any other than that unity  with everything 
living [… .]”392 Yet this universal, living unity of intellectual intuition, which is not “felt by  the 
limited soul” but rather “anticipated,”393 “transcends itself” and becomes separation because of 
its intensity and in “the excess of spirit within unity, in its striving for materiality, in the striving 
of the divisible, more infinite aorgic which must contain all that is more organic, […] in this 
striving for the divisible infinite, […] in this necessary arbitrariness of Zeus there actually lies 
the ideal beginning of the real separation.”394 
 The passage from the ideal to the real is that transport from the unity present in 
intellectual intuition to the event of the real wherein the god, limitless freedom and 
deathlessness, and man, whose essence is to die, and who is thus bound by necessity undergo 
their primordial separation, boundlessly separate from one another. Indeed, this separation ends 
in the voluntary death of tragic hero, his attempt to attain, in spite of separation, the absolute 
unity  within himself of the immortal and the mortal, which is to say: of divine necessity and 
human freedom. According to Hölderlin, there are different degrees of intellectual intuition: “If 
the intellectual intuition is more subjective, and if the separation proceeds mainly from the 
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concentrating parts, as in Antigone, then the style is lyrical [… .]”  Oedipus, on the other hand, is 
“tragic,” writes Hölderlin, because “it proceeds from the highest separable, from Zeus [… .]”395 
Zeus is the “highest separable” because he is the highest god, the one with the most  potent 
potential for separation from man, out of the unification of intellectual intuition. From the point 
at which his force as arbitrary destiny becomes, for Oedipus, an act of his own freedom through 
the hyperbolic attainment of self-consciousness, the god withdraws from the world of man, 
leaving behind only the curse of man’s fate to become free self-inflicted punishment 
accomplished in a radically  human manner, in a world condemned to immanence. It is by means 
of this “divine infidelity [götliche Untreue]”396—this departure of the godhead, presented in the 
emptiness of the hero’s tragic transport—that the tragedy proper to the mortal, the tragedy of a 
discontinuous, excentric temporality, comes into being for the tragic hero, as that which is proper 
to him.
Tragic Ode, Tragic Drama
 We have established that, for Hölderlin, the constant demand for poetry—for ποίησις, the 
creation of realities bathed in tragic light is “the free use of that which is our own,” and that this 
is precisely  what is both most necessary and “hardest of all.”397 Yet this use of the proper entails 
an experience of the different, the foreign, through which alone the proper, in its emptiness, 
comes to light, at two different levels. For the poet himself, the proper must be expressed 
through a dialectic between his own experience and intensity  and the medium through which this 
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is expressed. Within the tragic poem itself, it is a tragic dialectic between what is proper to the 
poem itself—to its musical spirit in the case of the ode or to its characters in the case of the 
drama and the supersensuous or divinity. Hölderlin, in an essay contemporary to the writing of 
his unfinished Trauerspiel, Der Tod des Empedokles (1798), which was to be a modern Greek 
tragedy, writes: 
every  poem, including the tragic, must indeed have proceeded from poetic life and poetic 
actuality, that is, from the poet’s own world and soul, because otherwise the proper truth 
everywhere goes missing; nothing at all can be understood and brought to life if we are 
unable to transpose our own innermost heart and our own experience to the foreign 
analogical material.398 
The foreignness of the material measures, by its distance from the proper, the capacity  for the 
drama to engender a new world and to bring into rhythmic actuality, by extension, the dialectic 
of unity and separation between internal “intensity” and external “divinity” both within the 
drama itself and within the poet’s own experience. The tragic dramatic poem, therefore, like all 
true poetry, brings to life “the divinity that  poets sense and experience in their own world”—
hence, divinity, which is, in fact, the recalling of the divine in its absence, must be grasped at 
every  moment of its metamorphosis through time, through history, and rediscovered in the 
artistic, the poetic and aesthetic synthesis. 
 In the tragic ode, which is the initial, more naïve stage of the tragic dramatic poem, 
“intensity” is also presented “in actual opposites” yet only “in the form and unmediated language 
of sensibility.”399 The tragic ode, for Hölderlin, is the origin—the beginning of a dialectic out of 
which tragedy issues. It refers precisely  to the choral ode, such that  Hölderlin’s theory of tragedy 
is, indeed, quite similar to the one that Nietzsche will develop after him: namely that tragedy is 
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born “out  of the spirit of music.”400  Nietzsche declares this thesis in bold tones as follows: 
“tragedy arose from the tragic chorus, and was originally only chorus and nothing but 
chorus.”401  The movement of Hölderlin’s tragic ode, which contains within it the excentric 
movement that extends across all of his thought, runs thus: it  begins, first of all, in “supernal 
fire,” that is, in the highest  intensity of the primordial element.402 He thus follows in the poetic 
cosmogony of Heraclitus, who speaks the following: 
This world, the same of all worlds, was neither created by  gods nor men, but always has 
been and is and shall be eternally living fire, which ignites [ἁπτόµενον] with measure 
[µέτρα] and is extinguished [ἀποσβεννύµενον] with measure [µέτρα]. 
      14 [A 30]403 
This measure is internal to the cosmic rhythm of chance and necessity, expressed in self-
generating movements of primordial fire—for Hölderlin, the measure shall be expressed in the 
rhythmic dialectic of tragic poetry. 
 The tragic ode ignites a “conflict” by an excess of “pure spirit  pure intensity  [sic]” having 
“overstepped its boundaries”—having erred, in other words, beyond its proper measure. This 
conflict, however, is necessary to the tragic ode in order to “depict what  is pure”—Hölderlin 
defines this purity as “the supersensuous.”404 It then moves dialectically between the extremes of 
“differentiation” and of “not differentiating at all with respect to what is pure.” Differentiation 
refers to the mode in which the difference between the sensuous and the supersensuous is 
apprehended, such that the latter is inadequately mediated through the former, while 
148
400 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 29.
401 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, § 7, 56.
402 Hölderlin, Empedocles, 142.
403 Colli, La sagesse grecque, 3: 45.
404 Hölderlin, Empedocles, 142.
nondifferentiation names the state in which the sensuous does not distinguish itself from the 
supersensuous and hence strives to unite with it in pure lucidity—perfect coincidence, which 
would be the attainment, indeed, of intellectual intuition. From the height, then, of this 
nondifferentiation, “the ode falls into a pure sensuality and a more modest intensity, because the 
original more lofty more godlike bolder intensity  appears to it to be extreme.” The ode comes to 
a point of self-consciousness and self-reflexivity  in its mode of nondifferentiation, of furious 
excess, which renders necessary  an Untergang, a downgoing from unity  with the supersensuous 
to separation from it, back into mere, modest sensuality—the mortal element. 
 From its fallen state, the ode comes to understand that it must transcend this opposition of 
“differentiation and nondifferentiation” so that it may “come to appreciate the necessity of 
struggle, that is, struggle for a lucidity that itself requires a more enhanced striving” and grasp 
the necessity of passing over into its original, maximally extreme and fiery intensity, “if it is not 
to end tragically in this modest state” of self-reflection and sentimentality, in Schiller’s sense. Yet 
because of the ode’s appreciation of its opposite, “the idea that unifies both opposites now 
emerges more purely, the primal tone is found once again, and with lucidity.” A liberation 
coincides with this return to the primal tone, as the ode has “attained the basis of an experience 
of, and an insight into, the heterogenous,”405  that  is, into its inner agonal nature, wherein it is 
constantly divided between its unity with and separation from the supersensuous. It is through 
the grasping of the ever-changing measure of that division and unification, and the necessity of 
ceaseless conflict, that  the ode becomes capable of returning to its original nature. The tragic 
ode, thus, in the sensuous experience of the differentiation between the sensuous and 
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supersensuous, returns anew to its ground, to the space of its primordial intensity, to the sphere 
of nature rediscovered through self-consciousness, transfigured by  the experience of 
heterogeneity; it is by this dialectic, in effect, that  nature qua origin is continually transformed in 
the poetic movement. Its return, moreover, is not a return to the same nature, which pretends to 
harmonious homogeneity, but is, rather, a re-ignition of the supernal fire that had been 
extinguished in the experience of separation from the supersensuous. It is a return to a nature 
whose movement is that of becoming, and its measure, after the moment of self-reflection, has 
become a sensuous, human measure, that is, a proper measure, infinitely approximated to the 
realm of the supersensuous. The ode sacrifices itself, out of a state that strives toward eternity, 
into the sphere of becoming. Thus, while the journey of the tragic ode appears to be circular, 
beginning and ending in primordial flame, it is actually excentric, which is to say: non-circular, 
and its final state is differentiated from its initial state precisely by the change in measure, the 
experience of the heterogenous, which introduces a reflective, temporal rhythm into the space of 
origin. It is, moreover, this excentricity that characterizes the ode’s musical movement—its 
musical dialectic, as tragic. 
 The tragic drama differs from the tragic ode in that it  is more immersed in the 
foreignness of its mode of expression, precisely because it moves into the realm of the 
representation of actuality, while the ode remains within ideality. Hence its movement between 
the sensuous and the supersensuous unfolds in a way that is not merely abstract and formal, but 
effects a passage from the ideal to the real. The tragic poem “veils the intensity  in the 
presentation to a greater extent, expressing it  in distinctions that are more stark, inasmuch as it 
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expresses a more profound intensity, a more infinite divinity.”406 The more powerful the divinity, 
the more whole is the unity of the true whose fire must be presented in the tragic poem, the 
thicker must its veiling be, and the more foreign (fremd) the linguistic fabric of the veil, just as 
Heraclitus must announce eternal truths through the medium of enigmas, whose decipherability 
varies according to the vitality of the truth and the force of its tragic character. Thus in the tragic 
poem, “[the] image of intensity  everywhere denies its ultimate basis, and has to do so, to the 
extent and to the degree that it everywhere approximates to the symbolic realm [… .]” In the 
tragic poem, “the material has to be a bolder more foreign likeness and exemplar of [the poet’s] 
sensibility [arrested within its boundaries], while the form has to withstand something more like 
a counter-posing and separating.”407 The symbolic material must be in profound heterogeneity 
with the intensity it presents; a “foreign” and “different world” must be created for the 
expression of the “characteristic intensity  that lies at the basis of the image” which itself must 
also be in strong affinity with the medium that reveals and veils it.408  “The more alien these 
foreign forms are, the livelier they have to be [… .]” The intense, that is, the poet’s inner world, 
and the divine, that  is, the “spirit” that takes possession of the poet  must be expressed in the 
foreign medium solely “through a correspondingly greater degree of differentiation.”409  Hence 
the inner world of the poet—that which is proper to him, must unite with and separate from the 
foreign, which in its absolute sense is the divine, in order for the tragic poem to serve the purpose 
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of transforming and engendering life and liveliness. The joy that  is the true sense of mourning, 
thus, depends upon the potency of this differentiation. 
 The mourning-play  (Trauerspiel) is thus dramatic in both material and form, precisely 
because “it  contains a third element, namely, the different, more foreign material that the poets 
have chosen, material quite distinct  from their inmost heart and their world, because they have 
found that foreign material to be sufficiently analogous for their investment of their total 
sensibility into it, thus preserving the poets’ sensibility within it  as in a vessel, indeed all the 
more assuredly as the analogous material becomes increasingly  foreign; for the most intense 
sensibility is exposed to what is transitory  to the degree that has not denied truly temporal and 
sensuous relationships [… .]”410 Because, therefore, the tragic poets express “the most profound 
intensity,” they are obligated to “renounce altogether their own person, their subjectivity” and 
also renounce “the object that  is present to them, conveying it to a foreign personality, a foreign 
objectivity,” even and most potently where “the drama’s object, namely, destiny, expresses its 
mystery  most  tellingly, and […] there where homogeneity grips the hero most strongly, even 
there [… .]” 411  The essence of the tragic drama is the poet’s dispossession of himself and his 
subjective propriety by the expression of that propriety in the medium of absolute foreignness. 
Destiny intersects the tragic movement precisely  by means of this dispossession, by  a return to 
the poetic wellspring, where god and man, from their eternal intermingling, must  separate. 
Hölderlin writes: 
The presentation of the tragic [Die Darstellung des Tragischen] rests principally upon 
this: that the monstrous [das Ungeheure], the fact that God and man couple, and the fact 
that without limit the power of nature [Naturmacht] and the innermost of man become 
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one in fury, is conceived in that the limitless becoming-one [gränzenloses Eineswerden] 
is purified through limitless separation [gränzenloses Scheiden].412 
Hence the role of destiny is to bring about this purifying rupture, this reversal of the rhythmic 
movement in the very primordial union of god and man, from that of unification to that of 
separation, and it is in this moment that the hero’s need to sacrifice himself becomes clear in a 
poetic flash—a voice carried from the oceans of the future to which he was previously  blind, into 
the rush of becoming on the instant’s opening. The caesura is this moment of reversal—this 
silence that admits of no presence, drawing mortal and immortal toward each other and purifying 
each of them through their boundless, mutual withdrawal. Hence does man discover in a single 
instant the time of his tragedy and the tragedy  of his time. For without the god to guide the 
human, he has no measure for himself, and merely strives forward, toward transcendence, in the 
monstrosity  of his self-consciousness. The only means of measure after this withdrawal is 
infinite approximation, which requires that the god who has flown be constantly called back, 
through a process of anamnesis. Yet Hölderlin reveals to us this secret, that  the ideal union 
between man and god never, in fact, took place as presence or eternity—rather, in its very origin, 
which the modern tragedian seeks in Sophocles, this union was, in the same instant, purified 
through separation. And in order for this purification—this κάθαρσις—to be delivered to the 
tragic hero’s people as the revelation of this temporal tragedy, the hero shall have to go down in 
self-sacrifice.
 In his “Notes to Antigone,” Hölderlin writes of tragedy as the very  expression of the time 
of life: 
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The boldest  moment in the course of a day or a work of art  comes when the spirit of the 
times and of nature, the divine that is seizing hold of a human being and the object in 
which he is interested are at their most wildly opposed because the sensuous object of his 
interest only reaches half way but the spirit wakes to its greatest power beyond the half. 
At that moment the human being must keep the firmest hold on himself, for which reason 
he stands most open in his character.413
For Hölderlin, the tragic is a kind of universal and eternal movement. It courses through the 
temporal unfolding of days across and under history, in time’s most secret crevices, between its 
pillars and under its openings. It is a night-lit, sunlit drift—a fateful intimacy between heaven 
and earth. In the καιρóς of tragedy, then, divinity  and the object of human love cast themselves in 
radical opposition, and the godly  portion of man, his spirit, extends beyond the earthliness of the 
relation between man and what he loves. In this miraculous moment, man is more than man—he 
is heroic—halfway divine in his entirety. But what kind of opposition is this? None other than the 
one between the godly, the unutterable, and the spoken, which buries the god deeper in man, 
outside the reach of all phenomena. This spirit, then says Hölderlin, is “wild”—a kind of mania 
that grips and transcends time and that the human half of man conceals in strife and weariness.
Hölderlin and Intellectual Intuition
 Hölderlin’s theory of the intellectual intuition (intellectuale Anschauung) and of 
primordial separation, transforms across the history of his thought, moving from philosophical to 
poetological ground. His early thinking on this subject is heavily influenced by his submersion in 
the development of speculative philosophy, that is, in the German Romanticist and Idealist 
transition from Kant’s critical philosophy to the foundation of the dialectic. His earliest 
philosophical fragments were written contemporaneous to Fichte’s lectures, which he attended, 
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at Jena in 1794-1795. Fichte was among the first of the German philosophers of the post-Kantian 
generation to theorize intellectual intuition as a decisive step  forward in the history  of 
philosophy. 
 The “essential incompatibility of the the sensuous and the intelligible” in Kant is given 
exception only in the Critique of Judgement. Yet there, intuition oscillates between “reception 
and production” for the aesthetic judgement, and its relation to the ratio “always” occurs solely 
“according to analogical laws.”414  Therefore, no concept corresponds to the aesthetic reflective 
judgement; this judgement, rather, remains irrevocably subjective. In the late eighteenth century, 
it became the project of German philosophers to restore this scission, to reignite the union of 
intuition and the supersensuous, the immediate experience of divinity.415 A primordial ground of 
union between these two had to be reestablished in an actual sense, that is, in a sense that entered 
into experience—not merely as analogy. 
 Hölderlin, in his early philosophical writings, seeks this primordial unity from which the 
“division between a natural and a rational causality must have originated.”416  From out of a 
theory  of the excentric movement of time, Hölderlin grasps intellectual intuition as an analeptic 
and “quasi Platonic anamnesis,”417  which shatters the possibility of an absolutely continuous 
subject. From his very  first theoretical writings, Hölderlin regards the philosophical with a high 
degree of skepticism. In a fragment of 1794 entitled On the Law of Freedom, Hölderlin writes of 
a “natural state of the imagination” which dwells in “lawlessness”—in an “anarchy of 
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representations,” and which is organized by  the “intellect” and the “law of freedom.” This 
natural state is “a moral one” over which the intellect exercises its law; hence a state of 
boundless disorder—the imagination—is accompanied by and opposed to an ordering and 
limiting force—the intellect.418  “There,” that is, in the anarchy of representations, the 
imagination is considered “in and of itself,” i.e., “theoretically,” while “here,” i.e., in its natural 
state, it is considered “in conjunction with the faculty of desire,” that is, of striving for freedom. 
In that anarchy, “where the imagination is considered theoretically, a unity of the manifold, an 
ordering of perceptions was indeed possible yet accidental.”419  Here, in opposition to Kant’s 
Critique of Pure Reason, which determines the necessary conditions of possibility for synthetic 
judgements, Hölderlin reduces the theoretical, insofar as its object is epistemology, to 
contingency. The imagination’s synthesis into a complete unity, visible only from the point of 
view of the theoretical, is for Hölderlin purely  accidental—thus the standpoint of the theoretical 
stands on no solid ground, but is highly aleatory with respect to its object. Likewise, in the 
imagination’s “natural state of fantasy,” where it is seen in relation with desire, “moral 
lawfulness is indeed possible yet accidental.”420  Here, Hölderlin rejects the Kantian 
“transcendental imagination,” which, as primordial Being, must precede the epistemological 
organization it grounds as well as the imagination in its reproductive function where it effects the 
application of synthetic judgements to intuitions. 
 In his Critique of Practical Reason, Kant defines Reason, the faculty by grace of which 
morality  is possible, as “pure spontaneity,” elevated above the sphere of understanding, which is 
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circumscribed to the phenomenal world, while Reason, in its pure productivity, applies to the 
intelligible realm.421  It is this faculty, this passport  to the unknowable world of things-in-
themselves, that defines man as a “rational being” and, consequently, also as a moral being, i.e., 
as subjected to the laws of the intelligible realm. Freedom itself is fundamentally defined as 
freedom from the “determinate” causality of the sensible world; from this follows the supremacy 
of the spontaneous freedom of the will. There is, for him, a supersensous causality that 
transcends and renders possible all other causalities—its existence assures “the idea of freedom” 
which, in turn, is inseparable from “autonomy” and the “universal principle of morality.”422 
Hence all moral “judgement [Urteil]” must base itself upon this superior causality  and take place 
“according to the absolute spontaneity of freedom” in order to attain universal validity.423 The 
absolute spontaneity, however, is based on the “spontaneity  of the subject as thing in itself,” 
which would be knowable only by  means of an impossible “intellectual intuition.”424  This 
noumenal existence of the subject is nonetheless posited necessarily in the idea of freedom, 
which is set in motion by every  moral judgement, whose function is to appeal to the intelligible 
causality of the will.
 Hölderlin’s moral theory rests on the primordial transgression of this impossibility of 
intellectual intuition. For him, there is “an aspect of the empirical faculty  of desire, the analogue 
of what is called nature, which is most prominent where necessity  and freedom, the restricted 
and the unrestricted, the sensuous and the sacred seem to unite [… .]” This aspect is called 
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variously  “a natural innocence” and “a morality of the instinct”—it is a primordial union of 
Kant’s sensible and intelligible realms, and—as Hölderlin writes, “the fantasy in tune with it is 
heavenly.”425 This harmony of the earthly and the divine, of human freedom and supersensuous 
necessity inherent in the subject thus characterizes the essential and originary morality of nature. 
Pfau writes: “Hölderlin recasts the convergence of ‘freedom and necessity’ as the most 
primordial synthesis of intellect and intuition itself, a synthesis that takes place within the subject 
itself.”426 Thus Hölderlin’s intuition overcomes the theoretical realm of the symbolic analogon to 
which Kant had relegated it. The presupposed ground of Being present in Kant’s theory, as the 
domain of freedom, is overcome by Hölderlin, for whom that primordial unity can only  come 
about by means of an action that limits it. It is, moreover, because of the contingent quality of 
that action that any effort to organize it systematically necessarily fails. Hence, critical 
philosophy falls short of its moral task precisely insofar as it falls short of experience in its 
aleatory  nature. For Hölderlin’s intellectual intuition, the simultaneity of freedom and necessity, 
has its manifestation only  through the act of punishment, which, by its violent force, effects at 
once a separation between the elements of the synthesis, in such rapidity that the καιρός of that 
simultaneity never even takes place—for the conflict between them is eternal and cannot be 
stopped. Where freedom and necessity are in their closest proximity, there they are also farthest 
from one another.
 Hölderlin posits the thesis (articulated by Pfau) “that a primordial order and unity  can 
only be grasped a posteriori, when instigated by punishment.”427 Hölderlin writes: “The first time 
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that the law of freedom discloses itself to us, it appears as punishing.”428 The very  affirmation of 
freedom depends upon a circular paradox, formulated in a footnote to the fragment, “On the 
Concept of Punishment,” as follows: “ideal [:] without punishment no law / real [:] without law 
no punishment”429  where the law in question is, precisely, moral law. Freedom is thus defined 
only negatively, as the act by  which “the transgression of the law within oneself” becomes 
transparent through a foundation of punishment.430 Hence the convergence of the “sensuous and 
the sacred” occurs only as anamnesis, as it  is drawn into time through the memory of a 
primordial existence that, perhaps, never took place, by an analeptic action. Hölderlin’s theory of 
punishment and freedom, of punishment as both the manifestation and annihilation of freedom, 
and of this event as irreducible to any  pretension to systematicity or perfect wholeness is thus 
primarily  a thinking of the tragic. The free creative force by which life defines itself is only 
illuminated, set in motion and manifested through punishment. That punishing that was once, 
among the Greeks, divine, has become for us, however, immanent. Inspiration itself is tragic for 
us—in it, the voice of a disappeared god intones in us with freeing force. Hence the god must be 
met with, parted with, and mourned in the space of the caesura. The task of the poet is to bring 
about the presentation of this process and the tragic morality of punishment that it founds.
 Hölderlin tells his brother in a letter that the “tragic with us” is this: “to go away from the 
kingdom of the living in total silence packed up in some kind of container, not to pay  for the 
flames we have been unable to control by being consumed in fire.”431  To leave this debt, then, 
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which is properly a debt to the Greeks, behind, to search out a new living kingdom beyond that 
ancient one whose fire, exceeding its measure, has consumed us, requires, then both mourning 
and a joyfulness born out of it. This paradoxical experience is precisely that of our tragedy, the 
tragedy of a fall from the primordial kingdom we never could have lived in, as we are 
condemned already to onrush of time that carries us unwittingly, from the moment of our self-
conscious birth, away from the harmony of nature. 
 This mourning (Trauer) and the play (spiel) that accompanies and overcomes it  through 
affirmation of life beyond the whole must then take place within the empty travel, the empty 
exchange between the propriety  of the moderns and the foreignness of the Greeks. That the 
central point  of the tragic drama for Hölderlin is the caesura in its onrushing rhythm—the 
moment of the silent  withdrawal of the god and and the turning of man toward his mortality—
this is the sign, in tragedy, the metaphor for intellectual intuition, and hence the very transport of 
this intuition, of the poet-philosopher’s radical displacement of the speculative discourse of his 
contemporaries.
 For Fichte, the ground of Being is provided a priori by a primordial judgement (Urteil), 
which posits the identity of the subjective and the objective. He writes: “The proposition ‘A = A’ 
constitutes a judgement. […] The self’s positing of itself is thus its own pure activity.” From this 
he construes a definition of “the self as absolute subject” in the following terms: “That whose 
being or essence consists simply in the fact that it posits itself as existing, is the self as absolute 
subject.”432 Intellectual intuition is hence defined as the supreme Act (Tathandlung, also, fact) of 
this absolute subject, by means of which it brings itself into being. This definition is born both of 
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the rigorous impossibility of the Kantian thing in itself, on his own critical ground, and of the 
irreconcilability  that  Fichte perceived between Kant’s denial of the possibility of intellectual 
intuition and his axiom of the subject’s intuitive immediacy to himself as a conscious being and a 
moral agent. Hence, for Fichte, the subject  becomes, from his very genesis by means of 
reflective self-consciousness, the absolute itself. The judgement by  which this comes about does 
not assure an attainment of the thing-in-itself, but the becoming all-encompassing of the subject 
which identifies with itself as its own object.
  Pfau specifies that Fichte’s proposition indicates neither a tautological identity of “I” and 
“I” nor a reified consciousness, but that the originary Act lays the primordial foundation from 
which the Fichtean “reflection of the absolute subject” can evolve as a systematic Science of 
Knowledge. The Act thus provides the subject as reified consciousness merely with its formal 
condition of possibility, by inaugurating an “ontological unity [… .]”433 As Cassirer explains, the 
self-identity of the “A” or the “I” is necessary insofar as it “implies the self-certainty of the 
grounding relation” by which the subject can determine all of its “possible moments and 
applications [… .]” This self-identity signifies, moreover, recognizability, and this recognition 
cannot be achieved by “mere ‘perception’” but, rather, requires “an intuition which encompasses 
the infinity and totality of all possible perceptions.”434 The difference between “I” and “non-I” is 
preserved in the progressive reciprocal determination of subject and object in consciousness, 
which issues forth from Being, defined as “the predicate of coherence and systematicity” so that 
this determination is constantly view from the perspective of its τέλος, which is “absolute 
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unity.”435 Fichtean intellectual intuition is simultaneously  the Act’s condition of possibility  and 
the guarantee of its teleological determination, its end in the absolute. 
 Hölderlin, as a reader of Fichte’s Science of Knowledge and as his student at Jena, found 
the practical lacking in this formal postulate of the “I” identical with itself. Following Fichte’s 
notion of a “‘reciprocal determination’ (Wechselbestimmung)” of the “I” and the “non-I,” the 
“formal matrix” wherein consciousness comes to knowledge,436  Hölderlin posits an “arche-
separation,” and a “reciprocity” between subject and object. In a text of 1795 entitled 
“Judgement and Being,” Hölderlin thinks intellectual intuition as the absolute healing and 
reconciliation of “the original separation between subject and object, that separation through 
which alone object and subject become possible, the arche-separation [Urtheil].”437  Krell 
explains that Hölderlin thinks Urtheil—judgement—as Ur-theilung, “the primordial sundering or 
dividing of consciousness and its object [… .]”438  The foundation of this fragment, written in 
Fichte’s terminology and rigorously opposed to him, is a challenging of the “possibility  of ever 
determining the primordial and systematic ground of Being.”439  Rather, following Fichte, for 
whom judgement (Urteil) is the primordial Act that founds consciousness, Hölderlin also refutes 
him, by  defining this judgement, in accordance with its name, as Ur-teil—that is, primordial 
separation. The “reciprocity” between subject and object that Hölderlin posits results in a 
dialectical structure of thinking (to all judgement) insofar as, for example, the theoretical 
proposition “I am I” divides itself from the beginning by introducing the necessity of difference 
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into identity, just as “in the practical arche-separation it [the ‘I’]  opposes the not I, not itself.”440 
This primordial separation is a return to Heraclitus’ cosmological principle of division, of 
duplicity, as inherent and prior to all unity. And, as for Heraclitus, this original split, for 
Hölderlin, results in the temporal movement of becoming—for Hölderlin, this is an excentric 
temporality, where the subject can never coincide with itself as object except in the saving power 
of intellectual intuition, envisioned as an event that heals the originary subjective scission. 
 Hölderlin also posits, in “Judgement and Being,” a dialectic between “reality  and 
potentiality,” which are respectively analogous and directly related to “mediate and immediate 
consciousness.” The object  expressed as potentiality is merely the repetition of the subject for 
whom it exists as such. The “concept of potentiality” applies only to the “objects of the 
intellect” (not to those of “reason” to which “necessity” applies), while the concept of “reality” 
applies to “perception and intuition”—hence does the combination of these concepts in a given 
subject bring about  the unification of the potential and the real, the intellectual object and the 
intuiting subject. In “intellectual intuition” alone are “subject and object united altogether”—that 
is to say, inseparably, to such an extreme extent that “no separation can be performed without 
violating the essence of what is to be separated [… .]”441  Yet this unity of Being in intellectual 
intuition is by  no means a principle of identity. Being, for Hölderlin, as a “connection between 
subject and object,” forms the condition of all reflexive separation, as anterior to all “synthetic 
unity.”442  Rather, “the I is only possible by means of [the] separation of the I from the I.” 
Hölderlin exposes the paradoxical nature of self-consciousness concealed in the utterance of “I,” 
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the rupture concealed in the “I” itself. For “I” cannot be said without self-consciousness, and yet 
this self-consciousness is only possible through an affirmation of the “I” that is at once its 
subversion, or: “In opposing myself to myself, separating myself from myself, yet in recognizing 
myself as the same in the opposed regardless of this separation.”443 The problem is altogether 
circular, that the subject is destabilized within itself from it very genesis—that the “I” is 
primordially split in two within the very Urteil by which it brings itself about. 
 Hence, because Fichte’s Act, which posits the “I = I” as a totality, does not account for 
the separation of the “I” within itself, it is, for Hölderlin, already derivative, presupposing the 
possibility of a cohesive and consistent  systematicity—a uniformity  of Being. Thus, Hölderlin 
claims that “identity is not = to absolute Being.”444 On the grounds of the misunderstanding of 
Fichte which prematurely anthropomorphizes and absolutizes his subject as a consciousness, of 
which Pfau also accuses Hölderlin,445  the latter demonstrates how “Being can neither be 
conceived of as an identity nor as a synthesis” nor, indeed, as consistent with the “absolute ‘I,’” 
since all transcendental categories imply a difference from that which is transcended.446 I’d like 
to gesture toward, however, the objection, against this accusation, that Hölderlin’s concern is 
with the presupposition of initial subjective continuity—a continuity  of Being—contained in the 
Fichtean proposition that the subject in possession of “self-consciounsess” who can say “I” is 
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capable of ultimately uniting with himself qua object in an impenetrable absolute without a 
temporal separation ensuing. 
 Hölderlin’s fragment thus dismantles the possibility of any  transcendental philosophy 
consistent with Being. For the “I” is never purely present, but is infinitely separated from itself as 
object, such that it  is “grounded by  a [primordial] unity [of Being] it can only  presuppose, and 
which becomes the ‘boundary concept’ of the intellectual intuition.”447  It is for this reason that 
self-consciousness qua self-identity is radically impossible—as soon as we begin to 
conceptualize Being through consciousness, we must equally grasp  the futility of this project; 
consciousness of Being is hence the consciousness of this futility, of the failure of an enduring 
intellectual intuition. Being is undermined by every attempt to grasp  it, running ahead of and 
behind the self-divided subject, who is, indeed, more than anything, subject to his own excentric 
time. In accordance with this, intellectual intuition as the definition of Being wherein subject and 
object unite can never found a totalizing transcendental system for Hölderlin, but rather opens 
itself out onto a rhythmic dissonance and discontinuity within the subject itself, and hence the 
failure of all philosophical systems.
 Hölderlin will thus also refuse Schelling’s conception of intellectual intuition as “the 
organ of all transcendental thinking” in 1800. Schelling’s thesis, based on Fichte as well, 
understood intellectual intuition as that “universally and freely productive” intuition wherein 
“producing and produced are one and the same”—in other words, that procedure whereby the 
“ego […] first originates” through “knowing” itself as both subject and object, thence creating 
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itself as such.448 Whereas Schelling proposes intellectual intuition as a “grounding function,” for 
Hölderlin it constitutes, in the words of Pfau, “an intuition of the very impossibility of ever 
grounding a totality.”449  Hölderlin views intellectual intuition as the movement by which 
philosophy reveals the very absence of its ground, by which absolute unity fails to be achieved 
from the first  moment of consciousness, and passes over into absolute discontinuity, absolute 
separation from itself. 
 However, Schelling also regarded intellectual intuition as an aesthetic act. He writes: 
“Aesthetic intuition is intellectual intuition become objective.”450  This aesthetic intuition is the 
rendering-sensuous of intellectual intuition, in the sense of the Greek αἴσθησις, perception; it is 
the becoming-perceptible of intellectual intuition, the subject’s unification with the god. As a 
visible movement, intellectual intuition, for Schelling, is only present in ancient  Greek 
tragedy. Thus for Hölderlin, who, in his later poetological works, would come to view tragedy as 
the metaphor of intellectual intuition, Schelling is of particular importance. One might almost 
say that, refusing the ontological ground of intellectual intuition, i.e., refusing it as a positive and 
coherent philosophical postulate, Hölderlin rather embraced it  as an aesthetic phenomenon, as 
the map of tragic transport in the rhythmic unfolding of tragedy, and, even there, as the 
movement of a ceaseless conflict between god and man. Yet tragedy, for him, far from being an 
abstract philosophical paradigm, tragedy becomes a template for tragic experience itself.
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Schelling’s Tragic Philosophy
 Schelling was the first philosopher of the tragic.451 His theory of the tragic came about 
through a meditation on the problematic dissonance, the apparent irreconcilability, between 
critical and dogmatic philosophy in regard to freedom, which is for Schelling “the essence of the 
I,” and even “the alpha and omega of all philosophy.”452 Critical philosophy, of which Kant is the 
paradigmatic thinker, proceeds from a positing of the “absolute I,”453 where the subject is given 
supreme reign, and is thus “a striving for immutable selfhood, unconditional freedom, and 
unbounded activity.”454 In dogmatic philosophy, on the other hand, whose exemplary philosopher 
is Spinoza, the absolute becomes the object of all subjective knowledge, which leads to a 
situation of “absolute passivity” and subservience of the subject to the objective force of 
necessity.455 Both of these doctrines, for Schelling, do not take into account, however, the power 
of the objective. For, in the first, the object  is always mastered by the subject and in the second 
as well, the subject’s position of passivity  neglects the fact that the objective “owes its victory to 
the subject itself.”456  Hence, Schelling, in his Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism (1795), 
construes a combination of these theories, or rather, an integrating (sublating) alternative to 
them, which will constitute the paradoxical paradigm of the tragic. He attributes its insight to his 
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imaginary  interlocutor and writes, in the tenth letter: “You are right, one thing still remains—to 
know that there is an objective power which threatens to destroy our freedom and, with this firm 
and certain conviction in our hearts, to fight against it, to summon up  all our freedom and thus to 
perish.”457  Thus the speculative philosophy  of the tragic has self-sacrifice at its center and it 
hinges upon this as the dialectical consequence of the contradiction between human freedom and 
divine necessity. Schelling accordingly views self-sacrifice as the only response to the threat of 
objective necessity to freedom that guarantees their coincidence in the absolute.
 This theory, however, remains for Schelling strictly aesthetic, applying only to Greek 
tragic art and being insufficient to furnish a “system of action” in the absence of a “race of 
Titans,” without whom such a systematization of the struggle between freedom and necessity 
could only  have “the most ruinous consequences for humanity.”458 The essential meaning of the 
tragic has its truth only in the ancient world, because it is only  there that  the power of necessity 
qua divine destiny has an actual existence and value. For modernity, the tragic conflict between 
freedom and necessity  does not have the same force—our task is not to assert our freedom in the 
face of divine necessity, in the manner of the tragic hero, but rather to reflect upon this conflict as 
an aesthetic principle. The “tragic process” that  plays itself out  in Oedipus Tyrannos is 
significant, thus, “only  in view of its telos.”459  Schelling’s interpretation of the tragic hero 
regards him as victim to the power not only of objective necessity  but of a punishment for his 
succumbing to this necessity; thus his (positive) will to freedom turns against him. The dialectic 
between destruction and salvation thus surfaces here, for Oedipus is both saved and destroyed by 
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his ultimate assertion of his freedom, “destroyed precisely by what should have saved” him,460 
that is, in his decision “to willingly  endure punishment even for an unavoidable crime, so that he 
might prove his freedom through the loss of that freedom itself, and so as to be defeated even as 
he declared the rights of free will.”461 
 Nearly  a decade after the Letters, in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Art (1802-1803), 
Schelling speaks again of the “essence of tragedy” as “a real conflict between freedom in the 
subject and objective necessity” in which neither force wins over the other, but rather, in the end, 
“both of them simultaneously [appear] as conquerors and conquered in perfect indifference.”462 
The point of departure in this passage is that of Schelling’s identity philosophy, developed in 
1801, where the self-conscious subject is regarded as a result rather than a self-generating cause, 
as in Fichte’s philosophy. His aesthetics thus rests on philosophical ground; Schelling views God 
as “infinite ideality grasping all reality within itself”463  and the beautiful as the “forming-into-
one [Ineinsbildung] of the real and the ideal”—thus, the common indifference of freedom and 
necessity come to rest in a “real entity.”464  The poetic genres each constitute a progressively 
higher manifestation of this identity and struggle between freedom and necessity. Their 
progression coincides with the development of culture (Bildung). The epic contains “a state of 
innocence” and “unity”—a perfect identity whose wholeness will later recur, after the experience 
of “dispersion.” The “lyrical poem,” then, is the event of “identity [flaring] up  into […] conflict” 
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in culture’s process of maturing. Schelling writes, then, of the genesis of tragedy: “It was only 
with the ripest fruit of later culture that unity  itself was reconciled with conflict on a higher level 
and that the two became one again in a more perfect formation [Bildung]. This higher identity  is 
drama.”465  Tragedy is thus thought as the final stage in an ascending dialectic and “the tragic 
process” is viewed as “the restoration of […] indifference in conflict.” And this conflict, taking 
place at the heart of freedom, causes freedom itself to “become its own adversary.”466
 Lacoue-Labarthe writes of Schelling’s theory, which bases itself primarily  on Sophocles’ 
Oedipus: “Here we have the scheme and the matrix of dialectical logic itself: the negative 
(privation of freedom) converts itself into a positive (accomplishment of liberty) by virtue of the 
accentuation, or of the redoubling, of the negative itself (the provocation of punishment, the very 
will to lose freedom). The dialectic treats of the paradox of contradiction, that is, of identity.” 
Identity presupposes identity  with itself, and must refer endlessly back to itself; thus “identity is 
always self-identity with itself and identity with its other. Which means also that alterity—
including the most extreme contradiction—is potentially identity.”467  Through the self-
condemnation to fate—through the self-sacrifice and punishment for a sin of which he knows 
himself to be innocent—the absolute tragic hero establishes also a mechanism of self-
appropriation, such that all that is strange, monstrous, horrifying in himself as a result of his 
destiny  (where destiny is transposed onto, or perhaps sublated into, nature) can be infinitely 
identified with the Same, which is to say, with the freedom that characterizes him. 
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 If Oedipus maintains, in Schelling’s view, a curative function as the relic of the κάθαρσις 
he provoked in Aristotle’s Poetics, it is because he is at once the originary event and the symbol 
of the speculative dialectic, that is, the dialectic whose completion is the subject’s self-
consciousness and his attainment of an absolute perspective—his τέλος in the god, and hence his 
absolute liberation from mortality. κάθαρσις, performed by tragedy in the figure of Oedipus, 
coincides with what shall become the Aufhebung (sublation, or relève) of the dialectic, present in 
Schelling’s text, according to Lacoue-Labarthe, in his discussion of the constraints and demands 
of art, that is, “under the name of the conditions proper to (re)presentation, Darstellung, or 
mimesis.” κάθαρσις is therefore the function of the aesthetic proper, where this representation or 
recreation of nature in art plays itself out on the ground of tragedy, the ancient ground wherein 
alone the gods are present in such a way that intellectual intuition becomes primordially possible.
  It is for the sake of the tragedy as a complete work of art that  the tragic hero must present
—i.e., bring into being—the conciliation, in the form of self-consciousness, of the dissonance or 
opposition embedded in himself, that is, namely, the opposition between his self-identity (his 
innocence) and the difference that undercuts it  through destiny (his guilt), so as to purify  the 
opposition through a synthesis that at once carries innocence and guilt with it in their isolation 
and leaves them behind it, abolishing them into the irretrievable past. This then is the operation 
of the Aufhebung—the simultaneous preservation and abolition of internal contradiction, which, 
in the case of Oedipus, results in voluntary punishment—in self-sacrifice. “And it  is, of course,” 
writes Lacoue-Labarthe, “because identity is thought as Self, ipseity or Selbstheit, that only a 
metaphysics of the subject can pretend to the resolution of the paradox of the Same. Inversely, 
there where this paradox is left in the state of paradox, there where the extreme difference 
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maintains itself, the circumscription of such a metaphysics is, in one way or another, 
exceeded.”468 Lacoue-Labarthe names Hölderlin as one who rigorously maintained the paradox. 
He did this, we can affirm, by replacing the unity  of selfhood with its constant, agonal separation 
and fragmentation.
Hölderlin: Poetology, Tragedy, Excentricity
 For Hölderlin, as for Schelling, the intellectual intuition “of a unity that antedates any 
structure of synthesis” is necessarily aesthetic. For Hölderlin, this intuition as origin and absolute 
can only  occur a posteriori, and, accordingly, the meaning of the aesthetic is transformed along 
with the meaning of the tragic. “Thus the aesthetic does not serve as the ‘objective’ manifestation 
of the union between the subjective and the objective (Schelling), but only  affords man an 
‘accidental’ glimpse into a past  that was never quite present.”469  Intellectual intuition, thus, 
represents for Hölderlin the very limit of the philosophical, the point at which it comes up 
against its impossibility by postulating the ground of Being in an absolute and eternal unity that 
cannot endure in time without dividing itself. Thus the philosophical, coming to its Ursprung in 
the contingency of the future, requires its purification in the poetological. Hence Hölderlin posits 
temporal self-separation as the pre-history of the Subject, and the purification of the unity 
achieved in intellectual intuition through “boundless separation.” It is through the actualization 
of his original instinct against Fichte, that the identity of the subject with itself as object is 
impossible without an original scission in the subject itself, that he comes to think separation, 
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rather than union, as the absolute and therefrom discovers poetology  as the only means by which 
this separation is demonstrable in its essential tragic temporality.
 Primordial separation precedes Being and the primordial unity  that succeeds it reveals 
itself, too, to be a separation; hence it proves, in the moment of its arrival, the impossibility of 
any attainment of the absolute. The failure of the philosophical, its self-fragmentation resulting 
from its pretension to absolute selfhood, gives way to the tragic for us, the need to mourn this 
impossibility  of a return to the unity  of nature, or rather, the impossibility of that  unity ever 
having taken place; the very arrival of the Ursprung is at once its infinite loss. The revelation of 
this impossibility, however, is the very event that renders life possible; the unification of nature 
and art, of god and man, which, as intellectual intuition, brings the absolute into being, can only 
come about by means of their initial boundless separation. It is thus that  mourning is, for 
Hölderlin, the very movement of living, the affirmation of mortality  calling out to itself as the 
god disappears. And this process is undergone in the painful, mournful movement of its 
temporality, only  in the art of tragedy, which is no longer thought as a medium isolated in a 
primal past and only proper to the ancient Greeks, but as a movement that extends into our own 
experience. For Hölderlin, indeed, as for Nietzsche after him, life is conceived on the basis of 
tragic art—it is not art that imitates nature, but nature that imitates art.
 The attainment of the absolute in a temporal present, as the coincidence of subject and 
object, of necessity and freedom that was sought after by the speculative philosophers of the 
German Idealist movement, that is, namely, by Fichte, Hegel and Schelling, is subverted by 
Hölderlin through the determination of the caesura as the occurrence, in tragedy, of intellectual 
intuition. Any  presence of such an event as an affirmation of the wholeness, the oneness of the 
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subject is rendered impossible by this determination of the very  attainment of the absolute as 
separation between freedom and necessity, between god and man. Rather, the continuity of 
subjectivity within the tragic hero is, from the point of this caesura, split apart and the splinters 
of the subject sent flying into the atoms of a non-unifiable and tragic becoming.
 Lacoue-Labarthe suggests such a subversion of in his essay “The Caesura of the 
Speculative”: “Why would we not conclude, then, that in (dis)organizing tragedy in this way, 
Hölderlin caesuraed the speculative (which is not to go beyond it, or to maintain it, or to sublate 
it) and, in doing so, rediscovered something of the Trauerspiel?”470  This role for Hölderlin is 
based, moreover, on the idea that Lacoue-Labarthe advances of tragedy, for Hölderlin, as the 
“catharsis of the speculative” insofar as the “speculative desire for the infinite and the divine,” 
insofar as it is associated with tragedy, is purified precisely  through tragedy’s presentation of this 
desire as “a casting into separation, differentiation, finitude.”471 Although it is not my intention to 
schematize Hölderlin’s philosophical project in this way, I believe that the indication is just—in 
general, Lacoue-Labarthe avoids a recognition of the negative connotations Hölderlin perceives 
in the failure of the speculative and hence does not bring across the weight  of the tragedy that 
separation entails. He tends, rather, quite often, toward an appropriation of the Hölderlinian 
configuration as a means of affirming and advancing the deconstructionist project. For, indeed, it 
is, for Hölderlin, a painful excentricity to which we are condemned, which exposes the failure of 
the speculative project  of intellectual intuition as a present unification—hence the endless need 
for mourning. 
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 The ἒν διαφέρον ἑαυτῷ of Heraclitus is, for Hölderlin, the tragic opening of life; it is the 
very event of the caesura, a prophetic revelation that determines the hero’s fate. For it is precisely 
the impossibility of overcoming that supreme separation, the unattainability of harmony, that 
condemns the hero to his self-sacrifice, and which defines his tragedy. This sacrifice is a final 
attempt at entering the absolute, of bringing about the coincidence of freedom and necessity. And 
yet, it shall bring to the man, the people, the culture it leaves behind merely a greater separation, 
and the tragic revelation of becoming. It  is in this respect that his sacrifice fails and, through its 
failure alone, succeeds.
 A un-traversable distance between god and man awakes in Hölderlin’s writing of the 
tragic. Boundless separation replaces Schelling’s indifference—the battleground of the tragic 
ἀγών shifts; no longer are both sides at once conqueror and conquered, but, rather, they are 
separated by immeasurable stretches of time, beaches of distance. Szondi points out that, for 
Hölderlin, the reconciliation between nature and art is “recognizable only when what has been 
bound together in an inner unity is divided through conflict” while “the physical union can only 
be merely apparent and temporary  and must be sublated,” so that the universal does not lose 
itself in the particular “‘life of a world’”—so that it does not expire in an individual. This death is 
the destiny of Empedocles, exemplary of all “‘tragic figures’”—his passing gives birth to a 
“‘becoming.’”472 Szondi thus discloses the meaning of the counter-rhythmic caesura as a passage 
from a world ruled by divinity and fate into  a fallen ground of immanence. Hölderlin devoted 
himself to understanding “the poet’s task in an age when the gods can be near only through their 
distance.”473 He writes: “Hölderlin is determined both to hold out in this night of divine distance 
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[…] and to prepare the future coming of the gods.”474 But who are these gods to come? Perhaps, 
no gods at all but something entirely other—for example, a new sort of mortal love. For 
Hölderlin’s tragic hero is always announcing the flight of the gods by his self-sacrifice.
 In a letter of June 1799 to Suzette Gontard, Hölderlin’s muse and the model for 
Hyperion’s great love, Diotima, Hölderlin writes: “Every day  I have to invoke the absent god 
again.” Thus the tragic movement that plays out between man and the disappearing god must be 
ceaselessly repeated; the mourning must daily recommence, in cosmological magnitude, as 
Heraclitus’ sun is new each day. Hölderlin continues: 
When I think of great men at the great moments of history, how they caught at the things 
around them like holy  fire and transformed everything dead and wooden, the world’s 
straw, into flame which flew up with them to the heavens; and then of myself, how I 
often go about like a poor glimmering lamp that would dearly beg a drop of oil to shine 
into the night a bit longer—then, I tell you, a curious shudder runs through my whole 
body, and softly I call out to myself the terrible words: more dead than alive.475 
This desire that Hölderlin speaks is precisely that of transforming the dead, the forgotten refuse 
of past glory, into the future—the fire reigniting ancient heroes. Tragedy as Trauerspiel is the 
only means to this power of transformation, this deliverance of the past into the future. In 
accordance with this, Hölderlin’s shift  toward the poetological, the function of tragedy as the 
passage, the transport from the ideal to the real, is also a shift  toward the embrace of tragic 
excentricity. Hölderlin ends his letter to Suzette Gontard thus: 
a nature like yours, where everything is joined in intimate, indelible, living union, this is 
the pearl of time, and whoever has recognized it and seen how its heavenly innate unique 
happiness is also its deep unhappiness, he is likewise forever happy and forever 
unhappy.476 
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Such a “pearl of time” is that nature which transforms the dead into the living, which calls the 
god back by its beauty, in the manner of Platonic anamnesis, and in which life in the tragic Greek 
sense, as this constant union and separation with divinity, revives itself once again. Within this 
pearl of time, therefore, a measure of timelessness is attained—an instant of eternity, that defies 
the rhythmic onrush of tragedy. If there is human love to be attained, it  lies, perhaps, within this 
temporary, counter-rhythmic experience of the eternal, which makes the descent back into the 
tragic rhythm of becoming bearable. It offers up  the dream of the absolute, of the possibility of 
retaining something of the divine, before the self is once again split and must undergo the 
constant sacrifice of itself in the movement of time, even as it gains in self-knowledge.
 Hölderlin’s intellectual intuition takes place within a conception of time as excentric, 
discontinuous, and thus of selfhood as discontinuous, where the distance between men and the 
divinity, between the moderns and the ancients, is measured by a tragic, living rhythm. The 
whole is not given beforehand—it comes later, as a mere instant before the boundless withdrawal 
of the god. The primordial ground of Being, likewise, comes about through the action of 
punishment; it is not the origin but the interstice between a circular and an excentric movement. 
There, at the point of the failure of the philosophical to attain the absolute, there lies the 
downgoing—the Untergang—of the tragic hero. Untergang equally  signifies setting, as in the 
downgoing motion of the sun. It thus contains within itself the promise of a dawn to follow. 
 Hölderlin’s turn to the poetological is based on the idea, expressed in his essay, “The 
Ground of Empedocles,” that “the image of intensity”477  which, as Pfau affirms, “is tragedy 
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itself,”478 must deny and “everywhere denies its ultimate basis”479 or foundation. Self-sacrifice, 
or going under, is always the infinite, immeasurable attainment of freedom brought about 
through the infinite loss of freedom. It is the re-unification of art  with nature, of man with god 
wherein both withdraw immeasurably—the god into his absence and the mortal into an 
“excentric sphere of the dead.” The sacrificial moment of the tragedy  is determined at the 
midpoint, when the human and the divine come into closest contact, thus, the boundless, tragic 
content of the play and the calculable law, the rhythm that measures it at a distance. There the 
downgoing begins; there, at the the moment of the god’s most potent presence, he vanishes. Man 
descends and god withdraws, and there an infinite work of mourning—Trauerarbeit—finds its 
origin. This mourning signifies for humanity  the loss of the divine—man is condemned to 
becoming, and to his own body as the source of his freedom and punishment. Szondi writes: 
A spark leaps over the fire that it kindles, night is changed into scorching day. By 
“interpreting the words of the oracle too infinitely,” that is, as a religious demand, and by 
fulfilling this demand, Oedipus forces a union with God. Yet this “boundless union” […] 
must pass over into a “boundless separation,” so that  the monstrosity it  presents becomes 
knowable. The forced day tragically  turns into an intensified night: into the darkness of 
the blinded Oedpius.480
 The idea of separation as the absolute, rather than unification in an intellectual intuition 
comes as an Empedoclean inspiration concerning love, during the Homburg period of Hölderlin’s 
Empedocles and translations of Sophocles’ Trauerspiele. In tragedy, this absolute separation 
becomes necessary in the counter-rhythmic rupture, and unity always results in a higher form of 
conflict—of ἀγών. There is indeed, for Hölderlin, an ascending dialectic—born, however, before 
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that of Hegel—of the tragic movement of union and conflict. Separation is so primordially 
inscribed at the heart of unification that it continually re-erupts like an eternally active volcano, 
indeed like Empedocles’ Etna itself.
 For Schelling, self-sacrifice is the fundamental movement by which man achieves 
divinity and freedom. He writes: “It is not likely that any enthusiast [Schwärmer] would ever 
have taken delight in the the thought of being engulfed in the abyss of the deity, had he not 
always put his own ego in the place of the deity.”481 Thus, the only way in which a tragic hero 
could desire to abolish himself is by a pretension to an attainment of divinity, of the absolute—of 
a self-transcendence that makes the ego itself the divine. The experience of intellectual intuition 
is, indeed, characterized by a death, for Schelling—the only way that infinite freedom can be 
attained is by a limitless descent into the night of the ego qua god. Schelling writes: 
Where all resistance ceases, there is infinite expansion. […] The supreme moment of 
being is, for us, transition to not-being, the moment of annihilation. Here is the moment 
of absolute being, supreme passivity is one with the most unlimited activity. […] We 
awaken from intellectual intuition as from a state of death.482 
The seeker of absolute freedom plunges himself into an annihilating night, and the only manner 
in which it would be possible to unite with the god would be by suicide—the absolute itself, the 
unification of the passive or meaningless sign of the hero with the pure activity of divine nature 
is itself a death. Thus the philosophical finds its end in death. This is so because “with absolute 
freedom no consciousness of self is compatible. An activity without any  object, an activity  which 
encounters no resistance, never returns to itself. Only  a restricted reality [Realität] is an actuality 
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[Wirlichkeit] for us.”483  Like Hölderlin’s monarchy, Schelling’s freedom is impossible in an 
absolute sense precisely  because it lacks an object, and hence, a limiting power. In inspiration, 
Schelling claims, that is, in the aesthetic exteriorization of the internal harmony  of freedom and 
necessity, the “self-intuition of the absolute” comes about.484 Inspiration is thus a self-sacrificial 
drive, the drive toward the absolute, which resists death by  uniting subject and object in a work 
of art: the absolute is attainable aesthetically. For Hölderlin, on the other hand, the aesthetic, art, 
and tragedy in particular, must  be capable of actually bringing about the real, and of 
transforming it. Thus the function of his Empedocles is precisely to deliver a people to freedom, 
returning them to a transfigured nature, through a self-sacrifice that is at once an attainment of 
true unity with the divine in death. And this is because “in Empedocles his time individualizes 
itself” to such a degree of intensity that his sacrifice becomes absolutely necessary to the 
salvation of the Agrigentian people.485
 The crime of Empedocles was to consider himself a wandering god—to affirm his unity 
with the divine. Hermocrates, in Hölderlin’s first draft of The Death of Empedocles, says, upon 
banishing Empedocles: 
And to his banishment in a barren wasteland, 
That there, never to return again, 
He’ll pay, and dearly, for that evil hour he 
Made himself a god.486 
This crime, unforgivable, and for which his people desired to punish him, resulted in his decision 
of suicide. In Hölderlin’s “Frankfurt Plan” for the Empedocles tragedy, he writes in the sketch of 
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act two, scene four, that it is after the Agrigent people topple the statue of him that they 
themselves have built that Empedocles resolves “to unite with infinite nature by  means of a 
voluntary death.”487
 In his letter to his brother of June 4, 1799, Hölderlin writes of the path of man out of 
nature, returning back into it: “all the meandering rivers of human activity  flow into the ocean of 
nature, just as they begin from it.” The task of “philosophy, art  and religion” is to teach men how 
to travel this dangerous “path [Bahn],” not “blindly” but “with eyes wide open, joyfully  and 
nobly” and these forces owe their power to the fact that they “proceed from this creative 
impulse” which gives life its value. Philosophy does this by bringing “this impulse into 
consciousness”—the tragic impulse, and unveiling to it “its infinite object in the ideal”—thereby 
it “strengthens and clarifies it.” Yet because it remains in the realm of the ideal, philosophy 
circumvents and escapes life by a pretension to universality, to circularity—to non-excentricity. 
Hölderlin continues:
Art presents the impulse with its infinite object  in a living image, in a higher world of 
representation. And religion teaches it to sense and believe this higher world precisely 
where it looks for and wishes to create it, i.e. in nature, both in its own human nature and 
in the surrounding world, as a latent disposition, as a spirit to be unfolded.488
The realm of the aesthetic, of art, proves itself to be the one in which life unveils itself most 
purely, precisely  because it transforms it into a medium of representation; therein, intellectual 
intuition is exemplified in its highest degree of purity. The ideal is no longer the mode of 
explicitation for the creative impulse—no grand synthesis is attempted—rather, the tragic 
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convergence and divergence of life force and the infinite are displayed according to the 
momentary flowering of their occurrence. 
 Hölderlin speaks to his brother of the tremendous courage it requires to be a great man. 
For the weakest, blindest men, rush through life seeking safety and shelter. But for great men, 
“the present is not satisfactory, […] they want things different, and so they fling themselves 
sooner into nature’s grave, and accelerate the march of the world.”489  Man is at  a precipice, 
where he must have the courage and eyefulness to plunge himself into the abyss of nature, to 
sacrifice himself to her perfection. The path of the man Hölderlin describes is an excentric one, 
departing out of unity, undergoing dissonance, and returning to its source transformed.
 The concept of excentricity, Exzentrizität, rose in ubiquity during the last five years of the 
18th century  among the German Romantics. The word was used originally strictly in astronomy, 
to describe the inscrutable and non-circular orbit of comets. In his Universal Natural History and 
Theory of the Heavens (1755), inspired by Newton, Kant explains that excentricity is “the 
deviation from circular motion”490  of heavenly  bodies in orbit. This deviation, he claims, is 
coincident with the increase of the distance of a body  from the sun. Such deviation is caused by 
the interference of contingent causes and “materials” that have different degrees of “orbital 
velocity,” with the circular path of heavenly  bodies. While planets remain primarily in a circular 
orbit around the sun, comets are distinguished from them precisely  by the excentricity  of their 
path: 
Eccentricity is the most notable characteristic differentiating the comets. Their 
atmosphere and tail, which expand through the heat of their close approach to the sun, are 
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only consequences of the eccentricity, although they have always served in times of 
ignorance as uncommon images of horror, announcing to the common folk imaginary 
destinies.491
Among the German Romantics, excentricity  took on the meaning of the turn away from 
philosophical systems and toward a fragmentary form of thinking, verging on poetics, as in the 
case of Novalis and Schlegel. For Hölderlin, thus, in form, a turn away from “Dame 
philosophy”—the “tyrant”492 and toward tragic poetry. But to be blinded to necessity, no longer 
to possess any sure circularity, and hence to be abandoned to chance at every juncture, this is 
tragic. The figure of the comet was considered to be a prophetic omen perhaps until the 
demystification of Pierre Bayle’s Pensées Diverses sur la Comète of 1680. Once it ceases to be 
such, once all absolute measure of necessity is lost, man is condemned to become his own 
Tiresias. It is indeed the task of the tragic hero to divert from the path that repeats itself ad 
infinitum, i.e., the dream of a circular path leading back into the naïve heart of nature, which has 
become impossible, or the path that progresses toward a goal; in the distance between the 
circular path and the excentric one lies the counter-rhythmic rupture—the encounter of tragic 
transport with the double-withdrawal of god and man. That is the point of the Untergang—the 
point when the tragic hero, becoming himself, discovers that he must go down. 
 The Chorus in Antigone addresses the heroine: “living the life of your own among / 
Mortals unique / You go down into the world of the dead [Gehst du hinab, in die Welt der Todten, 
Ἅιδην  καταβήσει].”493 This downgoing is an act of love—a love impossible in the monarchy of 
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Thebes, impossible in the world above ground. Hence Antigone’s excentric movement into death 
is, like that of Empedocles, one destined to revive love, nature, and which, by its very 
excentricity, fails to do so. Creon speaks to Antigone, in a punishing tone: “Go down below then 
if you want to love / And love down there. [So geh’ hinunter, wenn du lieben willst, / Und liebe 
dort!]”494 Antigone’s punishment, the necessity  of her Untergang, ensues from a mourning of the 
death that must not  be mourned. The love that inspires forbidden mourning, that seeks to reunite 
divine nature with man by insisting on their boundless, irresolvable separation must be banished 
to underworld. In Hyperion, Hölderlin writes: “We die so as to live.”495 For it is only in death 
that true reconciliation, the attainment of the harmony of nature through excentricity, can come 
to pass. The one who goes down must do so precisely because he endures the contradiction 
between man and nature most harshly—because he bears that opposition in his breast, and stands 
between them like a god, for, as Hölderlin writes in “The Ground of Empedocles,” when the 
tragedy reaches its “perfection,” the “divine stands at the midpoint” between art and nature.496
 Hölderlin refers to the cadence of the scenes in the Trauerspiel as an “excentric rapidity 
[exzentrischer Rapidität]”497—the time of the tragic drama, thus, its transport, is excentric. 
Deviating from the path of the circular orbit, pushed off its course by the force of contingency, 
the movement of the Trauerspiel leads its tragic hero to his downgoing—to absolute separation 
from the god. Tiresias “enters the course of fate as a custodian of the natural power [Naturmacht] 
which, in a tragic manner, removes man from his own life-sphere [Lebensphäre], the center of 
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his inner life into another world and into the excentric sphere of the dead [in die exzentrische 
Sphäre der Todten].”498  The natural power of prophecy, of the future, is that  which pushes man 
farther and farther into monstrosity, until he has reached the realm of the dead, and embodied the 
tragedy he is born into being. 
 Hölderlin writes, in an introduction to the second draft of Hyperion: 
We all pass through an eccentric path [eine exzentrische Bahn], and there is no other way 
possible from childhood to consummation [Vollendung]. 
 The blesses unity, Being (in the only sense of that word) is lost to us, and we had 
to lose it if we were to gain it again by striving and struggle. We tear ourselves loose from 
the peaceful [h]en kai pan of the world, in order to restore it through ourselves. We have 
fallen out with nature, and what was once one, as we can believe, is now in conflict with 
itself, and each side alternates between mastery and servitude. … Hyperion too was 
divided between these two extremes.499
Hölderlin defines this excentric path as the path that leads from Einfalt—simplicity, naïveté in 
Schiller’s sense, as the absolute, spontaneous organic, to Bildung—modern culture, which 
undergoes the infinite separation, analogous to Schiller’s sentimentality, as the nostalgic 
backward gazing onto an irretrievable, ideal past. We are condemned to a life of conflict—a 
ceaseless, agonal struggle, where Being—the myth that Fichte had conjured—is no longer 
possible in any degree. Rather than the original universal equality, we have nothing proper to us 
but the constant reversal between the “extremes” of “mastery and servitude.”500  Thus, Paul de 
Man writes: “controlled consciousness (Bildung) is the beginning of dissonance (Trennung) 
between man and nature.”501  The path of life leads out of simple, innocent harmony, into 
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dissonance, disparity, separation—Hyperion laments: “the blessing of every year becomes a 
curse, and all the gods flee”502—, and back into harmony, a higher harmony of love which bears 
the traces of dissonance, of suffering, of murderous self-consciousness, through downgoing. Yet 
life in the true sense comes about only  through pain and the mourning of lost love. Hyperion 
writes, in his last letter to Bellarmin: “a new bliss rises in the heart when it endures and suffers 
through the midnight of grief, and […] like the nightingale’s song in the darkness, the world’s 
song of life first divinely  sounds for us in deep suffering.”503  The restoration of an original 
harmonious nature that never truly took place can only come about a posteriori, from out of 
dissonance, through excentricity, which is to say, by undergoing the tragic course of life—a self-
inflicted punishment, indeed, must play  the central role in its arrival. It must come to be through 
an overcoming of Bildung, by means of a transformation of the sphere of origin and unity itself
—a reestablishment of the meaning of harmonious love.
  The excentric path is thus the one that must be followed for the transformation of 
predecessors into successors; it  guarantees the restoration of nature to man by its tragic creation. 
But the idea of excentricity, for Hölderlin, is an incarnation of the tragic—that we do not end in a 
perfect state of unity and innocence, but must follow a series of experiences, of loves and pains, 
that strip  us of our purity and dare us to become the self-sacrificing tragic hero, flinging himself 
into the flames of death in order to liberate the people of his age and to unite with divine nature, 
paradoxically, in the excentric sphere of the dead. It is a chthonic divinity of fragmentation that 
the hero shall meet in the underworld. This liberation, however, shall be the purification of the 
hero’s people from the myth of an enduring intellectual intuition--it is into becoming, rather, that 
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he shall deliver his people, and this, indeed, constitutes the hero’s failure—the triumph of his 
failure. This failure reveals the difference of self-sacrifice for Hölderlin from the sacrifice of 
which Schelling had spoken: for the sacrifice of Hölderlin’s Empedocles, although it strives 
toward unity with the god, serves, in fact, the function of allowing for an embrace of the tragic 
itself in the rhythm of life outside the perfection of nature—of joyful affirmation out of 
mourning.
 Hyperion writes to Bellarmin, after the Diotima’s death: 
And now tell me, where is there still a refuge?—Yesterday I was on top  of [E]tna. There 
the great Sicilian sprang to my mind who, weary  of counting the hours, intimate with the 
soul of the world, in his bold love of life flung himself down into the glorious flames—
for the cold poet had to warm himself by the fire, a mocker said later.
 O how gladly would I have taken such mockery upon myself! but one must regard 
oneself more highly than I do to fly  so unbidden to the heart of nature, or whatever else 
you may call it, for truly! as I am now, I have no name for things and all is uncertain to 
me.504 
Hyperion, the failed emulator of Empedocles, the absolute tragic hero, must fail to match his 
predecessor, to accomplish the justice of the tragic, he must fall short of the courage for suicide 
precisely in order to sing his forebear’s mourning-song, and to measure the distance in its rhythm 
and alternations of tones between the flown Greek philosopher, in whose soul the future speaks, 
and the modern man, whose spirit is excentric in its movement, and uncertain. Hyperion also 
sings, in verse, accompanied by his lyre, that man falls “from cliff to cliff / downward for years 
into uncertainty.”505  This downgoing, from the shelter of the gods to the immanence of the 
uncertain is one of mourning, and must  arrive in the musical and rhythmic tones of the tragic in 
order to effect their Trauerarbeit, and thus be faithful to life. This song, moreover, is sung before 
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Diotima’s death, takes place as a Tiresian prophecy of the downgoing and mourning that  her 
death will induce. It is a philosophic-poetic singing that brings about the counter-rhythmic 
interruption in the unfolding of Hyperion’s tragedy. For it  is poetry, indeed, that achieves the 
rhythmic separation and absolution of the tragic. This is what Hölderlin calls the tonal 
“Katastrophe,” taken in its etymological sense to mean “down-turning” or “overturning”—the 
point of the excentric inversion of tones, where the “idealic catastrophe” resolves itself “into the 
natural.”506
 The excentric path in Hyperion is a path of love, ascending the ladder of Plato’s Diotima 
toward the ideal form of beauty  and then falling boundlessly from that transcendent height back 
into immanence, where the tragic hero is defeated. This view of love, however, is combined with 
that of Empedocles, as the drawing together of all things that are alike in being one with nature, 
which necessarily  and ceaselessly results in their separation again, which is, nonetheless, the 
promise of an end in unity to come. Empedocles says that between love and strife, all things 
“have no constant life [αἰών]; / but insofar as they never cease from constantly interchanging 
[διαλλάσσοντα] / in this respect they are always an unchanged cycle [κύκλον].”507  Like 
Heraclitus’ becoming, which is eternal insofar as it is in constant flux (in Nietzsche’s view), the 
Empedoclean cosmic unification and separation achieves its universality, constancy  and 
absoluteness only insofar as the αἰών (time, life, eternity) is constituted by  a constant, tragic 
conflict between φιλία and νεῖκος—only the dream of a salvation from this constant struggle 
occasionally interrupts, and changes the course of its movement.
 Hyperion ends thus: 
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The dissonances of the world are like lovers’ strife. In the midst of the quarrel is 
reconciliation, and all that is separate comes together again. 
 The arteries part and return in the heart and all is one eternal, glowing life. 
 So I thought. More soon.508 
That dream of unity, perhaps, conjured as the end of the excentric path, is always destined to be 
shattered once again by another death, another irreparable separation. Excentricity defines the 
very experience of the tragic, both for us and in its original manifestation.
 To translate the central tragedy of the Greeks, that is, the betrayal of the gods against 
men, the event of “divine infidelity,” is first  of all the task of speaking, in a monstrous language, 
the essence of our tragedy, that is, the creation, the destruction and the mourning of the Greeks, 
of their tragedy—thereby alone does Tragödie, united with Trauerspiel, come to produce joy and 
the highest  affirmation of the suffering, the sundering of self that is our αἰών. In an untimely 
fashion, it is first of all necessary, in announcing a dawn at the end of our twilit life, to speak the 
loss of their loss. For it is through the mouth of Oedipus that our tragedy articulates itself. 
 Let us not forget the cryptic prophecy of Hölderlin on the verge of madness, from “In 
lieblecher Bläue:” 
 King Oedipus may have an eye too many.509
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The Ground of Empedocles
 Hölderlin claims that Empedocles’ fate as a tragic hero was determined by the fact  that 
his “times demanded a sacrifice in which the whole human being becomes actual and visible, a 
sacrifice in which the destiny of his times appears to dissolve and the extremes appear to unite 
actually and visibly  in one [… .]”510 This demand is proper to declining times, which prophesize 
in their very nature the coming of a newly sunlit  world through dissolution, and the embodiment 
of this destiny by an actual (as opposed to ideal) individual. 
 The destiny of a nation and its time, for Hölderlin, creates itself by means of a play 
between two sides of an Empedoclean opposition: 
When life is pure, art and nature oppose one another merely harmoniously. Art is the 
blossom, the perfection of nature; nature first becomes divine when it is allied with art, 
which differs from it in kind but is in harmony with it, first when each is everything it can 
be and when each allies itself with the other, supplying what the other lacks, and lacks 
necessarily if it is to be everything it can be as particular; at that point perfection is 
achieved and the divine stands at the midpoint between the two.511
Nature and art must enter into a harmonious and dissonant relation of duplicity, wherein the one 
completes the other and renders it possible, so that the divine can manifest itself. Harmony, that 
is, must not preserve itself simply  but, in the tragic, must give rise to dissonance, becoming 
monstrous to itself by means of conflict. Just as Empedocles’ world births itself as divinity, 
between Love and Strife, Hölderlin’s tragic divinity springs up at  the “midpoint” between nature 
and art. Tragedy for Hölderlin, that is to say, poetry in its highest form, as a metaphor for 
intellectual intuition—the purest expression of life—is nothing other than cosmogony itself. 
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 Nietzsche’s duplicity of the Dionysian and Apollonian, too, requires not only  a 
harmonious relation but essentially  a conflictual and agonal one—the perfection of this incessant 
conflict is tragedy itself. Hölderlin has names for this natural drive and artistic drive: the 
Organischere and the Aorgische. “The more organizational, more artistic human being is nature’s 
flowering; the more aorgic nature, when it  is felt  in its purity by human beings who are organized 
purely  in their mode of being, grants them their feeling of perfection. Yet such a life is at hand 
only in feeling, and is not a matter of cognition.” For this life to become knowable, it must 
“[separate] itself off from itself in the excess of intensity in which opposites mistake themselves 
for one another [… .]”512 Thus the organizational passes over into the “extremes of autonomous 
activity,” into artistic creation and self-reflection, recovering its forgotten “essence” and 
“consciousness” while nature passes over to the aorgic extreme, “the unbounded, until both 
sides, advancing in their reciprocal way, as though encountering one another at the 
commencement, except that nature has become more organized through the shaping and 
cultivating human being, through the cultural drives and formative forces in general, whereas, by 
contrast, the human being has become more aorgic, more universal, more infinite.”513
 Let us notice that the organizational is already monstrous—is already no longer nature, 
but nature’s result in man’s rational capacities. In the unification of the organic and the aorgic, 
“the universalized spiritually vital artistically  pure aorgic human being and the magnificent 
configuration of nature” in an alliance of pure harmony, resembling the initial one, but now 
rendered “more infinite”514 through reflection.
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 Here, in this meeting-between, there arrives the καιρóς of the tragedy. “At the midpoint 
lies the death of the individual, namely, the moment when the organizational dispenses with its 
ego, its particularized existence, which went to the extreme; the aorgic dispenses with its 
universality, not in ideal mixture, at  it was at the commencement, but in its real supreme struggle 
[… .]”515  The particular (organizational) and the aorgic thus enter into an agonal conflict, 
wherein the former, confusing itself with the aorgic, strives to become universal and the aorgic 
strives to become particular—at this point, each appears to revert  to its original existence, but in 
truth the aorgic takes on individuality  at the moment when the organizational becomes fully 
aorgic, so that “in the birth of supreme enmity, supreme reconciliation appears to be actual.” The 
individuality and universality  of this moment, in their radical contradiction, are both a product of 
“supreme strife.”516  A “unifying moment” then takes place, upon which the organizational as 
particular and the aorgic as universal have both made their creative “impressions” which, in their 
turn, also pass into their opposites as the twilight of the unification. That is to say, this moment 
must dissolve “like a mirage” as the aorgic becomes particular and the organizational, universal. 
 And yet, the result of this “death of the moment”517  is that “the warring extremes from 
which the moment came to be are more beautifully reconciled and united than they ever were in 
the life of the moment [… .]” For since individuality, whose inner forces are divinity and 
intensity, has been surpassed along with “the felicitous fraud of unification” the organizational 
rises, past the “transitory  moment” which repels it, to “a more pure universality” while the aorgic 
“passes over to the moment” and becomes an “object of tranquil observation” for the 
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organizational, such that “the intensity of the past moment now comes to the fore with greater 
clarity, universality, steadfastness, and capacity for differentiation.”518
 Through this interior dialectic of the organizational and the aorgic, which renders 
universal the individual, “Empedocles is a son of his heavens and of his period, a son of his 
fatherland and of the massive oppositions of nature and art in which the world appeared to his 
eyes.”519  These opposites unite and overcome each other in him, “divesting themselves of their 
original distinguishing form and thus reversing themselves” in such a way  that what is in 
principle most subjective becomes within him more entirely objective. Thus “he is more capable 
of making distinctions, comparing, shaping, organizing and being organized when he is less at 
home in himself; and to the extent that he is less consciously himself the ineffable comes to speak 
in and for him, and for and in him the universal, the less conscious, attains the form of 
consciousness and particularity [… .]”520 Conversely, that which for others is most objective—
aorgic—“disorganized”—becomes in Empedocles most subjective: he is “more aorgic and more 
disorganizational when he is more at home in himself” that is, when he attains consciousness “of 
the fact that in him and for him speaking attains the unspoken or the ineffable, and that in him 
and for him the more particular and the more conscious aspects assume the form of the 
unconscious and universal, so that these two opposites become one in him” precisely because of 
their mutual reversal in his being. Hölderlin remarks: “such a human being can have reached 
maturity  only on the basis of the supreme opposition between nature and art, and as (ideally) the 
excess of intensity comes to the fore on the basis of intensity, so also does this real excess of 
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intensity come to the fore on the basis of enmity and supreme conflict [… .]”521  That is to say 
that on an ideal level, the excess of intensity has inner poetical fire or passion as its ground, 
while on the level of reality, the same excess roots itself in struggle—αγών. 
 In their innermost being, the aorgic and the organizational are outside themselves within 
one another in the being of Empedocles, they “interpenetrate” and “touch one another in their 
uttermost extremes” as the aorgic fills the form of the particular and “thus appears to be 
reconciled with the hyperorganizational” while the organizational takes on the figure of the 
universal, “thus appearing to be reconciled with the hyperaorgic and the hypervital [… .]” In this 
way, the two forces are opposed merely in their outer form, in semblance. Of Empedocles, 
Hölderlin says: “His destiny exhibits itself in him as in a momentary  unification, one that has to 
dissolve in order to become something more.”522  This, then, follows the plan of Hölderlin’s 
Notes to the Sophoclean tragedies—this is the moment of unification, the arrival of the caesura, 
the moment in which the hero unites with the god in order to separate infinitely  into dissolution, 
which, like downgoing, contains the promise “something more”—in effect, of love among 
mortals.
 Because Empedocles “appears to have been born to be a poet,” he has, even in his most 
radically subjective and active nature, a “tendency to universality”—that inspiration that leads to 
the “tranquil observation […] by means of which the poet espies a totality [… .]” And, 
symmetrically, one might say, his passive and “objective nature” allows him to strive, even 
without inherent organization, toward order, thought, form, and toward “that malleability  of the 
senses and of the innermost heart that is able to absorb all things easily and quickly in their 
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totality and in a vital way [… .]”523 The discordant accord within Empedocles was thus destined 
to become, through “its own free expression,” “the most universal accord” which would 
“simultaneously be the determination of his nation [… .]” Empedocles was created to answer the 
call of his time—to be its destiny. And this time required neither merely  “song” nor an “authentic 
deed,” which are both one-sided, but rather “a sacrifice”—the sacrifice of a whole human life, in 
which it  becomes for the first time “actual and visible” and a sacrifice in which “the destiny of 
his times appears to dissolve and the extremes appear to unite actually and visibly in one [… ,]” 
while in reality  “the individual goes down in an idealized deed” of necessity since “in him the 
sensuous unification shows itself to be the proleptic product of calamity and conflict [… .]”524 
 In this unification, destiny is dissolved, either in an individual, in which case the “life of a 
world would be [impossibly] expunged in a singularity” or, conversely, this singularity  itself “as 
a proleptic result of destiny” dissolves because of its excessive intensity, actuality, and visibility. 
In the first case, destiny is dissolved “formaliter” while in the second it is dissolved 
“materialiter,” since the original intensity, produced by “good fortune” and become actual in 
supreme conflict, “cancels itself out” in correspondence with the self-canceling of “the original 
excess of intensity” and all its “levels forces and implements [… .]” In this way, “the force of the 
intense excess actually evanesces, and a more mature, true, and purely universal intensity 
remains.”525 Ideally, therefore, the universal does not expire in the waning of the individual but 
the individual, as a sacrifice that murders destiny precisely because it is a free act, in its suicidal 
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and divinatory gesture for the new birth of culture, leaves behind it a universal life-force out of 
which such a culture, absolved of destiny and returned to nature, can grow.
 “Thus Empedocles was to become a sacrifice of his time, the problems of destiny in 
which he grew up were to be apparently solved” yet this solution was to be merely “a temporary 
solution, as is the case more or less with all tragic personages [… .]”526 For the life and goal of 
all these figures is precisely  to solve the problem of destiny, and yet, in a divine reversal, these 
attempts “all cancel themselves to the degree that they  are not universally valid” which is to say 
that they  revert from one dissolution of destiny—the material one, in which the particular kills 
itself to leave only the purest universal, to the formal one, wherein the dying man attempts and 
fails to absorb a universal world-perspective into his particularity, and ends by  dying as a 
singularity alone. In this way, “the ones who apparently dissolve destiny  most completely  exhibit 
themselves most conspicuously in their transitoriness and in the implacable progress of their 
efforts to be a sacrificial victim.”527  The universal and timeless value of the sacrifice reverses 
itself and falls back into particularity precisely through the self-manifestation of these heroes as 
self-sacrificing individualities. 
 Thus, by  a paradoxical turn, that gesture which is meant to bring an end to the tragic 
becomes, through this very act of sacrifice, the individual exemplification of tragedy  itself—the 
absolute incarnation of tragic destiny, insofar as the attempt dooms itself to failure in its 
accomplishment. It is thus in the very  nature of the tragic hero to fail—for just as an eternal 
intellectual intuition is impossible, an enduring union of god and man, so the coincidence of 
universality  and particularity  in a single man are impossible. The universal value of the hero, by 
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virtue of which he is capable of saving his people, must revert to singularity out of the ideality  of 
its identity with the god, thus exposing, rather, the fragmentary nature of the subject and its 
condemnation to perpetual self-sacrifice in the temporal movement of our tragedy.
 The tragic individual is the explicitation of the destiny of his time, “constituted by the 
opposites of art  and nature” and created by the complex interpenetration of the organizational 
and the aorgic in harmony and strife particular to it. “Thus in Empedocles his time individualizes 
itself; the more it does so, and the more scintillating and actual and visible the riddle that appears 
to be dissolved in him grows, all the more necessary does his downgoing [Untergang] 
become.”528 It  is because the tragic dialectic of his time finds its objectification in the individual 
figure of the tragic hero Empedocles that his self-sacrifice becomes necessary—that he must 
descend to the hearth of the Titans beneath Etna to join their excentric world. It is hence for this 
reason also that his sacrifice constitutes a liberation and a purification of the Agrigentian people. 
The philosopher, as the unsurpassable brilliance of the brightest star in the heavens he embodies, 
must set upon the earth and the time of which he is the absolute manifestation, so that this earth 
and this time may liberate themselves in a universal dawn, from the highest plane of divinity: 
µοῖρα, housed beyond the reach of the gods. At the point of this downgoing, the tragic hero 
reaches the apex of his loneliness, the absence of his gods, and so must sacrifice himself in the 
mad hope of reuniting with them.
 Empedocles’ individualization of his time takes place in three different respects. Firstly, 
by a double determination, the Agrigentian people’s “spirit of art [Kunstgeist],” in its vigorous 
vitality, “had to repeat itself in him more aorgically”529  while simultaneously, “the glowing 
197
528 Hölderlin, Empedocles, 148.
529 Hölderlin, Empedocles, 148.
stretch of sky and the luxuriant Sicilian landscape had to exhibit themselves for him and in him 
more tellingly and in a way that was more powerfully felt [… .]” Empedocles thus found himself 
“seized by both sides”—the “active force of his essential self” and its “countereffect [… .]” In 
this way, the spirit of art and “his inmost heart” reciprocally  “nurtured” one another, each 
pushing the other toward the extreme.530 The interpenetration and exchange of the proper and the 
foreign, of intensity  and divinity, of art and nature thus rent the heart  of the hero apart just as 
they unified together, pushing his particularity into the sphere of universality.
 Secondly, in the political realm, and among the “hyperpolitical” Agrigentians, 
Empedocles’ “character” also united “two sides”: on the one hand, “a spirit of reform” in his 
natural yearning toward the whole, and on the other hand “anarchical self-reliance in which each 
citizen pursued a cause unique to him [… .]” These two natures of Empedocles, that of a 
restoration of the unity and equality of the people and that of a radical individualism, thus also 
“reciprocally enhanced and magnified each other.”531
 Thirdly: “The boldness of a free spirit sets itself in ever-waxing opposition to the 
unknown”—thus Empedocles “had to master the unknown [dem Unbekannten]”—that is to say, 
to master nature, and, in the process, to “struggle against sheer serviceability [… .]”532  In his 
grand effort to “comprehend the nature that overwhelms us,” Empedocles “felt compelled to 
struggle toward a sense of identity with nature”—it is for this reason that “his spirit  had to 
assume an aorgic configuration in the highest  sense of the word; he had to tear himself away 
from himself and from his point of equilibrium, always penetrating his object so excessively  that 
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he lost himself in it as in an abyss, while, viewed from the opposite side, the entire life of the 
object had to seize his abandoned inmost heart, which had become more and more infinitely 
receptive because of the boundless activity of his spirit; with him the object had to become 
individuality”533 in such a way that, while he strove to master nature, nature simultaneously had 
to invade him and, as his “object [, …] appear in a subjective configuration, just as he had taken 
on the objective configuration of the object.”534 Empedocles thereafter, because he had changed 
forms with nature in his duplicitous dialectic with it, “was the universal, the unknown, the object 
[… ,] the particular.” 
 Therefore, the contest (Widerstreit) between, on one side, “art, thought, and the human 
character’s compulsion to order” and, on the other side, the “less conscious nature [Natur]” had 
the appearance of being “united in their uttermost extremes” to such an extent that the very form 
by which they were distinguishable was “exchanged” by these extremes. “This was the magic 
[der Zober] with which Empedocles entered on the stage of his world.” The same nature by 
which the free spirits were dominated, “with all her melodies, came to appear in the spirit  and the 
mouth of this man […] as though his heart were her own [… .]” “This is what  lent him his 
special grace, his grandeur, his divinity; every heart was moved by the storm of destiny and 
every  specter that was flitting here and there, restless and without guidance in the enigmatic 
night of those times, flew to him [… .]”535 These worshipful hearts thus clustered around that 
“extraordinary soul” and the fervor of their love for him increased and sharpened to the degree 
that they each appropriated his “divinely configured being” into their own particularity. “Thus he 
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lived in supreme independence, in that relation which prescribed to him his own path [… .]” This 
relation “resulted in an encounter with his own freest determination and his very own soul,” this 
determination itself being “the most intrinsic spirit of the circumstances” as their extremes 
departed and returned to that spirit. “The destiny of his time, in its initial and ultimate problem, is 
dissolved in his utterly independent  relation to it,” and yet  this “apparent solution” afterward 
would cancel itself and “come to an end.”536 Empedocles, thus, within this independent relation 
to his nation’s destiny and in his “supreme intensity” had to live “with the elements” while the 
surrounding, free-spirited world opposed itself to them, refusing “to think about or acknowledge 
in any way that which lives” while, on the other hand, their relation to nature’s “encroachments” 
was ruled by “sheer serviceability.”537 In the face of this nihilism of the free spirits,538 this denial 
of primordial, divine and natural life and the valuation of nature according to its use-value alone, 
Empedocles had to fling himself into the elements, into the heart of nature, indeed, to become it 
and to let it become him so that, thus attaining a universal value, he would be able to return his 
people to nature through self-sacrifice—through a voluntary death as that universality, and 
furthermore, paradoxically, as the particular form of that universality.
 This independent relation encapsulated three capacities in which Empedocles lived: first, 
as a “human being” with a generally refined sensibility, second, as a poet and philosopher, and 
third, “as a solitary  who cultivates his gardens.” Because Empedocles “stands in an intense 
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relation” not only with the elements but also with people, he must not merely join in their 
struggle to “cultivate” nature and “anarchic life,” but, further, “he had to strive to grasp [the 
living] in its inmost core with his own essence” and to become “equal to the human element” and 
to its “soul, to all that is ungraspable and involuntary in it [… .]” In this way, his “will,” his 
“consciousness” and his “spirit, which transcended the usual human boundaries of knowledge 
and action, had to lose themselves and become objective [… .]” The “objective reverberated in 
him all the more purely  and profoundly the more open his inmost heart remained” which itself 
was open simply because he had “surrendered himself to the particular as well as to the 
universal.”539 
 Empedocles thus acted both as a political figure and as a “religious reformer” and, in his 
“exchanging the positions of object and subject, he solved for himself all that is destined.” In this 
relation, that which satisfies the incredulous portion of the population, and which therefore 
creates the situation in which “that which unites must  go down” is the “single unifying factor 
between themselves and this man”—that is, in the “unification of extremes [… .]” Yet because 
these extremes themselves “arise in the conflict between art and nature,” Empedocles must 
“reconcile nature with art precisely in that respect  which is most out of reach for art.”540  He 
accomplished this “with love, and against  his own will”541  since he knew that the greater his 
expression of intensity  was, the more sure the need for his downgoing would become.542  The 
“deception” of his oneness with them” then “comes to an end” in the same moment that “he 
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comes to realize what they are.” As a result: “He pulls back, and they grow cold toward him. His 
opponent uses this, brings about his banishment.”543 His opponent, whose “natural disposition” is 
great, is “[b]orn to be a hero” and so, rather than uniting extremes, he is inclined to “rein them in 
and tie their reciprocal relation” to something firm at their “midpoint” such that only  one 
extreme may act at  a time. “His virtue is the intellect, his goddess, Necessity.” This opponent is 
“destiny itself, with the difference that  in him contending forces are firmly  tied to a 
consciousness,” which solidifies the extremes in “a (negative) ideality” and allows them a single 
direction alone.544 
 In Empedocles, “art and nature unite in an extreme antagonism, the active in excess 
becomes objective, and the [lost] subjectivity […] is replaced by the profound encroachment of 
the object.” In his opponent, on the other hand, art and nature unite “through an excess of 
objectivity, of being-outside-itself and of reality  ([…] in such a dominant fear in the face of the 
unknown), in a courageous open heart” which substitutes itself for the active, formative force as 
the subjective becomes merely  passive. If, in this unification, the extremes take on the figure of 
the “organizational,” then the “subjectively  active” is forced to become “the organizing factor, 
the element”—it is thus that, even for Empedocles’ opponent, “the subjective and objective have 
to exchange their configurations and become united in one.”545  The necessity of the tragic 
dialectic of which Empedocles is the absolute manifestation must, insofar as it  creates itself from 
the initially harmonious and then dissonant and conflictual opposition of art and nature, always 
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produce itself when destiny  is the rule of the day, and end in one of various unifications of object 
and subject which are at once their separation.
Hölderlin’s Injunction
 On the dawn of the Austro-Prussian war, on May 7, 1866, Nietzsche wrote to Wilhelm 
Pinder from Leipzig of his hopes for the victory of the German Fatherland (Vaterlande). He 
speaks of the immense “mental” and “physical” performance (Leistungen) that will be required 
of the military  forces. He writes, then: “But let each give his best. For loving, as Hölderlin says, 
the mortal gives of his best [denn liebend giebt der Sterbliche vom Besten].”546 Hölderin is thus 
invoked as a voice calling the nation of Germany to its future unification—this love is the love of 
a Fatherland that is still to come. The poet’s eternal exigency  to every man, that he might 
incarnate the genius of a properly German world in the same spirit  as that of the Greeks. The love 
in question is a national love, which, by its power, demands that every creature under the 
German sun fulfill his role as citizen of a harmonious culture worthy of his people. Though 
Prussia would defeat Germany in this war, Nietzsche’s prophetic desire would find its 
accomplishment in the victory of the Franco-Prussian war that would unify  Germany as a nation-
state for the first time. Yet the great hope would be answered by  great danger, as a fascistic 
nationalism triumphed over the ideal of a harmoniously unified culture. Hölderlin, in a letter to 
his brother of 1793, wrote: “I love the race of men who are coming in the next centuries.”547 It is 
this love, then, that Nietzsche invokes in his letter to Pinder.
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 Three years later, on September 3, 1869, the first year of his professorship at Basel, 
Nietzsche wrote the same line to Rohde, who was in Florence at the time. The letter begins with 
a romantic complaint about  the veiling, insufficient nature of epistolary communication: “It is a 
terrible problem with letters: one wants to give one’s best, and in the end one gives only  the very 
ephemeral, the chord and not the eternal melody. Whenever I write letters to you I am befallen by 
the line of Hölderlin’s (my favorite from high school): for loving, the mortal gives of his best.” 
He then effusively apologizes for his shadowy  past letters and promises the fullness and force of 
his current letter to attain the highest perfection possible to it: “And know that Zeus and 
autumnal pure heaven so strongly  move me just at this time in positivity, so many a lush hour 
with rich insight and real illustration enfold me—but whenever such times and swelling 
sentiments come, I’ll take a whole letter, rich in good thoughts and wishes for you […] in the 
hope that the electric wire between our souls (or, according to Reichenbach, the odic force) will 
transmit this shorthand to you.” This love, then, is of a different sort; it  is intimate and literary in 
the highest degree. The love of which Nietzsche speaks through Hölderlin’s voice and with great 
devotion expressed toward the poet himself, is a love between the closest of friends, twin souls, 
which double one another, connected by Zeus’s lightning, an electric current, deathless and 
eternally unbroken. Odic force was a concept developed by Karl von Reichenbach in 1845 to 
designate a universal vital force which animated beings and connected like to like. 
 Nietzsche must thus, after Hölderlin’s injunction, give of his best—try ever harder to 
translate the inexpressible force of this friendship, and of the solitary experiences that kindle its 
sentiment in him, into the untruthful medium of language, in its most amorous and indirect form: 
the letter. A love between mortals, a love between geniuses, a love between philologists; and the 
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letter as the very material of the bridge that binds them together. The form that must fulfill this 
task can never be philosophy; it  must be literature, speech in its purest transmission, and not any 
literature but the letter; those words that overcome every  distance, that defy the far reaches of 
geography  to connect souls destined to communicate, that they  may inhabit one another. It is in 
this same letter that Nietzsche pines for Italy, saying: “I too have my Italy, like you, except that I 
can only ever go on Saturdays and Sundays. Recently, I have been there four times, in swift 
succession, and a letter almost every  week flies along the same path. Dearest  friend, what I learn 
and see, hear and understand is indescribable. Schopenhauer and Goethe, Aeschylus and Pindar 
are still alive—only believe.”548  The mortal, he thus proclaims, is the fertile dwelling-place in 
which the immortality of past  geniuses arises and comes to rest. By writing the vitality of these 
geniuses, Nietzsche in fact brings them to life, within himself, as for Rohde. It is no longer the 
gods who are immortal, who give birth to mortals, but the geniuses of a past Germany, of an 
ancient Greece, who are immortal—only brought into being through the obscure channels of an 
untimely mortality.
  The quotation appears again in Human, All too Human (1878), when Nietzsche writes of 
the “male culture” of the Greeks. As an explanation of the “erotic relationship of men to youths” 
and its necessity to education, he writes: “the whole idealism of strength of the Greek character 
was thrown into that relationship, and the treatment of young people has probably never been so 
aware, loving, so thoroughly  geared toward excellence (virtus), as it was in the sixth and fifth 
centuries—in accordance with Hölderlin’s beautiful line, ‘denn liebend giebt der Sterbliche vom 
Besten’ (for loving the mortal gives of his best).” The “love” present between Greek men and 
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their youths was not only romantic, not only carnal, but  spiritual—a love inaccessible to women, 
with whom “there was no spiritual intercourse”—no “real romance.” For this reason, women 
were excluded from “all kinds of competitions and spectacles,” so that “the sole higher 
entertainment remaining to her was religious worship.” In “art,” the tragic heroines Elektra and 
Antigone were merely  “tolerated,” though abhorred in “life.” The only task of women in Greek 
culture, then, was “to produce beautiful, powerful bodies”—to assure the continual survival, 
voracity and youthfulness of that “highly  developed culture [… .] For in Greek mothers, the 
Greek genius returned again and again to nature.”549  The invocation of Hölderlin’s words here 
speaks of a cosmic, multilayered love, binding the whole of Greek culture into a superior 
perfection. For this is the very principle of education; that it create genius by pushing mortals to 
the very limit of their amorous capacities. In the organon of the Greeks, men spontaneously give 
forth what they can, simply  because they love—their love thus rises to approach that mysterious, 
unknown love of the gods, and they are thus creative of a coming world.
 The Hölderlin line, which Nietzsche never cites, but  rather, seems to call forth from 
memory, comes from the first draft of Der Tod des Empedokles. It  is the fourth scene of the 
second act, in which Empedocles, refusing an invitation from Critias from Etna back into the 
city, delivers an oration to the Agrigentian people to announce his decision of suicide and calls to 
them to found a new Fatherland, a republic uniting it  with nature. It is not Hölderlin himself who 
speaks, but his Empedocles, one of his doubles, and Nietzsche’s failed reformer. Empedocles 
begins his speech by making a distinction between animal life and human life: animals, which he 
calls the “children of the earth / Will always shrink away from all that’s new and strange” and 
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thus desire to “stay at home” in eternal peace and “care only for / Survival” so that in death, each 
of them shall “Return to its own element, that it  may find / Rejuvination [… .]” On the other 
hand, “On human life the grand desire is / Bestowed that it rejuvinate itself.” Men of the greatest 
courage choose their own deaths: “And from the purifying death that they  / Themselves will 
choose, upon a time propitious, / Will rise, Achilles from the Styx, the nations.” An imperative 
follows, to overcome nature: “Oh, give yourselves to nature, before she takes you!— / For you 
have thirsted long for things unfamiliar, and / As though imprisoned in a sickly body the spirit / 
of Agrigent is yearning to slough off the old ways. / So, dare it!” The main distinguishing factor 
between men and animals (as well as naïve children) is thus that men seek the unknown, while 
animals remain isolated in the cycle of nature; men are a dissonance in the great harmonious 
necessity of nature. It is thus necessary for men to chase after the novel and the monstrous, and 
they  must  “Forget” old customs, laws, the “names of all the ancient  gods” and do this 
“courageously”—they must be incessantly active, while innocent animals are passive. It is the 
highest distinction of man from beast that he possesses the self-consciousness and power to go 
willingly to death. In this way: “like newborn babes / Your eyes will open to the godliness of 
nature, / And then your spirit  will flame from / The light of heaven, sweet breath of life / Will 
then suffuse your breast anew [… .]”550 Empedocles demands therefore a new birth, a resurgence 
of nature and the gods in man from which will flower a new system of laws: 
and you 
will dwell within your own grand world, 
shake hands with one another, give the word and share the good. 
Oh then dear friends—partake of deeds and fame, 
Like faithful Dioscuri; each will be the equal of 
The others—like slender statues in repose your 
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New life will come to rest on well-conceived 
Arrangements, letting law tie confederate bonds. 
You tutelary spirits of our all-transforming nature! […] 
You will invite from all the far-flung corners of the world 
The liberated peoples to the celebrated festival, 
Hospitable! pious! for mortals then will donate lovingly 
Their very best; no form of servitude 
Will cramp and crush the breast—551 
 It is the return to nature, to the primordial, that requires this sacrifice of our best in love. 
This is the call of the tragic hero to his people, a cry into the mortal abyss abandoned by the 
godhead, that his people may unify  again in everlasting love. For after the god has disappeared, it 
is only  by means of a giving forth of our best that he may be called back, that  the cosmic 
phenomenon of strife may be transformed into that of love and thus that a new culture may  be 
founded, a deliverance from dissonance back into harmony. And yet the excentric path of the 
philosopher-poet who sings his own downgoing has already been determined, and it is the very 
futility  of this un-accomplishable goal, the doom to failure of this mirage of a final promise of 
redemption that is the secret sense of this injunction, its tragic potency. For the voice of the god 
who calls Empedocles to death is a silent one and tragic destiny has already  gripped the hero. It 
shall, rather, be his task to disappear from the mortal sphere into the excentric sphere of the dead. 
And yet this double withdrawal of Empedocles and his voiceless god is the very purification of 
the Agrigentian people from the myth of the circular path; it is, in fact, the precipitation of this 
lost people into what Nietzsche calls the torrent of becoming.
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3The Time of Tragedy
 The tragic temporal movement, which falls outside the reach of divinity  as it withdraws, 
constitutes, for both Hölderlin and Nietzsche, a purificatory rhythmics. While for Hölderlin, this 
rhythm results in the necessity  of a poetology of tragedy, for Nietzsche, it comes about as a 
philosophical and physiological poetics of life, a life that for the ancients was 
anthropomorphically  transposed onto the cosmos as a physics and metaphysics of breath, and 
which for us moderns arises in a manner entirely  foreign to the Greek sensibility  and profoundly 
rooted in the body. Nietzsche’s early thoughts on epistemology take sensation as the ground of 
knowledge and of art, out of which rhythm arises as the measure of a chimerical time and space. 
Human beings, for Nietzsche, are endowed with an infinite plasticity of forces, whose 
externalization forms the illusory concepts by which they live. It is the transformation of these 
forces and their harnessing toward the creation of a culture to come that constitutes the 
movement of history. The task of the tragic hero, in a world tragically condemned to absolute 
becoming, is to become what Hölderlin had called a “pearl of time”—an instant of eternity 
beyond the tragic movement of life with no inherent teleology, and, from that height, to go down, 
to sacrifice himself so as to bring about the embrace of this temporality  as the essential 
phenomenon of our time. It is in this sense that the tragic hero must be the last man; his self-
sacrifice must also be the self-sacrifice of metaphysics. His downgoing must announce the 
downgoing of man defined as a creature subordinated to the divine sphere. 
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Loneliness of the Tragic Hero
 It is profound solitude, depthless loneliness, for both Hölderlin and Nietzsche, that 
characterizes the tragic hero, that determines his fate as such. This loneliness is a result of a 
double event: on the one hand, his monstrous consciousness, both of the tragedy of his people 
and of his own tragedy and, on the other, the loss of love—of the Empedoclean originary sphere 
of harmony between godly men in an eternal oneness. 
 In the second draft of Hölderlin’s Tod des Empedokles, the hero, in a soliloquy spoken 
alone on the slopes of Etna, cries out, enunciating the depth of his tragedy, and mourning the loss 
of the unity of divine nature from which he issued, thus performing his own prophecy:
Woe! lonely! lonely! lonely!   Weh! einsam! einsam! einsam!
And never will I find    Und nimmer find ich
You, my gods,     Euch, meine Götter,
and never more will I return   Und nimmer kehr ich
To your life, nature!552    Zu deinem Leben, Natur!
The tragic for Empedocles, the source of his profound loneliness, of his lack of unity  with even 
another human creature, is the loss of his gods, who depart in their greatest moment of intimacy 
with man, banishing the possibility of divine love: “For love expires as soon as gods have 
flown”553—it is for this reason, in the absence of this supreme love between mortals, that that 
they  must give of their best, in order to transfigure nature back into the whole—to redirect the 
mortal, excentric path back to a circular one. In this same speech, Empedocles inquires—not to 
the earless, far-off gods but to himself, or to his shadow: 
[…] why now is all    […] wie ists denn nun?             
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in mourning? am I alone?    Vertrauert? bin ich ganz allein?  
And is it night outside, the daylight  Und ist es Nacht hier außen auch am 
notwithstanding?     Tage?                                                                                      
An eye that saw more lofty things than Der höhers, denn ein sterblich Auge, sah
mortal eye 
Is now struck blind, I grope about me— Der Blindgeschlagene tastet nun umher— 
Where are you, O my gods?   Wo seid ihr, meine Götter?                  
Woe!554      Weh!
This song of Empedocles, the last man endowed with divinity, is one of mourning; a mourning of 
eternal, binding love. In the madness of self-reflection, where language is no longer a bridge to 
the divine, beyond the mortal word, these questions cast themselves into the abyss of solitude. 
Empedocles speaks, thus, but to whom? It is in this mourning, in the cry of “Woe” that, at one 
and the same moment, the disappearance of the god and the affirmation of life in spite of, and 
because of this disappearance, take place. It is the nearly-silent, the pure word, the caesura that 
splits the hero in two, into divinity and mortality, awakening in him the need to go down for the 
salvation of his people, and at once, the impossibility of such a salvation. Hence in the word 
“Woe,” the dream of a world outside time vanishes, and the hero announces the coming failure of 
his own self-sacrifice. Like the blind Oedipus, Empedocles gropes for the light of his gods, of his 
nature, but finds himself condemned to an endless night, a world veiled in mourning. Such 
unending Woe! is the outcry of the one who must go under to revive the day, to free all mortals 
from their curse, the silence of their gods, their wayward path. And so the idea of Oedipus as 
philosopher, not merely as the central figure of philosophy but its tragic speaker, takes form.
 In Nietzsche’s “Fragment / from the History of Posterity” called  “Oedipus / Soliloquies / 
of the Last Philosopher,” the hero cries his “soliloquy”:
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I call myself the last philosopher because I am the last human being. I myself am the only 
one who speaks with me, and my voice comes to me as the voice of someone who is 
dying. Let  me communicate with you for just one hour, beloved voice, with you, the last 
trace of memory  of all human happiness; with your help I will deceive myself about my 
loneliness and lie my way into community and love; for my  heart refuses to believe that 
love is dead; it  cannot bear the shudder of the loneliest  loneliness [einsamsten 
Einsamkeit] and it forces me to speak as if I were two persons.
 Do I still hear you, my voice? You whisper when you curse? And yet your curse 
should cause the bowels of this world to burst! But it continues to live and merely stares 
at me all the more brilliantly and coldly with its pitiless stars [Sternen]; it continues to 
live, dumb and blind as ever, and the only  thing that  dies is—the human being. —And 
yet! I still hear you, beloved voice! Someone other than I, the last human being, is dying 
in this universe: the last sigh, your sigh, dies with me, the drawn out Woe! Woe! [das 
hingezogene Wehe! Wehe!] sighing around me, Oedipus, the last of the woeful human 
beings [der Wehemenschen letzten, Oedipus]. 
      KSA 7: 19 [131]555 
 Oedipus, in Nietzsche’s rewriting of him, stands as a double or a mask of the writer 
himself, the tragic hero speaking through the philosopher to come, the hero of the Greeks 
speaking German, in the philosopher’s voice, is considered as the absolute mortal—the last to 
preserve the tragic flame of man’s essence, to die—the last mortal, and because of this, as the last 
philosopher. His death, in essence, is self-sacrifice. Nietzsche writes of Oedipus: “The world is 
an enigma. Sophocles is not the poet of perfect harmony between the divine and the human; 
unconditional submission and resignation, that is his doctrine.”556  Thus Oedipus, whose 
knowledge is monstrous precisely because it  is his fate to untie the enigmatic knot of the human 
as such and therefrom, blindly, to proceed to what Lacoue-Labarthe calls the “madness of self-
consciousness”557  and the profound knowledge of his crime against  nature accomplished, 
nonetheless, in accordance with Μοίρα, must freely submit himself, in terrible lucidity, to his 
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own punishment—his own sacrifice. This sacrifice must bring also about the death—the 
downgoing—of the human, the mortal as such. To invoke Oedipus again, in an untimely fashion, 
as a hero both ancient and modern, is to recreate him, precisely, as the tragic hero who must 
bring death to the metaphysical human beings, steeped in nihilism, of Nietzsche’s time. He 
stands above the abyss that  separates life from death, and, like Hölderlin’s Empedocles, 
announces his descent. Yet he announces it to no one but himself, his double born of loneliness—
the ghost of a love, a voice outside of voice. 
 Indeed, it is onto the motion of mortal becoming that Nietzsche transfers the paradigm of 
the tragic hero. His tragedy is, like that of Hölderlin’s hero, the loss of love, of community. Yet 
he calls out not to the absent god but to himself, the only possible receiver of his love in the 
absence of a binding force drawing men together. This loneliness, then, is different from that of 
Höderlin’s Empedocles; Oedipus suffers the loneliness of self-knowledge without another to 
share in it, to impart  it to. Nietzsche writes in a fragment: “Oedipus the ‘suffering human being’ 
solves the riddle of the human being.” (KSA 7: 26 [2])558 Suffering is, indeed, for Nietzsche, the 
ground of mortality  in tragedy. This Oedipus contains within himself the secret  of man, yet 
because he has become monstrous by that knowledge, he must divide himself and become his 
own interlocutor; in this loneliness, he has no one to whom to whisper his knowledge but his 
own voice. And this voice of the tragic hero, his other self born out of self, is indeed the most 
dangerous of his selves, whose tragedy is just that his curse does not “cause the bowels of this 
world to burst” but languishes as the last human being. That violent, dying voice, and not a god, 
is the withdrawing force that  Nietzsche’s Oedipus calls to. And its loss is not, indeed, an 
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occasion for mourning but, in the surpassing of the human that it  brings, it must evoke the most 
supremely powerful admixture of joy  and suffering; of affirmation out of pain, and from there, of 
boundless transformation. The secret of the human being, indeed, is just that he is dying, that he 
must be surpassed—self-consciousness, when it is too extreme, turns against itself and must, in 
the absence of a legislating voice, undergo the greatest  sacrifice. Is it merely by chance that the 
tragic hero should speak the pure word, “Woe” at the very moment when he is outside himself?
 Nietzsche writes of ἔκστασις not only as the καιρóς of tragedy, but also as the 
precondition of art  in general. In a fragment of 1869, he writes: “Every art [Alle Kunst] demands 
a ‘being outside of oneself’ [außer-sich-sein], an ἔκστασις; the step to drama occurs from here, 
since here [in drama] we do not return to ourselves but, in our ἔκστασις, remain lodged in a 
foreign being” (KSA 7: 2 [25]).559  If we take into consideration Nietzsche’s contemporaneous 
metaphysics of art, and his thinking of the aesthetic as indissolubly a definition of life and of art, 
indeed of art as the only means by which life is made manifest, ἔκστασις, the primordial split of 
self in the ocean of becoming, is that by which the human being becomes what he is. This 
shattering of the illusory principle of individuation is the very manifestation, the very  event of 
the tragic. It is the disruption of harmony by dissonance, of love by strife; thus it  takes place as 
the unveiling of the ἀγών that traverses the tragic hero. In the double prophetic word of Oedipus, 
Woe, which travels between himself and his voice, the Hölderlinian caesura comes to disrupt the 
ideal rhythm of life, to open the depth of its temporality. Again, Nietzsche writes, in The Greek 
Music Drama (1870):
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For drama […] begins when a human being steps outside himself and believes himself to 
be transformed and enchanted. In this condition of “being-outside-of-oneself” [Außer-
sich-seins], or ecstasy [Ecstase], only  one further step is necessary: we do not return back 
into ourselves, but turn into another being, so that we ourselves behave like enchanted 
beings. This is the fundamental reason for our deep astonishment at the sight of the 
drama: the ground shakes, the belief in the indissolubility of and permanence of the 
individual.560 
The rhythmic rupture in the drama for Nietzsche takes place on a biological level; it is the exit  of 
life from its body, its entrance into another, enchanted form. It is thus at  one and the same time a 
shattering of individuality and of subjectivity to the point that their sense languishes in finitude 
and a joyful affirmation in the face of this suffering, born out of it, which constitutes itself as a 
unification of beings-outside-of-themselves. The shattering of sense, conceived, after 
Schopenhauer, as the principium individuationis, against that which exceeds it beyond measure, 
the non-sense, the supra-sense of ἔκστασις, is the very cathartic experience of Tragödie for 
Nietzsche. In his lectures on Sophocles of 1870, Nietzsche sketches the Apollinian-Dionysian 
duplicity  (Duplicität) as follows: In the Apollinian state, “the individual accedes to an exalted 
disposition: an andante full of a sacerdotal majesty.”561 In the Dionysian revel, on the other hand, 
“the mass accedes to an ecstatic excitation: the instinctive externalizes itself in an immediate 
way. Unbounded violence of the springtime instinct; forgetting of individuality; allied with the 
ascetic exteriorization of self in pain and terror. Nature in its supreme force thus reunites the 
separated beings and makes them feel as one: so that the principle of individuation appears, so to 
speak, as a persistent state of weakness of nature.”562 With the “forgetting of self”563 that tragedy 
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entailed, a more primordial level of memory was unleashed, bringing with it a transformation of 
individuals into the recreation of a new oneness, a new nature, which the division of beings, 
pushing them outside themselves, gave rise to. The opening of these more profound and 
originary chasms of rhythm shaped thus the tragic rhythm of the drama through this confluence 
of shattering and unification—this simultaneity  which took place throughout and in spite of the 
time of tragedy. Nietzsche also writes: 
The drama ran without spectators because all participated in it. The principle of 
individuation was broken, the god, ὁ λύσιος (‘the liberator’). had delivered all the beings 
from themselves, each one was metamorphosed. The affects are converted into the state 
of ecstasy, the pains arouse pleasure, the terrors arouse joy. The song and communicative 
gestures of these fierily  excited masses was completely new and unheard-of in the 
Homeric Greek world, it  was an asiatic and oriental thing that he Greeks, with their 
prodigious rhythmic and plastic force, in a word with their sense of beauty, had mastered 
to the point of pulling tragedy from it [… .]564 
ἔκστασις is thus profoundly, rhythmically linked to plastic force, here even called rhythmic. The 
experience of being outside of oneself as the universal binding force of tragedy  was possible 
only because of the height of the Greek power of homeotic transformation and appropriation.
 For Nietzsche, Sophocles is a threshold figure, standing midway  between ancient tragedy 
and its modernization—between Aeschylus and Euripides. He writes: “Sophocles is the figure of 
transition; thought still moves along the path of instinct [… .]”565 It is because of his role as a 
boundary figure, and because in him the primordial, organic instinct of self-creation remains 
even as the organization of the new tragedy, the separation of chorus and drama begins to take 
place—at the daybreak, thus, of tragedy’s self-consciousness—that Sophocles is a figure of the 
tragic. Nietzsche writes:
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The worldview is tragic only  in Sophocles. The undeserved character [U n v e r d i e n t 
h e i t] of destiny seemed to him tragic: the enigmatic nature of human life, truly 
terrifying, was his tragic muse. The κάθαρσις comes on the scene as a necessary feeling 
of consonance in a world of dissonances [als nothwendiges Consonanzgefühl in der Welt 
der Dissonanzen]. Suffering, the origin of tragedy, [Das  L e i d e n, der Ursprung der 
Tragödie] achieves with Sophocles its transfiguration: it is grasped as something that 
makes one holy [Heiligendes]. […] The distance between the human and the divine is 
beyond measure: the most profound obeisance and resignation are called for. […] Heroic 
humanity is the noblest humanity, devoid of virtue; its destiny demonstrates the infinite 
chasm [die unendliche Kluft] [vis-à-vis the divine]. There is scarcely guilt; only a lack of 
knowledge concerning the worth of human life.566
In the word of the tragic hero thus correspond this consonance and this dissonance, in a 
simultaneity akin to that between the Apollinian and the Dionysian—individuation and its 
rupture. Thus just  as in Hölderlin’s intellectual intuition, where the unification is purified through 
separation, a consonance occurs, for Nietzsche, as the purification of the tragic discontinuity 
between the hero and his nation. The word, then—is precisely  caesura.567 Excentricity spells the 
necessary  failure of the tragic hero, of the philosopher-poet who sacrifices himself for the 
creation of a new culture. Rather, he eternally delivers the others into the flood of becoming from 
which it was his destiny to escape and to save his nation.
 Nietzsche attacks the “modern” and “esthetico-moral” interpretation of tragedy  that 
would claim κάθαρσις to be “the triumph of the just, moderate man, deprived of passion [… .]” 
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superficially than they act; the myth does not at all obtain adequate objectification in the spoken word. The structure 
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concepts” (Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, § 17,  105). This then, I am suggesting, is the Heraclitean silence of the 
caesura—the ἀγών silently pronounced in the word “woe.”
Tragedy, claims Nietzsche here, was born “precisely there where the tragic instinct manifests 
itself in a creative way, while nature is so sure in her instinctive reign [… .]”568 Thus κάθαρσις, 
for Nietzsche, takes place rhythmically, in accordance with the life-breath of the world brought 
into its highest possible idealization. 
 Schopenhauer had interpreted tragedy  as the process by which the will objectifies itself 
into external visibility, and thus as the playing-out of its own intrinsic tragic nature. “It is the 
antagonism of the will with itself which is here [in tragedy] most completely unfolded at the 
highest grade of its objectivity, and which comes into fearful prominence. […] It is one and the 
same will, living and appearing in […] all [individuals], whose phenomena fight with one 
another and tear one another to pieces.”569 Hence tragedy is merely the phenomenology of the 
will’s objectification and the ἀγών of its manifestations with one another. Because Schopenhauer 
determined the will as the thing-in-itself, he called the “self-knowledge [of the will] the sole 
event in-itself” and, in turn, defined the tragic process as precisely  this attainment of self-
knowledge.570 It is through the tragic process of the will’s objectification that it  ascends from the 
empty state of being “only a blind, irresistible urge” to the point at which it “obtains knowledge 
of its own willing and what it  wills through the addition of the world of representation, 
developed for its service.”571  For Schopenhauer, thus, as for Hölderlin and later Nietzsche, it is 
through monstrous reflective consciousness and self-knowledge that tragedy comes to necessitate 
a sacrifice. In the case of the Schopenhauerean will, the “tragic […] receives its characteristic 
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tendency toward the sublime from the dawning that the world of knowledge that the world and 
life can afford us no true satisfaction, and are therefore not worth our attachment to them.” In the 
perspective of this pessimism, the “tragic spirit,” having brought about the attainment of this 
extreme knowledge, “leads to resignation.”572  Szondi writes that for Schopenhauer, the “sole 
goal of art is the communication of this [the will’s] knowledge.573 The process of objectification 
and self-knowledge thus culminates in man and art.”574  The tragic hence becomes “the self-
destruction and self-negation of the will” as the movement of a tragedy  unfolds as “the battle of 
the will against itself” in the form of its various representations. In tragedy, moreover, art 
becomes “a clear mirror of the world” precisely because there, knowledge, which “proceeds 
originally  from the will itself,” and is therefore subordinated to it, finds the power to “withdraw 
itself” from “this servitude” and become “freed from all the aims of the will”575  thus revolting 
against its sphere of origin and pushing the will to self-destruction in resignation. The task of 
tragedy, then, for Schopenhauer, is to reveal to its spectators the will’s tragic nature—to lift them 
into the greatest proportions of the will’s self-knowledge and to lead them, too, into resignation. 
Simultaneously, in the darkness of this very resignation, “the will, whose manifestation is man, 
sublates itself in a dual dialectic.”576 
 Nietzsche, in turn, wrote in The Birth of Tragedy of the monstrous knowledge of the 
tragic hero. In reference to Oedipus he claims that the message delivered in that drama is that of 
the necessary downgoing of he who exceeds the limits of human measure, this being a peculiarly 
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Apollinian value: “the myth seems to whisper to us that wisdom, and particularly  Dionysian 
wisdom, is an unnatural abomination; that he who by  means of his knowledge plunges nature 
into the abyss of destruction must also suffer the dissolution of nature in his own person. ‘The 
edge of wisdom turns against the wise: wisdom is a crime against nature.’”577 Nietzsche goes on 
to form the hypothesis that every tragic hero in Greek tragedy until the time of Euripides was a 
manifestation of Dionysus; he asserts that  “all the celebrated heroes of the Greek stage—
Prometheus, Oedipus, etc.—are mere masks of this original hero, Dionysus.”578  Hence, Szondi 
postulates a parallel between Nietzsche’s Dionysus and Schopenhauer’s will as the universal 
ground of all life that takes on the form in its manifestation of different tragic heroes as, for 
Nietzsche, “Schopenhauer’s metaphysical concepts […] become aesthetic concepts.”579  Thus, 
just as the Schopenhauerean will in tragedy is driven to self-destruction through excessive 
knowledge, for Nietzsche, “Dionysus’s mythical fate of being torn to pieces is celebrated anew in 
every  tragedy.” Szondi writes that this fate is understood by  Nietzsche as “the symbol of 
individuation: in the tragic hero one can see ‘the god experiencing in himself the agonies of 
individuation.’”580 
 Szondi further draws together the Nietzschean Apollinian and the Schpenhauerean 
concept of representation, which are both positioned in opposition to “an original oneness”—yet 
the difference between their conceptions arises in the comparison, for while Schopenhauer’s will 
undergoes an auto-sublation into resignation, Nietzsche’s “Dionysus emerges from his 
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dismemberment in the process of individuation as one who is powerful and indestructible, which 
is precisely  the ‘metaphysical consolation’ that tragedy offers.” Thus, Szondi concludes that 
“Nietzsche confronts Schopenhauer’s negative dialectic with a positive dialectic [… .]581 
According to Szondi, while in Schopenhauer’s “dialectic” the “will negates itself in its 
objectification as appearance,” Nietzsche’s “dialectic” consists of the self-affirmation of the 
Dionysian through the very negation of the Apollinian pleasure of appearance, so that it plunges 
itself into “a still greater pleasure in the destruction of the visible world of mere appearance.”582 
Hence, rather than acting as a mirror of the world of individuation, art, for Nietzsche, unveils 
individuation as “the prime cause of evil”—“the joyous hope that the spell of individuation may 
be broken—the augury of a restored oneness.”583 
 The essence of tragedy, then, is the dismemberment of individuals through a loss, a 
forgetting of self that allows men to participate in the being of the god Dionysus and through this 
very violence and fragmentation to find a unification in joy—an affirmation of life as this 
capacity for transfiguration within the temporal movement of the drama and its music. The 
primordial unity the conjuring of which is the task of tragedy is therefore not a prehistorical state 
of perfection but, rather, arising from the dissonant flood of becoming, it is an instant in which 
consonance is born, precisely, through a community  of discontinuous selves, of selves pushed 
outside of themselves by  the exaltation of Dionysus. It is at once a sacrifice and a forgetting of 
individuality which serves a purificatory function for the whole of the chorus and the spectators 
insofar as it attains a state of timelessness and therefrom, with the god, is voluntarily torn to 
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shreds. The primordial is thus not an absolute; it is an aesthetic reserve of force that changes 
constantly, with every breath—of the force that makes both art and science—both illusion and 
knowledge—possible.
 In order to describe the process by which the Dionysian appears to the chorus and the 
audience in an ecstatic state, Nietzsche borrows the idea of the Urphänomen—the primordial 
phenomenon—from Goethe. In Eckermann’s Conversations of Goethe, the “naïve” poet-
philosopher speaks of this pantheistic proto-phenomenon as follows: “The Understanding will 
not reach her [Nature]; man must be capable of elevating himself to the highest Reason, to come 
into contact with the Divinity, which manifests itself in primitive phenomena (Urphänomenen), 
which dwells behind them, and from which they  proceed.”584  This view of the Urphänomen 
places it on a Kantian plan of consciousness, understanding Reason, the highest  of the faculties, 
as the means by which this phenomenon must be grasped.
 In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche distinguishes between the tragic, Dionysian “truth of 
nature” and the “lie of culture,” as a “contrast” comparable to that “between the eternal core of 
things, the thing-in-itself, and the whole world of appearances [Erscheinungen].”585 This leads to 
a discussion of the “artistic proto-phenomenon [Urphänomen]”wherein the poet “sees himself 
surrounded by figures who live and act before him and whose inmost nature he can see.”586
Nietzsche speaks of the chorus as the “primal ground of tragedy [Ur-grund der Tragödie]” which 
represents (darstellt) the “shattering of the individual [Zerbrechen des Individuums] and his 
fusion with primal being [Ursein]” such that the drama is the “Dionysian embodiment of 
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Dionysian insights and effects [… .]” The Dionysian is here defined as the “expression of 
nature” wherein the chorus “[shares] in [Dionysus’s] suffering” and thereby also “shares 
something of his wisdom and proclaims the truth from the heart  of the world.”587 This ground of 
reality, suffering, is thus brought about through the illumination of the symbolic faculty that the 
Dionysian excites. Through the communal ἔκστασις of the chorus, which, indeed, was originally 
the sole element of tragedy, all of the participants, in a religious exaltation, in dance and song, 
communally sacrificed themselves as part of the god himself, and it was this sacrifice that 
allowed the κάθαρσις of consonance to be experienced.
 Nietzsche writes, against the modern interpretation of tragedy:
Thus we use the experiences of the truly aesthetic listened to bring to mind the tragic 
artist himself as he creates his figures like a fecund divinity of individuation (so his work 
can hardly  be called an “imitation of nature” [Nachahmung der Natur]) and as his vast 
Dionysian impulse then devours his entire world of phenomena, in order to let us sense 
beyond it, and through its destruction, the highest artistic primal joy [Urfreude], in the 
bosom of the primordially One [Ur-Einen]. Of course, our aestheticians have nothing to 
say about this return to the primordial  home [Urheimat], or the fraternal union of the two 
art-deities, nor of the excitement of the hearer which is Apollinian as well as Dionysian, 
but they  never tire of characterizing the struggle of the hero with fate, the triumph of the 
moral world order, or the purgation of the emotions through tragedy, as the essence of the 
tragic. And their indefatigability makes me think that perhaps they are not aesthetically 
sensitive at all, but react merely as moral beings when listening to a tragedy.588
This passage contains Nietzsche’s rejection of the dialectic and of moralization as a way of 
thinking tragedy and his embrace, or replacement thereof, by the idea of a return to a primordial 
state by  means of the unification of Apollo and Dionysus insofar as they are considered as vital 
forces. Their combination, then, far from achieving an absolute “imitation” of Nature as origin 
[Ursprung], requires instead a creation of a new Ur-dimension, one that extends to the depths of 
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memory, though not to the beginning of time, which, indeed, never took place. He follows, in 
this respect, in Goethe’s footsteps. The bard had said: “That a work of art should be perfect and 
complete in itself is the eternal and essential requirement! Aristotle, who had before him the 
height of perfection, was thinking of the effect? How absurd!”589 This is, of course, equally  an 
attack on Kant, who, in his Critique of Aesthetic Judgement, claims that there is no such thing as 
a work of art in itself, and that, indeed, no judgement of the beautiful or sublime is ever made of 
an object but that, rather, it is merely the effect such an artwork or object has on the judging 
subject that is deemed “beautiful”—“sublime,” etc. 
 Against this idealist  subjectivism, Goethe and Nietzsche after him, combat with force, 
toward nothing other than a new metaphysics that shall destroy  metaphysics proper—of the 
aesthetic phenomenon as Urphänomen, in which, again, the distinction between subject and 
object is obliterated along with, in tragedy, that between spectators and chorus. Yet over against a 
German Idealist conception of the unification of subject  and object in an absolute, a universal I 
or eye, this musical destruction of the boundaries between collective subject and collective object 
leads both chorus and spectators into a realm beyond both—a primordial Ur-sphere of melody 
and rhythm—dance and song, where all perspective is plunged into oblivion. There is, further, an 
agonal relation at work in this artistic Urphänomen, between the Dionysian and Apollinian forces 
[Kräften], which carries a circular aspect, so that Dionysus and Apollo continually double and 
redouble themselves, unite and disperse into an infinite competition—infinite ἀγών. Nietzsche 
writes: “the public at an Attic tragedy found itself in the chorus of the orchestra, and there was at 
bottom no opposition between the public and the chorus: everything is merely a great sublime 
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chorus of dancing and singing satyrs or of those who permit themselves to be represented by 
such satyrs.”590  The chorus of satyrs, in its “symbolism,” plays the role of “proclaim[ing] this 
primordial relationship between the thing-in-itself and appearance [Urverhältniss zwischen Ding 
an sich und Erscheinung],”591  in other words, between the primordial One and and its 
appearances. The root that connects these two, however, that both unifies and separates them, 
holds them in luminous identity, in tenebrous difference, and it is in this choral experience that 
the circle of all life and movement comes back to itself as a transfigured space of origin. The 
κάθαρσις that takes place in tragedy is not an effect, but rather a shared musical experience that 
undergoes the collective sacrifice of individualities, of identity  and homogeneity, and gives itself 
over to the absolute heterogeneity of liberated souls, liberated beings, out of language, back to 
the Ur. 
 As a result of his position against the German Idealist interpretation of tragedy, which 
moralizes and follows in Aristotle’s footsteps, Nietzsche must account for the “aesthetic 
pleasure” provided by the tragic myth “without transgressing into the region of pity, fear, or the 
morally sublime.” Without a moral interpretation of the unbeautiful and monstrous in tragedy, 
necessarily heavily  marked by Kant’s Critique of Aesthetic Judgement. In answer to the question: 
“How can the ugly  and the disharmonic, the content of the tragic myth, stimulate artistic 
pleasure?” Nietzsche revives his “metaphysics of art” whose axiom is that “existence and the 
world seem justified only  as an aesthetic phenomenon.” Nietzsche continues: “In this sense, it is 
precisely the tragic myth that  must convince us that even the ugly and disharmonic are part of an 
artistic game that the will in the eternal amplitude of its pleasure plays with itself. But this 
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primordial phenomenon [Urphänomen] of Dionysian art is difficult  to grasp, and there is only 
one direct way to make it intelligible and grasp it immediately: through the wonderful 
significance of musical dissonance. Quite generally, only music, placed beside the world, can 
give us an idea of what is meant by the justification of the world as an aesthetic phenomenon.”592 
Nietzsche’s metaphysics of art and of the artist entails the destruction of metaphysics. In a 
fragment of 1872, he writes, here taking recourse to the scientific strain in Heraclitus, 
Anaxagoras, Empedocles and Democritus, all of whom affirmed the indestructibility  of matter: 
“How can anyone dare to speak of the objective of the earth! / In infinite time and space there are 
no aims: what exists, exists eternally in one form or another. It is impossible to foresee what kind 
of metaphysical world there ought to be. / Humanity must be able to stand without anything of 
this sort to lean on—enormous task of the artist!” (KSA 7: 19 [139]).593 It is therefore the artists 
task to serve this aesthetic, anti-moral metaphysics whose very task is to destroy  the possibility 
of metaphysics by proclaiming even the primordial to be a work of illusion. He must therefore 
harness the rhythmic plastic force of life in order to bring about a new sphere of origin which 
affirms itself as illusion—which proclaims the thing-in-itself to be nothing other than its own 
auto-representation. And this must take place on the wide temporal plane of immanence which 
has, in truth, neither an absolute beginning nor a goal—a tragic time, therefore, divested of all 
teleology. 
 In Nietzsche’s genealogical study of rhythm, he writes of two modes of rhythmic life; 
Zeitleben and Tonleben to which correspond quantitative rhythmics, which operate according to 
time and qualitative rhythmics, which work by force and depend on stress. Accordingly, while 
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the former is proper to lyric poetry, the latter finds its expression in speech and prose. After 
making the claim that Zeitleben precedes Tonleben historically,594  Nietzsche reconsiders this 
thesis and, complicating its supposition of linearity, posits a primordial agonal relationship 
between these two lives of rhythm: “At the very  earliest stage, struggle [Kampf] between Zeit- 
and Tonleben (side by side [Nebeneinander.]) / Victory of Zeitleben over Tonleben / Decline of 
Zeitleben and victory of Tonleben.”595 Originally, therefore, poetry  and speech are inseparable, in 
constant battle with one another, while at  the other extreme the lyric dissolves again into vocality 
through “its sheer profusion of polyrhythms [… .]”596 In their struggle, force serves as power that 
shapes and organizes time into various rhythms. Nietzsche thus conceives that originally, 
Tonleben is also temporal, such that rhythm itself can be viewed as “the shaping force of 
temporal proportions.”597 In the proper measure, then, and in the proper dynamical agon, these 
two temporal functions—that of time and that of force—constitute the rhythm of life, in a 
manner analogous to that in which the Dionysian and the Apollinian must  constantly combat in a 
state of “perpetual strife with only periodically intervening reconciliations.”598 
 Whenever either Zeitleben or Tonleben is overvalued, and the other element of rhythm 
denied or suppressed, as occurs in the wake of the primordial Kampf between them, idealism 
ensues. And yet this idealism is strictly  unavoidable for Nietzsche, and, indeed, structures his 
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very study of rhythm. Porter writes: “Rhythm is an idealization of time, and what is equally 
important […] the perception of rhythm is itself an idealization of what is perceived: rhythms 
never obtain except ideally, because ‘two beats are never equivalent in a mathematically exact 
way.’599”600  In the same instant at which a perception or a sensation is received, it is idealized 
into rhythm—rhythm is formed, that is, in the same manner as which concepts are formed, 
through an equalization of that  which is fundamentally unequal. Hence idealization occurs, and 
this is itself the rhythmic Urphänomen, the process by which the rhythm by which we live is 
determined. It is therefore a matter of treating the genealogy of idealisms, the development of 
one idealism out of another. Nietzsche writes: “the idealism of tonality  and feeling [that is, of the 
moderns], as against the idealism of space and light (appearance) of the Greeks.”601 In both of 
these idealism, sensation, which, for Nietzsche, constitutes the sphere of the in-itself, 
primordially enters into representation. Porter confirms that therefore: “There is no way of 
avoiding ideality”—for Nietzsche writes explicitly  that throughout history, in the case of both the 
ancients and the moderns, “representation [Vorstellung] is already underway and at work.”602 
 Dissonance and consonance are two levels of rhythmic ideality, the former being closer to 
the real, that is, to the immediate idealization of sensation, and the latter being more ideal, 
because of its suppression of the supreme irrationality of rhythm. In a fragment of 1870, 
Nietzsche writes: “One might think of the reality of dissonance [Realität der Dissonanz], as 
opposed to the ideality of consonance [Idealität der Konsonanz]” (KSA 7:7 [116]).603  This 
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fragment is a meditation on tragedy and accordingly  views the real as suffering or pain—der 
Schmerz. Denying the existence of “natural beauty,” Nietzsche asserts that, rather “there is the 
disruptively ugly and a point of indifference [indifferenter Punkt].” He continues: “What is 
productive, then, is the pain, which creates the beautiful as a related counter-color—out of that 
point of indifference” (KSA 7:7 [116]).604  The pain of which Nietzsche speaks is accordingly 
that Dionysian dissonant suffering that underlies appearance, which springs forth in the 
Apollinian ideality of consonance. 
 Dissonances were conceived by the ancient rhythmicists to be “irrational” rhythms, 
falling into what Aristoxenus called the space “intermediate between two ratios that the senses 
can recognize.”605 Dissonance thus defines the limits of sensation—it is the irrational substratum 
of rhythm that renders possible the sensible or rational aspects of rhythm possible. Hence, the 
experience of dissonance is the experience of the very  boundaries of sensation—the “effect” of 
such experiences is “often described as ‘ecstatic.’”606 In the rhythmic sense, then, ἔκστασις is the 
experience of dissonance rising up  to collide with sensation. Because, for Nietzsche, after 
Aristoxenus, language and music are “discrepant mediums” insofar as they “represent  the 
intersection of time and a body,”607 the irrationality, the senselessness of rhythm, in song, speech 
and dance, are necessary to the rationalization of rhythm, i.e., its idealization through the 
representative faculty of sensation. There is a primal need for dissonance in every man, every 
people, every culture, precisely so that  sense can be rhythmically, biologically  created. The 
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contradictory impulses toward dissonance and consonance, constantly in conflict with one 
another, constitute the rhythmic problem, the knot of the tragic in every human being. 
 Greek rhythm, thus, is kept alive precisely by a plenitude of dissonance. Thus consonant 
metrons (metrical units) are interspersed with dissonant ones. Nietzsche defines the dactyl ( ̄  ̆  ̆ ) 
as precisely a dissonant metron, or alogia, of which he gives the following definition: “alogia is a 
light dissonance in a beat  that in other respects is regular.”608 The ratio between the long and the 
two shorts is irrational, according to Nietzsche, but has been rationalized by rhythmic 
conventions into the ratio 1:2. However, this ratio has “nothing to do with the mathematical 
description of the way the dactyl comes out when spoken.”609  Nietzsche claims, moreover that: 
“In itself, language can develop only  the felt contrast of syllables that are long and short, not that 
of 1 long = 2 shorts. A foot with three syllables will always be slightly different from one with 
two. ̄   ̄and   ̄   ̆  ̆ will have been approximately  equivalent in time, but their division was slightly 
different.” This, then, shows the “[c]ontrast between mathematical facts and those of feeling.”610 
 Nietzsche associates quantitative rhythmics, which takes place temporally with the 
Apollinian and qualitative rhythmics, brought about through vocality and dissonance, with the 
Dionysian. He writes: “Originally (in citharodic music), the note functions as a measure of 
time.”611 Hence prior to the arrival of Dionysus in Greece, Zeitleben is stronger than Tonleben in 
musical rhythms—musical notes measure time, and are therefore consistent, symmetrical, and 
occur at regular intervals.  After Dionysus arrived in Greece, irrationality—the force of 
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Tonleben, along with ἔκστασις in dance and song, was introduced into Greek rhythm precisely as 
a dissonant disruption of its temporally  measured music. Once the “treaty of peace” between the 
two warring gods had been formed, the “reconciliation” of the “two antagonists” Dionysus with 
Apollo, brought about,612 this primordial conflict between Zeitleben and Tonleben would have, in 
this perspective, commenced, operating in a manner continuous with the ἀγών between the two 
artistic gods. Nietzsche writes: “Establishment of the ancient [viz., classical (antiken)] symbolic. 
The Dionysian innovations in tonality  [or “key” (Tonart)], in rhythm [alogia?].”613  Since 
harmony, according to this history, “was not drawn into the realm of the symbolic” for the the 
Greeks,614  the Dionysian senselessness of force, colliding with the temporal measure of 
Apollinian music was necessary precisely  in order to lift rhythm into the realm of the symbolic—
it is thus that dissonance was lifted into ideality, as, precisely, the most basic level of 
symbolization—hence, as a primordial phenomenon. Indeed, Nietzsche writes, in a fragment of 
1870-1871: “The projection of illusion [S c h e i n s] is the artistic primal process [d e r  k ü n s t 
l e r i s c h e  U r p r o z e ß]. / All that lives, lives on illusion” (KSA 7:7 [167]).615
 In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche elucidates this insight into the development of music 
from the Apollinian to the Dionysian as the shift from the time-beat of quantitative rhythmics to 
the dissonant and melodic Tonleben: “If music, as it would seem, had been known previously  as 
an Apollinian art, it  was so, strictly speaking, only as the wave beat of rhythm, whose formative 
power was developed for the representation of Apollinian states. The music of Apollo was Doric 
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architectonics in tones, but  in tones that were merely  suggestive, such as those of the cithara. The 
very element which forms the essence of Dionysian music (and hence of music in general) is 
carefully  excluded as un-Apollinian—namely, the emotional power of the tone, the uniform flow 
of melody, and the utterly incomparable flow of harmony. In the Dionysian dithyramb man is 
incited to the greatest exaltation of all his symbolic faculties [… .]”616 Thus, by the combination 
of force and tone in rhythm, accomplished through the musical unification of Dionysus with 
Apollo, rhythm was enriched by  the dissonance and harmony of tonality, which, in turn, by 
means of the ecstatic “annihilation of the veil of maya,” which delivered men back to nature, 
brought symbolization into its highest form by  extending rhythm to the body  itself in dance: “the 
entire symbolism of the body is here brought into play […] the whole pantomime of dancing, 
forcing every  member into rhythmic movement.”617  It is the arrival of Dionysus in tragedy, 
therefore, that at once renders sense possible and reveals irrationality and dissonance as the 
fundament, the primordial being of that sense. For, introducing qualitative rhythmics into Greek 
culture, the Dionysian also presented, necessarily, the seed of the stress accent—the ictus—and 
this, connected to the meaning of words, is called by Nietzsche a “logical accent”618—therefore, 
Porter writes: “stress and meaning go hand in hand.”619
 The experience of consonance in tragedy, therefore, which, for Nietzsche, is cathartic is 
an upsurge of timelessness and of the continuity of meaning and music in the movement of 
becoming that characterizes the time of tragedy, which movement is indeed the embodiment of 
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its tragic nature. Nietzsche writes the for the Greeks, through the power of their myths, “even the 
immediate present had to appear to them right away sub specie aeterni [under the aspect of the 
eternal] and in a certain sense as timeless.”620 This timelessness, this lifting up  out of the terrors 
of becoming, took place precisely as the unity experienced in division of self, the 
dismemberment of individuality, as artistic ideality. It was by a profound experience of 
Dionysian dissonance that this consonant Urphänomen could take place, and this, indeed, was 
brought about by  means of the tragic hero. For if the tragic hero is, at bottom, Dionysus himself, 
and if his fate must replicate that of his primordial predecessor—the “dismembered god”—thus 
undergoing, through resignation to Μοίρα the experience of “Dionysian suffering” by which the 
god, “torn to pieces by the Titans” is transformed in what Hölderlin had called the excentric 
sphere of the dead to be “worshipped in this state as Zagreus,”621  it is equally the case that the 
Dionysian, at its extreme, passes over into the Apollinian, such that the hero is at once 
individuated and idealized in the highest degree and lifted out of time. It is the function of the 
tragic hero to bring about such timelessness, delivering itself and its world continually back in to 
the stream of becoming, the stream of pain. In this perspective, Empedocles too becomes a figure 
for Dionysus, the self-sacrificing hero who descends into the realm of the dead—the realm of the 
Titans beneath Etna, where he is torn apart as a chthonic god, god of earth and underworld.
 Nietzsche had struggled with the necessity  of art  to obtain this timeless quality, to serve 
as a refuge from dissonant, tragic becoming in consonance. In a fragment of 1870, he writes: 
“The tendency of art is to overcome dissonance”—it is by this power of overcoming that, 
through “representation” a salvation from pain must take place: “A condition of painlessness 
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must be created somewhere—but how?” (KSA 7:7 [117]).622 The response to the question that 
Nietzsche poses to himself shall be, precisely, through the consonance achieved by art, out of the 
pain of dissonance. Through the rhythmic transfiguration into the god Dionysus, the participants 
of tragedy achieve this state of ideality born, precisely of suffering, and by which suffering is 
presented as the ground of the world, as the Heraclitean one differing in itself that is originary. 
For what is most primordial is precisely to suffer the “agonies of individuation” that Dionysus, 
voluntarily  submitting to his annihilation, undergoes. In another fragment, Nietzsche writes: 
“Dissonance and consonance in music—we may say that a chord suffers through a false note. 
The secret of pain must also rest in becoming. If every world of the moment is a new world, 
where do sensation and pain come from?” (KSA 7:7 [165]).623 This fragment ends as follows: 
“Pain, contradiction is the true being. Joy, harmony is illusion” (KSA 7:7 [165]).624  This 
illusion, this highest ideality, however, is only possible as an upsurge out of the fundamental 
dissonance of suffering and becoming—for it is precisely the purificatory function of suffering to 
give birth to joy, which, in turn, presentification of suffering.
 Nietzsche writes: “Tragedy with a chorus is born from a transfigured reality  in which 
men sing and move in a rhythmic manner; the tragedy  without a chorus, from an empirical 
reality  where they speak and walk.”625 Tragic time is thus highly  rhythmic—it is essentially  the 
excentric, temporal deployment of the power of self-transformation. Nietzsche’s rhythmics is 
thus homeotic—rooting itself deeply in the body, it opens wide the possibility of biological 
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transformation by  means of the artistic presentation of the physiological primordial phenomena 
of rhythm. It is precisely because the Dionysian impulse only  appears through its self-
symbolization that  it can be transformed by that symbolic expression—it is utterly historical, 
subjected to the movements of becoming insofar as they externalize—idealize themselves 
rhythmically. Therefore, consonance as the highest form of ideality  is capable of transforming, 
radically reversing the physiological Urphänomenen of the participants (spectators, players and 
chorus members) of tragedy. Originally, indeed, the Dionysian was closest to life—it was a vital 
impulse that exteriorized itself, mediated by the Apollinian, in the communally  conjured image 
of the god. Hence, as the entire throng took part in the suffering of Dionysus—became Dionysus, 
driven outside of themselves in exaltation, they also shared in the joy—the affirmation of life 
born of that suffering and, indeed, shared in the self-sacrifice of the god, going down into Hades 
as a chthonic deity beyond individuation, embracing the terrors of being torn to shreds.
 As the Apollinian gained in power in the historical development of drama—as the 
principium individuationis took over more and more in the dramatic process, the Dionysian 
instinct was progressively distanced and estranged from the Apollinian instinct  toward plastic 
ideality. The appearance of Dionysus himself on the stage marks the moment of rupture in 
tragedy between “chorus,” wherein Dionysus was merely  “imagined as present” and “drama,” 
wherein he appeared as “the real stage hero”—it was at this point that  the tragic hero, the saving 
individual was conceived, as a mask for the god himself. Yet when the Apollinian comes into 
play, which veils the reality of day in illusion such that a new dream-world arises, both more 
lucid and more shadowy, which “presents itself to our eyes in continual rebirths” so that we are 
no longer in that monstrous, profound, natural world of Dionysus. “The Apollinian appearances 
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in which Dionysus objectified himself are no longer ‘an eternal sea, changeful strife, a glowing 
life,’626  like the music of the chorus, no longer those forces [Kräften], merely felt and not 
condensed into images, in which the enraptured servant senses the nearness of the god”—the 
epic aspect overtakes the lyric, and we are lifted out of drunkenness, into dream. In accordance 
with this change in tragic drama, the hero took on the function of embodying Dionysus and the 
Dionysian, so that it became his task to bring about the tragic transformation, the deliverance, 
from the point of ideal consonance, into a transfigured dissonance of becoming—a new world, 
differently rhtyhmed, by means of his self-sacrifice. The Dionysian instinct to self-sacrifice was 
thus individuated, no longer belonging to the multitude, to the entire community of choral 
tragedy which in divine ekstasis created itself as the work of art rising into consonance out of 
dissonance, saving itself by the liberation of the world that the image of Dionysus brought about, 
but rather limited, in the epic fashion, to the singular and lonely tragic hero.
 In his letter on Hölderlin of 1861, Nietzsche had also written of the poignant dissonance 
peculiar to the poet’s Hyperion. Accusing his “friend” of his ignorance of the genius of 
Hölderlin’s work apart from his “accomplished Greek meters,”—to which Nietzsche responds: 
“Accomplished Greek meters! My God! Is that all the praise you can offer?”627—he expounds 
the supreme musicality  of the poet’s novel: “Also you do not know Hyperion, in which the 
harmonious movement of his prose, the sublimity  and beauty of the characters, made upon me an 
impression like that of the wave beat of a troubled sea. Indeed, this prose is music, soft melting 
sounds interrupted by painful dissonances, finally  expiring in dark mysterious funeral songs.”628 
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Here, Nietzsche calls attention to the very excentric tragic path that Hyperion describes, yet on a 
minute scale—the very rhythm of Hölderlin’s poetic prose, he suggests, is excentric, beginning in 
ideal, sublime harmonies (as the universal harmony with nature of which Hyperion dreams) and, 
descending through interruptive “painful dissonances,” ending tragically far outside the 
primordial sphere of originary love, in drawn-out mourning-songs—funerary hymns.
Nietzsche’s Tragic Philosophers
 The connection between the flight  of the gods and the tragic hero was made by  Nietzsche 
as well as Hölderlin. A fragment from 1870 contains the following lines:
Der große Pan ist todt. Untergang der Götter.
Der tragische Mensch—Empedocles.
The great Pan is dead. Downgoing of the gods.
The tragic man—Empedocles (KSA 7:7 [15]). 
For Nietzsche, Empedocles is indeed the tragic man par excellence. He is, moreover, an analog, 
a figure of the philosopher himself, caught between a metaphysics inherited from Heraclitus and 
Schopenhauer and a materialism determined through Democritus and Lange. He characterizes 
Empedocles, this singular pre-Platonic philosopher as the supreme agonal man, in whom the 
transition from myth to science takes place in the history of this early development of 
philosophy. Empedocles is thus the man in whom the mythic and scientific impulses, which are 
constantly battling in Nietzsche’s own thought, are most potently alive, coming together through 
φιλία and and dividing through νεῖκος in an eternal movement of becoming that, eventually, 
necessitates this hero’s Untergang—his boundless unification and separation with the 
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disappearing god. Indeed, for Nietzsche, Empedocles is the personification of the ἀγών in a 
multitude of ways. In the notes toward his courses on the Pre-Platonic philosophers, he writes:
Empedocles continually stands on this boundary line, […] and in almost all matters 
Empedocles is such a boundary-line figure. He hovers between poet and rhetorician, 
between god and man, between scientific man and artist, between statesman and priest, 
between Pythagoras and Democritus. He is the motliest figure of older philosophy; he 
demarcates the age of myth, tragedy, and orgiasticism yet at the same time there appears 
in him the new Greek, as democratic statesman, orator, enlightened figure, allegorist, and 
scientific human being. In him the two periods wrestle with each other; he is a man of 
competition [an agonal man, a man of the ἀγών] through and through.629
This is, indeed, the more profound reason for which Empedocles becomes a figure of Nietzsche 
as a tragic philosopher, a “philosopher of tragic knowledge” who experiences the tragedy  of his 
time, who “senses it  to be tragic that the ground of metaphysics has been cut away and can never 
be satisfied by the colorful kaleidoscope of the sciences” (KSA 7: 19 [35]).630  As this tragic 
philosopher sought after the proper measure of the revival of myth to the importance of science, 
trying ceaselessly to reconcile, or infinitely approximate these elements to one another, it was the 
fact that the gods had gone down that brought about the necessity  of a new religion, a new 
science for the revitalization of his nation and his time. He is the first philosopher to experience 
tragedy in the sense considered to be modern by both Nietzsche and Hölderlin: in the wake of the 
god’s disappearance. In the section of Ecce Homo on The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche would call 
himself “the first  tragic philosopher”—the strongest warrior against the “pessimistic 
philosopher,” precisely because of his ability  to affirm life in the absence of any metaphysical 
ground. “Before me,” he writes, “this transposition of the Dionysian into a philosophical pathos 
did not exist: tragic wisdom was lacking [… .]” He claims to have found a possible predecessor 
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in this regard only  “in the case of Heraclitus, in whose proximity I feel altogether warmer and 
better than anywhere else.” He continues by enumerating the aspects of the Heraclitean 
philosophy that inspired his own tragic philosophy: “The affirmation of passing away and 
destroying, which is the decisive feature of a Dionysian philosophy; saying Yes to opposition and 
war; becoming, along with a radical repudiation of the very concept of being—all this is clearly 
more closely related to me than anything else to date.”631  In a fragment of 1870, we find the 
following: “The ancient philosophers, the Eleatics Heraclitus Empedocles as tragic philosophers 
[als die  t r a g i s c h e n  Philosophen]” (KSA 7:5 [94]).
 Yet it was precisely by the pessimism of Empedocles that the young Nietzsche defined 
him as a tragic philosopher—as one whose pessimism did not become a nihilism, but was, rather, 
capable of strongly affirming life and which, rather than leading to asceticism, resulted in action: 
“[Empedocles] is the tragic philosopher, the contemporary of Aeschylus. The most unique thing 
about him is his extraordinary pessimism, which works on him actively, however, not 
quietistically.” The “fundamental idea” of Empedocles’ political view was “to lead humanity 
across to the universal friendship (κοινὰ τῶν φíλων) of the Pythagoreans and thus to social 
reform with a dissolution of private property; he moves about as a wandering prophet after he 
failed to found the rule by all (Allherrschaft) from love in Agrigentum.”632 Nietzsche also writes 
that Empedocles was a great champion of “‘equality  in politics’ [ἰσότητα πολιτικὴν ἀσκεῖν]”633 
and, with the use of his tremendous resources, attempted a redistribution of wealth in 
Agrigentum by  providing dowries for poverty-stricken young women. Empedocles’ success was 
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so great that he was “offered a kingdom (βασιλεíα), which he declined.”634  Instead, he left 
Agrigentum to wander as a self-proclaimed god, healer, prophet, and magician. Thus the political 
failure of Empedocles to put kingship  to death and effect the deliverance from monarchy  to 
communism, thus restoring the original, eternal love between all living things, and his 
consequent exile from his fatherland for the blasphemy of declaring himself to be a god 
determined his fate as a wanderer and, eventually, would necessitate his self-sacrifice in the hope 
of thereby bringing about again that lost unity. Indeed, in Nietzsche’s view, by claiming to be a 
god, Empedocles understood himself to be announcing a return to the equality  and friendship 
between all men.
 According to Nietzsche, following the siege of Himera, Agrigentum became extremely  
wealthy in riches and slaves, and Empedocles declared of it: “The Agrigentines live delicately  as 
if tomorrow they would die, but they build their houses well as if they thought they would live 
forever.”635  The House of Gelon, king of Syracuse, then fell in Sicily, and Hieron became 
Syracuse’s new ruler. Theron, the ruler of Agrigentum then died in 472 B.C.E. and his son 
Thrasydaeus, already king of Himera, inherited the throne at Agrigentum from his father as well. 
He quickly  became a tyrant with “bloodthirsty and violent instincts,” built an army of twenty 
thousand and besieged Sicily, after provoking its ruler, Hieron. From this act, “a monstrous 
bloodbath [ensued, with] 2,000 slain on the side of the Syracusans and 4,000 on the side of the 
Agrigentines—most of them Hellenes, according to Diodorus [11.53].” Thrasydaeus then fled to 
Megara, in Greece, where he was sentenced to death, and Hieron banished many of his subjects. 
 The result of this great tumult was the establishment of a democratic government by the 
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people of Agrigentum.636  Empedocles, for his part, was a passionate advocate of democracy. 
Once the Senate of One Thousand had installed itself in Agrigentum, Empedocles made his “first 
incursion into politics [and …] oratory” by “suppressing an attempt at tyranny.”637 Having been 
invited to a dinner party  of the magistrates (ἄρχοντες) of the thousand, he was driven to rage by 
the absence of wine and demanded that it be supplied. “When he [the actual host, the senator] 
arrived, he was made the ‘master of the revels’ (συµποσíαρχος) [and …] because resistance had 
been fomented, this man commanded the ‘guests’ either to drink or to have it  poured over their 
heads.” Empedocles, understanding this order to be a manifestation of tyrannical intent, “remains 
silent” at the time, but later “brings both of them before the court, and it sentences them to 
death.”638  With his great oratorical skill and political power, Empedocles even succeeded in 
dissolving the assembly of the thousand altogether. Nietzsche writes that with Empedocles 
“arose rhetoric,” and indeed, “Aristotle […] describes him in the [lost] dialogue Sophist as the 
‘inventor of rhetoric’ [πρῶτον ῥητορικὴν κεκινηκέναι].”639 
  The origin or mortals, Empedocles believes, is the punishment of “primal criminals: the 
anger of the aether drives them into the sea, the sea spits them out onto the land, land tosses them 
up into the flames of the sun, and there [push them] once more into the aether: thus one gathers 
them from the other, yet each hates them. Eventually they appear to become mortal”—thus are 
humans born of strife (νεῖκος).640 Nietzsche writes: “Mortals appear to him, accordingly, to be 
fallen and punished gods! The earth is a dark cave, the unholy meadow (λειµὼν ἄτης)” ruled 
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over by wicked fates. “He plunges into a pile of opposing daimons: Deris and Harmonia 
[Discord and Harmony], Callisto and Aischre [Beauty and Ugliness], Thoosa and Denaie [Haste 
and Tarrying], Nemertes and Asapheia [Truth and Obscurity], Physo and Phthimene (Nature and 
Downfall), and so on.”641 
 Eduard Zeller, one of Nietzsche’s main sources for his work on the pre-Platonics, 
pronounces this same paradox within Empedocles as follows: “With [his] system of natural 
philosophy Empedocles made no attempt to reconcile scientifically his mystic doctrine (allied to 
that of the Orphics and Pythagoreans) of the sinking down of souls into terrestrial existence, of 
their transmigration into the bodies of plants, animals, and men, and of the subsequent return of 
purified souls to the gods; nor his prohibition of animal sacrifices and of animal food.642 He did 
not even try to explain away  the contradiction between them, though it is evident that these 
doctrines involve the conception that strife and opposition are the cause of all evil, and that unity 
and harmony are supremely blessed.”643
 Erwin Rohde, whose great Psyche would not appear until 1894, when Nietzsche had 
already descended into madness, writes of Empedocles, too, as a man divided between 
metaphysics and science: “Empedokles united in his own person to an astonishing degree the 
most sober attempts at a study of nature that was scientific according to its lights, and quite 
irrational beliefs and theological speculations. Occasionally the scientific impulse passes over to 
influence even the world of his beliefs; but as a rule theology and natural science exist side by 
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side in his mind quite independently.”644 Unlike Zeller, who insists on the irreconcilability  of the 
myth and science instincts in Empedocles, Rohde speaks of them as a dissonant unity, which 
worked at the heart  of his organism, now fighting with one another, now harmonizing together, 
now passing over into one another, now separating into two individual forces. And perhaps 
Rohde wrote of this tragic philosopher himself as, precisely, a mirror image of his long-loved 
and lost friend Nietzsche. Perhaps the Odic force that bound them was not broken by  Nietzsche’s 
disappearance into madness but  was strengthened through this tragic figure left behind by the 
philosopher, which bound his fate inseparably to that of Hölderlin, through their common hero, 
Emepedocles. One can hardly doubt the surety  of Rohde’s homage to Nietzsche when one reads, 
in his allusion to the miraculous death of Empedocles: “He must have made a profound 
impression on the men among whom he lived, though he disappeared from their midst like a 
comet.”645  Indeed, it  was in Rohde’s company that Nietzsche first read the text of his book, 
Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, aloud to Richard and Cosima Wagner on the Easter 
of 1873 at Bayreuth, the first section of which contains the figure of the philosopher as comet.
 In a letter dated February  2, 1873, Friedrich Ritschl, the common mentor of the young 
Nietzsche and the young Rohde, who was responsible for the former philologist’s position at  the 
university of Basel at  the age of 24, wrote of Nietzsche in a manner nearly identical to that in 
which Zeller, whom Nietzsche read, and Rohde, whose Psyche would come after him, wrote of 
Empedocles: “It is strange how two souls can live right next to each other in the man 
[Nietzsche]. On the one hand the strictest method of scientific research … on the other hand this 
243
644 Rohde, Psyche, 2: 379.
645 Rohde, Psyche, 2: 378-379.
fantastic excessive overly spiritual verging-on-incomprehensible Wagnerian-Schopenhauerian 
artistic-mysterious-religious gushing!” (KSA 7: 15:46-47).646
 This complex combination of metaphysics and physics was, indeed, Nietzsche’s primary 
interest in his lecture on Empedocles. He carefully delineates their limits and the points at which 
they  pass over into one another in the philosopher’s work. According to Nietzsche, the 
“greatness” of Empedocles lay in the fact  that he “prepared the conditions for rigorous atomism 
[… .]” Thus he “[reduced] this power [Macht] of love and strife to a force [Kraft] lying inside 
things” after which “Democritus found weight and shape sufficient.” Democritus could affirm, 
after Empedocles’ doctrine of effluences, the existence of empty space, denied by Anaxagoras. 
Empedocles rejects Anaxagoras in his “doctrine of effluences (ἀπρροαί) [which] presupposes an 
empty space [… .]”647 In his theory of “chance forms,” according to Nietzsche, Empedocles is of 
a “purely atomistic-materialistic viewpoint.”648 Yet love and strife exceed all measure, and thus 
cannot be quantified; it is precisely because of this excessiveness and eternity  of these universal 
laws that Empedocles passes over into myth. Thus, at his most scientific, his doctrine reaches its 
extreme metaphysical point. In a fragment of 1870-1871, Nietzsche writes of this phenomenon 
as “the abrupt transformation of science into art every time its limits are reached” (KSA 7:7 
[125]).649
  The Empedoclean theory of effluences was based upon a view of love that was at once 
quasi-mythical, universal, and profoundly  rooted in the bodies of all living creatures. It was 
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Empedocles’ belief that he lived in a fallen world and that  earthly life was a punishment for a 
primordial sin against eternal life. Empedocles is deeply “related to Pythagorean-Orphic 
mysticism,” which is the main source of his metaphysical beliefs, “just as Anaxagoras is related 
to Hellenic mythology. He [Empedocles] joins the religious instinct to scientific explanation and 
broadens it in this scientific form. He is the one who enlightens and consequently remains 
unloved among the faithful.”650 The great lucidity and power of the philosopher thus turned the 
people of Agrigentum against him: “As a result he still takes over the entire collective world of 
gods and demons, in whose reality he believes no less than in that of human beings. He even 
feels himself to be an outcast god; he sighs about the pinnacle of honor from which he has fallen: 
‘I wept and mourned when I discovered myself in this unfamiliar land’ [frag. 118]”—this foreign 
land refers, precisely, to the human world.651
 Nietzsche writes: “In the world of sorrow, of oppositions, [Empedocles] finds only one 
principle that guarantees an entirely different order: he finds Aphrodite, known to all, but never 
as a cosmic principle. [Empedocles, frag. 17, 20 ff.] The life of sexuality  is the best, the noblest, 
the greatest opposition against the drive toward divisions.”652 This allegorization of the sexual 
“drive to sameness”653, referred to by Nietzsche as a Treib, extends both to the political realm, 
where it represents “the cooperation of conflicting social classes for the sake of production”654 
and to the domain of physics, in which the “mixture [of primal materials] becomes possible only 
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when the part[icles] of one body enter the spatial intervals between the part[icles] of the other” 
while “with complete mixing, there exists fundamentally  only a mass of particles [Teilchen].” 
Under this universal law of penetration, “[t]he more thoroughly the pores of one body 
correspond to the effluences and particles of the other, the more capacity it will have for mixture 
therewith; thus […] like seeks out like; whatever does not allow mixing is alien.”655
“The conclusion is this: love alone is thought to be active, such that, after absolute separation, 
everything rests once more. Thus both must struggle with each other.”656 This struggle between 
Love and Strife is absolutely necessary to life itself. “Here he touches on Heraclitus’s 
glorification of war as the father of all things. Yet if we conceive their forces as equal and 
instantaneously  effective, then once again motion does not  arise. Periodic cycles must alternate 
[in] predominance.”657
 In general, Nietzsche affirms that Empedocles surpassed Anaxagoras and “discovered all 
the foundational conceptions of atomism—that is, the fundamental hypothesis of the scientific 
view of nature of the ancients [… .]”658  However, on one point, he does not “overcome” his 
predecessor: namely, “his principles of love and strife in order to eliminate the dualism 
concerning motion. […] If all motion is reduced to the workings of incomprehensible forces, 
then science basically dissolves into magic.”659
 Nietzsche follows Hölderlin’s definition of the tragic as the monstrous transgression of 
divinity by the human—Empedocles is, then, the embodiment of tragedy. Nietzsche writes of 
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him: “What he says in general is true of himself: ‘In the course of time there come to earth 
certain men who are prophets, bards, physicians, and princes; such men rise up  as gods, extolled 
in honor.’ This was his belief: he has already crossed over to divinity. […] He is a seer, poet, 
doctor, and prince (a general term, not  τύραννος); now, since his wandering, he is also ‘god, no 
more a mortal.’ [θεóςµ οὐκέτι θνητóς (Empedocles, frag. 112, in Diogenes Laertius, Lives, bk. 8, 
sect.  62).] Well now, how does he cross over to ‘sharing hearth and table with the other 
immortals, freed from human woes and human trials?’ [v. 387-388, Empedocles, fragment 147] 
He plunges into [Mt.] [E]tna because he wants to confirm himself as a god; the immediately 
preceding event was either the worship of the Selinuntines or the healing of Panthea, a woman of 
Agrigentum.”660  Nietzsche also gives other accounts of Empedocles’ death: that of Timaeus, 
according to which he “never returned from the Peloponese”661 and that of Neanthes, according 
to which, he broke his thigh at a festival in Messana and died from it. Nietzsche then conjectures: 
“The legend of the faithful portrays him disappearing; that of the ironic portrays him plunging 
into [E]tna; that of the pragmatists portrays him breaking a thigh and being buried in Megara.”662
 Nietzsche’s notion of breath as the universal element that binds us together, as the 
rhythmic and inconstant  measure of all life is a very  ancient one: it is an idea common to 
Heraclitus and Empedocles. In Nietzsche’s discussion of the transition from Anaximander to 
Heraclitus with regard to physics, he writes that Heraclitus, replaced Thales’ and Anaximander’s 
primal element of water with that of fire precisely because because of the warmth of universal 
breath. Anaximander had defined heat and cold as the “preliminary stages of water,” which 
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Thales had declared to be first  element, which afterwards transforms into the other elements, 
while Heraclitus, in turn, “re-interprets the Anaximandrian warm as warm breath, dry vapor, in 
other words, as fire. Of this fire he now says what Thales and Anaximander had said of water; 
that it  coursed in countless transformations through the orbits of becoming; above all, in its three 
major occurrences as warmth, moisture and solidity.”663
 Nietzsche writes: “Empedocles’ entire pathos comes back to this one point, that all living 
things are one; in this respect the gods, human beings, and animals are all one.”664  To this 
declaration, Nietzsche appends, in a footnote, a quotation of Goethe: “And so every creature is 
only a tone, a shading of a grand harmony, which must be studied in large and whole, otherwise 
every  individual is a lost character.”665 Nietzsche continues: “Sextus Empiricus”—through whom 
Empedocles’ poems survive—“is quite explicit that breath (ἓν πνεῦµα) is the soul of the entire 
world, which relates us to the animals as well. […] [Empedocles’] life’s mission is presented as 
being to make good once more what had been worsened by strife (νεῖκος), to proclaim and even 
to aid the ides of oneness in love inside the world of strife wherever he finds sorrow, the result  of 
strife. Heavily he plods through this world of agony, of oppositions: the fact that he is within it 
may  be explained only as a transgression: in some time or another, a crime, a murder, a perjury, 
must have transpired. Existence in such a world punishes a guilt.”666 The world of Empedocles is 
thus a fallen one precisely because the eternal breath that binds together nature and man in love 
has been shattered and rendered discontinuous by  strife. Becoming is the punishment for this 
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transgression against love. Thus the path of man is indeed an excentric one: exiled from the 
universal, equal harmony of nature, which is timeless in its unity, he is condemned to suffer the 
dissonance of time itself, and of a time that offers no promise of salvation, no exit from the curse 
of strife but temporary sojourns in human love.
 In a fragment of 1870, we find the following: “The ancient philosophers, the Eleatics 
Heraclitus Empedocles as tragic philosophers [als die  t  r a g i s c h e n  Philosophen]” (KSA 7:5 
[94]). Heraclitus and Empedocles are tragic philosophers precisely  because they are the thinkers 
of becoming, of time as the dimension to which men are condemned. In Philosophy in the Tragic 
Age of the Greeks, Nietzsche speaks through Heraclitus as follows: “‘“Becoming [Das Werden]’” 
is what I contemplate,’ he exclaims, ‘and no one else has watched so attentively  this everlasting 
wavebeat and rhythm [ewigen Wellenschlage und Rhythmus] of things.’”667 And this is because 
Heraclitus denied the eternal ἄπειρον of Anaximander, the metaphysical substratum of existence, 
which Nietzsche aligns with the Kantian thing-in-itself. Heraclitus, rather “no longer 
distinguished a physical world from a metaphysical one, a realm of definite qualities from an 
undefinable ‘indefinite!’And after this first step, nothing could hold him back from a second, far 
bolder negation: he altogether denied being. For this one world which he retained—supported by 
eternal unwritten laws, flowing upward and downward in brazen rhythmic beat [Schlage des 
Rhythmus]—nowhere shows a tarrying, an indestructibility, a bulwark in the stream.’”668  Thus 
the indefinite, the eternal realm of Being is replaced, in Nietzsche’s vision of Heraclitus, by  an 
ever-changing musical rhythm, the laws of which remain concealed from men through language. 
249
667 Nietzsche, Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, § 5, 50.
668 Nietzsche, Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, § 5, 51.
 In this work, destined to be read by Wagner, Nietzsche thus aligns Heraclitus with 
Schopenhauer, and the cosmic rhythm with the will to live. He calls Heraclitus an intuitive 
philosopher who “embraces” two things: “one, the present many-colored and changing world 
that crowds in upon us in all our experiences, and two, the conditions which alone make any 
experience of this world possible: time and space.”669  He thus presents time and space for 
Heraclitus as the structures of intuition. The category of causality, as well as the forms of time 
and space had been retained from Kant by Schopenhauer as the necessary preconditions and 
structures of all experience, yet Schopenhauer, unlike Kant, characterized this causal and 
spatiotemporal intuition as the principle of sufficient reason, also called the principium 
individuationis, which, in turn, he aligned with space and time. Nietzsche thus defines 
Heraclitean becoming by a parallel with Schopenhauer: “As Heraclitus sees time, so does 
Schopenhauer. He repeatedly said of it that every moment in it  exists only insofar as it  has just 
consumed the preceding one, its father, and is then immediately consumed likewise. And that 
past and future are as perishable as any dream, but that the presence is but the dimensionless and 
durationless borderline between the two.”670  This Heraclitean-Schophenhauerean conception of 
time and space, however, differs from that of Kant in that it  views them as absolutely  relative, 
existing only by means of actions: “everything which coexists in space and time has but a 
relative existence […] whoever finds himself directly looking at it must at  once move on to the 
Heraclitan conclusion and say that the whole nature of reality [Wirklichkeit] lies simply  in its acts 
[Wirken] and that for it there exists no other sort of being.”671  Nietzsche then quotes 
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Schopehnauer as saying: “Only  by way of its acts does [reality] fill space and time. […] Cause 
and effect [Wirkung] in other words make out the whole nature of materiality: its being is its 
activity. Actuality  [Wirklichkeit] therefore is completely relative, in accordance with a 
relationship  that is valid only  within its bounds, exactly  as is time, exactly as is space.”672 Space 
and time are thus viewed, by Schopenhauer, as being on the same plane; as being equal 
phenomena whose “union,” in Nietzsche’s words, is effected “by means of causality [… .]”673 
 Nietzsche speaks of the life-affirming pessimism of Heraclitus, for it is the eternal 
“strife” between opposites that gives rise to becoming itself, “and it is just  in the strife that 
eternal justice is revealed.”674 The thought of pure becoming, however, as the eternal movement 
of the world, without an origin or goal, is a tragic, and hence terrifying one: “The everlasting and 
exclusive coming-to-be, the impermanence of everything actual, which constantly  acts and 
comes-to-be but never is, as Heraclitus teaches it, is a terrible, paralyzing thought.”675 Nietzsche, 
aligning himself with this philosopher, with this “wonderful idea”676  proposes the profound 
embrace of this tragic temporality; an affirmation of its supreme untimeliness; for him, life 
requires the profound acceptance of the excentric path of man in this inconstant temporality. 
Moreover, it is thus against  Hölderlin that he opens the possibility for this embrace of the tragic 
in time. For, in Hölderlin’s view, it  is the striving for eternity, for a salvation from this time that 
renders it bearable. The promise of intellectual intuition as a state that is more than temporary 
251
672 Schopenhauer, Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, Vol. I, Book 1, § 4. Nietzsche, Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the 
Greeks, § 5, 53.
673 Nietzsche, Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, § 5, 56.
674 Nietzsche, Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, § 5, 55.
675 Nietzsche, Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, § 5, 54.
676 Nietzsche, Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, § 5, 54.
remains a myth on the horizon of our lives for him, and in its absence, that unity with the god 
must be mourned. For Nietzsche, on the contrary, as for Heraclitus, life itself is nothing but this 
temporal movement, and it is this that we must affirm with the birth of each new moment and the 
sacrifice of the last.
 History, like time, for Nietzsche, as for Hölderlin and Heraclitus, is in its deepest reaches 
discontinuous. Hence is the self, too, discontinuous; it is not a solid body persisting in space, but 
an entity that is not, that, rather, becomes, a manifestation of forces in eternal strife and 
competition with one another. The greatest  advances from Anaximander to Heraclitus, according 
to Nietzsche, were the absolute denial of the ἄπειρον (which he equates, at turns, with both the 
Kantian thing-in-itself and the Schopenhauerian will) and the determination of becoming as 
justice, rather than as injustice. For according to Anaximander, in Nietzsche’s words: “Becoming 
is an injustice and is to be atoned for with Passing Away (φθορά).” Thus all time was at once a 
result and a punishment for the disunity with the qualityless one, eternal Being.677 Yet this eternal 
transformation, this flux of strife in all that becomes, was conceived by  Schopenhauer, as for 
Anaximander, not as a movement to be affirmed, but as a frightening truth, an occasion for 
pessimism. Nietzsche verifies that “strife for Schopenhauer is a proof of the internal self-
dissociation of the Will to Live, which is seen as a self-consuming, menacing and gloomy drive, 
a thoroughly frightful and by no means blessed phenomenon.” Moreover, the sphere of becoming 
is for Schopenhauer that of “persistent matter,” which “must change its form” constantly, 
“[f]orever and ever” by means of “causality [… .]”678 This then, is precisely that spatial domain 
of persistence of which Heraclitus utterly  denies the existence. With Heraclitus, then, against 
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Anaximander and Schopenhauer, Nietzsche embraces this becoming on the temporal plane 
against a spatial model of becoming as that which must be affirmed in the service of life; it  is an 
overturning of the pessimism of this fear of history, an embrace of the ἀγών  which, like history 
itself, defies all causality: “[Heraclitus’] idea of war-justice (Πóλεµος-δíκη) is the first 
specifically Hellenic idea in philosophy [… .]”679 
 Heraclitus’ central, paradoxical idea, is that: “The one is the many.” Nietzsche carefully 
explains that this is not a separation of the world onto a phenomenal and noumenal plan, but that, 
rather, it  is a cosmic game, a movement ruled by  chance. “‘The world is the game Zeus plays,’ 
or, expressed more concretely, ‘of the fire with itself. This is the only sense in which the one is at 
the same time the many.’”680  Referring to Heraclitus’ fragment: “Time (αἰών) is a child playing 
dice: royalty of a child,” Nietzsche writes: “as children and artists play, so plays the ever-living 
fire. It constructs and destroys, all in innocence. Such is the game that the aeon plays with itself. 
Transforming itself into water and earth, it  builds towers of sand like a child at the seashore, piles 
them up and tramples them down. From time to time it starts the game anew. An instant of satiety
—and again it is seized by its need, as the artist is seized by  his need to create.”681  The 
connection of the Heraclitean metaphor of the child for the αἰών with the artist, is Nietzsche’s 
doing, both for the benefit of Wagner and in accordance with his own epistemology, which is 
based on the human as fundamentally artistic, such that, in the creation of concepts, there is a 
“twofold artistic power [künstlerische Kraft], the power that generates images and the power that 
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selects among them” (KSA 7: 19 [79]).682 The homogenizing force [Kraft] of the intellect, that 
one which “allows us to perceive the major features of a mirror image with greater intensity” and 
the other force that “stresses similarity in rhythm despite actual imprecision” is, of necessity, a 
“K u n s tkraft” (KSA 7: 19 [67]).683  Science, from this perspective, is a mystification, a 
systematic concealment of this primordial artistic force.
 Hence Nietzsche writes of Heraclitus: “Only aesthetic man can look thus at the world, a 
man who has experienced in artists and in the birth of art  objects how the struggle of the many 
can yet carry  rules and laws inherent in itself, how the artist stands contemplatively  above and at 
the same time actively within his work, how necessity and random play, oppositional tension and 
harmony, must pair to create a work of art.”684  It is on the grounds of this interpretation that 
Nietzsche determines Heraclitus as an immoralist; herein lies the affirmative power of this pre-
Platonic philosopher: “But if we press upon Heraclitus the question why fire is not always fire, 
why it is sometimes water and sometimes earth, he could only say, ‘It is a game. Don't take it  so 
pathetically and—above all—don't make morality of it!’”685 
 Time, then, is a game of chance—the cosmic child ruling over the universe, who plays the 
song of destiny  governed by unknowable rules. The rhythm which makes us live is thus multiple, 
transforming at every moment, brought about through the caprices of a destroying and creating 
child. Following Heraclitus, whose view of the cosmos was, according to Nietzsche, entirely 
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aesthetic in the sense that  the world was for him a great work of art, he writes in a fragment: 
“Return to the Hellenic conception: art as physis” (KSA 7: 19 [290]).686
 Yet in his lectures on the pre-Platonic philosophers, Nietzsche speaks neither of 
Schopenhauer nor of the laws of time and of space as equal. He conceives becoming, rather, in 
temporal terms: “[Heraclitus] knows only Becoming, the flowing. He considers belief in 
something persistent as error and foolishness. To this he adds this thought: that which becomes is 
one thing in eternal transformation, and the law of this eternal transformation, the Logos in all 
things, is precisely this One, fire (τò πῦρ). Thus, the one overall Becoming is itself law [… .]”687 
Thus, because πάντα ῥεῖ, space in the absolute is utterly impossible, as, indeed, is time. 
Nietzsche writes of Heraclitus’ doctrine of becoming: “Nature is just as infinite inwardly  as it is 
outwardly: we have succeeded up to the cell and the the parts of the cell, yet there are no limits 
where we could say  here is the last divisible point. Becoming never ceases at the indefinitely 
small. Yet at the greatest [level] nothing absolutely  inalterable exists. Our earthly world must 
eventually perish for inexorable reasons. The heat of the sun cannot last eternally.”688  He then 
quotes Hermann von Helmholtz’s essay “On the Interaction of the Natural Forces,” in his 
explanation of the ever-decreasing speed of “rotation of the planets” resulting from that “every 
tide, although with infinite slowness still with certainty diminishes the stores of mechanical force 
of the system [… .]” Hence, Helmholtz concludes that “we must not speak of our astronomical 
time in an absolute sense.”689 Nietzsche attributes to Heraclitus an “intuitive perception” of such 
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a cosmological theory, based on his denial of Being and his embrace of the ever-changing, of 
Becoming.
 Nietzsche develops, moreover, against Kant and Schopenhauer, and by a return to 
Hume’s empiricism—indeed, by  forging an invisible bridge to that genius against whom critical 
and idealist  philosophy had defined themselves—his own theory of causality  and its 
epistemological genesis. He writes, in a fragment of 1872: “Space and time are dependent upon 
the sensation of causality” (KSA 7: 19 [161]).690 Causality, however, like all words and concepts, 
is a surface-phenomenon, a metaphor, existing only  in the mind of the subject, and based on the 
interpretation of sensations that links forces to results, or to external events. For Nietzsche 
describes the process by which concepts are formed as follows: “every word immediately 
becomes a concept precisely because it is not intended to serve as a reminder of the unique, 
entirely  individualized primal experience [Urerlebniss] to which it owes its existence, but 
because it has to fit at one and the same time countless more or less similar cases which, strictly 
speaking, are never equal, or, in other words, are always unequal. Every  concept comes into 
being through the equation of non-equal things.”691  And again, in his championing of sensation 
as the ground of experience, he writes: “The eye provides structures. We cling to the surface. 
[…] Lack of logic, but metaphors” (KSA 7: 19 [225]).692  The principle of causality is the 
inference of an agent from an action, as its originary cause, and hence the deduction of 
succession. This movement comes to play  in the formation of knowledge, that is, in the building-
up of metaphors out of actions that take place in the sphere of external experience. Nietzsche 
256
690 Nietzsche, Unpublished Writings, 51.
691 Nietzsche, Early Notebooks, 256.
692 Nietzsche, Unpublished Writings, 70.
writes: “A sensed stimulus and a glance at a movement, linked together, initially produce 
causality  as an empirical principle: two things—namely, a specific sensation and a specific visual 
image—always appear together: the belief that the one is the cause of the other is a metaphor, 
adopted from will and act: an analogical inference” (KSA 7: 19 [209]).693 Causality  is thus of the 
order of faith—it is a spatiotemporal metaphysical concept that obscures the reality of actions 
and, moreover, of the forces of which they are the manifestation. By means of an inference of 
causality  and the exercise of this law on the world, an action is performed and attributed to the 
will such that the “animal” is established as “a creature that wills” and this is called “its essence.” 
Thus nouns, or agents, are deduced from verbs, or actions, as be their sources. This, then, is how 
knowledge proceeds: 
 From quality to act: one of our characteristics leads to action: whereas in reality 
what happens is that we infer characteristics because we observe actions of a particular 
sort. 
 Thus: the action comes first; we connect it with a characteristic. 
 First the word for an action arises, from it is derived the word for the quality. This 
relationship transferred onto all things is causality. 
 First “seeing,” then “sight.” The one who “sees” is taken to be the cause of 
“seeing.” Between the sense and its function we experience a regulated relationship: 
causality is the transfer of this relationship (of sense to sensory function) onto all things.
 It is a primordial phenomenon [Urphänomen]: to associate with the eye the 
stimulus sensed by the eye, that  is, to associate a sensory impression with the sensory 
organ. Of course, only the stimulus is given in itself: to sense this to be an action on the 
part of the eye and call it “seeing” is to draw a causal inference. […] The inner 
connection of stimulus and activity transferred onto all things. […] The eye acts upon a 
stimulus: that is, it sees. We explain the world on the basis of our sensory functions: 
which means, we presuppose a causality everywhere because we ourselves are constantly 
experiencing changes of this sort. 
        KSA 7: 19 [209]694
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There are thus only actions. The force behind them, which brings them into being, is merely 
inferred, in a metaphorical veiling gesture, and is thus a matter of illusion, always to be 
recreated. All thought depends on the sensory Urphänomen that consist  of conceptually  claiming 
the will as the origin [Ursprung] of a stimulus. Yet this Urphänomen is itself an action: the eye 
must act upon action (stimulus) and assert itself to be its author in order for sensation to form 
itself as the ground of all experience, of all action. It is for this reason that living creatures 
artistically create their primordial aesthetic existence—it is thus that life creates life causally as 
an illusory phenomenon. The intellect depends for its scientific, analytic and synthetic being on 
its own power [Kraft] to create life as an aesthetic phenomenon. In another fragment, Nietzsche 
says that: “Misapprehension is the primordial phenomenon [Urphänomen]” because it is the 
exigency of language to collapse the differences between things. The intellect works by 
“[i]dentifying similar thing with similar thing—discovering some similarity  or other in one thing 
and another thing is the primordial procedure. Memory thrives on this activity and constantly 
practices it” (KSA 7: 19 [217]).695  This misapprehension, for its part, “presupposes the 
perception of structures. The image in our eye is decisive for knowledge, them the rhythm in our 
ear. We would never arrive at a conception of time based solely on the eye; never arrive at a 
conception of space based solely on the ear. The sensation of causality corresponds to the sense 
of touch.” Sounds and images arise in an interior manner, from which an external world is 
deduced by  an illogical “leap.” In accordance with this anthropological theory of causality, 
Nietzsche writes: “The human being is acquainted with the world to the extent that he is 
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acquainted with himself: that is, its profundity  is disclosed to him to the extent that he is amazed 
at himself and his own complexity” (KSA 7: 19 [118]).696
 In this proposition, thus, Nietzsche returns to Hume’s theory of causality, according to 
which all necessary connections between phenomena are purely  constructed, inferred from 
observation and projected onto the world as laws. Hume asserts that “[t]here are no ideas, which 
occur in metaphysics, more obscure and uncertain, than those of power, force, energy, or 
necessary connexion [… .]”697  On empiricist grounds, he establishes a theoretical structure for 
these concepts, so mysterious precisely  because of the obscure relationship  between inherent 
force, or will and appearance or action. Hume thus proposes that “all our ideas are nothing but 
copies of our impressions, or, in other words, that it is impossible for us to think of any thing, 
which we have not antecedently felt, either by out external or internal senses.”698  Necessity  is 
hence an entirely subjective concept, deduced from the only true realm of reality—sensation—
and employed to explain the mysteries of external phenomena in their connection to internal or 
otherwise hidden forces: “The scenes of the universe are continually shifting, and one object 
follows another in an uninterrupted succession; but the power or force, which actuates the whole 
machine, is entirely concealed from us, and never discovers itself in any of the sensible qualities 
of the body.”699  The repetition of the experience construed as that of causality  insures its 
apparent validity as an external process. The homogenizing power of such a concept thus permits 
it a pretension to universality in the consensus of its regulative use: “Our idea […] of necessity 
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and causation arises entirely from the uniformity, observable in operations of nature; where 
similar objects are constantly conjoined together, and the mind is determined by  custom to infer 
the one from the appearance of the other. There two circumstances form the whole of that 
necessity, which we ascribe to matter. Beyond the constant conjunction of similar objects, and 
their consequent inference from one to the other, we have no notion of any necessity, or 
connexion.”700  It is as a physiologist that Nietzsche returns to Hume, the philosopher whose 
thought famously awoke Kant from his dogmatic slumber and inspired him to surpass his 
empiricist predecessor by the foundation of a universal and infallible metaphysics, by 
“abolishing knowledge to make room for faith.” It is in his inversion, his overturning of this 
metaphysics that Nietzsche’s consideration of causality, as well as of time and space, returns to 
Hume, perhaps a genius whose thought was not comprehensible in his time. Past the invisible 
bridge that Nietzsche between the great empiricist and himself lie those to Democritus, to 
Empedocles and to Heraclitus.
 For Nietzsche, knowledge begins with the sacrifice of things themselves, and of things-
in-themselves, and ends with self-sacrifice for the creation of culture—the philosopher-
philologist must begin by sacrificing the world onto which he projects his image, and to end by 
sacrificing himself, thus his knowledge, from the very core of its creation. This sacrifice, which 
doubles and triples and multiplies itself ad infinitum across history, across time and becoming, 
must take place in the sphere of the tragic, as a work of art—for the philosopher’s task is to 
harness the force [Kraft] of illusion present in all humans in order to create monstrous life by 
reopening the chasm of the primordial.
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 In another fragment of 1870, Nietzsche poses a question: “What form of knowledge does 
art justify?” to which he replies: “The tragic science [die  t r a g i s c h e  Wissenschaft], which 
plunges like Empedocles into Etna” (KSA 7:7 [101]). This tragic science, then, is precisely that 
of becoming—it is a thinking of the movement of time as the fundamental life-force.
The Tragic Rhythm of Becoming
My heart, my heart, (θυµέ, θυµ[έ]) confounded by 
woes (κήδεσιν) beyond remedy, rise up and defend 
yourself, setting your breast against your foes as 
they  lie in ambush and standing steadfastly  near the 
enemy. Do not exult openly in victory and in defeat 
do not fall down lamenting at home, but let  your 
rejoicing in joyful times and your grief in bad times 
be moderate. Know what sort of rhythm (ῥυθµός) 
holds human beings.
      Archilochus, frag. 128701
 Nietzsche’s early writings contain a multitude of thoughts on rhythm, and a consideration 
of rhythm as the internal dynamic of forces that makes life possible. Between 1870 and 1873, he 
wrote a great deal on the subject of ancient rhythm, and, in the name of the “Philologist of the 
Future,”702  regarded this field of investigation as that by which his philological project of 
demonstrating the immeasurable breadth of the abyss separating the moderns from the ancients 
could finally be accomplished. He defines rhythm as the essential component of the experience 
of time, as the movement by which the most profound desires and drives surface. Hence rhythm 
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defines, or circumscribes, the life of a man, a people, a culture, as the motion by  which their 
plastic force becomes manifest. Nietzsche had planned to write a book called “Prolegomena to a 
Theory of Rhythmics in Antiquity,” of which two successive chapters were to be entitled 
“Philosophy of Rhythm” and “Physiology of Rhythm.”703 This physiological account of rhythm 
identifies the body as the locus of rhythmic life. Nietzsche writes, in his proposition of the 
“physiological foundation and explanation of rhythm (and its power [Macht])” that: “The entire 
body contains a countless number of rhythms,” thus, an innumerable quantity of modes of 
experience.704 And further, that “physiologically, life is … a continuous rhythmical movement of 
cells. The influence of rhythm seems to me to be an endlessly small modification of this 
rhythmical movement.”705  This inherently biological nature of rhythm is, then, what renders 
music, for Nietzsche, the most approximately universal element in tragic drama as, strictly 
speaking, its tragic core. This then is a scientific re-thinking of the Schopenhauerian concept of 
music as the absolutely universal representation of the will.
 Nietzsche writes, in a fragment from 1870: 
What does music do? It sets off contemplation in the will. It contains the general forms of 
all conditions of desire: it is through and through symbolic of the drives, and as such 
thoroughly  comprehensible in its simplest forms (time signature [Takt], rhythm 
[Rhythmus]) to everyone. It is thus always more general than any  particular action: 
therefore it is more comprehensible to us than any particular action: music is thus the key 
to the drama. 
       KSA 7:7 [23]706 
262
703 Nietzsche (KSA 7:323). Cited in Porter, Nietzsche, 145.
704 Nietzsche (KSA 7:322). Cited in Porter, Nietzsche, 145.
705 Nietzsche (KSA 7:325). Cited in Porter, Nietzsche, 145.
706 Trans. Miller. Cited in “Harnessing Dionysos,” 3.
Porter writes: “Takt, which covers ‘time,’ ‘measure,’ or ‘beat,’ but  also ‘tact’ and feeling, derives 
from the Latin tangere, ‘to touch,’ and Nietzsche never loses sight of this sensuous connotation 
either.”707 The very heart, the very  mechanism of rhythm is hence tied to sensation and therefore 
to bodily drives.
 For Nietzsche, rhythm is none other than the form that sensation—αἴσθησις (also 
perception)—takes in the experience of time. It is the fundamental beat, the internal measure of 
experience. Nietzsche thus determines music as “more universal than a single action” precisely 
because its rhythms “represent [darstellend]” the various human “drives [Triebe]” (KSA 7:7 
[23]). In 1871, Nietzsche writes in his notebook: “Rhythm [Takt] is to be understood as 
something utterly  fundamental, i.e., as the most primary  sensation of time, as the very form of 
time” (KSA 7:9 [116]).708 If Nietzsche claims that it is the task of music to “set off contemplation 
in the will,” this will is, however, no longer that of Schopenhauer, for it is historically 
determined, circumscribed by the bodies in which this “will” resides. Indeed, this will only exists 
through its self-manifestation, its self-symbolization in music. Nietzsche thus refers to music as 
the “most universal” element in drama, that is—it is universal only in a relative and not an 
absolute sense, as in the case of Schopenhauer, for whom the “music” exhibits “the will itself”709 
and this will is conceived as eternal, never becoming subject to the fluctuations of time and 
history.
 The philosopher as tragic hero is timeless—he is an island of respite from the ceaseless 
hurricane of becoming. It is his task, precisely, to deliver his people from the Parmenidean myth 
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of being into that very becoming; thus the attempt to deliver man into the perfect unity of lost 
Nature necessarily fails, for such a unity  is, in truth, a mere myth. Rather, the tragic hero must 
ascend out of the torrent of becoming that strives toward unity precisely in order to bring about 
the revelation of that becoming—in order to unveil to a people the true nature of time; that  it is 
without origin and without telos, but rather that it is the self-manifestation of bodies, which exist 
without being bound per se by temporal or spatial laws, since these laws are its own production
—this time is, rather, constant flux. Nietzsche writes, in a fragment: 
Sensation is the only cardinal fact with which we are acquainted, the only true quality. All 
the laws of nature can be reduced to laws of motion: wholly without substance. Once this 
is accomplished, the only thing we have established are the laws of sensation. Nothing at 
all is thereby gained for the “in itself.” […] Sensation cannot be explained on the basis of 
something else, since there is nothing else at all. 
      KSA 7: 27 [37]710 
Thus sensation is the only  possible ground for experience, and this is itself entirely relative; it is 
a meeting of internal and external forces whose origins remain obscure. It is through sensation 
that the illusions of time and of space originate. Indeed, for Nietzsche, time and space, like 
causality, are metaphors—they are hypotheses derived from sensation. It is Nietzsche’s ambition 
to utterly disprove and abolish the ideality of these structures in their determination as 
metaphysical prerequisites to experience by  both Kant and Schopenhauer: “Time in itself is 
nonsense: time exists only for the sensate creature. The same is true for space. / Every  structure 
appertains to the subject. It is the registering of surfaces by means of mirrors” (KSA 7: 19 
[140]).711 And again: “Time, space, and causality are only epistemological metaphors with which 
we explain things. […] Temporal coexistence produces the sensation of space. […] Sensation of 
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space first derived by means of metaphor from the sensation of time—or vice versa? / Two 
causalities coexisting with one another” (KSA 7: 19 [210]).712  In declaring this, Nietzsche 
complies with Democritus’ idea of time as phenomenal, a posteriori and merely psychological. 
Sextus Empiricus attests that for Democritus: “Time is an appearance [phantasma] resembling 
day and night.”713 Thus it has no actuality, but is, rather, a simulacrum issuing from the motion of 
bodies. In Epicurus, who owes his theory of time to Democritus, this notion of the non-reality  of 
time is further explicitated: “Since [time] depends for its existence on the bodies whose motion 
etc. it measures, it  certainly cannot exist per se.”714 Nietzsche’s conception of time as metaphor, 
and hence as the transport of bodies which create themselves as such out of sensation, as the 
movement by which they arrive into the daylight of reason, hence derives from Democritus.715 
 According to Nietzsche, Democritus believed that “[o]ur senses show us qualitatively 
determinant differences,”716  but that “in reality  atoms and the void” alone exist.717  Nietzsche 
draws the following conclusion: “All qualities are conventions (νóµῳ); the ὄντα differ only 
quantitatively. Thus all qualities should be reduced to quantitative differentials. They 
differentiate themselves solely  through shape (ῥυσµός, σχῆµα), arrangement (διαθιγή, τάξις), and 
position (τροπή, θέσις) [… .]”718  Following Democritus, Epicurus claims that  the “apparent 
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repose of the earth lies in the commonality of movement.” For Democritus, atoms arise and 
circulate in “combinations that lawfully dissolve and reconfigure themselves anew,” moving in a 
“circular motion” which is produced by  the “unequal acceleration” of atoms, since if they were 
all to fall “with the same velocity,” then the appearance of “absolute rest” would come about.719 
Hence the speeds of different atoms must differ quantitatively in order for movement to be 
possible, i.e., in order for time and the qualitative, phenomenal world to appear. James Porter 
writes that Nietzsche’s task is to demonstrate and affirm “the principle that all quality  is 
reducible to relations and proportions of quantity […], which are in turn volitilized by some 
dynamic factor (be it  motion, force, or will).”720  Nietzsche thus determines music as “more 
universal than a single action” precisely because its rhythms “represent [darstellend]” the various 
human “drives [Triebe]” (KSA 7:7 [23]). In a fragment from the Winter of 1872-1873 on the 
advancement past Anaxagoras’ atomism accomplished by Empedocles and Democritus, 
Nietzsche identifies these drives with Democritean atoms, defined there as “forces.” The 
ambition of this fragment is to point out the need, in physics, for the “smallest possible number 
of forces” and thus of the fewest amount of laws or “presuppositions” from which the existing 
world is deduced. He writes that  the “first unnecessary hypothesis to fall is Anaxagoras’s Νοῦς, 
for its assumption are much too complicated to explain something as simple as motion. After all, 
it is only necessary to explain two forms of motion, the movement of one object toward another 
and the movement of one object away from another” (KSA 7: 23 [30]).721 Atomism thus requires 
simply  the explanation of motion—and for this, no all-encompassing metaphysical concept is 
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necessary. The quantitative movement of atoms through empty space is circular. Nietzsche, as 
we shall soon see, undertakes in 1873 to explain motion on an entirely  temporal basis, entirely 
subtracting space from this phenomenon. The goal of such an endeavor is to draw forth the 
ancient perception of time, to return us to the body as a temporal phenomenon. 
 Aristoxenus, accordingly, and the other post-Democritean rhythmicists, viewed rhythm as 
divided into temporal, rhythmic “atoms.” Democritus’ atomism, according to which only empty 
space and atoms, the smallest constituent elements of matter, exist, was thus translated into 
temporal terms in chronoi. Quoting Aristoxenus, Porter writes: “‘The first duration[s] that can be 
grasped by perception,’ chronoi are the minima of rhythmical synthesis, or composition, that  get 
thrown into complex interrelations, the perceptual effect of which is rhythm. They are, in effect, 
atoms of rhythm.”722  That which, then, corresponds to the void of Democritus is precisely the 
pause in a rhythmic succession. Aristedes writes: “An empty  duration is one without sound, 
adopted to fill out the rhythm. A ‘pause,’ in the context of rhythm, is the smallest empty duration 
chronos kenos elachistos.”723  Porter comments, however, that “all durations are ‘empty’ from a 
certain perspective: they mark mere formal and abstract divisions in a system of relations.”724 
Thus, like Hölderlin’s tragic transport, rhythmic movement in time, following this Democritean 
rhythmics, is empty and unbounded. Rhythm, then, conceived as atomistic, is interrupted on 
occasion by caesurae, empty spaces of the void—these elements make up the tissue of 
experience. The intuition of such a rhythmic atomism is recovered by  Nietzsche in an attempt to 
found a temporal atomism; one that shall express the movement of the tragic. 
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 Nietzsche’s essential task in his philological study of rhythm was to demonstrate the 
radical incommensurability of modern dynamic theories of rhythm with ancient quantitative 
rhythm, indissolubly unified with rhythm as a bodily experience. In a letter to his mentor, 
Ritschl, of December 30, 1870, he writes: “The more we draw on modern music for 
understanding [classical] metrics, the farther we estrange ourselves from the reality of metrics in 
antiquity.”725  He accuses modern classicists of imposing, in a Kantian manner, a “rhythm an 
sich” onto antiquity. He thus tracks the genealogy in antiquity of the development of rhythm. The 
shift, in his view, in this history, is that from a quantitative conception of rhythm to a qualitative 
one. Originally, rhythm is conceived corporeally. It gradually becomes the means by which time 
is divided through a rhythmics that  is a “structure of signs” simultaneously “sensuous and 
abstract.”726 Rhythm is first  experienced in a manner that is purely temporal and quantitative, in 
terms of dance, and later separates itself from its rootedness in the body to become an abstract 
measure of time, as bodies, in turn, are conceived in terms of space. In accordance with this 
movement toward a separation of rhythm from the body, the stress accent in the Greek language 
overtakes the original tonal pitch accent, thus resulting in the loss of rhythm as absolutely 
quantitative.727  Nietzsche writes: “Dance movement emancipates itself naturally from the 
movement associated with keeping time [Taktbegewegung]. More accurately, ἄρσις [rising] and 
θέσις [placing] are no longer meaningful to the art of dancing [viz., as a lifting and lowering of 
the foot]; from now on they are only a measure of time [Zeitmesser].”728  In his essay, On the 
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Theory of Quantitative Rhythm (Winter, 1870-1871), Nietzsche quotes Aristides to ground these 
rhythmic terms in dance: “So ἄρσις is the bringing upwards of part of the body, whereas θέσις is 
the bringing downward of the same part.”729  He then refers these upward and downward 
movements back to Aristoxenus, rhythmically as “ὁ κάτω χρóνος and ὁ ἄνω χρóνος” (the 
downward time and the upward time) and writes:
The combination of ἄρσις and θέσις is πούς [foot]. Important rule, that foot was 
originally  based on dance: the singer is governed by dance (which was not a whirl, but a 
pleasant walk). When the measure was uneven, of course, there were also 
correspondingly varied κινήσεις [movements] of the dancers. Gradually there developed 
a separation of pure time-keeping and artistic performance, especially in pure 
instrumental music.730
Through the system of time-keeping that measured rhythm by ictus and percussio (stress and 
beat) rather than physical, rhythmic quantity, rhythmics was thus abstracted from the unity of 
measure and dance, from the rising and falling of the feet, of the limbs, and, indeed, of breath. 
Rhythm thereafter becomes measured according to sound; the rhythmics of postclassical 
modernity begins here, which Nietzsche called “Latin vocalism”—the move away from temporal 
quantity and toward accentuation.731 With the uprise of the word, and the syllable as measures of 
time, “the robust feeling for time disintegrates in [everyday] speech,” such that the original pitch 
accent and the ictus come into conflict with one another, “representing, as it were, a violent 
survival of the world.”732 A transition thus occurs from the dithyrambic experience of rhythm to a 
linguistic evaluation of rhythmics, which dominates primordial temporality.
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 The origin of this shift, according to Nietzsche, is a division, which occurs with 
Aristoxenus between rhythmed objects and rhythm itself: “rhythm is not identical with any of the 
objects made rhythmic.”733 Rhythm acts upon both bodies and time, organizing the movement of 
the former and dividing the latter into chronoi—durational segments of time. Rhythm requires a 
rhythmed body in order to supervene on time and effect its division. Aristoxenus writes that the 
“object made rhythmic [rhythmizomenon] must be capable of being divided into recognizable 
parts, by which it  will divide time.”734  Rhythm, which is the structure of sensation for humans, 
by means of which they measure time, must yet exists separately as an abstract  concept, after 
Aristoxenus. It is for this reason that Nietzsche says that this rhythmicist “speaks in a 
philosophical sense about rhythm.”735  Yet rhythm is not merely duration, but a whole 
constellation of times and measures—thus it is a “structure of signs” that overtakes bodies and 
makes them rhythmic.736  Thus rhythm becomes an abstract language which must  exist, to a 
certain extent, an sich. It  is this phenomenon, then, that renders rhythm, independent of bodies, 
universal. This transition can be understood in a parallel fashion to Nietzsche’s theory of the dis-
unification of chorus and dialogue in tragedy effected by Euripides under the rationalist sway  of 
Socrates. In Sophocles, “thought still moves along the path of instinct”737 so that tragedy forms a 
dissonant, harmonious whole, in the unity of choral lyric, dance and dialogue, such that the 
“unity of the artistic organism” was the “goal” of tragedy.738  Euripides, on the contrary, 
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employed “thought” in his tragedies, which came to overpower “the artistic instinct” which had 
previously  carried tragedy forward. While before Euripides, thought worked “in accordance with 
instinct,” this was henceforth no longer the case: “in Euripides it [thought] will become 
destructive to instinct.”739 The unity  present in Sophocles then became, instead, the “effect,” due 
to the fact that he employed “an aesthetic that placed itself in the spectator’s point of view.”740 
This concern with a dramatic formula organized to produce a particular effect on spectators 
separated from the action, rather than participating in it, was accordingly commended by 
Aristotle who, with his obsession with effect that Goethe so deplored, called Euripides “the 
τραγικώτατος  (‘the most tragic poet’).”741 This change, furthermore, coincided with a movement 
from the lyric to the epic sensibility, resulting in the dissociation of the chorus from the action: in 
Euripides, “the sung parts are no longer related to the course of action any more closely than 
with another tragedy [… .]”742  The chorus becomes an abstract idea, a musical interlude, no 
longer necessary to the heart of tragedy.
 In the same manner, rhythm and body are originally inseparable—it is only  with 
Aristoxenus—who is, indeed, another of Nietzsche’s transitional figures along with Sophocles, 
Empedocles and Theognis743—that rhythm is theorized in separation from the body. For 
Nietzsche, on the contrary, the universality  of rhythm is yet paradoxically relative—it depends 
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entirely  on the rhythms of the bodies of a certain time, bodies which transform across history’s 
movement of becoming. To deliver rhythm back into the body, its originary  source—that is his 
project. This entails, therefore, the reestablishment of the instinctive, agonal equilibrium between 
Zeitleben and Tonleben which Nietzsche had also posited as the origin of rhythm. Rhythmics 
must not  be an abstract, philosophical language foreign to the body, but must become again what 
Goethe had declared it to be: “‘The measure,’ Goethe said, ‘flows unconsciously from the mood 
of the poet. If he thought about it while writing the poem, he would go mad and produce nothing 
of value.’”744 Yet this unconscious harmony between rhythm and the body can only  be brought 
about from the point of view of an idealized system of rhythmics—hence, the metaphysical 
element of this abstraction, this separation of life and ordering rhythmics, must come about 
precisely through a sacrifice of that metaphysical element. Only thereby can a a return to the 
primordial indissolubility of rhythm and the body come about. It is necessary, perhaps, then, to 
travel through the madness of that dissonance, the tragic knowledge of the rules of rhythm, in 
order for that instinctual, creative ἀγών shall once again come about.
 In 1876, Nietzsche would write of music, in his Miscellaneous Maxims and Opinions 
(Vermischte Meinungen und Sprüche), which appends Human All too Human, and in apparent 
contradiction with his earlier vision: 
Music is, in fact, not a universal, timeless language, as is so often said in its praise, it 
corresponds, on the contrary, exactly  to a particular measure of time, warmth and emotion 
[einem Gefühls-, Wärme- und Zeitmaass] which involves a quite definite, individual 
culture, determined by time and place, as its inner law [inneres Gesetz].745
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Here, it is the multiplicity of these inner laws in their power to determined a culture that renders 
its music comprehensible and proper to a man, people, a culture. For the rhythms that measure 
time are infinitely changeable, and therein lies their homeotic power. From Nietzsche’s early 
thinking of music as the universal element in tragedy to his later renunciation of that universality, 
the thread of thought, and indeed the justification, remains consistent; music is the most 
universal part  of drama because it calls to the depths of the body and measures itself in 
accordance with that rhythm. Nietzsche’s shift, between the early  and late thoughts on rhythm 
brings that measure, that breath, into time, such that it takes place and unfolds as the secret text 
of history, its hidden force in becoming. The shift is, indeed, a distancing from the 
Schopenhauerean will—from the very word “will,” bearing the trace of Nietzsche’s predecessor, 
such that the universal power of music, already relative in Nietzsche’s early writing, is 
conceived, at this point, beyond the very terminology of the metaphysics of music. 
 The multiplicity  and transformability of rhythm as the deepest expression of bodily 
impulses had also been conceived by Nietzsche early, without reference to such metaphysical 
concepts as the will. In an essay entitled “Rhythmic Investigations” [Rhythmische 
Untersuchungen] (1870-1871), he writes the following, under the heading “The Power of 
Rhythm:”
I suspect that the sensuous power of rhythm lies in the fact that the two rhythms that 
work effects on each other determine [bestimmen] each other in such away that the 
broader one divides the narrower one. The rhythmic movements of the pulse, etc. (the 
pace) are apparently re-organized as the step accommodates itself to the beat. [...] And 
since the entire body [Leib] contains an infinite number of rhythms in it, every rhythm 
will make a direct attack upon the body. Everything suddenly moves according to a new 
law: not, indeed, as if the old ones no longer dominate, but rather in that they  are fixed 
[or attuned, bestimmt].746
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What is here considered to be objectified and expressed in rhythm is not the will, but the 
“pulse”—the internal biological measure of life. Nietzsche here takes Schopenhauer’s claim that 
“music […] acts directly on the will, i.e., the feelings, passions, and emotions of the hearer, so 
that it quickly raises these or even alters them”747  to its most radical conclusion and thereby 
surpasses his master. For it is through the infinity of rhythms contained in the body, and the 
“attack” of externalized rhythms upon the body that the very law internal to it is transformed. 
This is not a matter of the elation or exaltation of the will through the stimulation of sentimental 
faculties, but, rather, the establishment of an entirely new human measure through the 
externalization of novel rhythm. 
 For Nietzsche, dissonance underlies all consonance in ancient rhythm, in much the same 
manner as discord, for Heraclitus and for Empedocles, is the principle of life. Heraclitus says: 
“That which opposes converges, and out of these diverging things the most beautiful harmony  is 
formed. And all things arise according to discord” (14 [A 5]).748 Discord [ἔρις], which constitutes 
primordial contradiction, is also justice [δίκη]. In another fragment, we read: “And if it is 
necessary  that war be enchained, and that justice be discord, and that all things arise according to 
oracles …” (14 [A 7]).749 Dionysian dissonance, discord, then, as the regulating, judging law of 
life. Nietzsche had accordingly  said of Heraclitus’ view of Πόλεµος as the father of all things: “it 
is Hesiod’s good Eris transformed into the cosmic principle; it is the contest-idea of the Greek 
individual and the Greek state, taken from the gymnasium and the palaestra. from the artist's 
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agon, from the contest between political parties and between cities—all transformed into 
universal application so that now the wheels of the cosmos turn on it.”750
Nietzsche writes: “Originally […] the note functions as a measure of time”751—yet this primal 
temporal function of the note becomes covered over in modern music, so that music self-
rationalizes in tone. It is the gradual separation of Zeitleben and Tonleben that characterizes the 
historical development into modernity—finally, Tonleben masters Zeitleben, so that the 
temporality of music is forgotten as the ground rhythmic life. Nietzsche writes: “The soul of our 
melody and harmony is expressed in the ictus of our compositions”752—thus harmony, originally 
born of dissonance, seeks later to overcome it, to exclude it from music. This dissonance, for 
Nietzsche, must be recovered precisely  so that consonance—the rhythmic element of the tragic 
hero—may arise from it.
Interlude: Anaxagoras
 Anaxagoras occupies the time between Heraclitus and Empedocles. Nietzsche explains 
Anaxagoras‘ cosmogony in terms of the νοῦς and circular motion. For Anaxagoras, there is no 
Becoming, but  only Being, and that which is exists for all eternity. Following this, “everything is 
the same in all of time.”753 Time does not move, but is an eternity  of identity. It is an axiom of 
the Ionians that, in Goethe’s words: “Like is only known by Like”—which idea finds itself 
recovered by “an old mystic writer” in the words: “If the eye were not sunny, how could we 
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perceive light? If God’s own strength lived not in us, how could we delight in Divine things?” 
Goethe uses these words to demonstrate that “the eye […] is formed with reference to light, to be 
fit for the action of light; the light it  contains corresponding with the light without.”754  The 
phenomenon of sight is a circular one, wherein internal and external light interpenetrate, and 
semi-miraculously, with reference to a far divinity at its origin, color arises. 
 For Anaxagoras: “All difference concerns motion; motion is thus what it is to be 
genuinely alive.”755 Vitality  is motion, and living things move in such a way that they  are ordered 
into a “lawful regularity” by an eternal force. This force, pervasive Being, present at the heart of 
life is “the intellect  (νóος [in Attic, νοῦς], neither intellect, understanding, nor reason—
authentically Greek756—the power of language!)” The νοῦς “alone moves,” or rather, constitutes 
the impetus to all motion, which motion organizes the “aftereffects of such an intellect [… .]” 
The νοῦς, in the beginning, “produces a circular motion (or vortical movement, ἡ περιχώρησις) 
on one point  of mass, which immediately expands outward and pulls ever larger parts into its 
range, moving ever farther outward.”757  The cosmos is created in a series of moving concentric 
circles, the manifestation of universal vitality, forming rings. From out of a chaos of “primal 
matter,”758  the elements are organized according to their density  and luminosity; aether is the 
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name for the warm, the light, the thin in things, air the name for the dark, the cold, the heavy: 
“The thick and moist are driven to the center, thin and warm to the outside, by way  of 
momentum, just as the heavy is driven to the center.”759 Water and earth divide, the one pushing 
outward and the other inward. Nietzsche insists that Anaxagoras is not a teleologist: the νοῦς 
contains no purposiveness. Only in the sense that it is an eternally ordering force by its 
incitement of circular motion is it  “simultaneously efficient cause (causa efficiens) and final 
cause (causa finalis), according to Aristotle’s Metaphysics.”760 The νοῦς was neither a principal 
of individual purposiveness nor a “consciously knowing”761  entity. Rather, it was at once a 
“ghost in the machine ([…] θεὸς ἐκ µηχανῆς)”762 and, as the active, moving principle in human 
beings, “life” itself.763 Thus, the cosmological creative force as the divinity present in all living 
things. The grand ambition of Anaxagoras was “to explain the actual world with the fewest 
possible nonphysical theories” for which “circular motion suffices; had he immediately imagined 
an intellect with continually purposive ends, it would have become a mythological being, a god
—precisely what  he dismisses.”764  Rather, the νοῦς is pervasive, eternally present and its 
resulting “motion is a thing of regularity, and that is the origin of all order—one circular motion 
continuing into eternity, which is the infinitude of the All.”765  There is no world process, for 
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Nietzsche’s Anaxagoras, because there is no time, and no individual intentionality inherent in the 
νοῦς, which is, nonetheless a force of the will to life freed of all ends, of all τέλος.
 Nietzsche proclaims the scientific discoveries of Anaxagoras: “He discovers the laws of 
conservation of force [Kraft] and that of the indestructibility  of matter.” The νοῦς 
metamorphoses, in Nietzsche’s reading, into Geist (Mind, Spirit) and Kraft (force). Because of 
the eternity and infinitude of the νοῦς, which is to say, of the vital force in all things, in the 
absolute absence of time, both matter and force are conserved in the cosmic eternity that is our 
element. “All motion is either direct or indirect. The form of direct motion is organic life or 
mechanical motion: the indirect  is always [only] mechanical. In this regard we continually 
maintain that a dichotomy between matter and spirit did not exist for him. Intellect is only the 
finest (λεπτóτατον) and purest (καθαρώτατον) of all things and has all knowledge about 
everything (γνώµην περì παντòς πάσην ἴσχει).”766 Force thus produces different movements in 
the organon and in lifeless matter, yet treats them equally, indistinguishably, directly  or 
indirectly, moving all things. Force, this primordial figure, is, however, indistinguishable from 
the life it sets in motion. Hence, for Anaximander, there is only simultaneity  of circular motion in 
space, where all things infinitely coexist. Nietzsche, in his study of Anaximander’s doctrine, 
already insists on the unity, the non-opposition, of force (νοῦς) and motion, or matter. The νοῦς, 
also called the will by Nietzsche, is a “self-caused motion”767; it does not exist in a pre-historical, 
or rather, pre-vital, pre-cosmic eternity, but rather, its very eternity is its circular motion. To the 
greatest extent possible, Nietzsche integrates this efficient  or final cause into the vital motion it 
creates, though this integration be, in the strictest sense, impossible. Nietzsche writes: 
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“Representation and drive are both conjoined in one concept intellect (νοῦς and ψυχή): both are 
effects of the life force [Lebenskraft], which is one in all things, meaning the unique thing that is 
totally  homogenous. All other things are heterogenous [… .] Intellect ‘is alone by itself.’”768 The 
primordial phenomenon of this Lebenskraft, inserted by Nietzsche into the Anaximandrian 
system, encloses thus simultaneously  the Trieb and the Vorstellung (representation) it leads to. 
Thus the homogenous, the νοῦς, also called by  Nietzsche the primordial One in The Birth of 
Tragedy is defined as this totality  of force for life, its metaphysical strength behind appearance, 
and this force is unified originally  with the representation it makes of itself. In a fragment, 
Nietzsche writes: “Preference of our age for powerful biases because they at least still betray 
nature’s energy  for life [Lebenskraft]: and the prerequisite is indeed nature’s energy [Kraft der 
Natur]” (KSA 7: 30 [6]).769 Strength is thus defined in accordance with the power to harness and 
use this energy for the capacity to represent, that is, to create. This creative representation is 
accordingly that of illusion.
Nietzsche’s Temporal Atomism: Zeitatomenlehre
 In 1873, Nietzsche wrote a meditation on time in his notebook, using the Neo-Kantian 
philosopher, Afrikan Spir’s thesis, in his book Denken und Wirklichkeit (1873), that all time is 
reducible to spatial dimensions, in order, precisely, to assert the contrary. Spir’s metaphysics, to 
which Nietzsche refers in his discussion of Parmenides in Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the 
Greeks as a modern model for the pre-Platonic philosopher’s vision of the eternal “One,” has as 
its basis the fundamental discontinuity  and the ultimate non-correspondence between the world 
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of appearances and the world of the Kantian in-itself. Spir claims that “no intermediate element 
at all is possible between the unconditioned and the conditioned, since the concepts 
‘unconditioned’ and ‘conditioned’ form an exhaustive disjunction.”770  As a result, the 
unconditioned can in no way form the condition of the conditioned; it is, rather, supremely 
unknowable and, in addition, has neither any direct relation to, nor any necessity  for the 
experience of the apparent world; intellectual intuition is hence neither possible nor necessary. 
The only thing that can be assumed of the unconditioned world, according to Spir, is “that it must 
accord with the logical principle of identity, and from this we can infer that it cannot contain 
either plurality or change, since both of these would compromise its absolute identity.”771 It  is for 
this reason that Nietzsche will use Spir’s unconditioned, whose sole law is that of absolute 
identity, as a model for Parmenidean Being. As a result of Spir’s banishment of the eternal, 
noumenal sphere to a status of non-necessity  with regard to experience, that sphere becomes, in 
turn, a mere myth, and thus unveils metaphysics as such as a mere fable. The postulation of such 
an unconditioned world reduces metaphysics to Nietzsche’s will to truth, and reveals it as a 
manifestation of this drive which is, in essence, bodily. 
 Thus, for Spir, in the absence of any possible access to the unconditioned world, the 
conditioned world is condemned to the temporal movement of becoming. Small writes: “Arguing 
against both Kant and Herbart, Spir insists on the empirical reality of time, while denying its a 
priori status.772 Kant's error, according to Spir, is to treat space and time on the same basis, a bias 
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attributable to his love of symmetry.”773 While no empty time can be conceived, since succession 
is immediate and given in experience, empty space can be conceived because space itself is 
simply  a construction. Summarizing Spir’s argument, Small writes: “Since time is nothing apart 
from succession, we cannot imagine an empty space, and even assign it a definite size. Time is 
thus neither something existing in its own right, nor a necessary form of intuition on the part of 
the subject. It is an abstraction which expresses what given successions have in common with 
one another.”774 From this results the impossibility  of any absolute unit of time, hence its infinite 
divisibility. While Aristotle had used the infinite divisibility  of time and space to prove their 
absolute continuity, Nietzsche, through Spir, will speak of this divisibility as one of the aspects of 
the fundamental discontinuity of time. In a notebook, he jotted down: “Infinitude in nature: 
nowhere does it have limits. Only for us is there finitude. Time infinitely divisible” (KSA 7: 19 
[133]).775
 Aristotle’s argument for the infinite divisibility of time and of space is based on the 
observation that a moving object will always cover a distance twice as great as an object moving 
twice as slowly, in the same span of time. He writes: “the quicker will divide the time and the 
slower will divide the length. If, then, this alternation always holds good, and at every turn 
involves a division, it is evident that all time must be continuous.”776 This continuity depends on 
the assumption that the indivisibility of time would render the divisibility of space impossible 
281
773 Small, “Nietzsche, Spir, and Time,” 89. Cf. Spir, Denken und Wirklichkeit, 1: 263.
774 Cf. Spir, Denken und Wirklichkeit, 2: 7. Small, “Nietzsche, Spir, and Time,” 89-90.
775 Nietzsche, Unpublished Writings, 44.
776 Physics, VI.2.233a, trans. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye. Cited in Small, “Nietzsche, Spir, and Time,” 91.
and vice versa, such that in order for time and space to coexist, they must  both remain infinitely 
divisible; the existence of natural units of time and of space are contingent on one another.777 
 Spir, on the other hand, argues that time is a mere abstraction, that  it  possesses no natural 
measure, and is rather inferred from the phenomenal experience of succession. For him, 
therefore, the proof of the infinite divisibility of time contributes to the theory that  time has no 
existence in itself. Invoking an argument made by Sextus Empiricus, whose goal is to reinforce 
the Aristotelian argument against the objection that certain objects merely appear to move at 
different speeds while in truth they all move at the same rate, Spir writes: “With the rotation of 
the earth, for example, a point on the equator moves with a million times greater speed than a 
point located close to the pole: and yet both points complete their revolution in exactly the same 
time, and occupy this time with the same continuity and uniformity. The slower moving point 
never stands still, any  more than the faster moving one. How then could the same time, if it were 
not a mere abstraction but something distinct  from real successions, be occupied by  two so 
different quanta of succession in a uniform and, to that extent, equal way? It would obviously be 
impossible.”778 This argument serves to prove, thus, that from different quantities of succession 
the same time-span is deduced and that, moreover, time is nothing but such a deduction, and is 
hence an entirely empirical phenomenon, with no connection to the atemporal substratum of 
noumena. Nietzsche transfers these considerations onto a meditation of motion as purely 
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temporal, and of becoming as the only  true phenomenon of life, which is nothing more than the 
manifestation of various, constantly-changing forces.
 Nietzsche, in his fragment on the reduction of all dimensions of movement to time, which 
begins: “Motion in time” (KSA 7: 26 [12]),779 proposes the following: “Translation of all laws of 
motion into temporal proportions. / The essence of sensation would then consist in gradually 
sensing and measuring such temporal figures with more and more refinement; representation 
constructs them as something coexistent and then establishes the development of the world on 
the basis of this coexistence: pure translation into another language, into the language of 
becoming” (KSA 7: 26 [12]).780 Following Spir’s denial of the ideality of space, Nietzsche posits 
coexistence as a spatial fantasy, whose formation is strictly temporal; there is, strictly  speaking, 
“no spatial coexistence other than in representation [Vorstellung]” (KSA 7: 26 [12]).781 Nietzsche 
thus expresses, or exposes, for himself, the necessity of a translation of the Anaxagorian 
principle of motion in its circularity, which denies time and supposes the eternity  of space and 
the simultaneity  of all things, into the Heraclitean language of pure temporality, pure becoming, 
where eternity takes on the meaning of the incessant nature, the endlessness of movement and 
the transfiguration of life defined as fire. 
 Nietzsche’s first  step  in this procedure is to prove the irreconcilability of spatial and 
temporal laws with regard to motion. He begins his meditation by  drawing a “spatial point A” 
and a “spatial point B” in this notebook and assuming that each of them “has an effect” on the 
other. He then claims that since the effect must “cover a distance,” a “period of time” is 
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necessary  to this effective movement, for lacking this dimension, “[c]onsecutive points in time 
would merge with one another” in space. This collision would have as its result that neither of 
the points would change; they would simply congeal with one another, thus rendering the 
existence of A as an “effective force [Kraft]” impossible. Presuming, then, that A has an effect  on 
B in time, neither of these points remain the same following the event of this effect; rather, the 
force of A is transformed by its temporal activity. “If we take what is effective in time, then what 
is effective in the tiniest fragment of every moment in time always is something different.” 
Nietzsche thus comes to the conclusion that “time demonstrates the absolute nonpermanence of 
a force” (KSA 7: 26 [12]).782  Time, hence, is the manifestation of various, changeable forces 
which, precisely  because of the absence of space in their existence, have no identity  with 
themselves but, as atoms, move at constantly varying speeds, creating rhythms of distance in 
their travel. Causality itself is annihilated by the very fact that it takes place in time, and that as 
soon as motion occurs, its origin as such no longer exists but  has transformed by its effective 
action. Nietzsche then writes: “All laws of space are thus conceived as timeless, / which means 
that they must be simultaneous and immediate.” The result of an actualization of these laws in 
the absence of time would hence be: “The entire world with one strike. But then there is no 
motion.” Since motion, i.e. the phenomenal rhythm of becoming, is the fundamental 
phenomenon of life (for Anaxagoras, Empedocles and Democritus as well as for Nietzsche), no 
persistence of spatial laws is possible; motion is a purely temporal occurrence. “Motion struggles 
with the contradiction that it is constituted according to the laws of space and that once we 
assume time, these laws become impossible: that means that at one and the same time it  is and is 
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not.” Therefore, in order to overcome this contradiction, we must assume “that either space or 
time is = 0.” If space were infinitely  small, then the distance between atoms would also be 
infinitely small—hence “all punctual atoms would merge at one point.”783  Nietzsche concludes 
that “since time is infinitely divisible, the entire world is possible as a purely temporal 
phenomenon, because I can occupy every point in time with one and the same spatial point and 
hence can place it an infinite number of times.”784 Here, Nietzsche displaces the famous formula 
of Lessing’s Laocoon, namely  that: “succession of time is the department of the poet, as space is 
that of the painter.”785  Concerning rhythm in tragedy, these terms of space and time take on a 
different aspect—the former is measured by dancing bodies, while the latter is measured by 
music. Just  as, for Lessing, poetry is the realm of the purely temporal, wherein space = 0, while 
painting is that in which it is time that = 0 and space alone exists so that these two aesthetic fields 
display  worlds utterly incommensurable to one another, Nietzsche translates these categories 
onto song and dance, so that the temporal is that realm in which quantity alone exists while 
quality interrupts this realm with bodily dissonance. And yet, suppose bodies were merely the 
highest form of idealization, suppose they too were = 0 as spatial entities, and only existed in 
truth temporally—dance as pure becoming: this is the possibility Nietzsche exposes for us. 
 If the tragic hero, the genius, the philosopher, attains a state of timelessness, there is then 
a shift  that occurs in tragic becoming, from one of pure time to one of pure space—at his highest 
moment, the hero reduces time to nothing, and brings about an “entire world with one strike.” 
And it is precisely this moment, this return to the Greek world of “space and light” divested for a 
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golden instant of the pain and dissonance that is becoming, according to a new and different 
rhythm that is prophetic for the hero, both of his downgoing and of its failure, its failure as a 
task. For it is into the supreme affirmation of pure time, pure becoming that the hero, from this 
highest point of ideality, must deliver his people.
 Time, according Nietzsche, is absolutely  heterogenous—his thinking of temporality has 
as its goal to put force—the homogenous, for Anaximander, back into becoming, and the 
multiplicity of all things. Nietzsche thinks time as becoming—against Parmenides, with 
Heraclitus and Goethe: “All forces are merely a function of time [Alle Kräfte sind nur  F u n k t i 
o n  d e r  Z e i t]” (KSA 7: 26 [12]).786 Elaine P. Miller writes, in reference to this fragment: 
“With the word Kraft, Nietzsche does not imply  an original source; in addition, ‘forces’ are 
always multiple and fleeting, constantly changing each other as they collide.”787 This hypothesis 
is developed on the basis of the impossibility of “postulating a law of time.” For a vision of the 
world as ordered by “the regularity temporal figures,” writes Nietzsche, would suppose a 
“constant force” on the basis of coexistence. This constancy is disproved by time itself, in its 
pure inconsistency. Force, thus, as a function of time, must by  no means by  constant but 
“different” in “every tiniest moment”—therefore, Nietzsche postulates that there are only 
“absolutely  mutable forces” and these alone “can have an effect [… .]” The very idea of temporal 
succession is refuted by Nietzsche, for two “successive temporal moments […] would merge 
with one another. Thus, every effect is actio in distans, that is, by means of a leap” (KSA 7: 26 
[12]).788 
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 The possibility, however, of this action is unprovable. Rather, the different speeds of time 
we perceive are contained in the “nature of this effect” such that  “force, as functions of time, 
express themselves in the relationships to closer or more distant points in time: namely, fast or 
slow. The force is based on the degree of acceleration.” The faster the acceleration, the more 
proximal are the moments in time in their effect on one another. The more slowly this 
acceleration takes place, “the greater the temporal interstices, the greater the distans.” In this 
way, the most distant points in time combine in a relation of slowness, and “all slowness, of 
course, is relative.”  Insofar as time is measured “in terms of something that remains spatial,” a 
“constant time” is presupposed  between any two points in time: “But time is by  no means a 
continuum, rather, there are only wholly different points in time, no line. Actio in distans.” Hence, 
in the same way: “No motion in time is constant.” (KSA 7: 26 [12]).789 The more slowly  time 
moves, in other words, the greater the distance between temporal moments, the more effectively, 
the more intensely is the fundamental discontinuity, fundamental dissonance of time, and hence 
of motion, which arises within the “[r]elationships among different temporal layers” felt. History, 
then, bridges the greatest temporal distances, distances whose spatiotemporal origin, point of 
beginning can only ever be imagined, as, by means of the necessary “reproducing being” which 
“holds earlier moments in time next to the current ones[, … o]ur bodies are imagined” in these 
moments (KSA 7: 26 [12]);790 the body, as a spatial entity, is mythical, inserted by imagination 
into the representation of present moments as different from the past moments they are believed 
to have issued from. Bodies are thus by  no means heavy things in space; rather, they are a play of 
transforming forces, which manifest in the form of ceaseless becoming, discontinuous time. In 
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this vein, and following, too, a Heraclitean inspiration, Pierre Klossowski writes that for 
Nietzsche: “The body is a result of chance: it is nothing other but the site of the encounter of a 
collection of impulses individuated for that interval that  forms a human life, but that have no 
other aspiration than to de-individuate themselves.”791 This elucidates Nietzsche’s reversal of the 
Hölderlinian perspective; for while, for Hölderlin, individuation in the absolute is the desire of 
the discontinuous subject—his striving to escape the curse of time—for Nietzsche, the most 
primordial drive is precisely the Dionysian instinct toward the loss of self and the rupture of 
individuation. It is by  means of this reversal, moreover, that Nietzsche poises himself for his 
hyperbolic rejection of metaphysics, which is to say, first of all—of the metaphysical subject as 
absolute. 
 In essence, Nietzsche expresses thus that time is not, indeed continuous “time” held 
together by a spatial plane on which it is situated, but a disconnected non-series of innumerable 
“points in time”—“thus, dynamic qualities must be presupposed.”792  Like Hölderlin’s tragic 
transport, which measures the rhythm of the tragic drama in the temporality  of the poem, 
Nietzsche views time as the externalization of this internal game of forces. By his physiological 
depiction of the genesis of becoming, he effects the re-internalization, back into the depths of the 
body, re-imagined as a temporal entity, of the Heraclitean cosmic becoming and the 
Empedoclean cosmic rhythm of breath. The doctrines of the two pre-Platonics that  Nietzsche 
envisioned as tragic philosophers, thus prophetically  calling them by  the name he would one day 
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give himself, are thus re-thought on a ground of absolute immanence—the wide force-field of 
becoming. 
 The diagram drawn by Nietzsche to illustrate this discontinuous time, and labeled “Time 
line” shows a dotted vertical line, whose function is to display the disconnected temporal points, 
with short diagonal slashes through it, demonstrating “temporal layers,” and, on its right side, 
various near-circles of different dimensions, the largest being semi-circles (two), and the smallest 
being nearly complete circles (KSA 7: 26 [12]).793 These excentric curves, then, represent the 
motion produced by forces in their temporal mutability, and the inexplicable correspondence of 
events in history, which form, thereby, a kind of spider’s web—a series of mad constellations, 
which enclose the soul.
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 Nietzsche then proposes the following: “Doctrine of temporal atoms [Z e i t a t o m e n l e 
h r e]”  (KSA 7: 26 [12]).794  This doctrine translates the theory of atoms held by “atomic 
physics,” as Parmedean “ὄντα”—thus as “unalterable” and incapable of having an “effect” into 
temporal terms, which permits the espousing of the absolute mutability  of forces (KSA 7: 26 
[12]).795 Being therefore, on Parmenides’ terms, is equated with the spatial, while becoming, is 
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equated with the temporal. Nietzsche’s doctrine of temporal atoms, thus, translates them from 
spatial terms into the becoming of Heraclitus, and renders his very epistemology  possible. He 
writes: “the theory of temporal atoms ultimately coincides with the doctrine of sensation. The 
dynamic point in time is identical with the point of sensation. For there is no simultaneity of 
sensation” (KSA 7: 26 [12]).796 Such an atomic theory opens history out onto the unforeseeable, 
for if time is not a line but a non-linear series of singular points connected and separated across 
its levels by circularities of varying completeness, no teleology is possible, no causality, no grand 
metaphysical plan, no coincidence between thought and Being; there is no world process and no 
absolute goal, no destination, no Judgement of humanity. Stars, then, meteors and comets are 
nothing but temporal phenomena, occurring inexplicably across the wide skies of history’s 
eventfulness.
 Of Nietzsche, Blanchot writes: “History  carries with it the moment that it goes 
beyond.”797 And we might add that it carries with it, too, the moment that goes beyond it. That is 
to say, the untimely, which pervades our experience of time, and never allows us any  rest. For 
time, in its very essence, is untimely—irreducible to spatial dimensions, its discontinuity has as 
its effect that every  point in time is un-isolable. Rather, each of these points is constantly 
exceeding itself, beyond the possibility  of recapture. No continuity of subjectivity is hence 
possible; for the rhythmed individual, the individual subjected to the onrush of time is no 
individual at all, but rather, is in a constant discontinuous ἔκστασις of self—an infinite 
succession of selves, incapable of being drawn together, which thrust themselves into oblivion 
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one after another, merely by being temporal entities. This ἔκστασις requires in the same moment 
a forgetting of individuality and subjectivity  and a calling into memory of a primordial 
becoming. The fluid exchange between forgetting and remembering in ecstatic temporality takes 
place for Hölderlin as well as for Nietzsche, yet in radically different ways.
Memory and Forgetting at Dawn
 The mechanics of forgetting and remembering, which Nietzsche had called the operations 
of plastic force, for which another name is rhythmic force, is at the very core of the problem of 
the moderns’ relation to the ancients, and is thus essential to both Hölderlin and Nietzsche.
 In his “Remarks on ‘Oedipus,’” Hölderlin writes that “in the scenes” of the tragic drama, 
“the frightfully festive forms” constitute “language for a world where under pest and confusion 
of senses and under universally inspired prophecy in idle time, with the god and man expressing 
themselves in the all-forgetting form of infidelity [i n  d e r  a l l v e r g e s s e n  F o r m  d e r  U 
n t r e u e]—for divine infidelity [götliche Untreue] is best to retain—so that the course of the 
world will not show any  rupture and the memory of the heavenly  ones will not expire.”798 
Divinity must thus be retained in the mode of forgetting—the memory of the receding god must 
take place in the emptiness of tragic transport—in the empty value of the tragic hero. Therein the 
god must manifest himself as infidelity, that is, under the aspect of his flight. Hölderlin writes of 
this unfaithful crossroads between the human and the divine: “At such moments man forgets 
himself and the god and turns around like a traitor, naturally in a saintly manner.—In the utmost 
form of suffering, namely, there exists nothing but the conditions of time or space [der Zeit oder 
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des Raums].”799 Suffering thus in its supreme form comes about at the moment when the god, 
withdrawing, leaves the trace of his memory in man as infidelity—a waning light—and there all 
the regalia of life are stripped away until it is left bare, with nothing but the minimal structures of 
experience (a priori for Kant), namely  time and space, to hold it  together. Yet the ideal value of 
these elements, space and time, is undermined by Hölderlin as he replaces the “and” between 
them (und) with an “or” (oder). A reversibility of the postulates that render experience—and 
specifically tragic experience—possible thus undercuts the continuity of their coexistence, their 
equal necessity. For while the divine takes on the aspect of the temporal, for Hölderlin, the 
human is annulled as space.
 It is to this tragic event, whereby man, whose striving for knowledge has exceeded 
human measure and so turns against him and requires that he forget himself and forget the god 
that Hölderlin’s intellectual intuition—that is, “the boundless union purifying itself through 
boundless separation”800 which takes place in every tragedy—refers. Intellectual intuition itself, 
therefore, requires this dialectical exchange of forgetting and memory between the divine and the 
accursed human. For the hero must respond to divine infidelity with—precisely—infidelity: he 
must become a “traitor.” The hero thus contains the infidelity of the god—retains it in his 
memory by  forgetting it, as the god betrays him. Through a double paradox, thus, the hero is 
faithful to the god in his betrayal of him as the god is faithful to man by leaving the memory of 
his infidelity at the heart of mortality. In his poem Mnemosyne, Hölderlin writes: 
Ins Ungebundene gehet eine Sehnsucht. Vieles aber ist
Zu behalten. Und Noth dies Treue.
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There is a yearning that seeks the unbound. But much
Must be retained. And loyalty is needed.801
This loyalty, hence, works at the interior of infidelity, tempering the monstrous striving toward 
the boundless, so that emptiness can tragically  appear as the purificatory separation of the mortal 
and the immortal—their simultaneous betrayal. The faithless loyalty to the betraying god must 
take place precisely so that the absent god may be called back—so that the impossibility  of the 
god’s presentification in our time (indeed, in tragic time) may be invoked precisely  as its 
absence. Hölderlin is drawn back to Sophocles precisely because in his tragedies, the first flight 
of the gods takes place—there, mourning comes to be as mourning of the divine, a mourning 
which requires the constant work of a dialectic between past and present, to create a future, born 
out of the incommensurable difference contained between them.
 The Hölderlin writes of this tragic moment of the dialectic between forgetting and 
remembering in tragedy: 
Inside it, man forgets himself because he exists entirely for the moment, the god [forgets 
himself] because he is nothing but time [weil er nichts als Zeit ist]; and either one is 
unfaithful, time, because it is reversed categorically  at such a moment, no longer fitting 
beginning and end; man, because at this moment of categorical reversal he has to follow 
and thus can no longer resemble the beginning in what follows. […] Thus Oedipus 
himself stands in the tragedy of “Oedipus.”802 
If in the transport of the tragedy, the god is time, thus fundamentally unfaithful, the tragic hero, 
the spatial element in this intuitive organization, is mortal space, and there, full of the 
disappearing god in the word he speaks—in the absence spoken through the word Woe—he must 
come to = 0, and retain this memory in order to temporalize, and thus save the accursed world to 
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which he belongs, under the shadow of receding divinity. Yet to save requires at once the failure 
to save.
 For Hölderlin, a dialectic between Mnemosyne and Lethe takes place at the heart of 
tragic becoming. A feeling of timelessness is recovered through a pseudo-Platonic anamnesis, a 
recovering of the absent god out of many  layers of forgetting. This illusion of nature reattained is 
rendered possible through the deliverance to primordiality that art—and tragic poetry, in 
particular, provides the occasion for. It is for this reason that a tension is constantly retained 
between circularity and excentricity  in Hölderlin’s work. For the art work anamnetically conjures 
the unity  between the divine and the human, only to undermine this unity by the κάθαρσις of 
separation.
 Hölderlin’s essay, Becoming in Dissolution (1800), on the transition from the decline of a 
nation to its rebirth and revitalization, and thus also on the movement by  which the ideal passes 
into the real by means of the tragic hero, presents a phenomenological explication of this 
dialectic between the old and the new. It begins: 
The fatherland in decline, nature and humanity  insofar as they stand in a specific 
reciprocal relation, one that constitutes a particular world that has become the ideal and 
the very nexus of things; to that extent it is dissolving, so that  from it and from the 
generation that remains, along with the remaining forces of nature—nature being that 
which constitutes the other principle, the real—a new world may take shape; it will be a 
novel yet still reciprocal relation, precisely in the way  that the decline itself came to pass 
on the basis of a pure yet particular world. For the world of all worlds, which forever is 
all in all, depicts itself only  in the fullness of time—or in downgoing or in the moment, 
or, considered more genetically, in the coming-to-be of the moment and the 
commencement of time and world [… .]803
The downgoing that brings an end to one world must coincide, thus, with the commencement of 
another, and must even call this commencement into being. He writes: “the possibility of all 
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relations prevails in the transitional period [… .]” In other words, the time of the downgoing, 
which, in itself and insofar as it  is by necessity a transition, already incarnates and initiates the 
commencement of another world, and contains an infinity of possible worlds on the rise. From 
this period, therefore, only “the particular mode of relating” must be drawn, such that  only the 
“finite effect” of all particular relations, seen in their collectivity  as infinity, “comes to the 
fore.”804 Only a single result of a given relation in the downgoing must be grasped in its finitude 
and brought forth to exist as a particular commencement. The dissolution of the fatherland itself 
is the self-creating, self-fulfilling prophecy of a coming unification in an unknown recreation of 
the fatherland: “For how could the dissolution be apprehended without unification?”805  Here, 
then, the dialectic of intellectual intuition holds the prophecy of a final unification—that is, a 
circularity and a return to the unity  of divine nature. Yet Hölderlin poses this in the questioning 
mode—for the final resolution remains eternally uncertain, and there is no end in sight but an 
excentric one. 
 “This downgoing or transition of the fatherland,” the poet writes, must be felt to all 
“extremities of the subsisting world” in such a manner that “at the precise moment and to the 
precise degree that the subsisting world dissolves, the incipient, youthful, possible world can also 
be felt.”806  The death of subsisting life is but the announcement of a future, possible, potential 
life, and the feeling of these two moments must measure them against each other—it is the 
feeling, and not the knowledge or logical certainty, of a world to come that the dissolution of a 
former world brings about. In this dissolution, the subsistent world communicates that  which in 
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its “relations” and “forces” is “unexhausted and inexhaustible”—the dissolution of the relations, 
precisely, is felt through forces, “for nothing comes from nothing” and the negation of an actual 
thing annuls the possible, too. “But the possible, which enters into actuality, and does so 
precisely as the actuality is dissolving […] effects both the apprehension of the dissolution and 
the remembrance of what is dissolved.”807  Just as, as Hölderlin would later write, divine and 
mortal fidelity, the primordial memory of the divine inside the mortal, are only achieved through 
the experience of infidelity; the possible can only  pass over into the actual by an embrace of the 
emptiness of the dissolution of actuality  that simultaneously  brings about the remembrance of the 
finite actual of the past. 
 This dialectic between possibility and actuality is the source of the “thoroughgoing 
originality” and “enduring creativity” of “every genuinely tragic language”: “the emergence of 
the individual from the infinite, and the emergence of the finitely infinite, that is, of the 
individual eternal, from both”808—this individual, finite child of infinitude, “grasps” and 
“animates” the incomprehensible and wretched nature of dissolution—“the death struggle itself, 
which is grasped and animated by means of the harmonious, the comprehensible the living.”809 
Dissolution, in other words, the universality of suffering in a declining fatherland, is only felt and 
brought to life through its being lifted up into the ideality of a present harmony. From the initial 
pain of dissolution, which is “felt in its depths by sufferer and spectator alike,” the “ideal” that 
emerges, still undetermined, “radiates as the real nothing and as the dissolving that has been 
caught in a state” at  the midpoint “between being and nonbeing, that  is, caught in the turning of 
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necessity.”810 It  is precisely this ideal that is embodied by the tragic hero, in whom the twilight of 
his time is destined to become a dawn. The undissolved “new life” now becomes both “actually 
and ideally old” and its dissolution becomes necessary, manifesting itself as such “between being 
and nonbeing.” Yet, at this same instant of the coming of necessity, where the new becomes old, 
“the possible is everywhere real and the actual ideal, and in free artistic imitation (nachahmen) 
this is a frightful yet divine dream.”811 
 We may here grant ourselves the liberty to analogically relate these states of dissolution 
and commencement, in their simultaneously  self-actualizing ideality to Nietzsche’s two 
“immediate art-states of nature [Kunstzuständen der Natur]”—the Dionysian and the Apollinian, 
wherein “every artist is an ‘imitator’ [‘Nachahmer’], that is to say, either an Apollinian artist  in 
dreams, or a Dionysian artist in ecstasies, or finally—as, for example, in Greek tragedy—at once 
artist in both dreams and ecstasies [… .]”812 In the original “barbarian” Dionysian revels, which 
took place in absence of the Apollinian tempering force, “the most savage natural instincts were 
unleashed, including even that horrible mixture of sensuality and cruelty which has always 
seemed to me to be the ‘witch’s brew.”813  It  is only upon Greek soil, following the grand 
“reconciliation” of Dionysus and his enemy Apollo that the Dionysian “destruction of the 
principium individuationis for the first  time becomes an artistic phenomenon.”814  This artistic 
phenomenon is music itself. And reestablishment of this individuality principle, the reparation of 
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the “veil of maya”815 torn away in the ἔκστασις, the self-exceeding of the Dionysian revelers in 
the symbolic appearance of the Apollinian dream thus relates by analogy to the creation of a new 
world, of a coming fatherland, for Hölderlin. Yet Hölderlin’s proposition entails a dialectical 
view of history—one that moves teleologically from dissolution to commencement, and inside of 
which the hero plays the role of bringing about this dialectical transition, in much the same 
manner as Hegel, five years after Hölderlin’s essay on the declining fatherland, would write, with 
regard to Socrates, who is a “genuinely tragic” figure in his view: “This is the position of heroes 
in world history in general; through them, a new world rises.”816 Indeed, a trace of this historical 
dialectic remains in Nietzsche’s view of the tragic hero—yet this trace, as we shall see, is 
precisely the element that  must be sacrificed through his heroic self-sacrifice. Yet the Duplicität 
between the Apollinian and the Dionysian constitutes an eternal struggle—ἀγών, Kampf—
underlying all of life across history and temporality, wherein neither side is ever eradicated or 
surpassed, precisely because the nature of duplicity is such that the Dionysian and the Apollinian 
are necessary to one another for life to exist. Nietzsche writes of the Apollo: “his entire existence 
rested on a hidden substratum of suffering and of knowledge, revealed to him in the Dionysian. 
And behold: Apollo could not live without Dionysus!”817 It is because the Dionysian reveals the 
very primordial ground—rife with suffering and contradiction—that  the Apollinian seeks to hide 
with its beautiful appearance that this originary ecstatic force is vital to it. 
 Hölderlin’s “ideational dissolution,” whose points of birth and demise are already  “fixed, 
located, secured” by necessity, presents itself as “what it properly  is, namely, a reproductive act 
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by means of which life traverses all its points [… .]”818  It attains the totality of life, the sum of 
these points, by  dissolving “its attachment to each in order to reproduce itself in the next” such 
that “the dissolution becomes increasingly ideal as it removes itself from its point of 
commencement, or, by contrast, increasingly  real as the production advances, until in the end, 
out of the sum of these sensations of passing away and originating, run through infinitely in a 
single moment, a feeling of life as a whole comes to the fore [… .]”819  And the only thing 
excluded from this sentiment of the totality  of life is the “remembrance of what has dissolved, of 
the individual,” which in its turn “unites with the infinite feeling of life by means of [this] 
remembrance of dissolution itself [… .]” This movement between the finite past and the newly 
infinite present must take place in such a way that “after the gaps between them have been filled 
in, there should emerge from such unification and comparison” of past  and present “the new state 
proper the next step  that is to follow upon what is bygone.”820  Within and through the 
“remembrance of dissolution[,] the dissolution itself” thus comes to be the “inexorable bold act 
that it properly  is.”821 In order for the proper of dissolution to be the commencement of a new 
world, this dialectic of forgetting and remembering of the past that is dissolving—indeed, the 
retaining of remembrance within the emptiness of dissolution—must take place in such a way 
that memory is the fully mobile center of becoming. It  is through the ideal memory of a past 
communing with the actuality of that past within dissolution that the passage is effected from 
decline to rise. Only thus does the present itself come to contain anything proper.
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 The ideational dissolution, whose moving force is divine and not human, and which is 
therefore more determinable than the real, passes thus in two directions: initially, from “the 
infinitely present to the finite past [… .]” This happens in such a way  that everything “(1) within 
each point of the same dissolution and production; (2) between one point in its dissolution and 
production and every other point; (3) between each point in its dissolution and production and 
the total feeling of dissolution and production,” is ever “more infinitely interlaced.”822 That is to 
say, then, that  “everything is more infinitely permeated touched implicated in pain and in joy, in 
strife and at peace, in motion and at rest, in configuration and disfiguration, so that  celestial fire 
rather than an earthly blaze is at  work.”823  The divine, Empedoclean disharmony between 
opposite eternal operations is thus at work within the celestial fire of transition. The dissolution 
“passes through everything that lies between the first two points that are capable of dissolution 
and production, namely, between the opposed infinitely new and the finite old, between the 
totality of the real and the ideal particular.”824 
 Secondly, and after the completion of this first passage, the ideational dissolution moves 
in the reverse direction, “from the infinite to the finite [… .]” In this sense, it distinguishes itself 
from the real in that the “actual dissolution” appears as “the real nothing” from ignorance as to 
its commencement and end so that every subsistent particular thing takes on the appearance of 
the “be-all-and-end-all”—it is thus a “sensuous idealism or Epicurianism” depicted by Horace in 
his formula “Prudens futuri temporis exitum” (“wise is the future event”). Because the actual 
dissolution is this nothing while the ideational dissolution is the “coming-to-be of the ideal 
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individual in the direction of the infinitely real, and of the infinitely  real in the direction of the 
individual ideal” which gains in “harmony” and “import” as it grows and increases, this latter is 
thought as “a transition from one subsistent state to another [… .]” This subsistent, too, is 
augmented in spirit in the degree that it  is thought to have “originated from that transition” and 
its direction in such a way that the ideal individual’s dissolution appears “as burgeoning [and] as 
growth; the dissolution of the infinitely new comes to appear […] as love” and the two together 
appear at once “as a (transcendental) creative act” of which the essence is “to unite the ideal 
individual with the real infinite” and of which the result  is “the real infinite unified with the ideal 
individual” so that the infinitely real and the infinitely  ideal take on the life and configuration of 
one another, “uniting in a mythic state in which the transition, along with the opposition of the 
infinitely real and the finite ideal comes to an end [… .]”825 This cessation takes place insofar as 
the life of the infinitely real is maximally enhanced and the finite ideal becomes more tranquil.826 
 In the “lyrical” infinitely real, and in the “epic” individual ideal, “the state in question 
unites the spirit  of the one with the sensuous concreteness of the other. The mythic state, in both 
cases, is tragic” to the extent  that the infinitely  real and the finite ideal are in both cases united. 
The lyric and epic “differ merely  by degree [… .]” In the period of transition, “spirit  and sign,” 
defined respectively  as the “material of the transition” in union with “the infinitely real,” and 
“the infinitely real” with “the finite ideal” (“the transcendental” united with “the isolated”), are 
both together “like ensouled organs within an organized soul, that is, they are a one in 
harmonious opposition with itself.”827 This harmonious opposition between spirit and sign, each 
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in themselves a harmonious opposition, then, brings the tragic transition into being, because 
gives rise to the person of the tragic hero (who = 0) and unites the finite, the individual—with 
the infinite—the real of futurity, thus making this hero the very  figure in whom transition 
becomes possible. 
 From this organization of the transitional movement of the downgoing and 
commencement of the fatherland, Hölderlin draws a plan for the genesis of genius. “From this 
tragic unification of the infinitely  new and the finite old there then develops a new individual, 
such that the infinitely new, by means of its having taken on the configuration of the finite old, 
individualizes itself now in its proper configuration.”828 The infinity  of the novelty  brought about 
by the tragic unification, thus, can only become individual and novel of itself—which is to say, in 
a manner proper to itself, by  assuming the configuration of the concretized past individual 
preserved in remembrance, and by  simultaneously re-appropriating this very form, which, in fact, 
it itself has created in the downgoing so that this may belong exclusively to it. The genius is he 
who goes down, and can resurface as the commencement of an entirely new world, yet only by 
the transitional solidification, imitation, and invention of the past world in its finitude. The 
infinity of the future comes at the expense of that of the past, by working against the current of 
the surpassed world which alone allows for it to be broken with. Only such a genius—individual, 
radiant with celestial fire—can transform the fatherland into its proper self. So Hölderlin’s 
Hyperion writes to his Diotima: “O genius of my people! O soul of Greece! I must descend, I 
must seek you in the realm of the dead.”829 For Hades is the destination of all downgoing, and 
conversely the source of all life—the house of Gaia.
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 The new individual who results from the transitional period strives, thereafter, towards 
isolation and liberation from infinity in the same degree as the old individual struggles to 
universalize itself and dissolve itself “in the infinite feeling of life.” The “moment” in which the 
new individual’s time ends is that at which the “infinitely new comports itself toward the old 
individual as the dissolving yet unknown power” in the same way that, in a preceding time, the 
new, as an unknown power, comports itself toward the “finite old [… .]”830  A confrontation 
occurs between these two periods, wherein firstly  the individual (unique) seeks to dominate the 
infinite (whole) and secondly, the infinite strives to achieve dominion over the individual, “the 
whole over the unique.”831 The transition from this “second period”832 to the third takes place “in 
the moment at which the infinitely  new comports itself as the feeling of life (as I) toward the 
individual as object (as not-I).”833 
 Then, after the “opposition of the characters has tended toward reciprocity  and reversal,” 
the “tragic unification of both” occurs—a tragic union of the characters, akin in a deep sense to 
the ecstatic commingling of bodies and souls in Nietzsche’s choral tragedy.834 The end here, then, 
is circular once more—tragic separation ends in tragic unification, which is the very foundation 
of the new life which dissolution had promised. And yet this union is not  the regaining of the 
ground of nature but is tragic. In Hölderlin’s “Sketch toward the Continuation of the Third 
Version” of The Death of Empedocles, never to be actualized, he outlines a third scene, between 
Manes and Empedocles, as follows: “lyrical heroic / Manes, who has experienced all, the seer, 
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astounded by  Empedocles; speeches and by his spirit, says that Empedocles is the one who has 
been called, the one who kills and who gives life, the one in and through whom a world dissolves 
and in the same instant renews itself. / The human being who felt his country’s downgoing so 
mortally  was also thus able to sense its new life.”835  Here the dialectical structure of the 
Trauerspiel of Empedocles is clearly  laid out: it is through prophecy—the counter-rhythmic 
rupture, the caesura in the drama—that the hero is determined and destined to go down, to set 
like the betraying sun, which contains within itself the very  promise, the necessity of “new 
life”—a new nature, and, indeed, a new culture on the horizon of the tragedy of time.
 It is perhaps telling that Hölderlin never finished his Empedocles, and thus never fully 
embraced the failure of his tragic hero—his high untimeliness—as Nietzsche would and, without 
fail, maintained his ambiguity as to the tragic outcome. For he would ever retain his faith in the 
possibility of a circular path, a path that would lead his declining time back to the αἰών  of the 
Greeks. His Empedocles would never relinquish the dialectical promise of bringing about a 
revived harmony through his self-sacrifice. Yet perhaps it  is equally  telling that Hölderlin did not 
end his Trauerspiel with the attainment of such harmony. For as he would later write, in the 
“Notes” to Oedipus Tyrannos, the tragedy, in mourning, is that we must retain the god in his 
flight. Nietzsche, for his part, was firm in his perspective: “The failed reformer is Empedocles; 
when he failed only  Socrates was left” (KSA 7: 6 [18]).836 The failure of that tragic hero thus led 
not to a new, ideal unification, but to degeneracy, embodied in the figure of Socrates. Nietzsche, 
indeed, viewed Hölderlin’s own decline in madness—perhaps a self-sacrifice—not as a saving, 
redemptive act, but as a sign of weakness, a failure. In his third Untimely Meditation on 
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Schopenhauer, Nietzsche of “Our own Hölderlin and Kleist” as examples of geniuses who had 
succumbed to the temptation of self-destruction, in the manner of Schopenhauer’s tragedy, faced 
with their degenerate age. These were men who “died of their own unconventionality  and could 
not endure the climate of what is called ‘German culture’”—to these men, he opposes the 
“natures of iron—Beethoven, Goethe, Schopenhauer, and Wagner” who alone possess the 
strength of spirit to survive their twilight times.837  It is a different kind of failure, however—a 
failure leading into the mouth of the river of becoming, that Nietzsche’s conception of the tragic 
hero aims to attain.
 Lacoue-Labarthe formulates the paradoxical logic of the circularity between nature and 
man, an essential truth for both Hölderlin and Nietzsche, and by which process man must create 
nature precisely in his emptiness:
The “logic” of the open-ended exchange of the excess of presence and of the excess of 
loss, the alternation of appropriation and disappropriation—all that we might baptize, 
following Hölderlin’s terminology (and for lack of anything better) the “hyperbologic,” 
together with everything that holds it still within the framework of the “homeotic” 
definition of truth—who knows if this is not the (paradoxical) truth of aletheia?838
Lacoue-Labarthe also calls this “hyperbologic” by  the name, “mimetologic.”839  This logic is 
common, then, to Hölderlin and Nietzsche as moment of caesura—the moment in which the 
tragic hero arises as the divide between the ancient and the modern, who, by becoming empty, is 
able to receive the foreign time of the gods, the time of the ancients into his heart and thus 
transform it through his very descent in self-sacrifice, thus opening new paths for the 
transfiguration of truth and, above all, of the binding force of community—of love. Yet while this 
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love, for Hölderlin, requires the constant mimetic calling-into-presence of an absent god, even 
after the failure of self-sacrifice, for Nietzsche this sacrifice is to be final: it must be the absolute 
sacrifice of the metaphysical, and with it, of the human being bound by myth, who thus 
undergoes a dissolution into nihilism, precisely by the dissonance between his reality, which is 
nothing other than the temporal rhythm of becoming, and the metaphysics to which he blindly, 
feverishly clings as consolation in order to go on living. Only through the purificatory self-
sacrifice of the philosopher as tragic hero can the revelation of the movement of tragic time as a 
constant sacrifice of selves come about as the binding force of a people to come. The sacrifice, 
for Nietzsche, thus, must be the final failure of the project to return to a metaphysically idealized 
nature. 
 It is, perhaps, the homeotic nature of truth that Hölderlin and Nietzsche share most 
profoundly—for they both theorize the re-creation of nature and its truth—indeed, of origin—
within the flux of history. Yet while, for Hölderlin, this always necessitates the rapprochement of 
the human with the chimera of divinity, for Nietzsche, it  takes place within the rhythmic forces 
of the body—it is a biological time that is transformed through the power of the dying hero.
Primordial Becoming
 The Nietzschean epistemology is based on the primordial character of memory. This 
proposition, then, replaces the concept of origin (Ursprung) with a metaphysical role for memory 
(Gedächtniß) which thence subtracts itself from the biological aspect of life as its supreme 
metaphysical aspect: “Memory has nothing to do with nerves, with the brain. It  is a primordial 
characteristic [Ureigenschaft]. For the human being carries around with him the memory of all 
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previous generations. / The mnemonic image [Gedächtnißb i l d] something that is very artificial 
[Künstliches] and rare” (KSA 7: 19 [162]).840 This memory thus reaches back into the regions of 
primordial becoming, the becoming of Heraclitus and of all the pre-Platonic Greeks—it accesses 
this unknowable time and through this capacity awakens the philosopher—the possessor of tragic 
knowledge—to his task. It is this knowledge, this ancient memory that comes to light through 
Nietzsche’s conception of anamnesis, which bears in common with that of Hölderlin the notion 
of a present emptiness filled up with the calling into being of a primordial temporality through a 
metaphysical memory such that the very contents of this memory are transformed on a plane of 
immanence. In a fragment of 1876, Nietzsche writes: “All man’s goals and purposes were once 
also conscious to his ancestors, but  they have been forgotten. The directions followed by man 
greatly depend on the past: the Platonic ἀνάµνησις. The worm moves in the same direction even 
when its head has been cut off” (KSA 7: 23 [10]).841  It is only by means of this Nietzschean 
rethinking of “Platonic ἀνάµνησις” that art—through new mnemonic images, can come about as 
physiological ordering functions—as biological necessities. This transfigured anamnesis is 
precisely the scene of the ἀγών between past and future with which Nietzsche replaces the 
Hölderlinian dialectic. It  is that which makes untimeliness itself possible. Let us recall 
Nietzsche’s letter to Rohde, in which he says: “Dearest friend, what I learn and see, hear and 
understand is indescribable. Schopenhauer and Goethe, Aeschylus and Pindar are still alive—
only believe.”
 This access to the most primordial past, the most ancient time of knowledge, comes to 
constitute, for Nietzsche, one of the very  structures of consciousness, on the same level as 
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sensation. He writes: “Consciousness commences with the sensation of causality, which means 
that memory  is older than consciousness. […] But memory must be part of the essence of 
sensation; hence  must <be> a primordial characteristic [Ureigenschaft] of things. […] The 
inviolability  of the laws of nature means: sensation and memory are part of the essence of things. 
The fact that a substance reacts in a certain way to contact with another substance is a matter of 
memory and sensation. […] But if pleasure, displeasure, sensation, memory, reflex movements 
are all part  of the essence of matter, then human knowledge penetrates far more deeply into the 
essence of things” (KSA 7: 19 [161]).842 If this memory is thus primordial, this means that the 
invisible bridges from genius to genius are metaphysical phenomena—they form an ideal path, 
which must only be accessed and followed by the philosopher.
 Memory, however, is impossible, we remember, without forgetting. Therefore, each 
primordial pool of memories is eternally shifting, being rethought, recreated and reestablished, 
and for this reason the space of the Ur itself is at once historical and suprahistorical; it is 
contained within historical time precisely by virtue of the fact that  it exists, by definition, outside 
historical time. In other words, that which exists as memory only takes place within time itself, as 
a projection into a primordial sphere. And because it  is such a projection, it indeed exists outside 
time, before time. This movement of memory, endlessly permeated by forgetting, is thus cyclical, 
or circular, and yet never returns to itself as identity—rather, once it has returned to itself, in a 
process whose beginning is strictly  nonexistent, the identical, even if it is posited, has once again 
receded into impossibility, such that any  pronunciation of it as an event necessarily  pronounces 
itself as difference within, beyond, before and after, the identical. The place where origin springs 
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from, qua idea, transforms indefinitely as the surface-force of reason, of art and of science, 
transforms. This process is a circular one, such that as soon as the same occurs, it has already 
recurred, yet the memory of it, in its supreme infidelity, has changed, and has changed it. The 
infidelity takes place between what the Greeks called divinity and the human sphere. Goethe 
speaks as follows: “The Divinity works in the living, not in the dead; in the becoming and 
changing, not in the become and fixed. Therefore Reason, with its tendency toward the divine, 
has only  to do with the becoming, the living; but Understanding with the become, the already 
fixed, that it may  make use of it. […] We steer hypotheses to imaginary islands; but the proper 
synthesis will probably remain an undiscovered country; and I do not wonder at  this, which I 
consider how difficult  it is to obtain any synthesis even in such simple things as plants and 
colors.”843
 The physiological substratum of the conceptual, in Nietzsche, has as its consequence that 
the primordial memory, the primordial becoming that lies in the depths underlying consciousness 
can only come into the light of day, light of mind, according to a contingency of astral 
proportions. Thus does the philosopher bring the ancients into being once again through a 
poetical process of remembrance, according to his own physiology. The primordial essence of 
their thought and of their tragedy  is recreated according to a rhythm foreign to it, an untimely 
rhythm, through the modern body, and is thus transformed; we cannot know the bodies of the 
ancients, but through our bodies the Ursprung of the tragic arrived, that arcing experience that 
we share with the Greeks by remembering it, brought about anew, unforeseeably  each time. The 
path to that common tragic space is opened by the specific employment, that is, explicitations, of 
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the subterranean musicalities and rhythms of our bodies in art (or writing), the reflection of our 
living.
 For Hölderlin, the result of the Trauerspiel is that the absent god must ever be called 
back, invoked again in the form of his temporal disappearance, so that mourning, the mother of 
joy, may  come about. Indeed, this invocation is of the highest necessity—it is the only  means by 
which love can bind mortals, this creation of the eternal beauty out of the tragic dialectic 
between finite past and infinite future. Thus the Hölderlinian anamnesis serves the purpose of 
bringing the god back into being, reviving the memory of divine infidelity, which is, 
paradoxically, that to which man must be endlessly faithful and unfaithful, that which his 
emptiness must contain in order that nature—a new nature, second or third or fourth, may rise up 
on the horizon. This creation of nature through the call to a betraying god is the task of art itself.
 For Nietzsche, on the other hand, there is no recourse to divinity. Rather, by means of the 
reemployment of an infinite plasticity, the Dionysian must newly become a primordial, basic 
physio-biological instinct by  means of art insofar as this provokes and accomplishes a return to 
primordial becoming, primordial memory through a process of anamnesis. That is, for Nietzsche, 
divinity must be un-deified and returned to its ecstatic origin in the body. Yet, by  means of this 
anamnesis, the origin is transformed. The instincts too, must take on a new form, depending on 
the current physiological constellation and its agonal relation to the ancient one. Out of this 
artistic ἀγών  shall be born the unheard-of—the new culture born out of the rhythmic spirit of 
music.
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The New History
 Rhythm forms the bodily experience and the temporality  of becoming, and becoming, in 
turn is the inner pulse of history. Foucault, in his essay on Nietzsche, calls history “the very body 
of becoming.” He continues: “only a metaphysician would seek its soul in the distant ideality of 
origin.”844 By refusing metaphysical historicism, both in the form of progress and in the form of 
an early  formulation of the eternal return of the same, through an affirmation of becoming in the 
constantly transfigured primordial space of memory  and forgetting, Nietzsche creates a 
conception of the tragic capable of affirming life as a temporal phenomenon. He thus proposes, 
against all determining historicism, a counter-dialectics of tragic excentricity wherein the circular 
movement between man and nature is interrupted by the appearance of the tragic hero, the 
philosophical genius who embodies the eternity posited by any  metaphysics and, in sacrificing 
himself, sacrifices that very metaphysics, thus transforming the rhythm of becoming. The 
“ideality of misfortune” and of suffering845  which for the Greeks was the force of tragedy 
becomes for us the embrace of suffering, of excentric temporality  and of the impossibility of any 
complete subjectivity—an early  version of the Nietzschean amor fati, which constitutes the 
joyful affirmation of life as time, in the amorous surpassing of the Greeks and their pessimism, 
indeed in the triumphant reversal of that pessimism into an embrace of the tragedy of becoming. 
 There is, hence, for Nietzsche, no origin of time—no absolute beginning—no 
Anaximandrian ἄπειρον, no Anaxagorean νοῦς from which the whole of existences issues, and 
which subtracts itself from time as its necessary  cause. There are only  primordial instincts—
sensations that become images through imitation, and which make up the dense mass of objects 
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that furnish consciousness (and earlier: pre-consciousness) with the capacity  to produce 
knowledge, and to produce art. Nietzsche criticizes all teleology, all theories of an absolute 
beginning containing within them an absolute end. It is for precisely this reason that Nietzsche 
opposes all theories of a logical and necessary succession of philosophers. In a fragment, he 
writes: “1. No διαδοχαí. / 2. The various types” (KSA 7: 19 [169]).846 He also wrote an essay in 
1872 on The διαδοχαí of the philosophers, whose central task was to expose the extent to which 
the “diadocographers” had perverted the chronologies of the ancient philosophers in order “to 
establish their διαδοχαí” and the “extraordinary differences” between these historians and the 
contrary chronologies established by their “wiser” critics.847  Moreover, it was Nietzsche’s 
intention, in this essay, to prove how “dangerous” it is “to use different series of chronological 
combinations and thus to establish by means of intermediary figures an artificial harmony.”848 
The history of the pre-Platonics, in fact, for the moderns, is in no way harmonious and necessary 
but rather, it is of a supreme dissonance, and insurmountably fragmentary. 
 In concurrence with Rohde, Nietzsche chose Apollodorus as his preferred ancient 
historian of the lineages of philosophers precisely because he “denied the connections of 
disciples to masters and [among others] rejected the Anaximander-Anaximenes διαδοχή.”849 The 
very notion of a necessary historical succession of ancient philosophers leading to a τέλος 
implicitly  contained in the ἀρχή is thus, in Nietzsche’s eyes, a corruption of these philosophers 
themselves. In opposition to such a theory  of historical necessity, Nietzsche proposes, in the 
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fragment above, a typology of the pre-Platonics; rather than claiming a historical connection 
from teachers to students between these philosophers, he cultivates each of them as a man and an 
exemplary  worldview which may be used, in the balance each of them contains between 
metaphysics and science, for the foundation of a new nature which shall also be a new culture. 
The proper, approximate measure of mythical and scientific conceptions of life can thus be 
attained by this philological practice, which views history  not as a progression, but as a series of 
invisible bridges, forged through the practice of memory counterbalanced by necessary 
forgetting, across which stretches the historical connective tissue of the ancient thinkers’ genius. 
For Nietzsche, we may hazard to presume, these essential types for his time would be embodied 
by Heraclitus, Empedocles and Democritus. An atomistic philosophy  of becoming combined 
with the theory  of nature as art results from such a powerful combination—the formula for an 
artistic creation of the world and a dissolution of the plane of experience to purely temporal 
dimensions. 
 Nietzsche’s view of history is founded on the basis, as I have said, of a double refutation. 
Firstly, he refutes the circular view of history  as an eternal repetition of the same events. Long 
before Nietzsche had the idea of the eternal return of the same as “the highest formula of 
affirmation that is at all attainable”850—uttered through the mouth of a demon and of Zarathustra 
—-he encountered various versions of this thought. His early  position with respect to these 
theories of the singular idea of the eternal return is characterized by an intense fascination and a 
vehement refusal, which itself constitutes the affirmation of life as constant becoming, excentric 
temporality, which never arrives at its origin but confronts us, instead, with a series of sacrifice, 
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irrecuperable past selves. And suppose Nietzsche’s later assertion of the affirmative character of 
this thought referred, rather, to an evolved version of affirmation through refusal. The ambiguity 
ever endures. Secondly, Nietzsche shall refute the belief in progress—the modern teleology of 
history and culture—the undying faith in an absolute goal, Christian or otherwise, of the ever-
moving world process. 
 In a fragment contemporary to his second Untimely Meditation, Nietzsche quotes a 
passage from Hume: “‘Ask yourself,’ says Hume, ‘ask any of your acquaintances, whether they 
would live over again the last ten or twenty years of their life. No! but the next twenty, they say, 
will be better:
 ‘And from the dregs of life hope to receive
 What the first sprightly running could not give’”851 (KSA 7: 29 [86]).852
Nietzsche uses this Humean instinct, this characterization of the man resistant to the eternal 
return of the same to define the “historical man” whose will drives toward progress, the 
furthering of history: “These men we call historical men. A glance into the past drives them on 
toward the future, inflames their courage to go on living, kindles their hope that justice will 
someday  come, that happiness lies hidden on the other side of the mountain they are 
approaching. These historical men believe that the meaning of human existence will increasingly 
be revealed in the process of life [… .]” He then says of this man that: “In spite of their history, 
they  have no idea how unhistorically  they think and act, and how their pursuit of history serves 
not pure knowledge, but life.”853  This then is the Emersonian man, the man of progress, who 
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drives his idealist ship toward an unattainable horizon, carrying the weight of history on his 
shoulders even as he submerges himself in the waters of Lethe: “souls never touch their objects. 
An innavigable sea washes with silent waves between the things we aim at and converse 
with.”854  This is the attitude of the advancement of a world process and of progress toward a 
future goal whose very charm is its illusory character. 
 To these historical men Nietzsche opposes “supra-historical men” who refuse the eternal 
return of the same in favor of an a-temporal present, paralyzed between past and future, living in 
the shadow of a grand, inimitable history: “What could ten more years teach them that the last 
ten could not?”855 To characterize this attitude, Nietzsche turns to Leopardi: 
Nothing is worth your moving.
Earth is unworthy of your sighs. Life
is bitterness and boredom, nothing more.
And the world is foul.
Now be still.856
Refusing, then, at once the paralysis of the supra-historical man—his “nausea” and “wisdom”—
Nietzsche proposes that we “rejoice in our unwisdom” in the manner of “progressive men” and 
yet refuse all theories of historical process toward a goal. He writes, furthermore: “if historical 
scholarship  is to be a beneficent enterprise, holding future promise, it must itself move in the 
wake of a fresh and powerful torrent of life [neuen Lebensströmung]—for instance, a newly 
emerging culture [einer werdenden Cultur].”857 This Lebensströmung must move, indeed, by the 
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rhythm of a newly awakened, newly recognized torrent of becoming—it is through such a shift 
in the torrent’s rhythm, toward the reestablishment of the primordial ἀγών between Zeitleben and 
Tonleben, through a process of anamnesis that reaches into the coming-into-being of philosophy 
operated by the tragic hero in his moment of timelessness that this culture must rise into the 
future like a flaming sun. Nietzsche develops thus his counter-dialectics of history  and of life, 
which informs the tasks of philosophy and philology. Therein the primordial [Ur] is eternally in 
creative combat with the historical, in the service of life. And here, life itself is conceived in a 
circular manner: for just as it only thrives by  means of illusions, the surface-forces of art and 
knowledge (thus: of language), its essence lies in the depths, and its symbol is the Dionysian 
primordial One. 
 There are two movements where history is concerned: one, the Emersonian, whose 
essence and whose drive is the will to progress, and another, the Humean, or rather, the one 
borrowed from Hume, against which historicism defines itself, and which is an early  incarnation 
of the eternal return.858  Nietzsche’s epistemology itself abounds in spheres and circular 
economies, indeed, whose circularity  must be broken out of for the future to arise. In the essay, 
“Circles” Emerson writes: “The eye is the first circle; the horizon which it forms is the second; 
and throughout nature this primary figure is repeated without end. It  is the highest emblem in the 
cipher of the world.”859 This then is the very principle of Nietzsche’s anthropomorphism: that the 
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human eye, in its circularity, projects itself, its circular image, onto the entire cosmos, thus 
circumscribing the universal movement of all things and making itself the key to nature, to 
divinity. Nietzsche’s vision of the new anthropomorphism, which the death of metaphysics shall 
require, however, will be of a nature entirely different from that to which the world has so long 
been beholden—therein, outside the sphere of the divine, the movement shall be one of 
excentricity—the tragic beat of time.
  In his second Untimely, Nietzsche also attacks Eduard von Hartmann as a dialectician and 
teleologist. Hartmann’s Philosophy of the Unconscious (1869) had combined the Hegelian Idea 
with the Schopenhauerian Will, to form a cosmogony whose movement was circular, beginning 
at a fixed point, and returning to this point again and again in a circular world process. The 
illogical principle of the will and the logical principle of the idea formed together the cosmic 
Unconscious; at the “moment of initiative,” the “empty will” (will without object) began to will 
from out of a static eternity, and thereafter combined with the idea, thus beginning the world 
process. These two forces, logical and illogical, competing with one another, as the former 
strives to correct the latter, cause the world to pass through three “stages of illusion” until a 
“senile state” is reached, and a desire for rest envelops all the world.860 This is brought about by 
the idea’s creation of a “will to nothingness” that negates the will to life, and from this negation 
results the “collective decision that leads to the destruction of the whole universe”861  at which 
point the will returns to its static eternal state within “pure power itself [… .]”862 This state must 
then be willed as a pure redemption from temporality and world process, a liberation from the 
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dolorous fight between the logical idea and the illogical will, and thus from illusion, in absolute 
willing, absolute power and negation. This cosmogony is based on the thesis that, because it  is 
impossible and contradictory to posit an infinity extending into the past, an absolute beginning of 
the world process must necessarily have taken place. Hartmann comes to this conclusion out of 
the polemic between Kant and Schopenhauer concerning the beginning of the world. Kant’s 
demonstration of the first cosmological antinomy in the Critique of Pure Reason runs as follows: 
Thesis: “The world has a beginning in time, and in space it is also enclosed in 
boundaries.” Proof: “For if one assumes that the world has no beginning in time, then up 
to every given moment in time an eternity is elapsed, and hence an infinite series of states 
of things in the world, each following another, has passed away. But now the infinity of a 
series consists precisely in the fact that it can never be completed through a successive 
synthesis. Therefore an infinitely elapsed world-series is impossible, so a beginning of 
the world is a necessary condition of its existence, which was the first point to be 
proved.”863 
This antinomy results in reason’s capacity to believe in an absolute beginning of the world that 
cannot be rigorously rationalized, because the thesis dialectically transforms into its opposite, 
and, like Icarus, falls from the intelligible it strives towards into the sensible world. Such a belief 
in a beginning to the universe is thus morally  necessary, for Kant, to the human animal and its 
development. Yet the dialectic of pure reason, by which it relates to pure Ideas, is such that it 
falls equally into the opposite belief, in the infinity of time and space, the limitlessness of the 
universe. According to this thesis (that is to say, antithesis), since there must have been an 
infinity of time before the beginning of the cosmos, this infinite void would render any beginning 
impossible. Hence, no universal beginning has ever taken place, and time extends infinitely  into 
the past. However, because on the “battlefield” of reason’s antinomies the victory always belongs 
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to the “side which has been permitted to make the attack” it is the thesis of an absolute beginning 
of the universe, extending reason into the intelligible realm, that prevails over the antithesis of 
past and future infinities, which confines itself to the spatiotemporal sphere experience.
 Schopenhauer attacks the Kantian thesis of this first antinomy by exposing the fact that 
the proof of this thesis replaces “the beginninglessness of the series of conditions or states” with 
“the endlessness (infinity) of the series [… .]” However, Schopenhauer points out: “the end of a 
beginningless series can always be thought without detracting from its beginninglessness, just as 
conversely the beginning of an endless series can also be thought.”864  This thinkability, for 
Schopenhauer, entirely  delegitimizes Kant’s antinomy of reason since its very purpose is to 
confront reason with the impossibility of thinking its own theses, thus pushing it across the limit 
between thought and faith. Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche with him, thus posits the impossibility 
of a beginning of the world process. Against the “regressive” infinite movement posited by 
Schopenhauer, which he calls a mere “ideal postulate,” Hartmann proposes his thesis of the 
world’s “progressive movement”865 which is, on the contrary, real. He believes that the reality  of 
time necessitates positing an absolute beginning and an absolute end to the world process, thus 
returning to the thesis of the first Kantian antinomy of reason. The flaw of Hartmann’s logic, 
however, is that he attempts to prove his thesis of an end of the world process by  the process 
itself. This end, which should result in absolute freedom from illusion, the pure empty power of 
the will, succumbs once again to the union of will and idea, and the world process recommences 
with the struggle between logic and illogic, which plunges the cosmos again in illusion. 
Therefore: “Hartmann‘s view is that the world process leads into a final state absolutely  identical 
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to the initial state.”866 Such is the manner in which universal history endlessly repeats itself, as 
every  time the world comes again to a static state, “we are still haunted by  the specter of a new 
will and of another beginning of the world process.”867  Hartmann struggles with the 
contradiction between an absolute liberation from illusion and suffering and the implication of 
his own theory, that the world process eternally recommences. If the will, according to him, were 
entirely  bound by time, the world process would be obliged to repeat eternally and identically, 
yet because the will, in its origin, is both anterior to time and its cause, the probability  of cosmic 
recurrence is not 1 but 1/2, and is again diminished by 1/2, at the event of every recurrence.868
 In a set of fragments from 1873, Nietzsche attacks Hartmann as an unsuccessful 
“imitator” of Schopenhauer (KSA 7: 28 [6]),869  for pretending to a knowledge of the 
unconscious, which “by its very nature is something that is unknown,” to such an extent that he 
even considers it to be the matrix of the world process, and for believing this fact to be doubly 
demonstrable, both “on the basis of the past, ex causis efficientibus,” and “on the basis of the 
future, ex causa finali [… .]” Nietzsche continues, with vicious sarcasm: “H<artmann> lets the 
light of the Last Judgement shine upon our age” such that “it appears that it is now approaching 
humanity’s age of manhood, that joyous state in which there is nothing but solid mediocrity 
[…]” (KSA 7: 29 [59]).870 And this is, indeed, Hartmann’s own Christian language, for he writes, 
in Nietzsche’s transcription: “the complete victory of the logical over the illogical must coincide 
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with the temporal end of the world process, with the Last Judgement (!!)” (KSA 7: 29 [52]).871 In 
the second Untimely Meditation, he criticizes Hartmann, the would-be philosopher of the 
unconscious, as an unconscious “philosophical parodist” and calls his doctrine a “parody of 
world history.”872  “For every individual the unconscious parodist required ‘the full surrender of 
his personality to the world process.’”873  Nietzsche also writes of Hartmann, with venomous 
vehemence: “Disgusting book! Disgrace to our age! […] Hartmann’s philosophy is the scowl of 
Christianity, with its absolute wisdom, its Last Judgement, its redemption, etc.” (KSA 7: 29 
[52]).874  It  is contra this pseudo-scientific, Christianized philosophy of history as either an 
eternal recurrence or an inevitable, teleological progression toward a restored Christian eternity, 
that Nietzsche’s vision of history as becoming, with the tragic philosopher at its crux, will surge 
forth to put an end to all metaphysical historicism and which will hence forge the path to his later 
explicit conception of philological-philosophical genealogy. 
 Against Hartmann’s conception of an absolute beginning and an absolute end to the world 
process, Nietzsche opposes Schopenhauer’s theory of an infinity of the past, and of the 
consequent impossibility of a completion of infinity. Since an eternity has elapsed up until the 
present moment, Schopenhauer claims: “everything that  can or should become must have 
become already.”875 In other words, this infinity of elapsed time entails “the exhausted possibility 
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of events.”876 In Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, Nietzsche allies this theory  with that 
of Parmenides and the Eleatics, according to which: “‘There can be no time, no motion. no 
space, for we can only imagine all these to be infinite. Whether infinitely large or infinitely 
divisible, everything infinite has no being. It does not exist.’ But no one who interprets the 
meaning of the word ‘being’ strictly, who takes the existence of a contradiction such as a finished 
infinity seriously  as an impossibility, can doubt this.”877 Nietzsche refutes this theory of infinity’s 
impossibility  in harmony with Anaxagoras, Empedocles and Democritus, all of whom endorse 
the “reality of motion” as deduced from “reality  of thought,” and thus of thought as motion.878 
According to this argument, thought is itself successive, i.e., subjected to becoming and hence 
incapable of solidifying any thought into “Being,” against which Parmenides counters the idea 
that thought is stagnant  and what appears to us as succession is merely a representation of 
succession. Nietzsche refutes this thesis, in turn, through an appeal to Spir.  
 Spir, arguing against Kant, claims that the “idea [Vorstellung] of succession […] is not in 
itself successive; consequently it is completely different from the succession of ideas 
[Vorstellungen].”879 In addition, according to this hypothesis, the representation of succession is 
possible only based on the reality of thought as movement. Spir continues by asking: “how can 
the beginning and the end of conscious life itself, together with all its inward and outward senses, 
exist only  in the interpretation of the inward sense? The actual fact is that one absolutely cannot 
deny the reality of change. If you throw it out the window it  will slip  back in through the 
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keyhole.” For only the proposition that “our ideas appear to us as they are” can found the critique 
of reason, since it alone allows us to “make […] valid assertions about them” and thereby 
produce an “epistemology” as well as a “‘transcendental’ examination of objective validity.”880 
Nietzsche thus, with Spir, opposes the Parmenidean idea of a timeless eternity in which Being 
would subsist in absolute manner by means of an argument that subsumes the very event of this 
thought in the becoming that it both denies and presupposes. Constant change, then, is the 
essential truth of all movement for Nietzsche, and if an infinity  has already  elapsed, this is 
merely an expression of the indestructibility  of forces and matter posited by Heraclitus, by 
Anaxagoras, by  Empedocles and Democritus. The movement of history is rather the eternal 
transformation of these originary  bodily forces as functions of time. And in the movement of 
history, the ancient forces of life must, by a process of remembrance at once active, biological 
and metaphysical or philosophical, be transformed into forces of the future. The body itself, 
through a mimetic, homeotic, hyperbological approach to history, must become foreign to itself, 
such that its very physiology, and therefore too the illusions it must generate and by which it 
lives, are transfigured.
 Yet this constant change, for Nietzsche, in no way amounts to a logical, linear or causal 
motion that  could be described as a process. On the contrary, this change neither originates nor 
terminates. And, as Paolo D’Iorio points out, Nietzsche ultimately  rejects Spir’s Neo-Kantian 
theory, because rather than renouncing the metaphysical organization of the world into noumena 
and phenomena, it proposes, in opposition to the “Kantian and Schopenhauerian dualist model” a 
three-tiered model. In this model, there exists, between “the authentic dimension” of the thing-in-
324
880 Spir, Denken, 209f. Nietzsche, Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, § 15, 98.
itself and the level of “the subject’s representation” as reality, a third, “intermediary ontological 
level,” upon which things really exist but not as things in themselves; rather, they exist in an 
“inauthentic and contradictory  way.”881 This tripartition is just as unacceptable for Nietzsche as 
the thing-in-itself/appearance division of Kant and the will/representation division of 
Schopenhauer.   
  In the second Untimely, Nietzsche pronounces this injunction: “Assess your height as a 
man of knowledge by your depth as a man of action. True, you climb up  toward heaven and on 
the sunlight of knowledge, but you also sink downwards toward chaos.”882 To ascend in flight on 
the wings of knowledge requires a descent  into the real, the chaotic pandemonium of reality, the 
torrent of becoming—only through this constant ἀγών between reality and thought, between 
action and contemplation, or again, between the novel and ancient wisdom can a culture come 
about, can the new history arise. Nietzsche, thus, through this critique of the teleological and 
Christian tones of Hartmann’s doctrine, defines his own conception of history, his own 
epistemology and cosmogony, against it. 
Hartmann is important because he deals a deathblow to the idea of a world process 
simply  by being consistent. In order to be able to endure it he must base it on the τέλος of 
conscious redemption and freedom from illusions on our willingness to embrace decline. 
But the end of humanity  can occur at any moment due to a geological cataclysm: and all 
that illusionlessness would presuppose more highly developed moral and intellectual 
energies: which is wholly improbable: on the contrary, when they become old, the 
illusions are likely to become all the more powerful and old age, to conclude with a 
return to childishness [K i n d i s c h w e r d e n]. 
      KSA 7: 29 [52]883 
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Nietzsche points out that this doctrine of eternal return of the identical, wherein the state of ennui 
and yearning for eternity  and stagnancy that the realms of pure illusion lead instead to the 
repetition of the same series of events ad infintum, contradicts the progressive, teleological 
doctrine of liberation that Hartmann proposes. In place of this double-bind, Nietzsche proposes 
his idea of a system of invisible bridges connecting geniuses across history, and history’s role of 
serving and furthering their community. He writes: “We want to refrain from all constructions of 
human history and not pay any attention whatsoever to the masses, but instead only to the widely 
dispersed individuals: they form a bridge above the turbulent stream. They do not further a 
process; rather, they  live conjointly and concurrently, thanks to history. / It  is the ‘republic of 
geniuses’” (KSA 7: 29 [52]).884  This doctrine opposes itself to progress as well as to return—
there is no universal history, but rather, history binds great men, great geniuses and tragic heroes 
together and draws them into circular, temporal and trans-temporal communication with one 
another. In the second Untimely, Nietzsche prophesizes: “The time will come when we will 
wisely avoid all interpretations of the world-process, or even human history; when historians 
generally  will no longer consider the masses, but rather those individuals who form a kind of 
bridge over the wild torrent of Becoming [Brücke über den wüsten Strom des Werdens 
bilden].”885 The beings who spring forth out of that torrent refute, refuse and overcome the logic 
of their century; they  are supremely discontinuous with the homogeneity of the world in which 
they  are embedded—they  defy  the dialectic that precipitates the race of modern men by their 
very existence. Nietzsche declares: “the goal of humanity cannot lie at the end of history, but 
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only in the highest human exemplars.”886 These men are tragic. They are tragic heroes precisely 
because they arise out of the tragedy  of the age and exist in antagonism against it. From the 
raging tumult of Becoming they awake, open their eyes and seize life, a life unknown to the 
world in which they  come to be, and according to a necessity beyond necessity, beyond the 
teleological, dialectical movement to which everything around them is subordinated. In a 
fragment of 1872, Nietzsche writes of the philosopher as the “self-revelation of nature’s 
workshop” who exists with the “artist” in a sphere “above the tumult of contemporary history 
[Über dem Getümmel der Zeitgeschichte]” and “beyond need [abseits der Noth].” He proposes: 
“The philosopher as the brake shoe on the wheel of time” (KSA 7: 19 [17]).887  In apparent 
contradiction with the proposition that the philosopher-genius exists of necessity, he here is 
posited as a being beyond necessity. Here arises Nietzsche’s ambivalence with regard to the 
possibility of necessity  beyond metaphysics—it is a torturous ambiguity, and if the tragic hero is 
necessary this is because his is the greatest, most dangerous task—the task of bringing death to 
metaphysics for a people: “Philosophers appear in times of great danger—when the wheels keep 
turning faster—they and art take place of disappearing myth. But they are thrown far ahead of 
their time, because they only gain the attention of their contemporaries very slowly” (KSA 7: 19 
[17]).888 Like comets, these men are precipitated outside themselves and beyond their time. They 
follow the path of excentricity, and their immediate failure as reformers—after the fashion of 
Empedocles and, indeed, of Hölderlin, constitutes at the same time their greatest power. For they 
are destined to be misunderstood by the human beings, submerged in metaphysics, who surround 
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them. It is by thrusting themselves outside of history that they  open wide the possibility of a new 
history, of a new life liberated from metaphysics, in which art and science collaborate to reveal 
the sacrificial movement of the long tragedy of time. 
 These philosophers are heroes because they are self-generative, because their plastic 
force affirms itself in the face of the lawful lawlessness according to which their world functions. 
To the masses, they appear to be random, to be wandering in want of any direction but in truth, 
they  live according to a natural law that they  themselves bring into being by  their self-
engendering—this law, of the highest metaphysical strength, must be sacrificed in accordance 
with their downgoing. The genius who miraculously  issues out of the mire of a time not his own, 
a barbarian time ruled and pervaded by  philistines, is destined to be destroyed by this time, 
precisely because he is a bridge to a future time, a time unknown, and because he contains within 
him the fire of the great life-force of both the past and the time to come. Thus he must sacrifice 
himself so as to come into being as this bridge. Indeed, this sacrifice is destined to be 
misunderstood by his people—the philosopher as tragic hero is destined to fail in giving rise to a 
newly harmonious whole—this too is his tragedy—and yet! It is in this very  failure that his 
power lies—for the significance of this sacrifice is to be grasped by a time to come, the portent 
of the death of metaphysics, of the return of becoming to the temporal rhythm of the body. 
 Nietzsche opposes to Hartmann’s philosophy “our doctrine that consciousness is 
promoted and developed only by ever loftier illusions.” This doctrine of illusion as the material 
of life is not, however, one of progress, but rather, Nietzsche believes that our illusions have 
become greatly impoverished since the age of the Greeks: “our illusions are more inferior and 
more vulgar than theirs.” “We” are thus, if anything, in a process of regression, beginning in the 
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time of the Greeks, and yet illusion is inescapable—it is vital, binding force; the very stuff of life 
and its movement. Modern man lives in a “twilight atmosphere”889—the task of untimeliness is 
to resist this twilight, overcome it into dawn, to transform from “latecomers” into “forerunners” 
by “creating new generations.”890  There is no eternity, and likewise, there is no teleological 
unfolding—rather, all hinges upon the force of the illusions we are capable of producing. For 
“illusions are the only expression for an unknown state of affairs” (KSA 7: 29 [52]).891 Thus, in 
another fragment, Nietzsche writes: 
Truth as a cloak for completely different impulses and drives.
The pathos of truth is related to belief.
The drive for lies fundamental.
Truth is unknowable. Everything knowable semblance. Significance of art as truthful 
semblance.         
      KSA 7: 29 [20]892
At stake in the new history is precisely the possibility of this truthful semblance—the creation of 
art as, at once, the creation of new truths, truths understood to be illusions and hence lies, but 
which nonetheless carry the force to bind a people together—to affirm its culture as a dissonant 
harmony, a paradoxically  fragmentary  whole. The tragic hero is, perhaps, the highest 
manifestation of the “pathos of truth” together with the “drive for lies”—that is, the most 
supreme  and sovereign work of art.
 Since there is no absolute point of origin—no beginning of cosmic time, there can be no 
return in an identical sense; rather, any return, in the absence of origin, would necessarily 
articulate its difference with the past cosmic movement, and because it would be washed over 
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with the waters of Lethe, it could never reach, by any measure, the point from which it took off
—the configuration of life, between the primordial and the manifest, would have already 
infinitely changed, beyond itself. Origin—Ursprung—conceived as primordial becoming, which 
must be drawn into the consonance of the present through a procedure of anamnesis—is thus, 
rather, the space of transformation—of a primordial experience that must be recreated at every 
turn in an untimely fashion—that is, in accordance and in disaccord—in dissonant consonance 
with the time to which it belongs. The actual finds refuge in this reversal of origin—hence, the 
whole army of truths that follows in an excentric movement must transform itself as well in the 
aftermath of a transfigured force—a transfigured nature of which this army is the manifestation. 
As an alternative, a true path, against both progress, which is a philistine idea hingeing on 
modern pathos, and the eternal return of the same, Nietzsche advances this other temporal 
movement of rhythmic, tragic becoming, between art  and nature, which returns every time to a 
different origin.
  Time itself is the metamorphosis of origin, and this origin does not find itself at the 
beginning of life and time (αἰών), but rather pervades it and arises as the shift from one form of 
becoming to another. In “The Rhine,” Hölderlin wrote: “Ein Rätsel ist Reinentsprungenes”—“An 
enigma are those of pure origin.” And then: “Even song may hardly unveil it.”893 To penetrate 
into this enigma, this riddle, as Oedipus, the suffering human being solves the riddle of the 
human being posed to him by the monstrous sphinx—this requires at once the recreation of that 
origin, that purity, in a new sense. This is itself the beginning of tragic knowledge—the excessive 
self-consciousness, rising into universality, which necessitates the hero’s downgoing. Origin is 
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liberated by Nietzsche from its function as cause—just as Heraclitus denied any end to the game 
of the cosmic child, just as Empedocles had refused to admit of the purposiveness of time and 
motion. The tragic philosopher, in this light, has as his great task to embody the timelessness, the 
dream of eternity that his people hangs onto as a myth which renders the suffering of life 
possible, and, in sacrificing himself, to sacrifice this metaphysical myth as well to the foundation 
of a new culture. Let us not forget the philosopher’s injunction: “You should not flee into some 
metaphysics, rather, you should actively sacrifice yourself for the emerging culture [euch der  w 
e r d e n d e n  K u l t u r  thätig opfern]!” (KSA 7: 19 [154]).894
Sacrifice of the Last Philosopher
 While for Hölderlin, the transition from twilight to dawn accomplished by  the self-
sacrifice of the tragic hero is brought about by  means of a tragic dialectics, for Nietzsche it is of 
another nature, and rather than bringing joy through mourning, it brings life-affirmation through 
Dionysian suffering, precisely because life itself is suffering—is the constant, tragic sacrifice of 
one self to give rise to the next, through the temporal fragmentation of the subject and the return 
to the Dionysian instinct, the instinct  toward the embrace of life through pain, the purificatory 
experience of being-torn-to-shreds in tragedy. In the world of individuation, as we have seen, it  is 
an individual, a hero possessing monstrous wisdom—whose wisdom is so great that it is tragic—
who must undergo the tragic fate of Dionysus, and, for Nietzsche, it is his task, as the last 
philosopher, to bring about, with his self-sacrifice, the death of the very timelessness, the relic of 
ancient mythic metaphysics that he lives within. For tragic knowledge is specifically  defined by 
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Nietzsche as the knowledge that metaphysics is no longer possible. To bring this knowledge to a 
people, that it may found a new culture, which shall at once be a new nature, requires a self-
sacrifice and a deliverance into fragmentary time, time no longer conceived in metaphysical 
terms, as an a priori condition of experience, or as the motion of a teleological world-process, 
but a discontinuous time of which all inner forces—and first of all the plastische Kraft—are 
functions. To become timeless out of the flux of becoming and then to die as timelessness itself
—that is fate of the philosopher as tragic hero. Nietzsche writes, in a fragment of 1871: 
“Intention of Nature to come to perfection. The genius is, from this perspective, timeless 
[zeitlos]. The goal is ever reached” (KSA 7: 18 [3]). The perfection of nature by the creation of a 
new culture, hence, depends on the timelessness of the genius—this genius is, indeed, the 
necessary component, the axis of this natural-cultural creation.
 Nietzsche follows, at least to a certain extent, the vision of the philosopher as tragic hero 
that Hölderlin had sketched in his Ground of Empedocles as well as Schopenhauer’s conception 
of the genius as the individualization of the universal will. In a fragment of 1872, Nietzsche 
writes of the “philosophical genius” that “he has nothing to do with the the chance political 
situation of a people; on the contrary, in comparison with his nation [Volk] he is timeless 
[zeitlos].” Nietzsche then insists that this genius is by  no means attached to his people by  chance, 
but rather that, of absolute necessity, “what is specific in this people comes to light here as an 
individual: the drive of the people becomes a universal drive, applied to solving the riddle of the 
universe.” He finishes the note with the following declaration: “The philosopher is a means for 
coming to rest in the rushing current” (KSA 7: 19 [16]).895 The tragic hero is thus necessary and 
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universal, yet, again, only  in the sense and the degree in which he embodies and manifests the 
drives, the specific rhythm of his people; again, Nietzsche’s metaphysical, Schopenhauerean 
instinct is tempered by his philological conception of history and of culture as incommensurably 
different at different times, in different places, and of the human body as infinitely changeable. 
There is a “teleology of the philosophical genius” (KSA 7: 19 [16])896 that Nietzsche calls it his 
“task” to comprehend and, therefrom, to bring about. This teleology, then, is the modern remnant 
of the Greek µοίρα which, in ancient tragedy, constituted the power to which the hero had to 
freely subjugate himself and thus sacrifice himself, in order to restore the harmony of his people 
with the divine. It  is as a timeless being—in whom time, in other words, = 0—as a creature that 
provides rest from the ceaseless torrent of becoming, preparing a new world to come into being 
“with one strike” that the hero must sacrifice himself, in order to thrust his people into an 
affirmation of their suffering, to change the strength of the forces that form the rhythm of their 
becoming.
 Because, in the Nietzschean-Heraclitean becoming, every moment brings with it a new 
self, such that the previous moment and the previous self must be sacrificed in the onrush of 
temporality, time itself is tragic. It  is, indeed, a series of self-sacrifices between which no 
continuity  of subject can be drawn, extending into infinite futurity. The past, therefore, is 
irredeemable, irrecuperable, except by means of a mythical process of anamnesis, which is a 
conjuring into the present, itself mythical, of origin. In the absence, however, of such a force of 
magic—in the absence of a ground of metaphysics to call back the past—thus, from the 
perspective of temporal atomism, the past sacrificed selves remain inaccessible. The tragic hero, 
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by his excess of self-consciousness, accepts these sacrifices as his own, takes responsibility for 
them and, in his tragic song of downgoing, performs this sacrifice in as an absolute event. This 
sacrifice itself is the very self-sacrifice of metaphysics—the sacrifice of all hope of redemption, 
precisely as a timeless archetype of that hope. Thereby does he mark the difference between the 
old and the new. It is for this reason that the tragic hero becomes timeless precisely  as the 
untimely embodiment of his world. He contains within himself the primordial memory of the 
Greeks, of the whole history of metaphysics—it is as the timeless retainer of this history that he, 
the most conscious of men—so conscious that he becomes multiple—sacrifices himself. He 
sacrifices himself, indeed, as the last philosopher and the last human being—as the absolute 
metaphysical subject.
 Schopenhauer had defined the genius not only by his excess of knowledge, but also by 
the fact that his intellect is the master of his will: its very origin. He writes: “genius consists in 
the knowing faculty  having received a considerably  more powerful development than is required 
by the service of the will, for which alone it  originally  came into being. […] Genius, therefore, 
consists in an abnormal excess of intellect that can find its use only by being employed on the 
universal of existence. In this way it  then applies itself to the service of the whole human race, 
just as does the normal intellect to that of the individual.”897  We recall that this is precisely 
Schopenhauer’s formula of the tragic—the mastery of will by the intellect it  produces, which 
results in the will, represented by  the characters in tragic drama, being torn to pieces and 
dialectically  sublating itself in order to give rise to a new world—indeed, to a new nature, after 
the fashion of tragic sacrifice. And it  is indeed this nature of the genius—that his knowledge—his 
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propensity  to discover the solution to the enigma of the universe—that lends him his instinct 
toward self-sacrifice. In his third Untimely Meditation, “Schopenhauer as Educator,” Nietzsche 
names this instinct as the third great danger that  threatens the philosophical genius from within. 
This danger he calls by the name of “moral and intellectual hardening.” Out of his inescapable 
“fate of solitude,” the genius “breaks the bond that linked him to the ideal” and, in dejection, the 
“uniqueness of his nature” having become “an individual, isolated atom,” resolves himself to 
sacrifice. He is, in other words, in the manner of Hölderlin and Kleist, “destroyed through his 
uniqueness,” and “he can perish through his self as he can by sacrificing himself [im Aufgeben 
seiner selbst]”—therefore, Nietzsche writes, “living means, in short, to live in danger.”898 It is 
from the “peaks of tragic contemplation”899 that the courage of the genius—the philosopher who 
embodies the grace and curse of his age—in other words, whose actual existence contains within 
it the infinity of possibilities for the future “culture,” conceived as a “new and improved physis,” 
as Nietzsche had prophesized it to be at the close of the second Untimely,900 must show itself and 
prepare the hero for his self-sacrifice. After his rejection of Schopenhauerean metaphysics, the 
possibility of the philosopher’s attainment of universality is cast into obscurity, for Nietzsche. 
This is the question that will ceaselessly occupy him for the rest of his philosophical life.
 Nietzsche had again invoked the vision of the tragic hero as the figure who brings about 
the dialectical transition from decline to salvation in The Birth of Tragedy, speaking of Sophocles
—the only truly tragic tragedian:
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Sophocles understood the most sorrowful figure of the Greek stage, the unfortunate 
Oedipus, as the noble human being who, in spite of his wisdom, is destined to error and 
misery  but who eventually, through his tremendous suffering, spreads a magical power of 
blessing that remains effective even beyond his decease. The noble human being does not 
sin, the profound poet wants to tell us: though every  law, every natural order, even the 
moral world may  perish through his actions, his actions also produce a higher magical 
circle of effects which found a new world on the ruins of the old one that has been 
overthrown. That is what the poet wants to say  insofar as he is at the same time a 
religious thinker. As a poet he first  shows us a marvelously  tied knot  of a trial, slowly 
unraveled by  the judge, bit by  bit, for his own undoing. The genuinely  Hellenic delight at 
this dialectical solution [dialektischen Lösung] is so great that it introduces a trait of 
superior cheerfulness into a whole work, everywhere softening the sharp points of the 
gruesome presuppositions of this process.901
Through the process of the Nietzschean anamnesis, this transition, however, is once again 
transfigured. And it is perhaps as a tragic hero, identifying himself melodically with his own last 
philosopher—the modern Oedipus—that  Nietzsche takes on the role of receiving the temporal 
withdrawal of the Greek ideal, of delivering it into the flux of his becoming, incommensurable 
and absolutely different, that Nietzsche transforms the role and the significance of tragic 
sacrifice. For that his task is to push metaphysics off into the abyss he stands before is no secret
—yet perhaps, the knotted heart of an enigma.
 Standing at the midpoint between art and nature, between the mortal and the divine, like 
Hölderlin’s Empedocles, and made monstrous by the excess of his self-knowledge, the 
Nietzschean hero must thus sacrifice himself to bring about a new world. This vision of tragic 
self-sacrifice, out of the “terrible loneliness” that fills the heart of the “last  philosopher” and 
plunges him in “oblivion” (KSA 7: 19 [126])902  thus follows the dialectic of sacrifice, of 
dissolution in becoming that teleologically  brings about the commencement that Hölderlin and 
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Hegel had theorized, and yet his very sacrifice, for Nietzsche is also the sacrifice of the dialectic 
as such, ending excetrically in the fragmentation of the subject, who no longer possesses the 
capacity that  he had for Hegel to become the absolute. Because this sacrifice, for Nietzsche, 
essentially  fails in its attempt to restore absolute harmony, the very  power of the tragic hero’s 
self-sacrifice is that it  displays the ultimate, inevitable failure of the dialectic. Hence the tragic 
philosopher—the last philosopher—tragically travels an excentric path. As a comet shooting 
across a sky of fading stars, he brings about the necessity of an affirmation of this failure—the 
plunging into tragic becoming of his people and of the very culture that  his death announces. For 
it is only by the voluntary dissolution of joyful consonance back into dissonance that this 
dissonance itself, bearing the traces of Heraclitus’ war and Empedocles’ strife, may  become for a 
future culture the very  primordial source of joy. Culture itself, then—tragic culture, capable of 
this affirmation of life in the tragedy of becoming, in a transfigured temporality composed of 
dissonant atoms, beyond the sphere of the subject, tied indissolubly to the dream of a saving god
—requires in its soul the death of metaphysics. It is the infidelity of the modern demigod, his 
disappearance into the darkly gold and volcanic, excentric sphere of Zagreus, that is the portent 
guaranteeing the arrival of this absolute surpassing. The hero’s vertigo is ours—at the mouth of 
the abyss into a mortal future, filled with the tremors of monstrous uncertainty, the promise of 
community  unveils itself—the supreme birth of fragmentary truth as the manifestation of 
transformed drives, the ancient issuing from the new and binding fragmentary creatures, divested 
of eternity, in a newly  Dionysian rhythm of song and dance, illuminated once more by a red and 
rising dawn.
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Coda
 And yet, the demand remains, out of the mouth of Nietzsche’s Oedipus, for a sacrifice of 
the human being—of humanity  itself—to be brought  about by the last of the human beings, the 
tragic hero himself. 
 In Nietzsche’s drafts for a tragic drama of Empedocles, written in 1870 and doubtless 
inspired by Hölderlin, he transforms the self-sacrifice of Empedocles into the demand for a 
sacrifice of the entire Agrigentian people, befallen by plague. In one outline for this unwritten 
work, we read: “He [Empedocles] resolves while at a funeral ceremony to annihilate his people, 
in order to free them from their misery” (KSA 7: 5 [116]).903 In another of these outlines we find 
written: “He resolves to annihilate his people, because he has seen that they  cannot be healed. 
The people are gathered around the crater: he grows mad, and before he vanishes proclaims the 
truth of rebirth. A friend dies with him” (KSA 7: 5 [118]).904 This madness also mirrors the fate 
of Hölderlin, the modern tragic hero, whose failure resounds incessantly in Nietzsche’s heart. 
This plague just might be an allegory for metaphysics itself. For, in the same fragment, he writes: 
“Departure from religion, through the insight that it is deception” (KSA 7: 5 [118]).905 The bridge 
between Nietzsche and Hölderlin comes gracefully to light through the lucidity of this mad 
Empedocles in his intention to self-sacrifice, to put to death the myths of a twilight world, 
bringing about a new world purified of illusion and bathed in the rays of a future Heraclitean sun. 
Yet Nietzsche surpasses his predecessor by this leap from the self-sacrificing hero to the self-
sacrificing nation. To free a people utterly from the myth of the human being, which turns it 
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against life incurably, would require the self-sacrifice not only of a man, but of a whole people, a 
whole culture—the entire mass of those who call themselves “human.”
  In his Daybreak (Morgenröthe) of 1881, Nietzsche would propose, in an aphorism 
entitled “A tragic end for knowledge,” this “one tremendous idea,” by whose force “every  other 
endeavor” would be “thrown down”—“the idea of self-sacrificing mankind [s i c h  o p f e r n d e 
n  M e n s c h h e i t]” in the name of attaining “the knowledge of truth [… .]”906 This truth, a 
truth beyond all metaphysical truths, outside the solar systems of myth in which men hide 
themselves, would require the most tragic “drive to knowledge” of all. For humanity to sacrifice 
itself to truth as a work of art—“with the light of an anticipatory wisdom in its eyes”—this 
would be, paradoxically, the highest affirmation of life. This idea, moreover, would present the 
unification of the young Nietzsche’s instincts to art and to philosophy and, in the same strike, the 
most hyperbolic proposition for the overcoming of Schopenhauer’s metaphysical determination 
of the genius as universal. And yet  the means to this self-sacrifice of humanity, for Nietzsche, 
remain unthinkable: 
Perhaps, if one day an alliance has been established with the inhabitants of other stars for 
the purpose of knowledge, and knowledge has been communicated from star to star for a 
few millennia: perhaps enthusiasm for knowledge may then rise to such a high water 
mark!907
Perhaps it  is the very task of the self-sacrificing philosopher as comet to ignite the fire of this 
future drive to the truth, to prepare for the tragic downgoing of humanity itself.
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trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), § 45, 31.
907 Nietzsche, Daybreak, § 45, 31.
Bibliography
Abrams, M.H. Natural Supernaturalism: Tradition and Revolution in Romantic Literature. 
Oxford: OUP, 1971.
Aristotle. The Physics. Trans. Francis M. Cornford. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957.
Arnim, Bettina von. Die Günderode. Leipzig: Insel Verlag, 1983.
Asmis, Elizabeth. Epicurus’ Scientific Method. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982.
Barker, Andrew. “Music and Perception: A Study in Aristoxenus.” Journal of Hellenic Studies 
(1978) 98: 9-16.
---., ed. Greek Musical Writings: Volume 2, Harmonic and Acoustic Theory. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989.
Benjamin, Walter. The Origin of German Tragic Drama. Trans. John Osborn. London: NLB, 
1977.
Blanchot, Maurice. The Work of Fire. Trans. Charlotte Mandell. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1995.
Burckhardt, Jacob. The Greeks and Greek Civilization. Ed. Oswyn Murray. Trans. Sheila Stern. 
New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1999.
Cassirer, Ernst. Das Erkenntnisproblem. Darmstadt: Wissenchaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1974.
Colli, Giorgio. Après Nietzsche. Trans. Pascal Gabellone. Paris, Éditions de l’éclat, 1987.
---. Écrits sur Nietzsche. Trans. Patricia Farazzi. Paris: Éditions de l’éclat, 1996.
---. La Naissance de la philosophie, Trans. Patricia Farazzi. Paris: Éditions de l’éclat, 2004.
---. La sagesse grecque. Ed. and trans. Patricia Farazzi. Combas: Éditions de l’éclat, 1992.
Clark, Timothy. The Theory of Inspiration. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997.
Czolbe, H. Entstehung des Selbstbewusstseins. Eine Antwort an Herrn Professor Lotze. Leipzig: 
H. Constenoble, 1856.
D’Iorio, Paolo. “The Eternal Return: Genesis and Interpretation.” Trans. Frank Chouraqui, from 
Fr. “Nietzsche et l‘éternel retour. Genèse et interprétation,” in Nietzsche. Cahiers de l’Herne. 
340
Paris: l‘Herne, 2000: 361-389, and its expansion in “Cosmologia e filosofia do eterno retorno em 
Nietzsche.” Trans. Ernani Chaves and Rosistera Pereira de Oliveira in Scarlett Marton (éd.), 
Nietzsche pensador Mediterrâneo. A recepção italiana, ed. by Scarlett Marton. São Paulo: 
Discurso Editorial, 2007.
---. Le Voyage de Nietzsche à Sorrente. Paris: CNRS éditions, 2012.
De Man, Paul. “Keats and Hölderlin,” Comparative Literature, Vol. 8, No. 1. (Winter, 1956), 
28-45.
Eckermann, Johann Peter. Conversations of Goethe. Ed. J.K. Moorhead. Trans. John Oxenford. 
Cambridge: Da Capo, 1998.
Ellissen, O. A. Friedrich Albert Lange: Eine Lebensbeschreibung, Wohlfeile Ausgabe. Leipzig: 
Julius Baedeker, 1894.
Emerson, Ralph Waldo. Nature and Selected Essays. Ed. Larzer Ziff. Penguin Books: New York, 
1982.
Fichte, J. G. Science of Knowledge. Trans. Peter Heath and John Lachs. New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts, 1970.
Foucault, Michel. “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History.” The Foucault Reader. Ed. Paul Rainbow. 
New York: Pantheon Books, 1984, 76-100.
Freeman, Kathleen, trans. Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers: A complete translation of the 
Fragments in Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. Oxford: Alden Press, 1948.
Gerber, Douglas E., ed. and trans. Greek Iambic Poetry from the seventh to the fifth centuries BC. 
Cambridge: Loeb Classical Library, 1999.
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von. Theory of Colours. Trans. Charles Lock Eastlake. Cambridge, 
London: M.I.T. Press, 1970.
---. Werke. Weimar, 1907.
Gosetti-Ferencei, Jennifer Anna. Heidegger, Hölderlin, and the Subject of Poetic Language: 
Toward a New Poetics of Dasein. New York: Fordham University Press, 2004.
Hartmann, Eduard von. Philosophie des Unbewussten. Versuch einer Weltanschauung. Berlin, 
Carl Duncker‘s Verlag, 1869.
341
Helmholtz, Hermann von. Philosophische Vorträge und Aufsätze. Ed. H. Hörz and S. Wollgast. 
Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1971.
---. Science and Culture: Popular and Philosophical Essays. Ed. David Cahan. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1995.
Hölderlin, Friedrich. The Death of Empedocles. Trans. David Farrell Krell. Albany: SUNY Press, 
2008.
---. Essays and Letters on Theory. Ed. and trans. Thomas Pfau. Albany: SUNY Press, 1988.
--. Essays and Letters. Ed. and trans. Jeremy Adler and Charlie Louth. London: Penguin Books, 
2009.
---. Hölderlin’s Sophocles: Oedipus and Antigone. Trans. David Constantine. Newcastle upon 
Tyne: Bloodaxe, 2001.
---. Hymns and Fragments. Trans. Richard Sieburth. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.
---. Hyperion. Trans. Ross Benjamin. New York: Archipelago Books, 2008.
---. Poems and Fragments. Ed. and trans. Michael Hamburger. London: Anvil Press, 1994.
---. Selected Verse. Ed. and trans. Michael Hamburger. London: Anvil Press, 1986.
---. Sämtliche Werke: Grosse Stuttgarter Ausgabe. Ed. F. Beissner and A. Beck. Stuttgart: Cotta, 
1943-1985.
---. Sämtlische Werke und Briefe. Ed. Franz Zinkernagel. Leipzig: Insel Verlag, 1915.
Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Ed. Eric Steinberg. Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing, 1977.
---. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Ed. Nelson Pike. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970.
Inwood, Brad, ed. and trans. The Poem of Empedocles. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2001.
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. P. Guyer and A. W. Wood. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998.
--. Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics. Trans. Thomas 
Kingsmill Abbott. London: Longman’s, Green & co., 1879.
342
---. Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens. Trans. Ian Johnston. Arlington: Richer 
Resources Publications, 2008.
Klossowski, Pierre. Nietzsche et le cercle vicieux. Paris: Mercure de France, 1969.
Krell, David Farrell. Postponements: Woman, Sensuality and Death in Nietzsche. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1986.
---. The Tragic Absolute: German Idealism and the Languishing of God. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2005.
Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe. L’imitation des Modernes (Typographies 2). Paris: Éditions Galilée, 
1986.
---. Typography: Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics. Ed. Christopher Fynsk. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1998.
Lange, F. A. Geschichte des Materialismus und Kritik seiner Bedeutung in der Gegenwart. 
Iserlohn: J. Baedeker, 1873-1875.
---. History of Materialism. Trans. Ernest Chester Thomas. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, 
Trübner, & co., 1892.
Leopardi, Giacomo. Selected Poems. Ed. Anne Paolucci. Trans. Thomas G. Bergin and Anne 
Paolucci. Smyrna, Delaware: Griffon, 2003.
Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim. Laocoon: An Essay on the Limits of Painting and Poetry. Trans. E. 
C. Beasley. London: Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans, 1853.
Long, A. A. and David Sedley, eds. The Hellenistic Philosophers. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987.
Miller, Elaine P. “Harnessing Dionysos: Nietzsche on Rhythm, Time, and Restraint.” Journal of 
Nietzsche Studies, No. 17 (Spring 1999), 1-32.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Birth of Tragedy and The Case of Wagner. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. 
Toronto: Random House, 1967.
---. Correspondance de Nietzsche, 1869-1874. Ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari. Trans. 
Jean Bréjoux and Maurice de Gandillac. Paris: Gallimard, 1986.
343
---. Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality. Ed. Maudemarie Clark and Brian Leiter. 
Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
---. Digitale Faksimile Gesamtausgabe (DFGA). Ed. Paolo D’Iorio. Paris: Nietzsche Source, 
2009. http://www.nietzschesource.org/eKGWB.
---. The Dionysian Worldview. Trans. Claudia Crawford. Journal of Nietzsche Studies, No. 13, 
Nietzsche and German Literature (Spring 1997), 81-97.
---. Homer and Classical Philology. The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, Vol. 3. Ed. 
Oscar Levy. Trans. J.M. Kennedy. London: J. N. Foulis, 1910. http://www.gutenberg.org/files/
18188/18188-h/18188-h.htm.
---. Human, All too Human: A Book for Free Spirits. Trans. Marion Faber and Stephen Lehmann. 
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996.
---. Introduction aux leçons sur l’Œdipe-Roi de Sophocle et introduction aux études de philologie 
classique. Trans. Françoise Dastur and Michel Haar. Paris: Encre marine, 1994.
---. Kritische Gesamtausgabe (KGW). Berlin: de Gruyter, 1967.
---. Kritische Studienausgabe (KSA). Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980.
---. “On the Genealogy of Morality” and Other Writings. Ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson. Trans. Carol 
Diethe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
---. On The Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Random 
House, 1989.
---. On the Theory of Quantitative Rhythm. Ed. and trans. James W. Halporn. Arion, Vol. 6, No. 2 
(Summer, 1967), 233-243.
---. The Greek Music Drama. Trans. Paul Bishop. New York: Contra Mundum Press, 2013.
---. Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks. Trans. Marianne Cowan. Lanham: Regenery 
Publishing, 1962.
---. Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the early 1870’s. Ed. Daniel 
Breazeale. Humanity Books, 1990.
---. Les philosophes préplatoniciens. Ed. Paolo D’Iorio. Trans. Nathalie Ferrand. Paris: Éditions 
de l’éclat, 1994.
344
---. The Pre-Platonic Philosophers. Ed. and trans. Greg Whitlock. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2006.
---. Selected Letters. Ed. and trans. Christopher Middleton. Chicago: University  of Chicago 
Press, 1969. 
---. Thoughts out of Season. Trans. Adrian Collins. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1911.
---. Unpublished Writings from the Period of Untimely Observations. Trans. Richard T. Gray. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995.
---. Unmodern Observations. Ed. and trans. William Arrowsmith. New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1990.
---. The Will to Power. Ed. Walter Kaufmann. Trans. R.J. Hollingdale and Walter Kaufmann. 
New York: Vintage Books, 1968.
---. Writings from the Early Notebooks. Ed. Raymond Geuss. Trans. Ladislaus Löb. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009.
Nisetch, Frank J., trans. Pindar’s Victory Odes. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1980.
Opitz, Martin. Prosodia Germanica, Oder Buch von der Deudschen Poeterey. Frankfurt a.M., 
n.d. [ca 1650].
Porter, James I. Nietzsche and the Philology of the Future. Stanford: Stanford University  Press, 
2000.
Plitt, Gustav, ed. Aus Schellings Leben. Leipzig: S. Hirzel Verlag, 1869.
Rist, Johann. Die Aller Edelste Belustigung Kunst- und Tugendiebender Gemühter [April-
gespräch]. Frankfurt, 1666.
Rohde, Erwin. Psyche: The Cult of Souls and the Belief in Immortality among the Greeks. Trans. 
W. K. C. Guthrie. Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 1925.
Rosenweig, Franz. Der Stern der Erlösung. Frankfurt am Maim, 1921.
Safranski, Rüdiger. Nietzsche. Trans. Shelley Frisch. New York-London: W. W. Norton & Co., 
2002.
345
Schelling, F.W.J. Hauptwerke der Philosophie in originalgetreun Neudrucken. Leipzig: F. Müller 
Verlag, 1914.
---. The Philosophy of Art. Trans. Douglas W. Stott. Minneapolis: University  of Minneapolis 
Press, 1989. 
--. The Unconditional in Human Knowledge: Four Early Essays, 1794-1796. Trans. Fritz Marti. 
Lewisberg: Bucknell University Press, 1980.
---. Werke. Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta, 1856-1861.
Schiller, Friedrich. Essays. Ed. Walter Hinderer and Daniel O. Dahlstrom. Trans. Daniel O. 
Dahlstrom, Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L. A. Willoughby. New York: Continuum, 1993.
Schopenhauer, Arthur. Essays of Arthur Schopenhauer. Trans. T. Bailey Saunders. New York: 
A.L. Burnt Company.
---. Der handschriftliche Nachlaß. Ed. Arthur Hübscher. Frankfurt: W. Kramer, 1966-1967.
--. Philosophical Writings. Ed. Wolfgang Schirmacher. Trans. Virginia Cutrufelli. New York: 
Continuum, 1998.
---. World as Will and Representation. Trans. E.F.J. Payne. New York: Dover, 1958.
---. World as Will and Idea. Trans. R.B. Haldane and J. Kemp. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, 
Trübner & co., 1909.
Small, Robin. “Nietzsche, Spir, and Time,” Journal of the History of Philosophy, 1994, 32.1: 
85-108.
Spir, Afrikan. Denken und Wirklichkeit. Leipzig: J.G. Findel, 1873.
Szondi, Peter. An Essay on the Tragic. Trans. Paul Fleming. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2002.
Winckelmann, Johann Joachim. Gedanken über die Nachahmung der griechischen Werke in der 
Malerei und Bildhauerkunst. Gebr. Henninger, 1885.
Zeller, Eduard. Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy. Trans. Sarah Frances Alleyne and 
Evelyn Abbott. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1890.
Zöllner, Friedrich. Über die Natur der Kometen. Beiträge zur Geschichte und Theorie der 
Erkenntniss. Leipzig: Leipzig Verlag, 1872.
346
